Kiddushin 58b (נח:) — the Talmud in English

He said to him

Rav Huna to Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin:

You are an hotza’a!

And he proceeded to explain it.

He —

Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin —

thought:

hotza’a

he was saying from a shema’ta, meaning: You are deriving this from this teaching, and it appears that you are not proficient in it.

that is: You derive this from this teaching, and it appears that you are not learned in it.

Rav Huna said to him

to Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin: Not as you thought; rather,

this is what I meant

to you [that was my intention]:

Rav Asi of Hutzal stands with you,

Rav Asi from Hutzal interprets our Mishna as you do; and “hotza’a” is an expression referring to Hutzal.

Let us say —

whether tovat hana’a is regarded as property or not —

that it is

a dispute between tannaim:

As it was taught in a beraita:

One who steals another’s tevel must pay him the value of his tevel,

including the value of the gifts contained within it,

the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He does not pay

the owner of the tevel

anything but the value of the non-sacred produce in it,

because the value of the teruma and ma’aser does not belong to him; rather, it belongs to a kohen and a Levite, and they cannot bring a claim against the thief, since he can say to each one: “I will not give it to you, but to your fellow.”

And

is this not the point of their dispute,

whether tovat hana’a is regarded as property:

For one

— Rabbi —

holds: The tovat hana’a

that an Israelite possesses with regard to the gifts

is property,

and therefore he pays him even the value of the teruma and ma’aser.

And the other

— Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda —

holds: tovat hana’a is not property,

and therefore he pays the Israelite nothing for the teruma and ma’aser.

And we reject this:

No,

not as you explained; rather,

everyone agrees that tovat hana’a is not property, and here we are dealing with one who steals

tevel

produce

that fell

to an Israelite

from his maternal grandfather’s house, the grandfather being a kohen

;

and

with regard to the law of whether

gifts that have not yet been separated are considered as though they had been separated

or not, that is what they

dispute:

One

— Rabbi —

holds: “

Gifts that have not yet been separated

[while in the possession of the kohen grandfather]

are considered as though they had been separated,”

and the grandfather acquired them in order to bequeath them to his grandson, who would need only to separate them, but could then take them for himself; therefore, the thief must pay him for those gifts as well.

And the other

— Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda —

holds: “

Gifts that have not yet been separated

are not considered as though they had been separated,” and it follows that the Israelite grandson must give the teruma and ma’aser to a kohen and a Levite, and possesses nothing in them but tovat hana’a. Therefore the thief does not pay him, because “tovat hana’a is not property.”

Alternatively, one may say: Everyone agrees that gifts that have not yet been separated are considered as though they had been separated;

and

everyone

agrees that tovat hana’a is not property, and here we are dealing with a case in which one stole ordinary tevel from an Israelite:

and here

they dispute only with regard to the teruma contained in the tevel. With regard to the ma’aser, everyone agrees that he need not pay him, since tovat hana’a is not property; but with regard to the teruma,

they dispute the law of Shmuel

[the ruling of Shmuel]

they dispute!

For Shmuel said: One grain exempts the pile.

Rabbi—

One

— Rabbi —

holds Shmuel’s ruling,

and the victim can say to the thief: I could have exempted the entire stolen pile with one grain; therefore, he pays him the value of the teruma as well.

And the other

— Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda —

does not accept Shmuel’s ruling, and therefore he does not pay him the value of the teruma, just as he does not pay him the value of the ma’aser.

Alternatively, one may say

to explain their dispute:

Everyone does not accept Shmuel’s ruling, and tovat hana’a is not property,

so by strict law he should have paid only the value of the non-sacred produce contained within it.

And here, this is the reason for Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling

that the thief must return to the Israelite the value of the teruma and ma’aser contained within it: because

the Sages penalized the thief,

since if he were not required to return them to the Israelite, he would not need to return them to a kohen or Levite either, as they are property without claimants: He can say to each one, “I will give them to someone else.” It would then turn out that “the sinner profits.” Therefore, the Sages penalized the thief by requiring him to pay the owner of the pile.

Alternatively, one may say

to explain their dispute:

Everyone accepts Shmuel’s ruling, and by strict law he would at least have been liable to pay the Israelite for the teruma, since he could have exempted the stolen produce with one grain; this is Rabbi’s position.

And here, this is the reason for Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling,

that he is not liable to pay the homeowner even the value of the teruma: because

the Sages penalized the homeowner,

so that he would not be paid for the teruma, because

he should not have left his produce in a state of tevel [he should not have left his produce unseparated].

We learned

in our Mishna:

One who betroths a woman with terumot, ma’aserot, gifts, mei hatat, or the ashes of the red heifer is betrothed, even if he is an Israelite:

The initial assumption is that he betroths her with the payment for mixing the water and ashes, and therefore the Gemara raises a contradiction:

And we raise a contradiction

from what we learned in tractate Bekhorot:

One who takes payment for judging: his judgments are void.

And one who takes payment

for testifying: his testimony is invalid.

And one who takes payment

for sprinkling

and for sanctifying

the mei hatat upon an impure person [mixing the ashes with the water is called “sanctification”]:

its water

is like

the water of a cave,

which is foul,

and its ashes are the ashes of a furnace,

as though they were ordinary ashes produced by something roasted in fire; that is, its sprinkling is not a valid sprinkling, and its sanctification is not valid sanctification.

If so, it is clear that he may not take payment; with what, then, does he betroth her!?

Abaye said: It is not difficult!

Here

— in our Mishna — he betroths her

with payment for transporting

the ashes from place to place,

and

with payment for

drawing

the water.

Here,

in the Mishna in Bekhorot, where we learned that he may not take payment, it is

with payment for sprinkling and sanctification

the ashes in the water.

This is also precise

as we explained our Mishna:

For it teaches here

in our Mishna: “

with mei hatat and the ashes of the red heifer,”

which implies that they have not yet been mixed, whereas

it teaches there

in the Mishna in Bekhorot: “

to sprinkle and to sanctify.”

And we conclude:

Mishna:

One who says

[one who said]

to his fellow: “

Go

[go] as my agent

and betroth a certain woman for me.”

And he went

the agent

and betrothed

that

the

woman

to himself,

she is

betrothed to the second man.

And

likewise

also:

One who says to a woman: “

Behold, you are betrothed to me

with this money, and the betrothal shall take effect only

after thirty days,”

the woman does not become betrothed to him until after thirty days.

And

therefore: If

another

man

came and betrothed

that

her during

those

thirty days,

she is

betrothed to the second man forever, since the second man’s betrothal took effect while this woman was unmarried, and when the time came for the first man’s betrothal to take effect, she was not betrothed to him, because she had already become a married woman, and another betrothal cannot take effect upon her.

forever, since the second man’s betrothal took effect while this woman was still unmarried. When the time comes for the first man’s betrothal to take effect, she is not betrothed to him, because she has already become a married woman, and another betrothal cannot take effect with regard to her.

a. Just as a male member of the priestly family is permitted to eat teruma, so too a daughter of a priest eats teruma. His wife likewise eats it, even if she is the daughter of an Israelite.

b. A daughter of a priest who became betrothed to an Israelite is like a non-priest and is forbidden to eat teruma.

And if the second man who betrothed her was a priest, she is

the daughter of an Israelite

who is betrothed

to a priest

and

may eat teruma,

and even if the first man who betrothed her was an Israelite, he does not prevent her from eating teruma, since she is betrothed to the second man, and the first man’s betrothal does not take effect at all.

But one who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

from now and after thirty days,”

this woman is not fully betrothed until thirty days have passed.

And

therefore: If

another

man

came and betrothed

that

her during

those

thirty days,

this woman is

betrothed and not betrothed

to both of them; that is, she is considered betrothed conditionally to both the first man and the second man. The Gemara will explain this law.

And if this woman was

the daughter of an Israelite

who was betrothed

to a priest, or

if she was

the daughter of a priest

who was betrothed

to an Israelite, she may not eat teruma.

The daughter of an Israelite betrothed to a priest may not eat teruma, lest the betrothal is not valid; a priest enables his wife to eat teruma only through a definite betrothal.

The daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite may not eat teruma, even though a priest’s daughter is permitted to eat teruma, because perhaps his betrothal is valid, and the betrothal of a non-priest disqualifies a priest’s daughter from eating teruma.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

One who says to his fellow, “Go and betroth

a certain woman for me,” and he went and betrothed her to himself, she is betrothed to the second man.

And

the tanna

taught in the Tosefta concerning this law:

What he did

the agent indeed

is effective, and the agent is permitted to marry that woman,

except that he acted toward him

[toward the sender]

deceitfully,

with deceitful conduct,

for if he had acted properly, he should have told him that he intended to betroth her to himself and was not going as his agent.

And the tanna of our Mishna

[of the Mishna] also holds as does the Tosefta, because

“he went”

which it also teaches

in the Mishna

indicates that he acted deceitfully

. And we challenge this:

Why is it different here

[in the Mishna]

that it teaches: “

One who says to his fellow

” rather than “One who says to his agent”?