Kiddushin 60a (ס.) — the Talmud in English

And another came and said to her:

“Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after ten days.”

And it follows that the time of the last one precedes the time of the second one, and the time of the second one precedes the time of the first one.

The status of this woman is that

from

the

first and from

the

last she must

receive

a get,

so that she will be able to marry others; alternatively, she may receive a get from one of the two, and then she will be able to marry the other.

However,

from

the

middle one she does not need

to receive

a get.

For,

in either event,

whether we say that the expression “from now and after thirty days” is interpreted as a condition, or whether we say that this expression is interpreted as a retraction, she is not betrothed to the second one.

For

if it is a condition,

that is, if you interpret his intention as betrothing her “from now,” on the condition that he wishes these betrothals to take effect “after thirty days,” the betrothal

of the first one

is

a betrothal, the betrothals

of

these

[of the second and third ones]

are not betrothals,

since she was initially betrothed to the first one.

And

if it is a retraction,

meaning that after saying “from now” he retracted and said: “I do not want the betrothals to take effect now, but only after thirty days,” the betrothal

of the latter

is

a betrothal: the betrothals

of

these

[of the first and second ones]

are not betrothals,

because the betrothal of the last one took effect after ten days, and when the betrothals of the first and second ones would come to take effect after twenty or thirty days, they could not take effect, since she was already betrothed to the third one.

And we raise an objection:

Is it obvious!?

What innovation is there in Abaye’s statement!?

And we explain:

Lest you say

[that is, lest you say]: The fact that we are uncertain whether it is a condition or a retraction is because

this expression

has two meanings:

it implies a condition and it implies a retraction,

that is, sometimes the betrothed man’s intention is a “condition,” and sometimes his intention is a “retraction.”

And

if so,

she should require

[she should need]

a get from each and every one,

because it is possible that the first one intended a condition, in which case his betrothal is valid; and it is possible that the first one intended to retract, while the second one intended a condition, in which case she is betrothed to the second one; and it is also possible that the first two intended to retract and betroth her at a later time, in which case she is betrothed to the third one. Therefore, due to the uncertainty, she should have to receive a get from all of them.

It teaches us

that this is not so, for this expression has only one meaning, either a condition or a retraction, and we are uncertain what its true meaning is. Therefore, she must receive a get from the first one, lest this was a condition and the first one’s betrothal is valid; and she must likewise receive a get from the last one, lest this was a “retraction” and the last one’s betrothal is valid. But she does not need a get from the middle one.

Ulla said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan:

This woman is not in a state of uncertainty as to whom she is betrothed. Rather,

even one hundred

men who betrothed her in this manner,

take hold of her

with the status of certainty and not with the status of uncertainty.

And Rabbi Asi likewise said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Even one hundred take hold of her.

And he proceeds to explain it:

Rav Mesharsheya, son of Rav Ami, said

to Rabbi Asi: I will explain to you the reason for Rabbi Yohanan’s ruling

[I will explain to you the reason for Rabbi Yohanan’s ruling]:

For they made themselves

[Rashi]

like bricks in a wall, where each one and each one leaves space for the other.

That is, like a row in a brick wall, where each brick in the row does not stand directly upon the brick beneath it, but rather part of it rests upon one brick in the first row and part upon its neighbor, leaving in each one enough space to place upon it another part of an additional brick.

Thus, each and every one of the men who betrothed her found an available place and time for betrothal, and all of them took hold of her. Therefore, this woman is certainly forbidden to all of them, each one because of the portion belonging to the other.

Rav Hanina raised an objection

[he challenged]

Rav Hanina

against Rabbi Yohanan’s statement from a Mishna in Gittin 72a:

A. One who dies without children and has a brother: His wife must undergo yibbum with her husband’s brother, and she may not marry a stranger, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 25:6]: “When brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the dead shall not be married outside to a stranger; [rather,] her yavam shall come upon her and take her to himself as a wife and perform yibbum with her.”

B. If the yavam does not perform yibbum with his brother’s wife, the yevama removes the yavam’s shoe before a court, and she is permitted to marry anyone.

C. A woman who received a get, and afterward her husband died, may marry a stranger without chalitza, but she is forbidden to her deceased husband’s brother by the prohibition of “a brother’s wife.”

One who gives a get to his wife and says to her: “Behold, you are divorced

from today and after death.”

This is

a get and not a get,

that is, these are divorces of uncertain status.

And if he dies

without children, she cannot undergo yibbum with his brother, lest she is a “divorcee” and forbidden to the yavam by the prohibition of a brother’s wife; nor may she marry a stranger, lest she is not a “divorcee” but a “widow.” Therefore,

she performs chalitza

due to the uncertainty,

but does not undergo yibbum.

Granted, according to Rav,

who holds that it is uncertain whether he intended a condition or a retraction, this Mishna

supports him

[supports Rav’s statement], for it is clear from the Mishna that it is uncertain whether his intention was a condition or a retraction.

And

for Shmuel as well

there is no difficulty, for one can say:

This is the view of the Rabbis

[this Mishna follows the view of the Sages],

but we state our ruling in accordance with Rabbi

who disagrees with the Sages and holds that it is a condition and not a retraction.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says:

One who betroths a woman “from now and after thirty days”

has reserved part of the betrothal,

that is, at present only a reserved betrothal takes effect, since it is not completed until after thirty days:

If so, when one divorces his wife and says to her: “Behold, you are divorced from today and after death,” the divorce began from today, but is not completed, and

any get that reserves part

and does not completely sever the bond between the husband and wife

is nothing,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 24:1]: “And he gives her a scroll of severance, and he places it in her hand, and he sends her from his house.” Thus, divorce requires “severance” and disconnection between the man and his wife, and partial divorce is not “severance.” And if so, the difficulty arises against Rabbi Yohanan: Why does she perform chalitza but not undergo yibbum? She is not divorced at all, and

the yavam

also

performs yibbum

[the deceased man’s brother can perform yibbum with his brother’s wife]!?

Rava said

[answered]

Rava:

Since a

get

comes

to remove

the woman from her husband,

and death

also comes

to remove

her from him, one can say that the beginning of the divorce and death combine, and

what the get reserved, death completed

and completed it, or

it

was completed by

death.

A. The Rashba wrote in the name of the Raavad: Although severance is required in a get in order to permit her, since he reserved nothing in her except for what would remain until after death, from now she is forbidden to the yavam, even though this get lacks the power to permit her. See also Ramban, who wrote that from now she left her husband’s authority, and although the divorce was not yet completed, nevertheless the law of yibbum no longer applies to her. [Their answer does not work well according to Tosafot’s understanding of Rashi’s view, because if divorce “from today and after thirty days” does not take effect since “today” contains a reservation in the divorce, what benefit can death provide?] The Rashba concluded in the name of the Raavad: This is not a satisfactory explanation, but since Abaye came and refuted it, we have no need to analyze it further. In Mekaneh it is written that Rava holds that since the Torah mentions two means— a get and death—the same law applies when part is effected by a get and part by death. See there concerning the dispute between Abaye and Rava. B. Minchat Yehuda wrote that it is evident from here that the severance required need not be effected specifically through the get; it suffices that she is permitted and does not remain bound in marriage.

He said

[asked]

Abaye to him:

It is impossible to combine them with one another, for

are they comparable

[they are not comparable to one another]?

A get removes her from the authority of the yavam,

for if her husband divorced her and died without children, she is forbidden to the yavam.

Whereas

death brings

her

in

to

the authority of the yavam,

because the death causes the yavam to be required to perform yibbum with his brother’s wife. Death cannot combine with and complete what the get reserved, since they are not comparable to one another!?

Rather, Abaye said

[answered]

Abaye:

Indeed, by Torah law, if he divorced his wife “from today and after death,” she is not divorced at all, and she is permitted to the yavam, in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan.

And regarding what we say

there

that she performs chalitza but does not undergo yibbum,

what is the reason? It is a rabbinic decree

of the Sages,

because of

one who says to his wife: “This is your get

from today if I die,”

for

this is a get

completely valid.

For if you say that when he says “from today and after death” she does not require chalitza, people will say that even when he says “from today if I die,” she is permitted without chalitza. Therefore, the Sages decreed that even when he says “from today and after death,” she must perform chalitza.

And

we challenge this: If we are concerned that people will err and equate “from today if I die” with “from today and after death,” then

let us decree

with regard to one who says

“from today if I die”

that she perform chalitza, lest people equate it with

“from today and after death,”

so that they will not say: Just as when he said “from today if I die” she does not require chalitza, so too, when he said “from today and after death” she will not require chalitza, and they will come to permit a yevama to a stranger without chalitza!?

And we answer: It is impossible to establish that in the case of “from today if I die” she should perform chalitza, because

if you say that she performs chalitza

[that she should perform chalitza], then she

will undergo yibbum,

for people will say: From the fact that the Sages required her to perform chalitza, it can be inferred that she is not divorced and is permitted to undergo yibbum; yet in truth she is a “divorcee” and forbidden to her husband’s brother by the prohibition of karet.

And we refute this:

Here too,

in the case of one who says to her “from today and after death,” she should not perform chalitza, because

if you say that she performs chalitza,

then she

will undergo yibbum,

yet you have prohibited her from undergoing yibbum!?

And we answer:

“She should enter levirate marriage, and there is nothing wrong with that”,

meaning, even if she errs and enters levirate marriage, it is not such a severe prohibition, because by Torah law she is permitted to enter levirate marriage. They did not say “she may not enter levirate marriage” as a matter of law, but rather

it is merely a rabbinic concern

alone

that

arises from a decree in one case because of “from today if I die.”

But when he says, “from today if I die,” it is impossible to tell her to perform halitza because of the case of “from today and after death,” lest she enter levirate marriage, for she is prohibited from entering levirate marriage by Torah law.

Mishna:

A man may betroth a woman on condition, and if he does so and the condition is not fulfilled, she is not betrothed.

One who says to a woman:

“Behold, you are betrothed to me

with a peruta,

on condition

that

I give you two hundred zuz”,

she is betrothed

to him

and he shall give

that is, if he indeed fulfills the condition, she is betrothed to him.

One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me, with a peruta,

on condition that I give you

two hundred zuz

from now until thirty days”

[within thirty days], if he

gives her

the money

within thirty

days, she is

betrothed, but if not

[if he gives it to her after thirty days],

she is not betrothed,

because the condition was not fulfilled.

One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on condition that I have two hundred zuz”,

she is betrothed, and he has them

[if he indeed has them].

One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on condition that I show

you

two hundred zuz”,

she is betrothed, and he shall show her

[if he indeed showed her] two hundred zuz. His intention was that she see money belonging to him, but if he showed her money belonging to others, the condition was not fulfilled.

But if

he was a money changer and

showed

her two hundred zuz

on the table, she is not betrothed,

since the money did not belong to him.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that I give you two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed and he shall give them to her.

It was stated: Rav Huna said: “And he shall give”

when he wishes, and she is betrothed retroactively from the time of the betrothal.

Rav Yehuda said:

She is not betrothed retroactively, but only

when he gives

[from the time he gives the money onward].

And we explain:

Rav Huna said: “And he shall give”,

because “on condition that I give you two hundred zuz”

is a condition; he fulfills the condition and proceeds.

[It is merely a condition, and it is sufficient that the condition be fulfilled.]

Rav Yehuda said: “When he gives”,

because his intention was

that when he gives, the betrothal takes effect

[that when he gives it to her, the betrothal takes effect], but

at present

[still]

the betrothal has not taken effect.

And we ask:

What is the difference between them,

Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? According to both of them, if he gives the money, she is betrothed, and if he does not give it, she is not betrothed.

And we explain:

There is a difference between them:

For example,

she extended her hand

after the first betrothal, before the condition was fulfilled,

and accepted betrothal from another man.

According to

the view of

Rav Huna,

who maintains that betrothal “on condition that he gives two hundred zuz” takes effect from now, the second betrothal

does not take effect,

because when the first man gives her the money, it becomes clear retroactively that his betrothal took effect at the time he gave her the peruta, before the second man came and betrothed her.

But

according to

the view of

Rav Yehuda,

who maintains that his betrothal is not a betrothal until the condition is fulfilled, the second man’s betrothal preceded the taking effect of the first, and

does take effect

.

And we also learned a similar case with regard to bills of divorce

[we find this law in the Mishna with regard to bills of divorce as well], and Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda also disagree concerning bills of divorce.

And so we learned:

One who says to a woman:

“Behold, this is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz”,

she is divorced, and she shall give.

And

it was stated

concerning it:

Rav Huna said: “And she shall give”

when she wishes, and the divorce takes effect from the time the bill of divorce was given.

And

Rav Yehuda said: “When she gives”

the divorce takes effect, and not from the time the bill of divorce was given.

And we explain:

Rav Huna said: “And she shall give”,

because

it is a condition; she fulfills the condition and proceeds

[it is sufficient for her to fulfill the condition], and then the divorce takes effect retroactively.

Rav Yehuda said: “When she gives”,

because his intention in saying, “on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” should be interpreted as

that when she gives it to him

[when she gives the money],

it is a bill of divorce,

but

at present

[still]

it is not a bill of divorce.