Kiddushin 59b — the Talmud in English

For indeed,

an act removes immediately both an act and a thought

, that is, through an act, the status of susceptibility to impurity is annulled from the vessel, whether it took effect through an act or whether it took effect through a thought. But

a thought does not remove immediately either an act or a thought

, because once the status of susceptibility to impurity has descended upon the vessel, a thought has no power to remove it.

And now this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan:

Granted

a thought

does not remove it from an act

[it does not remove it], because

speech does not come

and annul

an act.

Rather

a thought

at least immediately from a thought

[at the very least]

should remove it

, for Rabbi Yohanan holds that a thought removes it from a thought; and a thought with regard to susceptibility to impurity is no better than a woman who received money for betrothal and then retracted!?

And we answer:

Different is the thought of

here, concerning susceptibility to

impurity, for it is considered like an act

, that is, the Torah treats this thought as an act. Therefore, a thought does not remove it from a thought, because with regard to impurity the matter is considered like a thought coming to remove it from an act, and “speech does not annul an act.”

And as

for the words of

Rav Pappa

concerning the preparation of foodstuffs to receive impurity:

For Rav Pappa raised a contradiction

[he challenged a contradiction]:

It is written

[Leviticus 11:38]: “

When he gives

water upon seed, and any of their carcass falls upon it, it is impure for you.” It implies that the person himself gives the water that prepares the seed [the food] to receive impurity.

And we read

[the keri is]: “

When water is put

”—the yod is vocalized with shuruk and the tav with pataḥ]. It implies that even if the water fell upon the seed by itself.

How is this

the contradiction between the meaning of the ketiv and the meaning of the keri resolved!?

We require “

when water is put

analogous

to ‘when he gives’

,” that is, from the verse we learn that giving by hand is not required, as is implied by the ketiv; rather, even if the liquid fell by itself, the food is prepared, provided that the falling of the liquids resembles giving by hand.

And in what way will these be similar to one another?

Just as

“

he gives

” implies

that he is pleased with it

[that it is his wish] regarding the liquid, for he gave it intentionally,

so too

“

water is put” [the falling of the liquid by itself]

that he is pleased with it

is required; and if the liquid fell and this was not the owners’ wish, the food is not prepared to receive impurity.

We have therefore learned concerning the preparation of foodstuffs to receive impurity that the Torah considers his desire for the liquid [“when water is put”] as though he performed an act and gave the liquid by hand [“when he gives”].

And also concerning the status of susceptibility to impurity in vessels, it may be said that his desire and thought to use the vessels as they are is like an act, and it cannot be annulled through a thought.

Rav Zevid taught

[he taught]

this teaching

of Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish

with regard to this

[in the context of the Mishna brought below], and not concerning the Mishna in our chapter:

We learned:

And likewise she

[a woman]

who gave permission to her agent to betroth

her, and

she went and betrothed herself

, while the agent also received betrothal for her.

If

the betrothal

of hers came first, her betrothal is betrothal; but if

the betrothal

of her agent came first, her betrothal is not betrothal

, because she is betrothed to the man from whom the agent received betrothal, and she cannot return and become betrothed to another.

And we are uncertain: A woman who appointed an agent to receive betrothal for her,

but did not betroth herself, and retracted

from the appointment of the agency,

what

is

is

her law?

Rabbi Yohanan said: She may retract

[she has the power to retract from the appointment of the agency].

And Resh Lakish said: She may not retract.

And we explain:

Rabbi Yohanan said: She may retract

, because

speech comes

of retraction

and annuls speech

of the appointment of the agency.

Resh Lakish said: She may not retract

, because Resh Lakish held that

speech does not come and annul speech.

He challenged him

[he raised an objection]

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish:

One who says to his agent, “Go and separate teruma from my produce,” and

annulled

his agency:

If, before he separated

[before the agent separated],

the sender annulled

his agency,

his teruma

[the agent’s]

is not teruma.

It follows that speech annulling the agency comes and annuls the speech of the appointment, which is difficult for Resh Lakish, who says: Speech does not annul speech.

He said

[he answered]

Rava:

This does not refer to a case in which the sender annulled the agency through his speech alone; rather,

here, with what are we dealing? With a case such as where the owner went first and separated teruma from his pile

[the owner of the produce separated the teruma before the agent separated it].

For it became

the separation

an act

, and an act removes it from a thought.

He challenged him

[he raised an objection]

Resh Lakish

to Rabbi Yohanan:

All vessels descend to their state of impurity

[they acquire the status of a vessel with regard to receiving impurity]

through a thought

that he thought to use them as they are,

but do not rise from their impurity

once they became impure,

except

through damaging the vessel and

through a change of act.

For indeed,

an act removes immediately an act and immediately

a thought

, but

a thought does not remove either an act or a thought.

And now this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan:

Granted

a thought

does not remove it from an act

[it does not remove and annul it], because

speech does not come and annul an act, but

[rather] a thought

should at least remove it from a thought!?

He said to him

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish:

Different is the thought concerning impurity

, which a thought cannot remove,

for it is considered like an act

[it is considered as an “act”].

And as

for the words of

Rav Pappa!

For Rav Pappa raised a contradiction: It is written: “

When he gives,”

and it implies that an act by hand is required,

and we read: “

When water is put,”

and it implies that even when the liquid fell by itself, the food becomes prepared to receive impurity!?

How is this

the ketiv and the keri reconciled with one another!? “

When water is put”

analogous to “

when

he gives.”

Just as “

he gives”

that he is pleased with it

implies,

so too “

water is put”

also, that he is pleased with it. It follows that his thought and desire for the liquid [“when water is put”] are considered like an act by hand [“when he gives”].

Thus, his thought and desire concerning the liquid [“when it is placed”] are considered like an act performed by hand [“when he places it”].

And here too, his thought to use the vessel as it is is considered an “act,” and the status of susceptibility to impurity cannot be removed from the vessel except through an act.

He challenged him

[he raised an objection]

Rabbi Yohanan to Resh Lakish: One who sends a bill of divorce to his wife and encounters the agent

[meets the agent]

or

the husband

sends another agent after him and says to him: “

The bill of divorce that I gave you is annulled”;

it is annulled.

We have learned from here that one who sends an agent and retracts, his agency is annulled.

A refutation of Resh Lakish

, who says, “Speech does not annul speech,” and a person cannot retract from the appointment of an agency!?

And we conclude: Indeed,

a refutation!

And

we rule:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan

, who says: Speech comes and annuls speech,

and even in the

first

wording

, for one who says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and she retracts within thirty days, she is not betrothed.

And although it may be said

in such a case:

The placing of money into the hand of a woman is different

from mere speech alone,

for

one may say:

It is considered like an act

, and speech does not annul an act.

Even so, the receipt of the betrothal is considered mere speech, since the betrothal has not yet taken effect; therefore,

the acceptance of the betrothal is considered mere speech, since the betrothal has not yet taken effect. Therefore,

speech comes

of retraction

and annuls speech

of betrothal.

And we challenge:

The halakha is difficult against the halakha!

That is, a contradiction must be raised between two halakhic rulings:

For when

you say

here

the halakha is in accordance with

Rabbi

Yohanan

, who says that speech comes and annuls speech,

and

on the other hand

we hold that the halakha is in accordance with Rav Naḥman

with regard to annulling a bill of divorce, and it implies that speech does not come and annul speech!?

For they raised the following question

[the members of the academy were uncertain]: One who sends a bill of divorce to his wife and then says to the agent, “The bill of divorce that I gave you is annulled,”

what is the law: may he retract

afterward

and divorce

his wife

with it

[with this bill of divorce]?

Rav Naḥman said:

the get is valid, and

he may again divorce with it

if he wishes, because the agency of the agent was indeed revoked, until he again appoints him as an agent, but the get was not nullified.

And

Rav Sheshet said: He may not again divorce with it,

because the get itself was nullified.

And we hold: The halakha is like Rav Naḥman [

the halakha is like Rav Naḥman], who says: He may again divorce with it.

It might have entered our minds that even if he wishes to nullify the get, he cannot, although as long as the get has not reached the woman, the get is considered speech and not an act, this implies that speech does not nullify speech; and if so, how do we hold like Rabbi Yoḥanan, that speech comes and nullifies speech!?

And we answer: In truth, speech comes and nullifies speech; and that he may again divorce with the get is not because he cannot nullify it, but rather

although he nullified it as an agency,

but

he did not nullify it as a get,

that is to say, he indeed nullified the agency, but his intention was not to nullify the get itself; therefore, he can again divorce with it whenever he wishes. We learned in the Mishna: If one says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another came and betrothed her within the thirty days,

she is betrothed to the second.

Rav said: She is betrothed to the second forever,

and the betrothal of the first does not take effect, even after the thirty days have passed.

And Shmuel said:

What we learned,

she is betrothed to the second,

is only

until thirty days,

but

after thirty days,

when the time for the legal effect of the first betrothal has arrived,

the betrothal of the second lapses [

expires and is nullified]

and the betrothal

is completed

of

the

first.

Rav Ḥisda sat [

sat]

and it was difficult for him [

and he raised the difficulty]:

On account of what does the betrothal of the second lapse?

Surely the betrothal of the first is fit to take effect only after thirty days, and since she had already become betrothed to the second within the thirty days, how can the betrothal of the first take effect, and for what reason should the betrothal of the second lapse!?

Rav Yosef said to him

to Rav Ḥisda:

Master, you learned it with reference to the first clause, and it is difficult for you. [

You are learning the dispute of Rav and Shmuel with reference to the first clause of the Mishna, and indeed these words are not understandable.]

But

Rav Yehuda learned it with reference to the latter clause

of the Mishna,

he learned

the dispute of Rav and Shmuel,

and it is not difficult for him

at all.

We learned in the Mishna: If one says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me

from now and after thirty days,” and another came and betrothed her within thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed.

And concerning this,

Rav said:

She is betrothed and not betrothed forever,

that is to say, forever she is in doubt whether she is betrothed to the first or to the second.

And Shmuel said:

What we learned,

she is betrothed and not betrothed,

that is to say, it is uncertain to whom she became betrothed, is

only until thirty days,

but

after thirty days,

there is no uncertainty here, because

the betrothal of

the

second lapses, and the betrothal of

the

first is completed,

and he explains it as he proceeds:

According to Rav, it is uncertain to him:

What did the betrothed man mean when he said, “From now and after thirty days”?

If it was a condition,

that is to say, his intention was to betroth her immediately, except that he stipulated a condition in the matter: “and after thirty days,” meaning, if I do not retract within thirty days, the betrothal will take effect from now.

Or [

or perhaps]

it was a retraction,

that he retracted what he had said, “from now,” and he is like one who says: “I do not wish to betroth you from now; rather, become betrothed to me after thirty days.” Therefore, this woman remains forever in doubt to whom she became betrothed, because if his intention was that the betrothal should take effect from now if he did not retract within thirty days, it follows that she is betrothed to the first, since he did not retract.

And if his intention was to retract and betroth her after thirty days, it follows that she is betrothed to the second, since the betrothal of the second took effect before the time of the betrothal of the first arrived.

But

for Shmuel, it is obvious to him that it was a condition,

therefore, throughout the thirty days she is “betrothed and not betrothed” to the first, lest the condition not be fulfilled, but from thirty days onward, if he did not retract and he desires the betrothal, the condition has been fulfilled, and she is betrothed to the first, and the betrothal of the second cannot take effect.

And

the dispute between Rav and Shmuel is dependent

on the dispute of these tannaim:

For it was taught:

If one says to a woman, “Behold, this is your get

from today and after death,” and he died, this is

a

get and not a get according to

the

words of the Sages.

That is to say, the Sages are uncertain whether his intention was a condition—“if he dies”—and when he died the condition was fulfilled, and this is a get, since he said: “Behold, this is your get from today.”

Or: his intention was to retract, for initially he said, “Behold, this is your get from today,” and afterward he retracted, and he is like one who says: “It will not be a get after death”; and since “there is no get after death,” therefore “it is not a get,” and she is a “widow” and not a “divorcee.”

And

Rabbi

disagrees and

says:

A get

such as this is a complete get

he is. For what he said, “and after death,” is a condition: he is divorcing only if he dies, and he died, and his condition was fulfilled; she is divorced retroactively from the time the get was given.

Rav, who said: She is betrothed and not betrothed forever, holds like the Sages who say: “a get and not a get”; and Shmuel, who said: After thirty days she is certainly betrothed, holds like Rabbi, who says: “such as this is a get,” and after death the divorce takes effect retroactively.

And

we object: If so,

let Rav say [

let him say]

“The halakha is like the Sages”,

since Rav holds according to the view of the Sages.

And let Shmuel say: “The halakha is like Rabbi”!?

And for what purpose did Rav and Shmuel need to disagree on their own initiative, and in a different case from the one in which the Sages and Rabbi disagreed!?

And we answer:

It is necessary,

that is to say, it was necessary for the amoraim to disagree on their own initiative concerning betrothal, because if they had ruled like the tannaim with regard to divorce, we would not have known their view with regard to betrothal.

Because

if Rav had said: “The halakha is like the Sages”,

who said: “a get and not a get,”

I might have said:

specifically

there,

with regard to divorce, we are uncertain lest he retracted what he had just said,

for

this

is a coming to distance her

with this get, and it is difficult for him to divorce her.

But here, since this is a coming to draw her close [

since he came to draw her close to him] through the betrothal,

I might say [

I would say]:

Rav concedes to him

Rav

with Shmuel, that it was a condition

and not a retraction.

Rav teaches us that even with regard to betrothal there is uncertainty whether his intention was a condition and the betrothal took effect from now, or whether his intention was a retraction, so that the betrothal should take effect only after thirty days; and if another came and betrothed her within thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed to both of them.

And

Shmuel likewise had to state his view with regard to betrothal, because

if Shmuel had said: “The halakha is like Rabbi”

with regard to divorce,

I might have said: There,

in a get in which he said, “from today and after death,”

it

is that we say: He intended a condition and he wants the divorce to take effect today, and he did not intend to retract and say that the get would take effect only after death, for he knows

that there is no get after death.

But here, since there is a betrothal

that can take

effect after thirty days, I might say: Shmuel concedes to him

Shmuel

to Rav,

that we are uncertain lest he retracted.

Therefore:

it is necessary

to teach their dispute with regard to betrothal, and they could not suffice with ruling the halakha according to the words of the Sages or according to Rabbi.

Abaye said: And according to Rav’s reasoning

that we are uncertain whether he intended a condition or a retraction:

If

one came and said to her: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after thirty days.”

And another came and said to her: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after twenty days.”