Kiddushin 58b — the Talmud in English

He said to him

Rav Huna to Rabbi Hiyya bar Abin:

You are an extractor!

And he proceeds to explain it.

He—

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abin—

thought:

extracting

he is saying to him from a teaching,

that is: You derive this from this teaching, and it appears that you are not learned in it.

He said to him

Rav Huna to Rabbi Hiyya bar Abin: Not as you thought, but

this is what I am saying to you

[this was my intention]:

Rav Asi of Hutzal stands in agreement with you,

[Rav Asi of Hutzal interprets our Mishna like you], and “extracting” is the expression of Hutzal.

Let us say—

whether usufruct benefit is property or not—

it is like the dispute between

the תנאים who disputed the matter:

For it was taught:

One who steals his fellow’s untithed produce pays him the value of his fellow’s untithed produce,

including the value of the gifts contained in it,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He does not pay

the owner of the untithed produce

anything except the value of the non-sacred produce in it,

but the value of the teruma and tithe does not belong to him; rather, they belong to the koen and the Levite, and they cannot claim it from him, because he can say to each one: “I will not give it to you, but to your fellow.”

And

is it not concerning this that they disagree,

whether they disagree about the law of whether usufruct benefit is property:

One—

Rabbi—

holds: The usufruct benefit

that an Israelite has in the gifts

is property,

and therefore he pays him also the value of the teruma and tithe.

And the other—

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda—

holds: Usufruct benefit is not property,

and therefore he pays the Israelite nothing from the teruma and tithe.

And we reject this:

No,

not as you explained, but

everyone holds that usufruct benefit is not property, and here we are dealing with

one who steals

untithed produce

that fell

to an Israelite

from the house of his maternal grandfather, a koen

and it is with this that we are dealing,

and with

the law of

gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had been separated

or not, that they

disagree:

One—

Rabbi—

holds:

“Gifts that have not been separated

[in the hand of the koen grandfather]

are considered as though they had been separated,”

and the grandfather acquired them in order to bequeath them to his grandson, who would need only to separate them, but would take them for himself; and therefore the thief pays him for these as well. And the other— Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda— holds:

“Gifts that have not been separated

[in the hand of the koen grandfather]

are not considered as though they had been separated,”

and it follows that his Israelite grandson must give the teruma and tithe to a koen and a Levite, and he has only usufruct benefit in them; therefore the thief does not pay him, because “usufruct benefit is not property.”

And if you wish, say to explain their dispute:

everyone holds that gifts that have not been separated are considered as though they had been separated,

and everyone

holds that usufruct benefit is not property,

and here, what are we dealing with? With a case in which he stole ordinary untithed produce from an Israelite:

and here

they disagree only concerning the teruma in the untithed produce, but concerning the tithe everyone agrees that he need not pay him, since “usufruct benefit is not property”; and concerning teruma

they disagree about the law of Shmuel

[about Shmuel’s ruling]

they disagree!

they dispute the law of Shmuel

[the ruling of Shmuel]

For Shmuel said: One stalk of wheat exempts the pile.

One—

Rabbi—

holds Shmuel’s ruling,

and the one robbed can say to the thief: I could have exempted the entire theft with one stalk of wheat; therefore he also pays him the value of the teruma.

And the other—

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda—

does not hold Shmuel’s ruling,

and therefore he does not pay him the value of the teruma, just as he does not pay him the value of the tithe.

And if you wish, say

And the other

to explain their dispute:

everyone does not hold Shmuel’s ruling,

and usufruct benefit is not property,

and according to the strict law he should have paid only the value of the non-sacred produce in it. And here, this is the reason for Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,

that the thief is obligated to return to the Israelite also the value of the teruma and tithe in it: because

the Sages penalized the thief,

for if he did not have to return it to the Israelite, he would also not have to return it to the koen and Levite, since it is property with no claimant, as he can say to each one: “I will give it to another.” It would follow that “the sinner profits,” and therefore they penalized the thief, so that he would pay the owner of the pile.

And if you wish, say

to explain their dispute:

everyone holds Shmuel’s ruling,

and according to the strict law he was obligated to pay the Israelite at least for the teruma, since he could have exempted the theft with one stalk of wheat, and this is Rabbi’s position.

And here, this is the reason for Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,

that he is not obligated to pay the homeowner even the value of the teruma, because

the Sages penalized the homeowner,

so that he should not pay him for the teruma, because

he should not have left his produce untithed

[he should not have left his produce in a state of untithedness].

he should not have left his produce in a state of tevel [he should not have left his produce unseparated].

We learned

in our Mishna:

One who betroths with terumot, with tithes, with gifts, with the water of purification, or with the ashes of the cow, she is betrothed, and even an Israelite:

It enters our minds that he betroths her with the payment for mixing the water and ashes, and therefore the Gemara asks:

And we raise a contradiction

from that which we learned in tractate Bekhorot:

One who takes payment to judge: his judgments are void.

And one who takes payment

to testify: his testimony is void.

And one who takes payment

to sprinkle

the water of purification upon the impure

and to sanctify

it [the mixing of the ashes with the water is called “sanctification”]:

its water

is like

water of a cave,

which is foul,

and its ashes are ashes of burnt refuse,

as though they were ordinary ashes that come from something roasted in fire; that is, its sprinkling is not a valid sprinkling and its sanctification is not a valid sanctification.

And if so, it is clear that he cannot take payment; and if so, with what does he betroth her!?

Abaye said: It is not difficult!

Here—

in our Mishna—he betroths her

with payment for bringing

the ashes from place to place,

and

with payment for

drawing

the water.

Here,

in the Mishna in Bekhorot, where we learned that it is forbidden for him to take payment, this refers to

payment for sprinkling and sanctification

the ashes in the water.

It is precise as well

as we explained our Mishna:

For it teaches here

in our Mishna: “

with the water of purification and with the ashes of the cow,”

which implies that they have not yet been mixed—

and it teaches there

in the Mishna in Bekhorot: “

to sprinkle and to sanctify.”

And we conclude:

Conclude from it!

We shall return to you, chapter ‘The Man Betroths’.

Mishna:

The one who says

the one who said

to his fellow: “

Go

[for you] as my agent,

and betroth a certain woman for me.”

And he went

the agent

and betrothed

that

the

woman

for himself,

she is

betrothed to the second. B. That which we say, “He betrothed her for himself, she is betrothed,” is applicable when he did not betroth her with the sender’s money, for if so, it would be like one who betrothed her with stolen property, in which case she is not betrothed [above 13a]; rather, for example, the sender said to him: “Betroth her for me with your money” [see above 7a, Rashi, s.v. “Take a maneh”]—Mordekhai, section 522. See further in Rambam, Sale 7:10, and what the Mekaneh and Torat Abirim, letter alef, wrote about this.

And

likewise

so:

The one who says to a woman: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me

with this money, and the kiddushin will take effect only

after thirty days,”

the woman does not become betrothed to him until after thirty days.

And

therefore: if

another

person

came and betrothed

her

within

those

thirty days,

she is

betrothed to the second forever, since the kiddushin of the second took effect when this woman was unmarried, and when the time came for the first kiddushin to take effect, she was not betrothed to him, because she had already become a married woman, and it is impossible for other kiddushin to take effect upon her.

forever, since the second man’s betrothal took effect while this woman was still unmarried. When the time comes for the first man’s betrothal to take effect, she is not betrothed to him, because she has already become a married woman, and another betrothal cannot take effect with regard to her.

A. Just as a koen is permitted to eat teruma, so the daughter of a koen eats teruma. And likewise his wife eats it, even if she is the daughter of an Israelite.

B. A daughter of a koen who became betrothed to an Israelite is like a non-koen, and is forbidden to eat teruma.

And if the second one who betrothed her was a koen, she is

an Israelite woman

who was betrothed

to a koen

and

she may eat teruma, and even if the first one who betrothed her is an Israelite, he does not prevent her from eating teruma, since she is betrothed to the second, and the kiddushin of the first do not take effect at all.

, even if the first man was an Israelite. He does not prevent her from eating teruma, since she is betrothed to the second man and the first man’s betrothal does not take effect at all.

But the one who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

from now and after thirty days,”

this woman is not completely betrothed with kiddushin until thirty days have passed.

And

therefore: if

another

person

came and betrothed

her

within

those

thirty days,

this woman is

betrothed and not betrothed

to both of them; that is, she is considered betrothed in a state of doubt both to the first and to the second, and the Gemara will explain this law.

And if this woman was

an Israelite woman

who was betrothed

to a koen, or

who was

the daughter of a koen

who was betrothed

to an Israelite, she may not eat teruma.

An Israelite woman betrothed to a koen may not eat teruma, lest the kiddushin are not kiddushin, and a koen feeds his wife only through certain kiddushin.

A daughter of a koen betrothed to an Israelite may not eat teruma, and even though a daughter of a koen is permitted to eat teruma, for perhaps his kiddushin are kiddushin, and the kiddushin of a non-koen disqualify the daughter of a koen from teruma.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

The one who says to his fellow, “Go and betroth”

a certain woman for me, and he went and betrothed her for himself, she is betrothed to the second.

And

a tanna

taught in the Tosefta concerning this law:

What he did

the agent indeed

is done, and the agent is permitted to marry that woman,

except that he acted toward him

with him [the sender]

with deceitful conduct, since if he had acted in the proper manner, he should have told him that he was going to betroth her for himself and was not going as his agent. B. The Rambam [Marriage, chapter 9, law 17] wrote: One who appoints an agent to betroth a woman for him, and he went and betrothed her for himself—she is betrothed to the agent, and it is forbidden to do so; and anyone who does this, and the like, in other matters of purchase and sale,

is called wicked.

In its plain sense, the Rambam’s view implies that even the agent who betrothed the woman for himself is called wicked, and so wrote the Beit Shmuel [35:20], even though the beraita said that he acted with deceitful conduct and did not say that he is called wicked. And the Hatam Sofer [there] wrote that the Rambam learned this from what is explained below, 59a, that a poor man striving after a cake, and another came and took it, is called “wicked.” But according to most decisors, the sender is not considered one who is striving after a cake, and is not called wicked [and so it is written in Shulḥan Arukh, 35:9]. And in Noda BeYehuda [there] it is written that what the Rambam called “wicked” is not on account of “a poor man striving after a cake”; rather, the Rambam holds that “deceiver” means “wicked”; see there. Some of the later authorities wrote that according to the Rambam, the agent is not “wicked,” and what the Rambam wrote—that he is called “wicked”—refers only to matters of purchase and sale.

And our tanna

[of the Mishna] also holds like the Tosefta, because “

he went”

which he also teaches

in the Mishna

means that he went deceitfully.

And we object:

What is different here

[in the Mishna]

that it teaches: “

The one who says to his fellow

and it does not teach, ‘The one who says to his agent’”?