Kiddushin 60a — the Talmud in English

And another man came and said to her:

“You are betrothed to me from now and after ten days.”

It follows that the time designated by the last man is earlier than the time designated by the second man, and the time designated by the second man is earlier than the time designated by the first man.

The status of this woman is that

the

man

first and the

man

last must

receive

a bill of divorce from them, so that she can marry other men. Alternatively, she may receive a bill of divorce from one of the two and then marry the other.

so that she will be able to marry others; alternatively, she may receive a get from one of the two, and then she will be able to marry the other.

However,

the

man

in the middle does not need

to give her

a bill of divorce.

Because,

whichever way one looks at it,

whether we say that the phrase “from now and after thirty days” is understood as a condition, or whether we say that it is understood as a retraction, she is not betrothed to the second man.

For

if it is a condition,

meaning that you interpret his intention as betrothing her “from now,” on the condition that he wishes these betrothals to remain in effect “after thirty days,” then the betrothal

of the first

men

is a betrothal; the betrothals

of

these men

[of the second and third men]

are not betrothals,

since she was initially betrothed to the first man.

And

if it is a retraction,

meaning that after he said “from now,” he retracted and said: “I do not want the betrothal to take effect now, but only after thirty days,” then the betrothal

of the last

man

is a betrothal; the betrothals

of

these men

[of the first and second men]

are not betrothals,

because the last man’s betrothal took effect after ten days, and when the betrothals of the first and second men would take effect after twenty or thirty days, they could not take effect, since she was already betrothed to the third man.

And we raise the question:

Is it not obvious?!

What new point is there in Abaye’s statement?!

And we explain:

Lest you say

[that is, perhaps you would say]: The reason we are uncertain whether this is a condition or a retraction is that

this phrase

has two meanings:

it can mean a condition and it can mean a retraction,

that is, sometimes the betrother’s intention is “a condition,” and sometimes his intention is “a retraction.”

And

if so,

she should require

[that is, she should need]

a bill of divorce from each and every one

of them. For it is possible that the first man intended a condition, in which case his betrothal is valid; and it is possible that the first man intended to retract, while the second man intended a condition, in which case she is betrothed to the second man. It is also possible that both of the first two men intended to retract and to betroth her at a later time, in which case she is betrothed to the third man. Therefore, because of the uncertainty, she should have to receive a bill of divorce from all of them.

This teaches us

that this is not so, because this phrase has only one meaning, either a condition or a retraction, and we are uncertain which meaning is the true one. Therefore, she must receive a bill of divorce from the first man, lest this was a condition and the first man’s betrothal is valid. Likewise, she must receive a bill of divorce from the last man, lest this was a retraction and the last man’s betrothal is valid. But she does not need a bill of divorce from the middle man.

Ulla said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

This woman is not in a state of uncertainty as to whom she is betrothed. Rather,

even a hundred men

who betrothed her in this manner,

have a legal hold on her

with absolute certainty and not merely because of uncertainty.

And Rabbi Asi likewise said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Even a hundred men have a legal hold on her.

And he proceeds to explain this statement:

Rav Mesharsheya, son of Rav Ami, said to Rabbi

Asi: I will explain to you the reason for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling

[I will explain to you the reason for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling]:

They made themselves

[Rashi]

like a row of bricks, in which each one leaves space for the other.

That is, like a row in a brick wall: each brick in the row does not stand entirely on the brick beneath it. Rather, part of it rests on one brick in the lower row and part on the adjacent brick, leaving in each brick enough space for another part of an additional brick to rest upon it.

Thus, each and every one of the men who betrothed her found an available place and time for his betrothal, and all of them acquired a legal hold on her. Therefore, this woman is certainly forbidden to all of them, each because of the portion belonging to the other.

Rav Ḥanina raises an objection

[he challenged]

to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement

from a Mishna in tractate Gittin 72a:

A. If a man dies without children and has a brother, his wife must enter into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother, and she may not marry a stranger, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 25:5]: “When brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the dead shall not marry outside, to a stranger; [rather,] her husband’s brother shall come to her and take her as his wife and perform levirate marriage with her.”

B. If the levir does not perform levirate marriage with his brother’s wife, the woman performs the ritual of chalitza by removing the levir’s shoe before a court, and she is then permitted to marry anyone.

C. A woman who received a bill of divorce and afterward her husband died may marry a stranger without chalitza, but she is forbidden to the dead man’s brother because of the prohibition against marrying one’s brother’s wife.

One who gives a bill of divorce to his wife and says to her: “You are divorced

from today and after my death.”

This is

a bill of divorce and not a bill of divorce,

meaning that the divorce is uncertain.

And if he dies

without children, she may neither enter into levirate marriage with his brother, lest she is a divorcee and therefore forbidden to the levir as his brother’s wife, nor may she marry a stranger, lest she is not a divorcee but a widow. Therefore,

she performs chalitza

because of the uncertainty,

but she does not enter into levirate marriage.

Granted, according to Rav,

who holds that it is uncertain whether he intended a condition or a retraction, this Mishna

supports his view

[supports Rav’s statement], since the Mishna clearly teaches that it is uncertain whether his intention was a condition or a retraction.

And

for Shmuel as well

there is no difficulty, because one can say:

This Mishna is according to the Sages,

[this Mishna follows the view of the Sages],

but we state our ruling in accordance with Rabbi

who disagrees with the Sages and holds that it is a condition and not a retraction.

But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says:

One who betroths a woman “from now and after thirty days,”

has reserved part of the betrothal,

meaning that at present only a reserved betrothal takes effect, since it is not completed until thirty days later—

If so, when one divorces his wife and says to her: “You are divorced from today and after my death,” the divorce began from today but is not completed, and

any bill of divorce that reserves part of the bond

does not completely sever the relationship between the husband and wife

is entirely ineffective,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 24:1]: “And he shall give her a document of severance and place it in her hand, and send her from his house.” Thus, divorce must be a complete severance and separation between the man and his wife, and partial divorce is not a complete severance. If so, this is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan: Why does she perform chalitza but not enter into levirate marriage? She should not be divorced at all, and

the levirate marriage

too

should be performed by the levir

[the dead man’s brother should be able to enter into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife]!

Rava said

[he answered]

: Since a bill of divorce

comes

to remove

the woman

from

her husband,

and death

also comes

to remove

her from him, one can say that the beginning of the divorce and the death combine, and

what the bill of divorce reserved, death completed

and completed it, or

it

was completed by

death.

Abaye said

[he asked]

to him:

It is impossible to combine them with one another, because

are they comparable?

[they are not comparable]:

a bill of divorce removes her from the levir’s control,

since if her husband divorced her and then died without children, she is forbidden to the levir.

Whereas

death brings

the woman

into

the

levir’s control,

because the death causes the levir to be required to enter into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife. Therefore, death cannot combine with and complete what the bill of divorce reserved, since they have opposite effects.!

Rather, Abaye said

[he answered]

:

Indeed, according to Torah law, if a man divorces his wife “from today and after my death,” she is not divorced at all and is permitted to the levir, in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan.

And when we say

there

that she performs chalitza but does not enter into levirate marriage,

what is the reason? It is a decree

of the Sages,

because of

one who says to his wife: “This is your bill of divorce

from today if I die,”

which

is a complete bill of divorce

.

For if you say that when he says “from today and after my death” she does not require chalitza, people will say that even when he says “from today if I die,” she is permitted without chalitza. Therefore, the Sages decreed that even when he says “from today and after my death,” she must perform chalitza.

And

we object: If we are concerned that people will mistakenly equate “from today if I die” with “from today and after my death,” then

let us decree

with regard to one who says

“from today if I die”

that she must perform chalitza, because of

“from today and after my death,”

so that people will not say: Just as when he said “from today if I die” she does not require chalitza, so too, when he said “from today and after my death” she will not require chalitza, and they will come to permit a woman subject to levirate marriage to marry a stranger without chalitza!

And we answer: It is impossible to institute that she perform chalitza in the case of “from today if I die,” because

if you say that she performs chalitza

[that she should perform chalitza], she will

enter into levirate marriage,

because people will say: From the fact that the Sages required her to perform chalitza, it can be inferred that she is not divorced and is permitted to enter into levirate marriage. But in fact she is a divorcee and is forbidden to her husband’s brother by a prohibition punishable by karet.

And we refute this:

Here too,

in the case of one who says to her, “from today and after my death,” she should not perform chalitza, because

if you say that she performs chalitza,

she will

enter into levirate marriage,

yet you have forbidden her from entering into levirate marriage!?

And we answer:

“Let her perform yibbum, and there is nothing in this,”

that is to say, even if she should err and perform yibbum, it is not such a serious prohibition, because by Torah law she is permitted to perform yibbum. And when they said, “she does not perform yibbum,” this was not by law, but rather

a concern of the Sages

alone

it is,

a decree on account of “from today if I die.”

But when he says, “from today if I die,” it is impossible to tell her to perform halitza on account of “from today and after death,” lest she perform yibbum, whereas she is forbidden to perform yibbum by Torah law.

Mishna:

A person is permitted to betroth his wife on a condition, and if he did so and the condition was not fulfilled, she is not betrothed.

“The one who says to a woman”: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me

with a peruta,

on condition” [A0016]that is, on the condition

that is, subject to the condition]

“that I give you two hundred zuz,”

behold, this one is betrothed

to him

and he shall give,

that is to say, if he indeed fulfills the condition, she is betrothed to him.

The one who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me, with a peruta,

on condition that I give you

two hundred zuz

from now until thirty days” [A0029]within thirty days—if he

within thirty days], if he

gave her

the money

within thirty

days, behold, this one is

betrothed, and if not [A0035]if he gave it to her after thirty days,

if he gives it to her after thirty days],

she is not betrothed,

because the condition was not fulfilled.

The one who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on condition that I have two hundred zuz,”

behold, this one is betrothed, and he has them [A0041]if he indeed has them.

if he indeed has it].

The one who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on condition that I show

you

two hundred zuz,”

behold, this one is betrothed, and he will show her [A0047]if he indeed showed her two hundred zuz. And his intention was that she see money of his own; but if he showed her money belonging to others, the condition was not fulfilled.

if he indeed showed her] two hundred zuz. His intention was that she see money belonging to him; but if he showed her money belonging to others, the condition was not fulfilled.

And if

he was a money changer and

showed

her two hundred zuz

on the table, she is not betrothed,

since they are not his.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The one who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that I give you two hundred zuz”—she is betrothed, and he shall give her.

It was stated: Rav Huna said: And he shall give

when he wishes, and she is betrothed retroactively from the time of the kiddushin.

Rav Yehuda said:

She is not betrothed retroactively, but rather

when he gives [A0064]from the time he gives the money and thereafter.

from the time he gives her the money and thereafter].

And we explain:

Rav Huna said: “And he shall give,”

because “on condition that I give you two hundred zuz”

is a condition; he fulfills the condition and proceeds. [A0070]It is merely a condition, and it is sufficient for him that the condition is fulfilled.

It is merely a condition, and it is sufficient that the condition be fulfilled.]

Rav Yehuda said: “When he gives,”

because his intention was

that when he gives, the kiddushin take effect [A0074]that when he gives her, the kiddushin will take effect, but

when he gives it to her, the betrothal takes effect], but

at present, in any event [A0076]still

still]

the kiddushin have not taken effect.

And we ask:

What is the difference between them

between Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? For according to the words of both of them, if he gives the money, she is betrothed, and if he does not give, she is not betrothed.

And we explain:

There is a difference between them:

for example,

she extended her hand

after the first kiddushin, before the condition was fulfilled,

and accepted kiddushin from another.

According to

the view of

Rav Huna,

who holds that kiddushin “on condition that he gives two hundred zuz” take effect from now, the second kiddushin

have not taken effect,

since when the first man gave her the money, it became clear retroactively that his kiddushin had taken effect at the time he gave her the peruta, before the second man came and betrothed her.

But

according to

the view of

Rav Yehuda,

who holds that his kiddushin is not kiddushin until the condition is fulfilled, the second kiddushin preceded the taking effect, and

have taken effect

.

And we likewise learned with regard to bills of divorce in this manner [A0102]also with regard to bills of divorce we find this law, and Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda likewise disagree with regard to bills of divorce.

we find the same law in the Mishna concerning bills of divorce], and Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda also disagree there.

And so we learned:

“The one who says to a woman:

‘Behold, this is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,’”

behold, this one is divorced, and she shall give.

And

it was stated

concerning it:

Rav Huna said: “And she shall give”

when she wishes, and the divorce takes effect from the time of giving the bill of divorce.

And

Rav Yehuda said: “When she gives,”

the divorce takes effect, but not from the time of giving the bill of divorce.

And we explain:

Rav Huna said: “And she shall give,”

because

it is a condition; she fulfills the condition and proceeds [A0119]it is sufficient for us if she fulfills the condition, and then the divorce takes effect retroactively.

it is sufficient if she fulfills the condition], and then the divorce takes effect retroactively.

Rav Yehuda said: “When she gives,”

because his intention in what he said, “on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” must be interpreted as

that when she gives it to him [A0123]when she gives the money

when she gives the money],

it is a bill of divorce,

but

at present, in any event [A0127]still

still]

it is not a bill of divorce.