Kiddushin 59a (נט.) — the Talmud in English

And why is it different there

[above, in the chapter “The Man Who Betroths”]

that it teaches: “One who says to his agent”: “Go and betroth a certain woman for me in a certain place,” and he went and betrothed her elsewhere, she is not betrothed — yet it does not teach “one who says to his fellow”?

Why here did the tanna phrase it as “one who says to his fellow,” implying that he did not send him specifically for this purpose, but told him that if he happened to be there, he asked him to betroth that woman?

That is, why did the tanna here use the wording “one who says to his fellow,” implying that he did not specifically send him for this purpose, but rather told him that if he happened to be there, he requested that he betroth that woman for him,

whereas above the tanna used the wording “one who says to his fellow,” implying that he sent him there for this purpose!?

And we answer:

Here it teaches us a novel point, and there it teaches us a novel point.

That is, in both places the tanna comes to teach us something novel through his choice of the wording “his fellow” or “his agent.”

And we explain:

Here

in our chapter

it teaches us a novel point

[a new teaching]

through its wording, in that it used “his fellow” rather than “his agent.”

by using “his fellow” rather than “his agent.”

For if

he had

taught “

his agent,”

we would have been mistaken and

might have thought: It is specifically when he is his agent

that we say that he

is deceitful if he went and betrothed her to himself, since

the sender’s mind relied

upon him, and he

would

think: Since I sent him specifically for this purpose, certainly he

will do

[he will do]

for me

the

agency I assigned him.

But

if he said to his

fellow: “Betroth a certain woman for me,” and did not send him specifically for this purpose, since

the sender’s mind did not rely upon him, because it is possible that his fellow would not happen to be in that place,

, because it was possible that his fellow would not happen to be in that place,

then

we might say

[we would think]: Even though he did not inform him that he wished to betroth her to himself,

he should not be considered deceitful

[the fellow should not be considered deceitful] if he betrothed her to himself.

Therefore the tanna taught “one who says to his fellow,” to teach us that even with regard to a fellow, the sender’s mind relies upon him, and if he went and betrothed her to himself without informing him beforehand, he is acting deceitfully.

And likewise

there

[in the chapter “The Man Who Betroths”], where it teaches “one who says to his agent” rather than “one who says to his fellow,”

it teaches us a novel point.

For if

he had

taught “

one who says to his fellow,”

we might have thought:

It is specifically when he sends his

fellow that

we say

that when

he tells him, “Betroth her for me in a certain place,” and he goes and

betroths her elsewhere, she is not betrothed, since

the sender

thinks: Surely

Surely my fellow

my fellow will not

take the trouble

to seek her elsewhere; therefore, from the outset, he appointed him as an agent only to betroth her in that place.

But when one says to his

agent, since he sent him specifically for this purpose,

the sender thought

that surely the agent would

take the trouble for him, and if he did not find her in that place, he would seek her elsewhere.

for him, and if he did not find her in that place, he would seek her elsewhere.

If so,

we might say

[we would think] that he intended to appoint him as his agent in every circumstance and in every place where he found her, and when he told him, “in a certain place,”

he was indicating a location for his convenience,

that is, if you find her there, betroth her for me, and I will not trouble you to go elsewhere; but if you pursued her and betrothed her elsewhere, she is betrothed.

The Mishna therefore teaches us,

that the tanna used the wording “one who says to his agent” to teach us that even when one sends an agent specifically for this purpose, if he tells him “in a certain place,” he does not appoint him as an agent to betroth her elsewhere, and if he went and betrothed her elsewhere, she is not betrothed.

The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving

Ravin Ḥasida,

who was

going to betroth a woman for his son

[he was going as his son’s agent to betroth a woman for him], and he went and

betrothed her to himself

[to himself].

And we are astonished:

But

it is

taught

above,

“What he did is effective, except that he acted toward him deceitfully,”

so how could Ravin Ḥasida have acted in this way!?

And we answer:

They did not give her to him,

that is, they did not want to give that woman to him for his son, and therefore he betrothed her to himself. This was not deceitful conduct, since in any event the son would not have received that woman.

And we ask: Still, so that people would not suspect him of acting deceitfully,

it should have been necessary for him

Ravin

to inform

his son from the outset that they did not want to give him that woman, and only afterward should Ravin Ḥasida have gone and betrothed her to himself!?

And we answer: Ravin Ḥasida could not inform his son of this before betrothing her to himself, because

he thought

[he was concerned]: He might suffer a loss through this, because perhaps

in the meantime

[meanwhile]

another man would come

and

betroth her,

and therefore Ravin Ḥasida hurried to betroth that woman to himself, and only afterward went to inform his son that they had not wanted to give him the woman for himself.

This principle of “a practice of deception” applies also to buying and selling, and not only to the betrothal of a woman, as the Gemara relates:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana gave money [נ]

he gave money

to Rav,

and

said

to Rav:

Buy this land for me [נ]

purchase a certain plot of land on my behalf.

He went

and

bought it for himself [נ]

Rav went and purchased that same land for himself. And we are surprised:

But

it was taught

above:

What he did is done, but he acted toward him with a practice of deception;

so how could Rav have done such a thing!?

And we answer:

It was a valley belonging to powerful men [נ]

it was a valley belonging to men of power, who would not allow just anyone to purchase land in their vicinity, and it was impossible to buy the land on behalf of Rabba bar bar Ḥana.

For although

they accorded Rav honor [נ]

they honored Rav and did not prevent him from purchasing the field,

they did not accord Rabba bar bar Ḥana honor

and they would not have allowed the field to be purchased on his behalf.

And we challenge this: Even so, in order that they would not suspect him of acting with a practice of deception,

Rav should have

to Rav

informed

Rabba bar bar Ḥana at the outset that they would not allow him to purchase the land on his behalf, and only afterward should Rav have gone and purchased the land for himself!?

And we answer:

He reasoned: In the meantime, another person might come and

purchase it,

meaning, Rav could not first inform Rabba bar bar Ḥana that he was not purchasing the land for him, because he was concerned that by the time he went to inform him, they might agree to sell the land to someone else, and Rav would thereby lose the opportunity.

Rav Giddel was pursuing that land [נ]

seeking and endeavoring to purchase a certain plot of land.

Rabbi Abba went and purchased it [נ]

Rabbi Abba went and bought that same land for himself. Rav Giddel had no possibility of protesting directly to Rabbi Abba, and therefore

Rav Giddel went

and

lodged a complaint against him [נ]

he complained about Rabbi Abba

before

Rabbi Zeira,

so that he would help him obtain the land.

Rabbi Zeira himself also could not protest to Rabbi Abba, and therefore

Rabbi Zeira went and lodged a complaint against him before

Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa.

He said to him

Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to Rabbi Zeira:

Wait until Rabbi Abba ascends

Rabbi Abba

to us for the Festival,

because during the Festival the rabbi would lecture on the laws of the Festival, and his students would come before him. Rabbi Abba would also come with them, and then I would rebuke him for purchasing the land that Rav Giddel had been pursuing.

When he ascended [נ]

when Rabbi Abba ascended,

he found him [נ]

Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa found him and

said to him [נ]

asked him:

A poor man pursuing a cake [נ]

a cake baked on coals — that is, he had been pursuing it in order to acquire it from hefker, or from the homeowner, so that the homeowner would give it to him.

And another person came and

acquired it, and it is as though he

took it from him [נ]

from the poor man;

what

is his status?

He said to him

Rabbi Abba said to Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa:

He is called wicked!

For he encroaches upon his fellow’s livelihood and diminishes his means of support.

Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to Rabbi Abba:

But then, Master, why did you act this way!?

That is, if you know this halakha, why did you purchase the field that Rav Giddel had been pursuing!?

He said to him

Rabbi Abba said to him:

I did not know

that Rav Giddel was dealing with this land.

Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to him:

Now too, let the Master give it to him!

That is, at the very least, you should now give him the land.

He said to him

Rabbi Abba said: Indeed, I agree to return the land, but

I will not sell it to him [נ]

I am not prepared to sell it to Rav Giddel.

Since

it is my first plot of land, and it is not a good sign.

That is, this land is the first land I ever purchased, and it is not a “good sign” for a person to sell his first acquisition, because one who sells his first properties never sees a sign of blessing.

And therefore, if

Rav Giddel wishes

to receive this land

as a gift, let him take it [נ]

he may take it, but I am not prepared to sell it.

Rav Giddel did not descend to it [נ]

he did not take possession of that field, because he was unwilling to accept it as a gift,

as it is written [נ]

Proverbs 15:27: “

And one who hates gifts shall live.”

And

Rabbi Abba also did not descend to it, because Rav Giddel had pursued it.

Rabbi Abba did not wish to benefit from the prohibition.

Neither the Master [נ]

Rav Giddel

took possession of it, nor the Master [נ]

Rabbi Abba

took possession of it, and it was called: “

the land of the Sages,”

because the land became like hefker for the students.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise, one who says to a woman: “

You are betrothed to me

after thirty days,” and another person came and betrothed her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second.

And we raise a doubt: If

another person did not come and betroth her within

those

thirty

days,

what

is the status of that woman?

The Gemara is not uncertain about the status of this woman when the betrothal money remains, because it can be derived from the Mishna that she is betrothed.

But if the woman used the betrothal money, or lost it, the Gemara is uncertain whether she is betrothed, since no other betrothal prevents the first betrothal from taking effect, or whether she is not betrothed, since the money with which the betrothal was effected is no longer in her possession.

And we resolve the matter:

Rav and Shmuel both say: She is betrothed

even though all

the

money [נ]

was consumed and no longer exists.

a. One who betroths a woman with a loan — a debt that she owes him — does not betroth her.

b. One who betroths a woman with a deposit that he deposited with her: if the deposit was lost and not even the value of a peruta remained, she is not betrothed.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that she is betrothed even if the money was consumed, and how does this differ from one who betroths with a loan or with a lost deposit, in which case she is not betrothed?

Because

these coins [נ]

these funds, which the woman received for the purpose of betrothal,

do not resemble

the money of a

loan [נ]

they are not similar,

nor do they resemble

the money of a

deposit,

and he explains further:

They do not resemble a deposit,

because a

deposit

remains in the owner’s legal domain, and if it is lost,

it is consumed in the domain of its owner

that is, the deposit was lost from the owner’s possession, not from the guardian’s. Therefore, if he betrothed her with a deposit that was lost, she is not betrothed, because since the deposit no longer exists at the time of betrothal, he has nothing with which to betroth her.

And

if

these betrothal coins had existed at the time of the betrothal, and only afterward

betrothal coins existed at the time of the betrothal and afterward

were consumed in her domain,

she is therefore betrothed to him, even though the money was lost.

And

they likewise do not resemble a loan,

these funds given for betrothal, because

a loan is given to be spent,

that is, as soon as he gave her the loan, the money became hers, and she was able to spend it for her needs. Therefore he cannot betroth her with this money, because it is no longer his.

But

these

funds were

given to her as betrothal money,

that is, this money was not given to her for her to spend, but rather on the condition that she be betrothed with it. It follows that he initially betrothed her with his own money. Therefore she is betrothed with that money, even if it was lost.

And further we raise a doubt: One who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and

another person did not come and betroth her, and

the woman who received the betrothal

changed her mind

during those thirty days and said, “I do not want the betrothal,”

what

is her status?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract,

that is, she can retract and nullify the betrothal she accepted, because

the

second statement

in which she says that she does not want the betrothal

comes

and nullifies the

statement

the first one, expressing her consent to the betrothal. And

Reish Lakish

disagrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan and

said: She cannot retract,

because

a statement cannot come and nullify a statement,

that is, she cannot retract and nullify the initial betrothal, because a statement of retraction does not have the power to nullify her consent to become betrothed.

Rabbi Yoḥanan challenged

Reish Lakish:

A person can appoint an agent to separate terumot and ma’asrot on his behalf, and this is derived from what is stated [Numbers 18:28]: “So shall you also raise the teruma of the Lord,” which the Sages expounded [above, 41b]: “You also” includes the agent.

One who says to his agent, “Go and separate teruma from my produce,” and then changes his mind and

cancels

his agency:

if he canceled it before the agent separated,

if he canceled the agency before the agent separated the teruma,

his teruma is not teruma,

because a person cannot separate teruma from produce that is not his.

But here,

when he appointed the agent and then changed his mind,

the

appointment

is a statement,

and

and

the cancellation

is a statement, and a statement does come and nullify a statement. This is difficult for Reish Lakish, who says that a statement cannot nullify a statement!? And Reish Lakish answers: An ordinary statement can indeed be nullified by another statement; however, in the case of a woman who accepted betrothal after thirty days and then retracted,

it is different.

Because

the giving of money into the hand of

the

woman is comparable to an act,

it resembles the performance of an act,

and a statement

of retraction

cannot nullify an act

of betrothal.

It might have been thought that the reason giving money is considered an act is that the “statement” of betrothal was accompanied by the action of giving the money.

Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan returned and

raised an objection

to Resh Lakish:

If one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife is overtaken by the agent

[he encountered him]

or the husband sends

the husband

another agent after him, and says to him: “

The bill of divorce that I gave you is hereby nullified,”

it is nullified,

and the agent may not give the bill of divorce to the woman.

Now, is not the giving of a bill of divorce into the hand of an agent

an act that joins with the “declaration” appointing the agency, and

since

[just as]

it is comparable to giving money into the hand of a woman, and

nevertheless

it teaches: It is nullified,

which is difficult for Resh Lakish, who says that a declaration cannot nullify another declaration with which an act was performed!?

And we answer:

There, too,

it is not considered an act, and

as long as the bill of divorce has not reached her hand

[as long as the bill of divorce has not come into the woman’s hand],

it is merely a declaration and another declaration,

since no act has been performed with regard to her; therefore,

a declaration comes and nullifies a declaration.

But giving money into the woman’s hand is considered an act, and therefore Resh Lakish maintains that she cannot retract.

He raised an objection

[he asked]

Resh Lakish to Rabbi Yohanan:

a. An unfinished metal vessel, such as a vessel that one intends to polish and improve its form: although it is fit for use, it does not become susceptible to ritual impurity.

b. A vessel that became impure and then broke becomes pure from its impurity.

c. Food does not become susceptible to ritual impurity until it has been prepared to receive impurity by one of the seven liquids falling upon it—wine, honey, oil, milk, dew, blood, or water, whose mnemonic is Yad Shahat Dam—as it is stated: “Of all food that may be eaten, upon which water comes, it shall become impure; and any liquid that may be drunk in any vessel shall become impure.”

d. Food does not become prepared to receive ritual impurity if the liquid fell upon it without the owner’s consent. But if it is agreeable to the owners, then even if the liquid fell on its own, the food is prepared to receive ritual impurity.

All vessels

whose manufacture has not yet been completed, but one then formed the intention to use them as they are,

become subject to ritual impurity

[become fit to receive ritual impurity]

through this thought,

since from that point onward they are “vessels whose manufacture has been completed.”

But if he changed his mind and decided to continue manufacturing the vessels rather than use them as they are, his intention is not effective to remove the vessels from the status of being susceptible to ritual impurity.

And all the more so, if the vessels had already become impure, this intention is not effective to purify them from their impurity.

And

these vessels

emerge

[leave and become purified]

from their impurity only through a change in the physical object,

that is, if they have already become impure, one must perform an act that damages them: he must break them or make a hole in them, so that they are no longer fit for use.

And even if the vessels have not yet contracted ritual impurity, they do not leave the status of being susceptible to ritual impurity until one performs an act that demonstrates that he intends to continue making and beautifying the vessels, such as beginning to polish them.