Kiddushin 67b — the Talmud in English

And

every place

in the latter clause: to include a convert who married a mamzeret, since the Mishna holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, that a convert is forbidden to a mamzeret, and the child follows the defective one, in accordance with the second rule.

But if you say

that our Mishna is according to the method of

Rabbi Yosei,

and you cannot include in “every place” of the latter clause a convert who marries a mamzeret, for there is no transgression in his case and he does not belong to this rule, then this is difficult for you:

This works well for

“every place”

of the first clause:

to include

as we said,

namely, an Israelite who married a ḥalala; and if the halakha is like Rabba bar bar Ḥana, also to include an Egyptian who married an Egyptian.

And this works well for

“which is this”

of the first clause: to exclude

as we said,

namely, an Egyptian with an Egyptian, if the halakha is like Rav Dimi, and to exclude nations who converted.

But

“every place”

of the latter clause—

with regard to “there is kiddushin and there is a transgression, the child follows the defective one”—

what does it come to include?

What has it come to include?! It is not reasonable that the expressions of inclusion and exclusion in the first clause come to include and exclude, whereas the expression of inclusion in the latter clause does not come to include anything?!

And we answer by way of a question:

and according to your reasoning,

even according to the interpretation you are striving to give our Mishna, that it is Rabbi Yehuda’s, it is also difficult:

According to Rabbi Yehuda,

“which is this”

in the latter clause—why do I need it?!

What does the expression of exclusion in the latter clause come to exclude? Just as this expression in the first clause comes to exclude?!

Rather,

you must also say:

since he taught in the first clause

“which is this,”

therefore

he also taught

in the

latter clause

“which is this.”

And if so,

so too,

according to my method, by which I interpret the Mishna as being according to Rabbi Yosei, it is not difficult: Why did we teach “every place” in the latter clause, although it does not come to include anything? Because

since he taught in the first clause

“every place,”

therefore

he also taught

in the

latter clause

“every place.”

The body of the matter: When Ravin came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Among the nations, follow the male; once they converted, follow the defective one of the two.

The Gemara asks:

What

does “among the nations, follow the male”

mean—that is, in what matter do we follow the male before they converted, and from where is it derived?

And we explain that the practical difference concerns the matter of what we were commanded regarding the seven nations in the Land of Israel: “You shall not keep alive any soul.” Rabbi Yoḥanan came to teach that if one of the child’s parents is from the seven nations and the other is not from the seven nations, follow the male—

and

as it was taught

that this is the law, and the source of the law is explained:

From where do we know regarding

a gentile

one of

the other

nations

who is not from the seven nations in the Land of Israel, regarding whom we were commanded, “You shall not keep alive any soul,”

who had relations with a

gentile woman, the

Canaanite

who is from the seven nations regarding whom we were commanded, “You shall not keep alive any soul,”

and fathered

from her

a son whom you are permitted to purchase as a slave—that is, he is not considered a Canaanite, and you are permitted to let him live, and if you wish, take him as a slave, since he follows his father.

That is, the child is not considered a Canaanite, and you are permitted to let him live; and if you wish, you may acquire him as a slave, since he follows his father.

When a man marries a woman from another place, it is customary for the man to be exiled after his wife to the place where she lives, whereas the woman is not exiled after her husband, for it is the way of a man to be exiled, but not of a woman.

The verse therefore says: “Your male slave and your female slave who will be yours from the nations that surround you [and not from the nations in your land, regarding whom you were commanded: ‘You shall not keep alive any soul’] from them you shall purchase a male slave and a female slave. [And not only from the other nations who did not become intermingled in marriage with the seven nations shall you purchase a male slave and a female slave, but]”

“And your male and female slaves that you shall have from the nations around you [and not from the nations in your land, concerning whom you were commanded: ‘You shall not spare the life of any soul’]. From them you shall acquire a male slave and a female slave. [And not only from the other nations who had not intermarried with the seven nations shall you acquire a male slave and a female slave, but]”

“and also from the sons of the residents who dwell with you”

[that is, also from the sons of other nations who became intermingled with the seven nations through marriage and came to dwell with you in the land of Canaan]

from them you shall purchase,

and from their families [of the sons of those residents] who are with you, whom they fathered in your land.”

Could it even be a Canaanite who had relations with one of

the other

nations and fathered a son whom you are permitted to purchase as a slave,

because we follow the mother?

The verse therefore says: “And from their families who are with you,

“And from their families who are with you,

whom

they fathered

in your land.”

The Torah permitted only

from

those born

in your land,

in the place where their mother lives,

and not from

those who dwell

in your land,

whose mother is not from this land, but gave birth to him in the place where she lives, and the son came to dwell in the land; and presumably the Torah prohibited those born in another land only when their father is a Canaanite, who followed his wife and there she gave birth.

We further explain what we said:

“Once they converted, follow the defective one of the two.”

In what case?

That is, who are the two peoples who converted and married one another, both of whom are defective, and Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches that the children follow the more defective one among them?

If you say it is with

a convert,

an Egyptian who married

a convert,

an Ammonite woman

[who is permitted], and we follow the defective one, the Egyptian, to forbid his children until the third generation, because the Torah said: “For them, follow their disqualification.”

It is impossible to say so, for the language of the teaching is: “Follow the defective one of the two,” implying that both the father’s side and the mother’s side are defective, except that one is more defective, and we follow him; whereas with an Egyptian who married an Ammonite woman,

what

“defect”

is there

on the mother’s side?! Since

the Ammonite

the Torah prohibited

but not the Ammonite woman.

Rather, it is with

a convert,

an Ammonite who married

a female convert,

an Egyptian

in the first generation, for he and she are defective, and we follow the defective one of the two; and therefore:

And if this one is male

[the child],

she casts him after him

[place him after his father]—for he is more defective than the Egyptian woman, since he is forbidden forever—and the child too will be forbidden forever.

And if it is female

[the child],

she casts her after her

[place her after her mother], and she will be a second-generation Egyptian woman, to prohibit her, and do not judge her as an Ammonite woman, to permit her “because it is an Ammonite and not an Ammonite woman.” We learned in the Mishna:

Anyone

[for whom]

she has no kiddushin with him,

but she has kiddushin with others, the child is a mamzer; and who is this? This is one who has relations with one of all the forbidden relations in the Torah:

And we explain:

From where are these words derived

that kiddushin does not take effect with any of all the forbidden relations in the Torah:

For Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, and some attribute it in the name of Rabbi Yannai

—that is: Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said this teaching in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, and Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba added that there are those who attribute this teaching to Rabbi Yannai, and not to Rabbi Yohanan—

And Rav Aha, son of Rava, said:

They did not attribute this teaching to Rabbi Yannai; rather,

they attributed it to Rabbi Yose the Galilean:

From here we learn that kiddushin does not take effect with forbidden relations, because

the verse says: “

And he shall write for her a scroll of severance and place it in her hand,

and she shall leave his house and go and become

[married]

to another man” —

And for this reason the verse added and said “to another man,” and did not say “to a man,” in order to teach us: She shall become and be married

to another,

and she shall become and be married

not to relatives.

may she become and become betrothed.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection against this:

But say:

Perhaps this is what the verse said: “She shall become

to another”

and

not to a son

of her husband who divorced her, for she is forbidden to him because of “his father’s wife”; but the Torah did not exclude her from the other relatives!?

And we answer: The verse cannot exclude the son, for

a son is explicitly written concerning him

that kiddushin does not take effect for him with his father’s wife, for the verse says: “

A man shall not take his father’s wife,”

and since the verse said “shall not take,” we learn that kiddushin does not take effect with her, for “taking” is kiddushin—

And if so,

“another”

why do I need it!?

Rather, necessarily,

infer from it: to others and

also

not to

the other

relatives,

and the exclusion is not only of the son.

And we still ask:

But say: both this and that,

perhaps both the verse “shall not take” and the verse “another” come to teach

the

taking effect of

the son’s

kiddushin with his father’s wife!? And concerning what is difficult for you—why do I need two verses—say to you:

This—“shall not take”—comes to teach that

не должен брать” — учит, что

initially

he shall not take her; that is, the verse does not come to say that kiddushin does not take effect, but it is a warning that he should not take her,

and this—“to another and not to a son”—

к другому, но не к сыну” —

teaches that even

after the fact

the kiddushin did not take effect; but we still do not know from where that with the other relatives as well there is no kiddushin with their female relatives!?

And we answer: Necessarily, the verse “shall not take,” which is stated concerning a father’s wife, for whom he is liable for execution by a court, was not stated only as a warning, but to teach that even after the fact the kiddushin did not take effect, for concerning the prohibition of

initially,

the verse did not need to state it, since

it is derived from a wife’s sister,

concerning whom the verse said, “And a woman to her sister you shall not take,” which implies a warning not to betroth her; and through a kal va-chomer we can learn that a father’s wife too is included in this warning, for:

Just as a wife’s sister,

who is only

liable for excision,

the Torah said: “

You shall not betroth,”

a father’s wife, who is also among

those liable for execution by a court, all the more so

should she be forbidden to him through taking.

And if so, the verse “shall not take,” stated concerning a father’s wife, comes to teach us that even after the fact kiddushin does not take effect, and “to another” is again superfluous in order to teach “to another and not to the other relatives,” for regarding the son we have already heard this, both initially and after the fact.

And the Gemara raises another difficulty against the derivation from “to another,” which comes to exclude all relatives from the taking effect of kiddushin:

But say: this and this [“

you shall not take,” stated concerning a wife’s sister]

and this [“to another and not to relatives”] are only

to another, but not to relatives,”] refer only

with regard to a wife’s sister

and not with regard to the other relatives, and

this—“

you shall not take”—is

initially [as a warning concerning kiddushin],

as a warning concerning kiddushin ],

and this—“to another and not to relatives”—is

to another, but not to relatives”—

after the fact,

meaning that kiddushin does not take effect with a wife’s sister even after the fact, but we have not heard this concerning the other relatives.

That is: Since the Torah made known to us the prohibition of kiddushin with a wife’s sister, something it did not make known to us concerning the other relatives, we must say that the exclusion “to another and not to relatives” also comes only for a wife’s sister. The Torah needed this exclusion to teach us that even after the fact kiddushin does not take effect with a wife’s sister; but concerning the other relatives, from where do we know that kiddushin does not take effect!? And we answer:

Indeed so,

that from “to another” one can derive only the case of a wife’s sister. And the Gemara returns to its question:

We have found a wife’s sister—

that kiddushin does not take effect with her—but

from where do we derive the other forbidden relations

that kiddushin does not take effect with them!?

And we answer:

We derive

all the forbidden relations with whom kiddushin does not take effect

from a wife’s sister

through a binyan av [“by what we find”]:

Just as a wife’s sister is distinctive in that she is a forbidden relation, and one is liable for excision for her intentional transgression and for a sin-offering for her unintentional transgression, and kiddushin does not take effect with her; so too, any woman who is a forbidden relation, and one is liable for excision for her intentional transgression and for a sin-offering for her unintentional transgression, kiddushin does not take effect with her.

Just as a wife’s sister is distinctive in that she is a forbidden relation, and one is liable for her intentionally with karet and for her unintentionally with a sin-offering, and kiddushin do not take effect with her; so too, with every forbidden relation for which one is liable intentionally with karet and unintentionally with a sin-offering, kiddushin do not take effect.

And we still ask:

Granted, all of them,

the forbidden relations indeed

come [they can be included],

from this binyan av—

But a married woman and a brother’s wife

—it is impossible to derive them from a wife’s sister, and from where do we know that kiddushin does not take effect with them? For

there is room to refute: What is distinctive about a wife’s sister

—that kiddushin does not take effect with her—

is that she has no permitted case in the place of a mitzva,

that is: Even when his wife’s sister was married to his deceased brother and left no sons, and there is a mitzva of yibbum through his brother, nevertheless the Torah did not permit the prohibition of a wife’s sister on account of the mitzva of yibbum.

Can you say this concerning a brother’s wife, who has a permitted case in the place of a mitzva

, for the Torah permitted the prohibition of a brother’s wife when the deceased has no sons?

And

a married woman too can be refuted

so as not to include her through a wife’s sister:

What is distinctive about these—

that is: What is distinctive about a wife’s sister—

is that she has no permitted case during the lifetime of the one who forbids her,

for even if he divorced his wife [who forbids her sister to him], her sister nevertheless remains forbidden to him, since the Torah permitted a wife’s sister only after the sister’s death—

Can you say this concerning a married woman, who has a permitted case during the lifetime of the one who forbids her,

during the lifetime of the one who forbids her,

for if the husband divorced her [the one who forbids his wife], even though he is still alive, his wife is permitted.

If so, from where do we know that eshet ach and eshet ish do not have kiddushin take effect with them!?

Rather, Rabbi Yona said—and some say that it was Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua—

Do not derive the other forbidden relations from a wife's sister by establishing a general principle from that case. Rather, derive it as follows:

The verse states

at the end of the section concerning the forbidden relations, which includes a brother's wife and a married woman as well: “For

everyone who commits any of these abominations shall be cut off,”

which shows that

all the forbidden relations were equated with a wife's sister,

because all the forbidden relations are included in this verse. And we learn:

Just as betrothal does not take effect with a wife's sister

[as we derive from the phrases “Do not take” and “afterward,” indicating that betrothal does not take effect with her either initially or after the fact],

so too, with all the forbidden relations, betrothal does not take effect.

They raise an objection to this:

If so,

since we learned that betrothal does not take effect with all the forbidden relations because they were equated with a wife's sister: