Kiddushin 59b (נט:) — the Talmud in English

For indeed,

an act removes the status created by an act, and removes the status created by a thought

; that is, through an act, the status of susceptibility to ritual impurity is nullified from the vessel, whether that status took effect through an act or whether it took effect through a thought. But

a thought does not remove the status created by an act, nor the status created by a thought

, because once the status of susceptibility to impurity has descended upon the vessel, a thought does not have the power to remove it.

And now this poses a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Granted

a thought

does not remove the status created by an act

—that is, it does not remove it—because

speech does not come

and nullify

an act.

Rather

, a thought

at least removes the status created by a thought

—that is, at the very least—

it should remove it

, since Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that a thought removes the status created by a thought. Is a thought, with regard to susceptibility to impurity, no better than a woman who received money for betrothal and then retracted?!

And we answer:

The thought concerning

the matter here, with regard to susceptibility to

impurity, is different, for it is considered like an act

; that is, the Torah treats this thought as an act. Therefore, a thought does not remove the status created by a thought, because with regard to impurity the matter is considered as a thought that seeks to remove the status created by an act—and “speech does not nullify an act.”

And this is in accordance with

the words of

Rav Pappa

with regard to the preparation of food for susceptibility to impurity:

Rav Pappa raised a contradiction [that is, he presented conflicting verses]:

[he challenged a contradiction]:

It is written [Leviticus 11:38]: “

[Leviticus 11:38]: “

When water is placed

” [written defectively, as though it said yitten, with a ḥiriq under the yod and a ẓere under the tav] “upon seed, and some of their carcass falls upon it, it is impure for you.” This implies that the person himself places the water, thereby preparing the seed [the food] to contract impurity.

And we read [the qeri is]: “

[the keri is]: “

When water is placed

” [the yod is vocalized with a shuruk and the tav with a pataḥ], implying that even if the water fell upon the seed on its own, it is effective.

How

is the contradiction between the meaning of the ketiv and the meaning of the qeri resolved?!

We require “

when water is placed

in the manner

of ‘when he places

”; that is, from the verse we learn that placing it by hand is not necessary, as the ketiv implies. Rather, even if the liquid fell on its own, the food becomes prepared, provided that the falling of the liquid is similar to placing it by hand.

And in what respect are they to be similar to one another?

Just as

“

he places

” implies:

he is pleased with it [that is, it is his desire]

as regards the liquid, since he placed it intentionally,

so too

‘it is placed’

—the falling of the liquid on its own—

requires that he be pleased with it

. If the liquid fell and the owners did not desire this, the food is not prepared for susceptibility to impurity.

We have therefore learned, concerning the preparation of food for susceptibility to impurity, that the Torah regards his desire for the liquid [“when water is placed”] as though he had performed an act and placed the liquid by hand [“when he places it”].

Likewise, with regard to the status of vessels’ susceptibility to impurity, it may be said that his desire and thought to use the vessels as they are is considered like an act, and it cannot be nullified through a thought.

Rav Zevid taught [that he transmitted]

[he taught]

this teaching

of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish

in connection with [the Mishna cited nearby], and not with the Mishna in our chapter:

[in the context of the Mishna brought below], and not concerning the Mishna in our chapter:

We learned:

And similarly, she [the woman]

[a woman]

who gave permission to her agent to betroth

her,

but then went and betrothed herself

, while the agent also accepted betrothal on her behalf.

If

the betrothal

performed by her preceded that performed by her agent, her betrothal is valid; but if

the betrothal

performed by her agent preceded hers, her betrothal is not valid

, because she is betrothed to the man from whom the agent accepted betrothal, and she cannot then become betrothed to another.

And we are uncertain: A woman appointed an agent to accept betrothal on her behalf, but

did not betroth herself and retracted

from the appointment of the agency—

what

is

its

law?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract [she has the power to retract from the appointment of the agency].

[she has the power to retract from the appointment of the agency].

And Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract.

And we explain:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract,

because

speech comes

of retraction

and nullifies speech

of the appointment of the agency.

Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract

, because Reish Lakish held that

speech does not come and nullify speech.

He raised an objection [that is, he challenged]

[he raised an objection]

Rabbi Yoḥanan challenged Reish Lakish:

One who says to his agent, “Go and separate teruma from my produce,” and

nullified

his agency,

if he nullified it before the agent separated [before the agent separated it],

[before the agent separated],

the sender nullified

the agency,

the agent’s teruma

is not

teruma.

It follows that speech nullifying the agency comes and nullifies the speech of the appointment, which is difficult for Reish Lakish, who says: Speech does not nullify speech.

He said [and answered]

[he answered]

Rava:

This does not refer to a case in which the sender nullified the agency through speech alone. Rather,

here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which the owner of the produce preceded the agent and separated teruma from his produce [the owner of the produce separated teruma before the agent separated it].

[the owner of the produce separated the teruma before the agent separated it].

For it became

the separation

an act

, and an act removes the status created by a thought.

He raised an objection [that is, he challenged]

[he raised an objection]

Reish Lakish

to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

All vessels descend into their state of susceptibility to impurity [they acquire the status of vessels with regard to contracting impurity]

[they acquire the status of a vessel with regard to receiving impurity]

through a thought

that one thought to use them as they are,

but do not ascend from their state of impurity

once they have become impure

except

through damaging the vessel and

through a change effected by an act.

For indeed,

an act removes the status created by an act and the status created by

a thought,

but

a thought does not remove the status created by an act or the status created by a thought.

And now this poses a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Granted,

a thought

does not remove the status created by an act [it does not remove or nullify it],

because

speech does not come and nullify an act; rather

a thought

should at least remove the status created by a thought!?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yoḥanan to Reish Lakish:

The thought concerning impurity is different,

for a thought cannot remove it,

as it is considered like an act [it is considered an “act”].

[it is considered as an “act”].

And this is in accordance with

the statement of

Rav Pappa!

For Rav Pappa raised a contradiction: It is written: “

When he places

,” implying that an act by hand is required,

and we read: “

When it is placed

,” implying that even when the liquid falls on its own, the food becomes prepared to contract impurity!?

How

are the ketiv and the qeri reconciled with one another!? “

When it is placed”

in the manner of “

when he

places”:

just as “

he places”

implies that he is pleased with it,

so

too “

it is placed”

also requires that he be pleased with it.

Thus, his thought and desire concerning the liquid [“when it is placed”] are considered like an act performed by hand [“when he places it”].

Here too, his thought to use the vessel as it is is considered an “act,” and the status of the vessel’s susceptibility to impurity can be removed only through an act.

He raised an objection [that is, he challenged]

[he raised an objection]

Rabbi Yoḥanan challenged Reish Lakish: One who sends a bill of divorce to his wife and encounters the agent [meets the agent]

[meets the agent]

or

the husband

sends another agent after him and says to him: “

The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified”;

it is nullified.

We learn from here that when one sends an agent and then retracts, his agency is nullified.

A refutation of Reish Lakish,

who said, “Speech does not nullify speech,” and that a person cannot retract from appointing an agent!?

And we conclude: Indeed,

a refutation!

And

we rule:

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who said: Speech comes and nullifies speech,

even in the

earlier

language, as in the case of one who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and she retracts within thirty days: She is not betrothed.

, for one who says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and she retracts within thirty days, she is not betrothed.

And although one might say

in such a case:

The giving of money into a woman’s hand is different

from mere speech,

for

one might say:

It is considered like an act, and speech does not nullify an act.

, and speech does not annul an act.

Even so,

the acceptance of the betrothal is considered mere speech, since the betrothal has not yet taken effect. Therefore,

speech comes

of retraction

and nullifies speech

of betrothal.

And we challenge:

The halakha contradicts the halakha!

That is, a contradiction is raised between two halakhic rulings:

For

if you say

here

that the halakha is in accordance with

the opinion of

Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who says that speech comes and nullifies speech,

and

on the other hand

we hold that the halakha is in accordance with Rav Naḥman

with regard to nullifying a bill of divorce, implying that speech does not come and nullify speech!?

For they raised a dilemma [the students of the academy were uncertain]: One who sends a bill of divorce to his wife and then says to the agent, “The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified,”

[the members of the academy were uncertain]: One who sends a bill of divorce to his wife and then says to the agent, “The bill of divorce that I gave you is annulled,”

what is the law: may he later retract

afterward

and divorce

his wife

with it [with this bill of divorce]?

[with this bill of divorce]?

Rav Naḥman said:

the bill of divorce is valid, and

he may return and divorce her with it

if he wishes, because the agency of the agent was indeed revoked until he again appoints him as an agent; but the bill of divorce itself was not nullified.

And

Rav Sheshet said: He may not return and divorce her with it,

because the bill of divorce itself was nullified.

And we have established: The halakha is in accordance with Rav Naḥman [

the halakha is in accordance with Rav Naḥman], who says: He may return and divorce her with it.

It might have entered our minds that even if he wishes to nullify the bill of divorce, he cannot do so, although as long as the bill of divorce has not reached the woman, it is considered speech and not an act, this indicates that speech cannot nullify speech. If so, how can we establish the halakha in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that speech can come and nullify speech?!

And we answer: In fact, speech can come and nullify speech. And the fact that he may return and divorce her with the bill of divorce is not because he cannot nullify it; rather,

although he nullified it in its capacity as an agency

but

he did not nullify it in its capacity as a bill of divorce,

meaning: He indeed nullified the agency, but he did not intend to nullify the bill of divorce itself. Therefore, he may return and divorce her with it whenever he wishes. We learned in the Mishna: If one says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another man comes and betroths her within the thirty days,

she is betrothed to the second.

Rav said: She is betrothed to the second forever,

and the betrothal of the first does not take effect, even after the thirty days have elapsed.

And Shmuel said:

What we learned,

“She is betrothed to the second,”

means only

until thirty days,

but

after thirty days,

when the time arrives for the first betrothal to take effect,

the betrothal of the second is uprooted [

it is uprooted and nullified]

and the betrothal of the first is completed [

it is completed],

the betrothal of

the

first.

Rav Ḥisda sat [

he sat]

and this difficulty was troubling him [

and he asked]:

How can the betrothal of the second be uprooted?

After all, the betrothal of the first is not fit to take effect until after thirty days, and since she had already been betrothed to the second within the thirty days, how can the betrothal of the first take effect, and for what reason should the betrothal of the second be uprooted?!

Rav Yosef said

to Rav Ḥisda:

Master, you learned it with regard to the first clause, and it is troubling you. [

You learned the dispute between Rav and Shmuel with regard to the first clause of the Mishna, and indeed, these matters are difficult to understand.]

But

Rav Yehuda learned it with regard to the latter clause

of the Mishna,

he taught

the dispute between Rav and Shmuel,

and it is not difficult for him

at all.

We learned in the Mishna: If one says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

from now and after thirty days,”

and another man comes and betroths her within thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed.

And concerning this

Rav said: She is betrothed and not betrothed forever,

meaning: She remains forever in doubt as to whether she is betrothed to the first or to the second.

And Shmuel said:

What we learned,

“She is betrothed and not betrothed,”

meaning, it is uncertain to whom she was betrothed,

applies only until thirty days,

but

after thirty days,

there is no longer any uncertainty, because

the betrothal of

the

second is uprooted, and the betrothal of

the

first is completed,

and he proceeds to explain it:

According to Rav, it is uncertain to him:

When the betrother said: “From now and after thirty days,”

perhaps it was a condition,

meaning: He intended to betroth her immediately, except that he stipulated a condition in the matter: “And after thirty days,” meaning, if I do not retract within thirty days, the betrothal will take effect from now.

Or [

or perhaps]

it was a retraction,

for he retracted what he had said, “from now,” and it is as though he said: “I do not wish to betroth you from now; rather, be betrothed to me after thirty days.” Therefore, this woman remains forever in doubt as to whom she was betrothed. For if his intention was that the betrothal should take effect from now if he did not retract within thirty days, she is found to be betrothed to the first, since he did not retract.

And if his intention was to retract and betroth her after thirty days, she is found to be betrothed to the second, since the betrothal of the second took effect before the time for the first betrothal arrived.

But

according to Shmuel, it is obvious to him that it was a condition,

and therefore throughout the thirty days she is “betrothed and not betrothed” to the first, lest the condition not be fulfilled, but from thirty days onward, if he has not retracted and wishes the betrothal to take effect, the condition has been fulfilled, and she is betrothed to the first; the betrothal of the second cannot take effect.

And

the dispute between Rav and Shmuel depends

on the dispute between these tannaim:

As it was taught:

If one says to a woman: “This is your bill of divorce

from today and after death,”

and he dies, this is

a bill of divorce and it is not a bill of divorce according to

the

words of the Sages.

That is, the Sages are uncertain whether his intention was a condition—“if he dies”—and when he died the condition was fulfilled, making it a bill of divorce, since he said: “This is your bill of divorce from today.”

Or, his intention was to retract: At first he said, “This is your bill of divorce from today,” and afterward he retracted, and it is as though he said: “It will not be a bill of divorce after death.” Since “there is no bill of divorce after death,” it is therefore “not a bill of divorce,” and she is a widow and not a divorcee.

And

Rabbi

disagrees and

says:

A bill of divorce

such as this is a complete bill of divorce

and it is fully valid, because what he said, “and after death,” was a condition: He divorces her only if he dies, and he did die, so his condition was fulfilled, and she was divorced retroactively from the time he gave her the bill of divorce.

Rav, who said that she is betrothed and not betrothed forever, follows the view of the Sages, who say that it is a bill of divorce and it is not a bill of divorce. And Shmuel, who said that after thirty days she is certainly betrothed, follows the view of Rabbi, who says: “Such as this is a bill of divorce,” and after death the divorce takes effect retroactively.

And

we raise an objection: If so,

let us say [

let him say]

Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis,

since Rav follows the opinion of the Sages.

And let us say: Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi!

Why did Rav and Shmuel need to disagree on their own initiative, and in a different case from the one in which the Sages and Rabbi disagreed?!

And we answer:

It was necessary,

meaning: The amoraim needed to disagree on their own initiative with regard to betrothal, because if they had ruled in accordance with the tannaim concerning divorce, we would not have known their opinions concerning betrothal.

Because

if Rav had said: The halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis,

who said: “It is a bill of divorce and it is not a bill of divorce,”

I might have said:

Specifically

there,

with regard to divorce, are we uncertain whether he retracted what he had just said,

for

he

comes to distance her

with this bill of divorce, and it is difficult for him to divorce her.

But here, where he comes to draw her near [

where he comes to draw her close to himself] through the betrothal,

I might say [

I might have said]:

Rav agrees

with

Shmuel that it was a condition,

and not a retraction.

Rav therefore teaches us that even with regard to betrothal there is uncertainty as to whether his intention was a condition and the betrothal took effect immediately, or whether his intention was to retract, so that the betrothal would take effect only after thirty days; and if another man came and betrothed her within thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed to both of them.

And

Shmuel likewise needed to state his opinion with regard to betrothal, because

if Shmuel had said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi

with regard to divorce,

I might have said: There,

in the case of a bill of divorce concerning which he said, “from today and after death,”

it is

that we say: He intended a condition and wants the divorce to take effect today; he did not intend to retract and say that the bill of divorce would take effect only after death, for he knows

that there is no bill of divorce after death.

But here, where there is a betrothal

that can take effect

after thirty days, I might say: Shmuel agrees

with

Rav,

that we are uncertain whether he retracted.

Therefore:

It was necessary

to state their dispute with regard to betrothal, and they could not suffice with ruling in accordance with the words of the Sages or Rabbi.

Abaye said: And according to Rav’s reasoning,

that we are uncertain whether he intended a condition or a retraction:

If

one man comes and says to her: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after thirty days.”

And another comes and says to her: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after twenty days,”