Kiddushin 59a — the Talmud in English

And what is different there

[above, in the chapter “The Man Who Betroths”]

that it teaches: The one who says to his agent: “

Go and betroth a certain woman for me in a certain place,” and he went and betrothed her in another place, she is not betrothed, and it does not teach, “The one who says to his fellow”!?

That is, why here did the tanna formulate it as “the one who says to his fellow,” implying that he did not send him specifically for this purpose, but told him that if he happened to be there, he requested that he betroth that woman;

whereas above the tanna used the wording “the one who says to his fellow,” implying that he sent him for this purpose!?

And we answer:

Here it teaches us a novelty, and there it teaches us a novelty.

That is, in both places the tanna came to teach us a new point by using in his wording “his fellow” or “his agent.”

And we explain:

Here

in our chapter

a novelty

a new point

it teaches us, by using “his fellow” and not “his agent.”

by using “his fellow” rather than “his agent.”

For if

he had

taught “

his agent,”

we would have erred and

might have said: It is his agent

of whom we say

that he is a deceiver if he went and betrothed her for himself, since

the sender’s mind relied

upon it

and

thought: Since I sent him specifically for this purpose, surely he

will do

[will perform]

for me

the

agency I gave him.

But

if he said to his

fellow: “Betroth a certain woman for me,” and did not send him specifically for this purpose, since

the sender’s mind did not rely upon it, because it is possible that his fellow would not happen to be in that place,

, because it was possible that his fellow would not happen to be in that place,

if so,

let us say

[we would say]: Even though he did not inform him that he wanted to betroth her for himself,

he should not be a deceiver

[the fellow should not be considered a deceiver] if he betroths her for himself.

Therefore the tanna taught: “The one who says to his fellow,” to teach us that even with regard to his fellow, his mind relied upon him, and if he went and betrothed her for himself without informing him beforehand, he is acting with deceitful conduct.

And likewise

there

[in the chapter “The Man Who Betroths”], where it teaches “the one who says to his agent” and does not teach “the one who says to his fellow,”

it teaches us a novelty.

For if

he had

taught “

the one who says to his fellow,”

I might have said:

Specifically when he sends

his fellow, he

is the one of whom we say

that when

he says to him, “Betroth her for me in a certain place,” and he goes and

betroths her in another place, she is not betrothed, since

he

thought

the sender: Presumably

he will not

trouble himself

to seek her in another place, and therefore from the outset he appointed him as an agent only to betroth her in that place.

But one who says it to his

agent, since he sent him specifically for this purpose,

the sender thought

that presumably the agent

will trouble himself for him, and if he does not find her in this place, he will seek her in another place.

for him, and if he did not find her in that place, he would seek her elsewhere.

If so,

let us say

[we would say]: His intention was to appoint him as an agent in every manner and in every place where he would find her, and that which he said to him, “in a certain place,”

is indicating a place for him

that is, if you find her there, betroth her for me and I will not trouble you to go to another place; but if he troubles himself to seek her and betroths her in another place, she is betrothed.

It teaches us, therefore the tanna taught: “The one who says to his agent,” to teach us that even when he sends an agent specifically for this purpose, if he says to him, “In a certain place,” he does not appoint him as an agent to betroth her in another place, and if he went and betrothed her in another place, she is not betrothed.

that it used the wording “one who says to his agent” to teach us that even when he sends an agent specifically for this purpose, if he tells him “in a certain place,” he does not appoint him as an agent to betroth her elsewhere; and if he went and betrothed her elsewhere, she is not betrothed.

The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving

Ravin Hasida,

who was

going to betroth a woman for his son

[who was going as his son’s agent to betroth a woman for him], and he went and

betrothed her for himself

[for himself].

And we are astonished:

But

it

was taught

above:

What he did is done, except that he acted toward him with deceitful conduct,

and how could Ravin Hasida have acted in this way!?

And we answer:

They did not give her to him, that is, they did not want to give that woman to him for his son, and therefore he betrothed her for himself; there is no deceitful conduct here, since in the end the son would not have received that woman.

, meaning, they did not want to give that woman to him for his son. Therefore, he betrothed her to himself, and there was no deceit here, since in the end the son would not have received that woman.

And we challenge: Still, in order that they should not suspect him of acting with deceitful conduct,

it was necessary for him

to Ravin

to inform

his son from the outset that they did not want to give him that woman, and only afterward should Ravin Hasida go and betroth her for himself!?

And we answer: Ravin Hasida could not inform his son of this before he betrothed her for himself, because

he thought

[he was concerned]: He would suffer a loss through the matter, for perhaps

in the meantime

[during the interim]

another person would come

and

betroth her,

and therefore Ravin Hasida hurried and betrothed that woman for himself, and only afterward went to inform his son that they had not wanted to give him the woman for himself.

This law of a “practice of deception” applies also to the matter of buying and selling, and not only to the matter of a woman’s kiddushin, as the Gemara relates:

Rabba bar bar Hana gave money [A0003]he gave money

[he gave money]

to Rav, [A0005]and

and

said [A0007]to Rav:

to Rav:

Buy this land for me [A0009]purchase a certain piece of land for me.

[buy this particular piece of land for me].

He went [A0011]and

and

bought it for himself [A0013]Rav went and bought that same land for himself. [A0014]And we ask:

[Rav went and bought that same land for himself]. And we are astonished:

But [A0016]it

was taught, [A0018]above:

above:

What he did is done, except that he acted toward him with a practice of deception, [A0020]and how did Rav do such a thing!?

so how could Rav have done such a thing!?

And we answer:

It was a valley of powerful men [A0024]it was a valley belonging to men of force, who did not allow just anyone to buy land in their neighborhood, and it was not possible for him to buy the land for Rabba bar bar Hana. [A0025]For indeed,

[it was a valley belonging to men of force], who did not allow just anyone to buy land near them; therefore, it was impossible for him to buy the land for Rabba bar bar Ḥana.

Although

they treated Rav with honor [A0027]they honored Rav and did not prevent him from buying the field, but

[they showed Rav respect] and did not prevent him from buying the field,

they did not treat Rabba bar bar Hana with honor [A0029]and they would not have allowed the field to be bought for him. [A0030]And we object: Even so, so that they would not suspect him of acting with a practice of deception,

and would not have allowed him to buy the field for Rabba bar bar Ḥana.

And we challenge this: Even so, in order that people should not suspect Rav of acting deceptively,

it was necessary for him [A0032]for Rav

to Rav

to inform [A0034]Rabba bar bar Hana from the outset that they did not allow him to buy the land for him, and only afterward should Rav go and buy the land for himself!? [A0035]And we answer:

to Rabba bar bar Ḥana from the outset that they would not allow him to buy the land for him, and only afterward should Rav have gone and bought the land for himself!?

And we answer:

He reasoned: In the meantime, another person will come

and buy it, [A0038]that is, Rav could not first go and inform Rabba bar bar Hana that he was not buying the land for him, because he was concerned that perhaps, by the time he went to inform him, they would agree to sell the land to another person, and Rav would thereby lose the matter.

meaning that Rav could not first go and inform Rabba bar bar Ḥana that he was not buying the land for him, because he was concerned that before he could go and tell him, they might agree to sell the land to someone else, and Rav would thereby lose the opportunity.

Rav Giddel was turning over that land [A0042]he was pursuing and making efforts to buy a certain piece of land;

[he was seeking and working to buy a particular piece of land].

Rabbi Abba went and bought it [A0044]Rabbi Abba went and bought that same land for himself; Rav Giddel had no possibility of protesting to Rabbi Abba himself, [A0045]and therefore

[Rabbi Abba went and bought that same land for himself]. Rav Giddel had no possibility of protesting directly to Rabbi Abba, and therefore

Rav Giddel went [A0047]and

and

lodged a complaint against him [A0049]he lodged a complaint against Rabbi Abba

[he appealed and complained about Rabbi Abba]

before [A0051]Rabbi

Zeira, [A0053]so that he would help him obtain the land. [A0055]Rabbi Zeira himself also had no possibility of protesting to Rabbi Abba, and therefore

so that he would help him obtain the land.

Rabbi Zeira himself also could not protest to Rabbi Abba, and therefore

Rabbi Zeira went and lodged a complaint against him before [A0057]Rabbi

Yitzhak Nappaḥ.

He said to him [A0060]Rav Yitzhak Nappaḥ said to Rabbi Zeira:

Rav Yitzḥak Nafḥa said to Rabbi Zeira:

Wait until he ascends [A0062]Rabbi Abba

Rabbi Abba

to us for the Festival, [A0064]because on the Festival the rabbi would expound the laws of the Festival, and his students would come before him, and Rabbi Abba would also come with them; then I will rebuke him for buying the land over which Rav Giddel had been making efforts.

because on the Festival the teacher would expound the laws of the Festival, and his students would come before him. Rabbi Abba would also come with them, and then I would rebuke him for buying the land that Rav Giddel had been pursuing.

When he ascended [A0066]when Rabbi Abba ascended,

[when Rabbi Abba came up],

he found him [A0068]Rav Yitzhak Nappaḥ found him and

[Rav Yitzḥak Nafḥa found him] and

said to him [A0070]asked him:

[he asked him]:

A poor man turning over a loaf [A0072]a cake baked upon coals; that is, he was pursuing it in order to acquire it from ownerless property, or from the householder, that he should give it to him.

[a cake baked on coals], meaning that he was pursuing it in order to acquire it as ownerless property, or from the householder who would give it to him.

And another came [A0075]and acquired it, and he is as though he

obtains it, and it is as though he

took it from him [A0077]from the poor man;

[from the poor man],

what [A0079]is his law?

[what is his status]?”

He said to him [A0081]Rabbi Abba said to Rav Yitzhak Nappaḥ:

Rabbi Abba said to Rav Yitzḥak Nafḥa:

He is called wicked! [A0083]For he descends into the life of his fellow and diminishes his livelihood. [A0085]Rav Yitzhak Nappaḥ said to Rabbi Abba:

because he is taking away his fellow’s livelihood and diminishing his income.

Rav Yitzḥak Nafḥa said to Rabbi Abba:

But then, master, for what reason did you do this!? [A0087]That is, if you know this law, why did you buy the field over which Rav Giddel had been making efforts!?

That is, if you know this law, why did you buy the field that Rav Giddel had been pursuing!?

He said to him [A0089]Rabbi Abba said to him:

Rabbi Abba said to him:

I did not know [A0091]that Rav Giddel was occupied with this land. [A0095]Rav Yitzhak Nappaḥ said to him:

that Rav Giddel was involved in acquiring this land.

Rav Yitzḥak Nafḥa said to him:

Even now, let the master give it to him! [A0097]That is, at the very least, you should now give him the land.

That is, at the very least, you should now give him the land.

He said to him [A0099]Rabbi Abba said: Indeed, I agree to return the land, except that

Rabbi Abba said to him: Indeed, I agree to return the land, but

I will not sell it to him [A0101]I am not prepared to sell it to Rav Giddel. [A0102]Since

[I am not willing to sell it] to Rav Giddel.

Since

it is the first land, and it is not a favorable sign. [A0104]That is, this land is the first land I have ever bought, and it is not a “good sign” for a person to sell his first purchase, because one who sells his first assets never sees a sign of blessing. [A0106]And therefore,

That is, this land is the first piece of land I have ever bought, and it is not a “good sign” for a person to sell his first purchase, because one who sells his first assets never sees a sign of blessing.

Therefore,

if he wishes [A0108]Rav Giddel to receive this land

Rav Giddel wishes to receive this land

as a gift, let him take it [A0110]let him take it; but I am not prepared to sell it.

[let him take it], but I am not willing to sell it.

Rav Giddel did not descend to it [A0113]he did not go down to that field, because he was not prepared to accept it as a gift,

[he did not take possession of that field], because he was unwilling to accept it as a gift,

as it is written [A0115]Proverbs 15:27: “

[Proverbs 15:27]: “

And one who hates gifts shall live.” [A0117]And also

And

Rabbi Abba did not descend to it, because Rav Giddel had been turning it over. [A0119]And Rabbi Abba did not wish to benefit from the prohibition.

Rabbi Abba did not wish to benefit from something involving a prohibition.

Neither the master [A0121]Rav Giddel

[Rav Giddel]

descended to it, nor the master [A0123]Rabbi Abba

[Rabbi Abba]

descended to it, and it was called: “

the land of the Sages,” [A0126]because the land became like ownerless property for the students. [A0128]We learned in the Mishna:

because the land became like ownerless property for the students.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise, one who says to a woman: “

You are betrothed to me [A0131]after thirty days,” and another came and betrothed her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second. [A0132]And we deliberate: If

after thirty days,” and another man came and betrothed her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second man.”

And we raise a doubt: If

another did not come and betroth her within [A0134]those

those

thirty [A0136]days,

days,

what [A0138]is the law of that woman? [A0139]And the Gemara is not uncertain about the law of this woman when the kiddushin money exists, for it can be learned from the Mishna that she is betrothed. [A0141]But if the woman used the kiddushin money, or lost it, the Gemara is uncertain whether she is betrothed, since no other kiddushin prevents the first kiddushin from taking effect, or perhaps she is not betrothed, since the money with which the kiddushin was performed does not exist in her possession? [A0142]And we resolve it:

is the status of that woman?

The Gemara is not uncertain about this woman’s status when the betrothal money still exists, because it can be learned from the Mishna that she is betrothed.

But if the woman used the betrothal money, or lost it, the Gemara is uncertain whether she is betrothed, since no other betrothal prevents the first betrothal from taking effect, or whether she is not betrothed because the money with which the betrothal was performed is no longer in her possession.

And we resolve it:

Rav and Shmuel both say: She is betrothed [A0144]she is,

even though all [A0146]the

the

money [A0148]has been consumed [it was eaten and no longer exists]. [A0149]A. One who betroths a woman with a loan — a debt that she owes him — she is not betrothed. [A0150]B. One who betroths a woman with a deposit that he deposited with her: if the deposit was lost and not even the value of a peruta remained from it, she is not betrothed. [A0151]And we explain:

[the money was consumed and no longer exists].

a. One who betroths a woman with a loan — a debt that she owes him — has not betrothed her.

b. One who betroths a woman with a deposit that he deposited with her: if the deposit was lost and not even the value of one peruta remained, he has not betrothed her.

And we explain:

What is the reason [A0153]that she is betrothed even if the money was consumed, and how does this differ from one who betroths with a loan and one who betroths with a lost deposit, in which case she is not betrothed? [A0154]For

that she is betrothed even if the money was consumed, and how is this different from one who betroths a woman with a loan or with a lost deposit, in which case she is not betrothed?

Because

these coins [A0156]this money, which the woman received for the purpose of kiddushin,

[this money], which the woman received for the purpose of betrothal,

do not resemble [A0158]money of a

loan

loan [A0160]they do not resemble it,

[they are not similar],

and do not resemble [A0162]money of a

deposit

deposit, [A0164]and he explains it further:

and the Gemara explains further:

They do not resemble a deposit, [A0166]because a

because a

deposit [A0168]is in the owners’ possession, and if it was lost,

remains in the owner’s legal domain, and if it is lost,

it is consumed in the possession of its owner [A0170]that is, the deposit was lost from the owners, and not from the bailee. Therefore, if he betrothed her with a deposit that was lost, she is not betrothed, because since the deposit is not in the world at the time of the kiddushin, he has nothing with which to betroth her.

meaning that the deposit was lost from the owner’s possession, not from the custodian’s. Therefore, if he betrothed her with a deposit that was lost, she is not betrothed, because since the deposit no longer existed at the time of the betrothal, he had nothing with which to betroth her.

And [A0172]if

if

these [A0174]coins of kiddushin were in the world at the time of the kiddushin, and afterward

betrothal coins existed at the time of the betrothal and afterward

they were consumed in her possession, [A0176]therefore she is betrothed to him, even though the money was lost. [A0177]And

she is therefore betrothed to him, even though the money was lost.

And

they also do not resemble a loan, [A0179]these coins given for kiddushin, because

these coins that were given for betrothal, because

a loan is given for spending, [A0181]that is, as soon as he gave her the loan, the money became hers, and she was able to spend it for her needs. Therefore, he cannot betroth her with this money, because it is no longer his. [A0183]But

meaning that as soon as he gave her the loan, the money became hers, and she was permitted to spend it for her needs. Therefore, he cannot betroth her with this money, because it was already no longer his.

But

these [A0185]coins were

coins

given to her as kiddushin, [A0187]that is, these coins were not given to her for her to spend, but rather on the condition that she be betrothed through them; it is found that he initially betrothed her with his money and therefore she is betrothed with those coins, even if they were lost. [A0190]And again we deliberate: One who says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and

meaning that this money was not given to her to spend, but on the condition that she be betrothed with it. It follows that he initially betrothed her with his own money, and therefore she is betrothed with those coins even if they were lost.

We raise another doubt: One who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,”

another did not come and betroth her, and [A0192]the woman [A0193]who received the kiddushin

the woman [who received the betrothal]

changed her mind [A0195]within those thirty days and said, “I do not want the kiddushin,”

during those thirty days and said, “I do not want the betrothal,”

what [A0197]is her law?

is her status?

Rabbi Yohanan said: She can retract, [A0199]that is, she can retract and nullify the kiddushin she accepted, because

meaning that she can retract and cancel the betrothal she accepted, because

the [A0201]second

second

speech [A0203]in which she says, “I do not want the kiddushin,”

in which she says that she does not want the betrothal

comes and nullifies [A0205]the

the

speech [A0207]of her initial consent to the kiddushin. [A0214]And

of her first agreement to the betrothal.

But

Resh Lakish [A0216]disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan and

disagrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan and

said: She cannot retract, [A0218]because

because

speech cannot come and nullify speech, [A0220]that is, she cannot retract and nullify the initial kiddushin, because speech of retraction does not have the power to nullify her consent to become betrothed.

that is, she cannot retract and nullify the initial betrothal, because a statement of retraction does not have the power to nullify her consent to become betrothed.

He raised an objection to him [A0222]Rabbi Yohanan

[he challenged]

to Resh Lakish: [A0224]A person appoints an agent to separate terumot and tithes on his behalf, and this matter is learned from what is stated [Numbers 18:28]: “So shall you also raise the contribution of the Lord,” and the Sages expounded [above, 41b]: “You also” includes the agent. [A0225]One who says to his agent, “Go and separate teruma from my produce,” and then changed his mind and

A person may appoint an agent to separate tithes and teruma offerings on his behalf. This is learned from the verse [Numbers 18:28]: “So shall you also raise the teruma of the Lord,” which the Sages expounded [above, 41b]: “You also” includes an agent.

One who says to his agent, “Go and separate teruma from my produce,” and then changes his mind and

nullified [A0227]his agency,

his agency,

if he nullified it before he separated [A0229]if he nullified the agency before the agent separated the teruma,

[if he canceled the agency before the agent separated the teruma],

his teruma is not teruma, [A0231]because a person cannot separate teruma from what is not his.

because a person cannot separate teruma from produce that is not his.

But here, [A0234]when he appointed the agent and then changed his mind,

the appointment

the [A0236]appointment

the agency

is speech [A0238]and

and

the [A0240]nullification

of the agency

is speech, and speech does come and nullify speech, [A0242]which is difficult for Resh Lakish, who said: Speech cannot nullify speech!? And Resh Lakish answers: Ordinary speech is indeed nullified through speech, but a woman who received kiddushin after thirty days and changed her mind

is different. [A0244]For

Because

the giving of money into the hand of [A0246]the

the

woman resembles an act, [A0248]it resembles the performance of an act, and

[it resembles the performance of an act],

speech does not come [A0250]the speech of retraction

of retraction

and nullify an act [A0252]the act of the kiddushin. [A0253]It might have been thought that the reason that giving money is considered an act is that the “speech” of the kiddushin was accompanied by an action of giving money.

of betrothal.

It might have been assumed that the reason giving money is considered an act is that the “speech” of the betrothal was accompanied by the action of giving the money.

Therefore Rabbi Yohanan returned and

challenged him

Resh Lakish:

One who sends a get to his wife and encounters the agent [

meets him]

or sends

the husband

another agent after him, and says to him: “

The get that I gave you is annulled,”

it is annulled,

and the agent cannot give the get to the woman.

But is not the giving of a get into the hand of an agent

an act that joins with the “speech” of the appointment of the agency, and

for [

like]

it is comparable to the giving of money into the hand of a woman, and

even so

it teaches: “It is annulled,”

and this is difficult for Resh Lakish, who says: speech does not annul speech with which an act was performed!?

And we answer:

There too

it is not considered like an act, and

as long as the get has not reached her hand [

as long as the get has not come into the hand of the woman],

it is speech and speech,

for no act has been performed with it; therefore,

speech comes and annuls speech,

but the giving of money into the hand of the woman is considered like an act, and therefore Resh Lakish holds that she cannot retract.

He challenged [

asked]

Resh Lakish Rabbi Yohanan:

A. A metal vessel whose workmanship has not been completed, such as a vessel that he intends to polish and beautify its form: even though it is fit to be used, it does not become susceptible to impurity.

B. A vessel that became impure and broke becomes pure from its impurity.

C. Food does not become susceptible to impurity until it has been prepared to receive impurity, by one of seven liquids falling upon it [wine, honey, oil, milk, dew, blood, or water; and your mnemonic is: Y-D, Sh-H-T, D-M], as it is stated [Leviticus 11:34]: “Of all food that may be eaten, upon which water comes, it shall become impure; and every liquid that may be drunk in any vessel shall become impure.”

D. Food does not become prepared to receive impurity if the liquid fell upon it without the consent of its owner; but if it is agreeable to the owners, even if the liquid fell by itself, the food has been prepared to receive impurity.

All vessels

whose making has not yet been completed, but he then formed the intention to use them as they are,

become subject to their impurity [

become fit to receive impurity]

through this intention,

for from now on they are “vessels whose workmanship has been completed.”

But if he changed his intention and decided to continue making the vessels, and not to use them as they are, his intention is not effective to remove the vessels from the legal category of susceptibility to impurity.

And all the more so, if the vessels had already become impure, this intention is not effective to purify them from their impurity.

And not

these vessels

rise [

leave and become pure]

out of their impurity except through a change in action,

that is, if they had already become impure, he must perform an act that damages them: he must break them or make a hole in them, in such a manner that they will not be fit for use.

And even if the vessels have not yet received impurity, they do not leave the legal category of susceptibility to impurity until he performs an act that demonstrates that he intends to continue making and beautifying the vessels, such as beginning to polish them.