Kiddushin 67b (סז:) — the Talmud in English

And

every place

in the latter clause: to include a convert who married a mamzeret, since the Mishna follows Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a convert is forbidden to a mamzeret, and the child follows the more defective lineage, in accordance with the second rule.

But if you say

that our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Yosei,

and you cannot include in “every place” in the latter clause a convert who marries a mamzeret, since no transgression is involved in that case and it does not belong to this rule, then the following difficulty arises:

That works for

“every place”

in the first clause:

to include

as we said,

namely, an Israelite who married a halala; and if the halakha is in accordance with Rabba bar bar Ḥana, it also comes to include an Egyptian who married an Egyptian.

And that works for

“which is this”

in the first clause: to exclude

as we said,

namely, an Egyptian who married an Egyptian, if the halakha is in accordance with Rav Dimi, and to exclude nations that converted.

But

“every place”

in the latter clause—

with regard to the rule that where there is betrothal and there is a transgression, the child follows the more defective lineage—

what does it come to include?

[What does it come to include?] And it is not reasonable that the expressions of inclusion and exclusion in the first clause come to include and exclude, whereas the expression of inclusion in the latter clause comes to include nothing at all!?

And we answer by way of a rhetorical question:

But according to your reasoning,

even according to the interpretation you are attempting to give our Mishna, that it follows Rabbi Yehuda, the same difficulty arises:

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

“which is this”

in the latter clause—why do I need it!?

What does the expression of exclusion in the latter clause come to exclude? Just as this expression in the first clause comes to exclude, so too it should have a function here!?

Rather,

you must necessarily say as well:

Since the tanna taught in the first clause

“which is this,”

therefore

he also taught

in the

latter clause

“which is this.”

And if so,

here too,

according to my approach, in which I interpret the Mishna as following Rabbi Yosei, there is no difficulty: Why did we state “every place” in the latter clause, although it comes to include nothing? Because

since the tanna taught in the first clause:

“every place,”

therefore

he also taught

in the

latter clause

“every place.”

The body of the matter: When Ravin came, he said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Among the nations, follow the male; once they converted, follow the more defective lineage of the two.

The Gemara asks:

What

does “among the nations, follow the male”

mean? That is to say: In what regard do we follow the male before they converted, and from where is this derived?

And we explain that the practical difference concerns the commandment given with regard to the seven nations in Eretz Yisrael: “You shall not allow any soul to live.” Rabbi Yohanan teaches that if one of the child’s parents belongs to the seven nations and the other does not, one follows the male—

and

as it was taught

that this is indeed the law, and this is the source of the law:

From where

is it derived that a gentile

from among

the other

nations

who is not one of the seven nations of Eretz Yisrael, concerning whom we were commanded, “You shall not allow any soul to live,”

who has intercourse with a

gentile woman who is

Canaanite

and belongs to the seven nations concerning whom we were commanded, “You shall not allow any soul to live,”

and fathers

a child with her,

a son whom you are permitted to purchase as a slave? That is, he is not considered a Canaanite, and you are permitted to let him live; and if you wish, you may acquire him as a slave, since he follows his father.

That is, the child is not considered a Canaanite, and you are permitted to let him live; and if you wish, you may acquire him as a slave, since he follows his father.

When a man marries a woman from another place, it is customary for the man to follow his wife to the place where she lives, whereas the woman does not follow her husband, since a man’s way is to go into exile, but not a woman’s.

The verse states:

“And your male and female slaves who will be yours from the nations around you [but not from the nations in your land, concerning whom you were commanded: ‘You shall not allow any soul to live’], from them you shall buy a slave and a maidservant. [And not only from the other nations that have not intermarried with the seven nations may you buy a slave and a maidservant, but]

also from the children of the resident aliens who dwell with you

[that is, even from the children of other nations who intermarried with the seven nations and came to dwell with you in the land of Canaan,]

from them you shall buy, and from their families [the families of those resident aliens] who are with you, whom they fathered in your land.”

“and from their families [the families of those residents] who are with you, who have begotten children in your land.”

Could it also include a Canaanite who has intercourse with one of the

other

nations and fathers a son whom you are permitted to purchase as a slave,

since we follow the mother?

The verse states:

“And from their families who are with you,

whom

they fathered

in your land.”

The Torah permitted this only

from

those born

in your land,

in the place where their mother lives,

and not from

those dwelling

in your land,

whose mother is not from this land, but gave birth to him in the place where she lives, and the son came to dwell in the land. Presumably, the Torah prohibited those born in another land only when their father is Canaanite and followed his wife, and she gave birth there.

We further explain what we said:

“Once they converted, follow the more defective lineage of the two.”

In what case?

That is to say: Which are the two peoples who converted and married one another, both of whom have a defective lineage, and Rabbi Yohanan teaches that the children follow the more defective of the two?

If we say it concerns

a

second-generation Egyptian convert who married

an

Ammonite female convert

[who is permitted], and the child follows the more defective lineage, namely the Egyptian one, making his children prohibited until the third generation, because the Torah said: “With regard to them, follow their disqualification.”

This cannot be said, since the wording of the tradition is “follow the more defective lineage of the two,” implying that both the father’s side and the mother’s side are defective, except that one is more defective, and the child follows it. But with regard to an Egyptian who married an Ammonite woman,

what

defect

is there

on the mother’s side?! Since the Torah prohibited

an Ammonite male

but permitted

an Ammonite female.

Rather, it concerns

a

Ammonite male who married

a female convert who was

a first-generation Egyptian, both he and she having defective lineage, and the child follows the more defective of the two. Therefore:

in the first generation, for he and she are defective, and we follow the defective one of the two; and therefore:

And if this child is male

[the child],

cast him after his father

[follow him after the father]—for the father has a more defective lineage than the Egyptian woman, since he is prohibited forever—and the child will likewise be prohibited forever.

And if it is female

[the child],

cast her after her mother

[follow her after the mother], and she will be a second-generation Egyptian woman, making her prohibited; do not treat her as an Ammonite woman and permit her “because the Torah prohibited an Ammonite male but not an Ammonite female.” We learned in the Mishna:

Anyone

[who]

for whom he cannot effect betrothal,

but for whom she can effect betrothal with others, the child is a mamzer. And who is this? This is one who has intercourse with any of the forbidden relations mentioned in the Torah:

And we explain:

From where are these matters derived

that kiddushin do not take effect with any of the forbidden relations in the Torah:

As Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, and some attribute it in the name of Rabbi Yannai;

that is: Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said this teaching in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, and Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba added that there are those who attribute this teaching to Rabbi Yannai, and not to Rabbi Yohanan—

And Rav Aha, son of Rava, said:

They did not attribute this teaching to Rabbi Yannai; rather,

some attribute it to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

From here we learn that kiddushin do not take effect with forbidden relations, because

the verse says: “

And he writes for her a scroll of severance and places it in her hand,

and she leaves his house and goes and becomes [

shall become betrothed ]

to another man.” —

Therefore, the verse added the phrase “to another man,” rather than saying merely “to a man,” in order to teach us:

To another

she may become and become betrothed,

but not to relatives

may she become and become betrothed.

Rabbi Abba challenged this:

But say—

perhaps this is what the verse said: “

To another”

she may become

but not to the son

of the husband who divorced her, for she is forbidden to him because she is his “father’s wife”; but the Torah did not exclude her from the other relatives!?

And we answer: It is impossible for the verse to exclude the son, since

the son is explicitly written with regard to it:

that kiddushin do not take effect for him with his father’s wife, for the verse says: “

A man shall not take his father’s wife,”

and since the verse says “shall not take,” we learn that kiddushin do not take effect with her, for “taking” refers to kiddushin—

And if so, “

another”

why do I need it!?

Rather, necessarily,

infer from it: For others and

also

not for

the other

relatives,

and the exclusion is not limited to the son.

We nevertheless ask:

But say that both one and the other

perhaps both the verse “shall not take” and the verse “another” come to teach

about

the kiddushin of

the son

with his father’s wife!? And as for your difficulty—why do I need two verses?—I can say:

This—“shall not take”—comes to teach that

initially

he shall not take her; that is, the verse is not saying that kiddushin do not take effect, but rather that there is a prohibition against taking her,

and this—“to another but not to the son”— —

teaches that even

after the fact

the kiddushin do not take effect; but from where do we know that kiddushin with the other relatives also do not take effect!?

And we answer: Necessarily, the verse “shall not take,” stated with regard to a father’s wife, for which he is subject to a court-imposed death penalty, was not stated merely as a prohibition, but to teach that even after the fact the kiddushin do not take effect. For with regard to the prohibition

initially,

the verse did not need to state it, since

it can be derived from a wife’s sister,

concerning whom the verse says: “And a woman and her sister you shall not take,” which implies a prohibition against betrothing her; and by means of a kal va-chomer we can learn that a father’s wife is likewise included in this prohibition, for:

Just as a wife’s sister,

who is subject only

to karet,

the Torah says: “

You shall not betroth,”

so a father’s wife, who is also among

those subject to a court-imposed death penalty, certainly

is forbidden to him through “taking.”

If so, the verse “shall not take,” stated with regard to a father’s wife, comes to teach us that even after the fact kiddushin do not take effect; and the word “another” is again superfluous, in order to teach “to another but not to the other relatives,” since we already know this with regard to the son, both initially and after the fact.

The Gemara raises another objection to the derivation from “another,” that it excludes all relatives from the effectiveness of kiddushin:

But say that both one [“

You shall not take,” stated with regard to a wife’s sister]

and the other [“

to another but not to relatives”] are only

with regard to a wife’s sister

and not with regard to the other relatives, and

this—“

you shall not take”—is

initially [

as a warning concerning kiddushin ],

and this—“

to another but not to relatives”—is

after the fact,

meaning that kiddushin do not take effect with a wife’s sister even after the fact, but we have not learned this with regard to the other relatives.

That is: Since the Torah made known to us the prohibition against kiddushin with a wife’s sister, but did not make it known to us with regard to the other relatives, we should say that the exclusion “to another but not to relatives” also applies only to a wife’s sister. The Torah needed this exclusion to teach that even after the fact kiddushin do not take effect with a wife’s sister; but from where do we know that kiddushin do not take effect with the other relatives? And we answer:

Indeed,

it is true that from “another” we can derive only the case of a wife’s sister. The Gemara returns to its question:

We have found a wife’s sister—

that kiddushin do not take effect with her—but

from where do we know regarding the other forbidden relations

that kiddushin do not take effect with them!?

And we answer:

We derive

that kiddushin do not take effect with all the forbidden relations

from a wife’s sister,

by a binyan av [“

what we find”]:

Just as a wife’s sister is distinctive in that she is a forbidden relation, and one is liable for her intentionally with karet and for her unintentionally with a sin-offering, and kiddushin do not take effect with her; so too, with every forbidden relation for which one is liable intentionally with karet and unintentionally with a sin-offering, kiddushin do not take effect.

We nevertheless ask:

Granted, all the

forbidden relations indeed

can be derived [

can be included ] from this binyan av—

But a married woman and a brother’s wife

cannot be derived from a wife’s sister, and from where do we know that kiddushin do not take effect with them? For

there is room to refute: What is true of a wife’s sister

—that kiddushin do not take effect with her—

is that she has no permitted case even when there is a mitzva, meaning that even when his wife’s sister was married to his deceased brother, who left no children, and there is a mitzva of yibbum through the brother, the Torah nevertheless did not permit the prohibition against a wife’s sister because of the mitzva of yibbum.

That is: Even when his wife’s sister was married to his deceased brother, who left no children, so that there is a mitzva for the brother to perform yibbum with her, the Torah nevertheless did not permit the prohibition against a wife’s sister on account of the mitzva of yibbum.

Can you say the same regarding a brother’s wife, who has a permitted case when there is a mitzva?

The Torah permitted the prohibition against a brother’s wife when the deceased has no children.

And

a married woman likewise has room for a refutation

that she should not be included from a wife’s sister:

What is true of these—

that is, what is true of a wife’s sister—

is that she has no permitted case during the lifetime of the one who causes their prohibition,

for even if he divorced his wife [who is the one who renders her sister forbidden to him], her sister remains forbidden to him, since the Torah permitted a wife’s sister only after the sister’s death—

Can you say the same regarding a married woman, who has a permitted case during the lifetime of the one who causes her prohibition,

the one who causes her prohibition,

for if the husband divorced her [the husband being the one who renders his wife forbidden], then although he is still alive, his wife is permitted.

In "Avnei Melo'im," siman 44, paragraph 4, he cites from the words of the "P'nei Yehoshua," which is clarified from his words, that regarding a married woman, besides that kiddushin do not take hold in her like other ervayot, there is yet another reason that kiddushin should not take hold — namely, that one kiddushin does not attach after another; for once the first kiddushin takes hold, she is in his possession, and she has no hand to accept kiddushin from another. And the "Avnei Melo'im" wrote concerning him that our question escaped him, that they objected on a married woman, whence is it that kiddushin do not take hold, and they were forced into casuistic reasoning, and they did not say that kiddushin do not take hold in her on the basis of the "P'nei Yehoshua"!? And in "Chazon Ish" [brought in Likutim Hendamach] he wrote that so, too, is plain to him that there are no kiddushin in her because she is acquired to another, except that this does not cause the child to be a mamzer, but rather that the non-taking of the kiddushin is because of ervah [see there], and apparently the Gemara properly asks, From where is it that kiddushin do not take hold in her because of ervah?; And see also in "Divrei Yechezkel," siman 56, letter d. And if so, from where do we derive that a brother's wife and a married woman — kiddushin do not take hold in them!?

Rather — said Rabbi Yona, and some say Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

Do not learn the other ervayot from "a sister of a woman" by binyan av; rather learn thus:

The verse says

at the end of the section of the ervayot, which includes also a brother's wife and a married woman: "for

all who do any of these abominations shall be cut off,

therefore that

all the ervayot were analogized to 'a sister of a woman',

for all the ervayot are included in this verse, and it teaches us:

From 'a sister of a woman': 'kiddushin do not take hold in her'

(and as we derive from "lo tikach" and "le'achar" that whether originally or retroactively kiddushin do not take hold in her)

Thus: even all the ervayot — kiddushin do not take hold in them.

And we raise an objection on it:

And we raise an objection on it: If so,

that because by the analogy of all the ervayot to 'a sister of a woman', we have learned that kiddushin do not take hold in them.