Kiddushin 58a (נח.) — the Talmud in English

And I have only

non-sacred animals

that are unblemished

and fit to be offered

which are forbidden to eat when slaughtered in the Temple courtyard;

from where is it derived to include

also non-sacred animals

that have a blemish

which are forbidden to eat when slaughtered in the Temple courtyard?

And even if I were forced to say that

I include blemished animals

which are forbidden to eat when slaughtered in the Temple courtyard,

since they are of a type that is fit

for offering—

I would still say:

And from where is it derived to include the wild animal

which is forbidden to eat when slaughtered in the Temple courtyard?

And even if I were forced to say that

I include the wild animal

which is forbidden to eat when slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, because

its slaughter is like that of a domesticated animal—

I would still say:

From where is it derived to include birds

which are forbidden to eat when slaughtered in the Temple courtyard? Therefore,

the verse states: “

And he shall slaughter it,” “

And he shall slaughter it,” “

And he shall slaughter it.”

That is, since these were included as forbidden to be slaughtered, like unblemished animals, they were also included as forbidden to be eaten, like unblemished animals.

One might have thought that one should not slaughter

non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard,

but if

one transgressed and

slaughtered it, he should cast it before dogs;

that is, it should be permitted to derive benefit from it?

The verse states: “

And meat that is torn in the field [this is meat that left the boundary within which it was permitted, such as a fetus that extended its foreleg from its mother’s womb, as the mother’s womb is the fetus’s boundary with regard to slaughter, since its mother’s slaughter renders it permitted]

you shall cast to the dog.”

Therefore, the Torah added and said: “it,” to teach:

it—

the meat that became forbidden because it left its boundary—

you shall cast to a dog, but you may not cast

to a dog that which became forbidden because it entered within the boundary, namely,

non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard,

and this teaches that they are forbidden even to derive benefit from.

The Gemara relates that

Mar

found

Yehuda

Rav Yosef and Rav Shmuel, son of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who were standing at the entrance of Rabba’s study hall

when they were standing at the entrance to Rabba’s academy.

He said to them,

Mar Yehuda:

It was taught in a beraita: One who betroths a woman with the flesh of a firstborn donkey

before its breaking of the neck,

with meat cooked with milk, or with non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard:

Rabbi Shimon says: She is betrothed,

because in his view meat cooked with milk is permitted to derive benefit from, as explained above in his name; and Rabbi Shimon likewise said above that the flesh of a firstborn donkey is permitted to derive benefit from before its breaking of the neck. The reason concerning non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is explained in our discussion.

And the Sages say: She is not betrothed,

because in their view all these are substances from which it is forbidden to derive benefit.

Mar Yehuda challenged them:

Apparently,

as is demonstrated by this beraita,

non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, according to Rabbi Shimon, are not

forbidden by

Torah law

to derive benefit from.

And we raise a contradiction

from that which was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Shimon says: Non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard must be burned, and likewise a wild animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard.

The difficulty now is as follows: This works if they are forbidden to derive benefit from by Torah law. One can say that the Sages decreed that they be burned, rather than merely buried [like other substances from which it is forbidden to derive benefit, concerning which the Torah did not command that they be burned], due to concern that people might say: “They are sacrificial animals that became disqualified,” and conclude that disqualified sacrificial animals require burial, whereas this is not so; rather, their Torah-law status is that they must be burned. Once the Sages required that an animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard be burned, they did not distinguish and said:

Everything forbidden because it is a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard—even a wild animal, regarding which this decree does not apply—must likewise be burned.

But if the entire prohibition against deriving benefit from non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is only by rabbinic law, they should not have been stringent and required burning except with regard to a domesticated animal, because of the decree that people might say that disqualified sacrificial animals are buried. But with regard to a wild animal, to which this decree does not apply, they should not have been stringent.

Rav Yosef and Rav Shmuel were silent,

because they did not know how to answer him!

They came before Rabba

Rav Yosef and Rav Shmuel came before Rabba and told him what Mar Yehuda had challenged them:

Rabba said to them,

Rabba said to Rav Yosef and Rav Shmuel:

A contentious one

has silenced you

a contentious person, accustomed to disputing his colleagues, silenced you! And his objection is not an objection, because:

Rabbi Shimon actually maintains that non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard are forbidden by Torah law, and therefore the wild animal must also be burned. But

here—

in the beraita in which Rabbi Shimon said that if one betroths a woman with non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, she is betrothed—

with what case are we dealing? It is, for example, that it was slaughtered

in the Temple courtyard

and was found to be tereifa, and Rabbi Shimon follows his own reasoning,

for he permits non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard when they are found to be tereifa. And

as it was taught:

One who slaughters a tereifa

whose condition was apparent,

and likewise one who slaughters an animal and it is found to be a tereifa

through an examination after slaughter,

both this and that

are

non-sacred animals

that were slaughtered

in the Temple courtyard: Rabbi Shimon permits deriving benefit from them,

because he maintains everywhere: “Slaughter that is not fit [to render the meat permitted for eating] is not considered slaughter,” and these are not non-sacred animals that were “slaughtered” in the Temple courtyard.

And the Sages prohibit

in accordance with their view everywhere, that even “slaughter that is not fit” is considered slaughter.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he sold them and betrothed a woman with the proceeds, she is betrothed:

And we explain:

From where do we derive

that these substances from which it is forbidden to derive benefit do not cause the money received for them to assume their prohibition against benefit?

From the fact that the Merciful One explicitly stated

since the Torah explicitly stated

with regard to idolatry: “

You shall burn the graven images of their gods in fire … and you shall not bring an abomination into your house

and you shall be banned like it,” and this teaches:

every thing that you cause to exist from it

from the abomination, which is idolatry, such as when one sells it and receives money for it,

it is like it

and is forbidden to derive benefit from; we learn by inference:

that all other prohibitions in the Torah

that are forbidden to derive benefit from

permit

their money.

And we challenge this:

But

on the contrary,

let us derive from it

let us learn from idolatry that all substances from which it is forbidden to derive benefit throughout the Torah cause the money received for them to assume their prohibition as well!?

And we answer:

Because idolatry and the Sabbatical year are two verses that come as one,

both of which cause the money received for them to assume their prohibitions,

and two verses that come as one do not teach

a principle applicable

elsewhere.

The Gemara asks: The verse concerning

idolatry

is

the one we stated

the verse “and you shall be banned like it.”

And what is the second verse concerning

the Sabbatical year?

As it was taught:

It is written: “

It is the Jubilee; it shall be holy for you,”

the verse equated the Jubilee to something holy, in order to teach:

Just as something holy causes the money received for it to assume its sanctity, so too, the Sabbatical year causes the money received for its produce to assume its sanctity.

That is, the verse teaches that the Jubilee causes the money received for it to assume its sanctity, and the Sabbatical year is derived from it because it too is forbidden for plowing and sowing and was juxtaposed to the Jubilee.

Lest you say:

If, just as something holy causes the money received for it to assume its sanctity and

the original item itself

leaves its ordinary status, so too, the Sabbatical year causes the money received for it to assume its sanctity and itself leaves its ordinary status!?

The verse states: “

Holy

shall be”

it shall remain in its state

and shall not become permitted.

How

does the Sabbatical year cause the money received for its produce to assume its sanctity without the original produce leaving its sacred status?

If one purchased meat with Sabbatical-year produce: both this and that must be removed during the Sabbatical year

at the time when the produce must be removed, because the Sabbatical year caused the money received for it to assume its sanctity, while the original produce itself does not leave its sacred status.

But if he went and purchased

with meat—

which had assumed Sabbatical-year sanctity—

fish: the meat leaves

its Sabbatical-year sanctity, and

the fish enters

in its place, and the fish must be removed at the time when the produce must be removed.

He went and purchased

wine with fish: the fish leaves

and

the wine enters.

With wine, oil; the wine leaves

and

the oil enters—

How so? The last item assumes Sabbatical-year sanctity, while the original produce itself

the produce of the Sabbatical year itself

remains forbidden

forever.

We still challenge the explanation given for the source that substances from which it is forbidden to derive benefit do not cause the money received for them to assume their prohibition, namely, that they are “two verses that come as one”:

This works according to the one who says that two verses that come as one

do not teach, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one

do teach, what can be said!?

On the contrary, we should learn from idolatry and the Sabbatical year that substances from which it is forbidden to derive benefit cause the money received for them to assume their prohibition.

And we explain:

Restrictive terms are written

both with regard to idolatry and with regard to the Sabbatical year, teaching that they alone have this status, and not others:

For

it is written here

with regard to idolatry: “

For it is banned,”

“it” excludes; it comes to exclude other prohibitions.

And it is written there

with regard to the Sabbatical year: “

It is the Jubilee,”

and “it” comes to exclude:

it alone,

but

anything else—

no.

Mishna:

One who betroths a woman with terumot,

or

one who betroths her

with tithes, or

one who betroths her

with gifts

the foreleg, cheeks, and maw,

or with the water of the purification offering

water with which the ashes of the red heifer are mixed,

or with the ashes of a red heifer

red—

she is betrothed.

And even if he is an Israelite,

and the Gemara explains this.

Gemara:

Ulla said:

The benefit of discretion

that an Israelite has with regard to terumot, tithes, and gifts

is not money

with which to betroth a woman,

that is, if one betroths a woman with produce consisting of priestly gifts [teruma and the foreleg, cheeks, and maw, or tithes] that he must give to a koen or a Levite, but may give to any koen he wishes, and may receive a benefit of discretion from someone in exchange for giving it to a particular koen, and he betroths the woman with these items, she is not betrothed. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla from our Mishna:

One who betroths a woman with terumot, tithes, or gifts, with the water of the purification offering or with the ashes of the red heifer, she is betrothed, and even if he is an Israelite.

The meaning appears to be as follows: Even if an Israelite betroths a woman with these items, she is betrothed. This demonstrates that although he possesses no more than the benefit of discretion, as he may give them to any koen or Levite he wishes, she is betrothed, because he gave her that right!?

He said to him,

Ulla said to Rabba:

A koen or Levite who possesses untithed produce separates teruma and the tithe in order to remove the produce from its untithed status. However, he need not give them to a koen or Levite; rather, he himself has acquired them.

If a koen or Levite possessed untithed produce and bequeathed it to his daughters’ sons, who are Israelites, the status of the recipients depends on the question of whether “gifts that have not yet been separated are considered as though they have been separated.” If they are considered as though they have already been separated, the teruma was already in the koen’s possession and he had acquired it, and likewise the tithe was in the Levite’s possession. When they bequeathed the produce to their daughters’ sons, the latter acquired the untithed produce and the gifts contained within it, and they too need only separate them and may keep them for themselves.

Here—

what we learned in the Mishna, “even if he is an Israelite”—

refers to an Israelite who inherited untithed produce from his mother’s father, who was a koen,

and the tanna holds

that: “

Gifts that have not been separated”—

in the house of the maternal grandfather, the koen—

are considered as though they have been separated,”

and the grandfather acquired them and bequeathed them to his relatives, who will not need to give them to a koen when they separate them; rather, they will separate them and keep them for themselves.

And concerning this teruma they said in our Mishna that he can betroth a woman with it, because it belongs to him, and when she accepts it from him it will belong to her, and she can sell the teruma to a koen who will eat it.

and the kohein grandfather acquired them in order to bequeath them to his relatives, who would not need to give them to a kohein when they separated them, but could separate them and keep them for themselves.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin asked Rav Huna:

Is the benefit of discretion money or

is it not money?

He said to him,

Rav Huna said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin:

You have learned it

in our Mishna:

One who betroths a woman with terumot, tithes, or gifts

or with the water of the purification offering or with the ashes of the red heifer, she is betrothed, and even if he is an Israelite.

Thus, an Israelite who has nothing in the teruma except the benefit of discretion can betroth a woman with it. It is therefore proven that “the benefit of discretion is money.”

He said to him,

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said to Rav Huna:

But

is it the case that

we did not establish

it

as referring to

an Israelite who inherited untithed produce from his mother’s father, who was a koen!?

And this is as the Gemara rejected the proof from our Mishna above.