Kiddushin 60b (ס:) — the Talmud in English

And we ask:

What difference is there between them—between Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? According to everyone, if you give him two hundred zuz, she is divorced, and if you do not give them to him, she is not divorced. And even according to Rav Huna, as long as she has not given them to him, she is forbidden to marry, lest the condition not be fulfilled?

between the opinions of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? According to everyone, if she gives him two hundred dinars, she is divorced, and if she does not give them, she is not divorced. And even according to Rav Huna, as long as she has not given the money, she is forbidden to marry another man, lest the condition not be fulfilled?

A woman is divorced only if the get is extant at the time the divorce takes effect. Therefore, if he said to her, “You are divorced when you give me two hundred zuz,” the get must be extant when she gives the money.

And we explain:

The difference between them is in a case

such as

the get was torn

or was lost

before she fulfilled the condition.

According to Rav Huna, it is a valid get, since when she fulfilled the condition, the divorce took effect retroactively, and at the time the divorce took effect, the get had been extant. But

according to the opinion of

Rav Yehuda

who holds that the divorce takes effect only when the money is given, if the get was lost beforehand,

it is not a valid get,

and she is not divorced.

And it is necessary

to state Rav Huna’s ruling

both with regard to betrothal and with regard to divorce.

Because if it had been taught to us only

with regard to betrothal,

we might have said:

specifically

in this case Rav Huna said

that the betrothal is merely a condition and that the betrothal takes effect immediately,

because he comes to bring her closer to him

—the betrothal is intended to draw her close to him.

But with regard to divorce, since he comes to distance her, we might say:

Rav Huna concedes to Rav Yehuda

that one should say: A person does not hasten to distance his wife, and he does not resolve to divorce her until she gives him the money; perhaps they will become reconciled in the meantime.

And if their dispute had been stated

concerning

this [in the case of divorce], one could say:

specifically

in this case Rav Huna said

that she is divorced immediately, and that the husband was not concerned to delay the divorce until he received the money,

because he is not embarrassed to demand it from her

—he is not embarrassed to demand that she give the money and fulfill the condition.

But here,

with regard to betrothal,

since

he must give her money, and

she is embarrassed to demand it from him

—she is embarrassed to demand it from him—

we might say

[it should be said]:

he concedes to Rav Yehuda,

that the betrothal does not take effect until he gives it, since she is not reconciled to her betrothal until he gives it.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach Rav Huna’s statement both with regard to betrothal and with regard to divorce.

The following objection

is raised against Rav Yehuda from a beraita:

One who says to his wife: “

This is your get, on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz,”

even if the get was torn or lost, she is divorced,

as Rav Huna stated.

But

afterward, she may not marry until she

fulfills the condition and

gives

the money, for perhaps the condition will not be fulfilled, with the result that the get is void and her children are mamzerim.

And it was further taught

in accordance with Rav Huna:

He said to her: “

This is your get, on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz, and he died.”

If she

gave

him the money before he died, she is a “divorcee” and

is not

subject to levirate marriage.

But if she

did not give

it, the condition was not fulfilled and it is not a get; consequently, she is a “widow” and

is subject to levirate marriage.

him the money before he died, she is a “divorced woman,” and

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

disagrees and

says: Even if she did not give the money during her husband’s lifetime,

she may give

[she can give now] the money

to his father,

or to his brother,

or to one of his relatives

—his relatives.

disagrees and

says:

And yet,

the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree only

about the following:

one

—the Sages—

holds that when he said, “on the condition that you give me,” his intention was

to me

specifically,

and not to my heirs. And the other —Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds: “To me” is not meant specifically, and

even to my heirs,

if I die.

But

everyone agrees in any event that it is a condition, and even the first tanna concedes that if he explicitly said, “on the condition that you give it to me or to my heirs,” and he died, she gives the money to his heirs and is exempt from halitza, since the get took effect retroactively from the time it was given.

An refutation of Rav Yehuda

who says that it is not a get until she gives it, for according to his words, even if he explicitly says, “on the condition that you give it to me or to my heir,” and she gives the money after his death, she is not divorced, since there is no get after death. The beraita therefore presents a difficulty for Rav Yehuda!?

And we answer: It is not difficult, for

Rav Yehuda will say to you: Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi’s

[these beraitot follow Rabbi’s view].

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel]

For Rav Huna said in the name of

Rabbi: Anyone who states

a condition using the expression

“

on the condition,”

is considered as though he said: “I want this matter to take effect

from now,”

he is considered to have said so.

Therefore, Rabbi holds that one who says, “You are divorced on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” is equivalent to one who explicitly says, “You are divorced from now if you give me two hundred zuz.” Consequently, she may give the money to his heirs [according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel] even after his death, since when she fulfills the condition, the get takes effect retroactively from the time it was given. And the Sages disagree with him

[the Sages disagree with Rabbi] and hold that she is divorced only from the time the condition is fulfilled and thereafter, not retroactively.

And

Rav Yehuda will say:

I hold

in accordance with the Sages. The body of the matter:

The Gemara now discusses Rav Huna’s statement in the name of Rabbi:

Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi: Anyone who states

a condition using the expression “

on the condition”

is considered as though he said: “

from now

the matter shall take effect,”

he is considered to have said so.

He said

[he related]:

Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in Babylonia

[when we were in Babylonia]

we would say

[we thought]: That which Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi:

Anyone who states: “

on the condition”

is considered as though he said: “

from now,”

the Sages disagree with him. That is, we thought that the Sages disagree with Rabbi and hold that it is not considered as though he said “from now,” but that Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi.

But

when I went up there

[when I went up to Eretz Yisrael],

I found

Rabbi Asi sitting and saying this in the name of Rabbi Yohanan

[I found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying it in the name of Rabbi Yohanan]:

Rabbi Zeira said [

he related]:

Everyone

[both Rabbi and the Sages]

agrees that

when one says “

on the condition,”

it is considered as though he said “

from now.”

And

they disagree only

in the case of one who says: “You are divorced

from today and after death.”

when I went up there [

And it was taught

[in accordance with Rabbi Zeira’s statement ]: One who says, “You are divorced

from today and after death,”

it is a get and it is not a get

according to the words of the Sages.

For the Sages are uncertain: When he said “after death,” did he intend a condition, as though he had said, “from today if I die”? If so, when he dies and the condition is fulfilled, the get takes effect retroactively from the time it was given.

Or perhaps, initially he wanted to divorce her “from now,” and afterward he retracted and said to her: “You are divorced after death.” If so, it is not a get, because “there is no get after death.”

Therefore, according to the Sages, this woman is divorced subject to doubt, and is not divorced subject to doubt.

Rabbi

disagrees and

says:

A get

such as this is a valid get

because certainly his intention was a “condition” and not a “retraction.”

And we challenge this:

But according to Rav Yehuda, who says that in the case of one who says

“

on the condition”

they also disagree,

if so,

since they disagree [until the Sages and Rabbi disagreed]

in the case of one who says “

from today and after death,”

let them disagree

[let them disagree]

in the case of one who says “

on the condition”!? That is, according to Rav Yehuda, the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi applies both when one says “on the condition” and when one says “from today and after death.” If so, it would be preferable for them to say: In the case of one who says “on the condition,” it is a get and it is not a get, and it would follow by means of a kal va-chomer that in the case of one who says “from today and after death,” it is also a doubtful get. [Tosafot, Gittin 74b.] Why, then, did the Sages and Rabbi disagree with regard to “from today and after death,” and not with regard to “on the condition”!?

This is because the Sages are uncertain: When he said “after death,” did he mean it as a condition, as though he had said, “from today if I die”? In that case, when he dies and the condition is fulfilled, the bill of divorce takes effect retroactively from the time it was delivered.

And we answer: The reason the Sages and Rabbi disagree with regard to one who says “from today and after death,” and not with regard to one who says “on the condition,” is

to make known Rabbi’s power, for

even when one says “

from today and after death,”

Rabbi also

holds:

It is a valid get,

and all the more so when one says “on the condition.”

And we ask again:

Let them disagree in the case of one who says “

on the condition,”

to make known the power of the Sages!?

For “on the condition” contains a novelty in the words of the Sages, while “from today and after death” contains a novelty in the words of Rabbi. Why, then, did the tanna prefer to emphasize the novelty in Rabbi’s ruling!?

And we answer:

The power of the lenient ruling is preferable: That is, it was preferable for the tanna to state a novel ruling concerning Rabbi, who says that it is a completely valid get and that she is permitted to marry a stranger without halitza from the yavam, a novelty that leads to a leniency,

rather than to state a novel ruling concerning the Sages, who hold that it is a doubtful get; because of the doubt she is forbidden to a kohen and to the yavam, as a divorcee, and she is forbidden to a stranger without halitza, as a widow—a novelty that leads to stringency.

when one says

“from today and after death,”

let them dispute

[

let them disagree]

when one says

“on the condition”

!? That is, according to Rav Yehuda, the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi applies both when one says “on the condition” and when one says “from today and after death.” If so, it would be preferable for them to say that when one says “on the condition,” it is a bill of divorce and not a bill of divorce; then we would know by an a-fortiori inference that when one says “from today and after death,” it is certainly a doubtful bill of divorce. [Tosafot, Gittin 74b] Why, then, did the Sages and Rabbi dispute “from today and after death,” rather than “on the condition”

!?

And we answer: The reason the Sages and Rabbi dispute the case of one who says “from today and after death,” and not the case of one who says “on the condition,” is

to demonstrate Rabbi’s strength, for

even when he says

“from today and after death,”

also

Rabbi holds:

this is a valid bill of divorce,

and all the more so when he says: “on the condition

”.

And we ask again:

Let them dispute the case of one who says

“on the condition,”

to demonstrate the strength of the Sages’ position!?

For there is a novel aspect in the Sages’ statement in the case of “on the condition,” and there is a novel aspect in Rabbi’s statement in the case of “from today and after death.” Why did the tanna prefer to emphasize the novelty in Rabbi’s position!?

And we answer:

The strength of the lenient position is preferable:

That is, it was preferable for the tanna to state a novel point concerning Rabbi’s position, that it is a completely valid bill of divorce and she may marry a stranger without a release from levirate marriage by the husband’s brother, because this is a novel ruling that permits her, rather than to state a novel point concerning the Sages’ position, that it is a doubtful bill of divorce, and because of the doubt she is forbidden to a kohen—a member of the priestly family—and to the husband’s brother, as a divorced woman, while she is forbidden to marry a stranger without a release from levirate marriage, as a widow, which is a novel ruling that imposes stringency.

We learned in the Mishna: If one says to a woman, “You are hereby betrothed to me

on the condition that I give you

two hundred zuz

from now

until thirty days,” if he gives them to her within thirty days, she is betrothed; and if not, she is not betrothed.

And we raise an objection: What novel point is there in this? For if he did not give them to her within thirty days, he did not fulfill the condition, and

it is obvious

that she is not betrothed!?

And we answer: Indeed, there is a novel point here, for

you might say [

perhaps you would say]:

it is not a condition,

because she is not particular about the matter,

and

what he said, “from now until thirty days,” he

said

merely

to urge himself [

in order to urge himself to fulfill his condition].

This teaches us

that it is a full-fledged condition.

We learned in the Mishna: If one says to a woman, “You are hereby betrothed to me

on the condition that I have two hundred zuz,”

she is betrothed, and he has them [if he has them].

And we raise an objection: From the language of the Mishna it is implied that if he does not have them, she is not betrothed,

and

why?

Let us be concerned [

for there is reason for concern]

that perhaps he has them,

and how can we say with certainty that she is not betrothed!?

Furthermore,

this

was taught

explicitly in a beraita:

We are concerned that perhaps he has them!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult;

for

this [

the Mishna] deals

with definite betrothal,

and if we do not know that he has them, she is not betrothed with regard to definite betrothal.

And

this [

the beraita] deals

with doubtful betrothal,

and indeed, even if we do not know that he has them, we are concerned that perhaps he has them, and she is therefore doubtfully betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna: If one says to a woman, “You are hereby betrothed to me

on the condition that I show you two hundred zuz,”

she is betrothed, and he must show them to her.

And the

tannai

explains it in a beraita:

This woman did not intend

merely that he show her unspecified money;

rather, her intention was that he show her his own

money, and if he showed her money belonging to others, she is not betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if he showed them to her on the table [

if he is a money changer],

she is not betrothed.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious,

for she intended only that he show her money of his own, whereas the money on the table does not belong to him, but to others who have come to exchange their money for it!?

And we answer:

It is necessary, even though he holds business-investment funds.

That is, the Mishna would have needed to state this law even with regard to a money changer who received money from his fellow in order to exchange it and receive compensation for doing so, after which the money changer and the owner of the money would divide the profit, and thus this money is in the money changer’s possession so that he may generate profit with it.

One might have thought that money he received in order to conduct a “business investment” [a commercial venture for half the profit] is considered like his own money, and he has shown her money of his own.

This teaches us otherwise! The condition is not fulfilled by this, because her intention was that the money be entirely his.

Mishna:

If one says to a woman, “You are hereby betrothed to me,

on the condition that I have a beit kor of land” [

a place suitable for sowing a kor — thirty se'a of grain; that is, an area of seventy-five thousand square cubits],

she is betrothed, and he has it

[if he has it].

If one says to a woman, “You are hereby betrothed to me,

on the condition that I have

a beit kor of land

in a particular place,”

if he has it in that place, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

If one says to a woman, “You are hereby betrothed to me,

on the condition that I show

you

a beit kor of land,”

she is betrothed, and he must show it to her

[if he shows it to her].

And if

he said this to her and

showed

her a beit kor of land

in an open plain,

that is, he showed her an open plain and said to her, “Here is a large plain containing many beit kor of land,”

she is not betrothed,

because the land does not belong to him.

Gemara:

And we raise an objection: From the language of the Mishna, “She is betrothed, and he has it,” it is implied that if he has it, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

And

why?

Let us be concerned that perhaps he has it!?

Furthermore,

this

was taught

explicitly:

We are concerned that perhaps he has it!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult; this

[

the Mishna] deals

with definite betrothal, and if we do not know that he has a beit kor of land, she is not betrothed with definite betrothal.

This

[

the beraita] deals

with doubtful betrothal, and even if we do not know that he has it, we are concerned that perhaps he has it, and she is therefore doubtfully betrothed.

And we raise an objection:

Why is it necessary

for the tannai of the beraita

to state

that we are concerned that perhaps he has it

with regard to land, and why is it necessary

to state it with regard to money as well!?

That is, why did the tannai need to teach us this novel point twice, both with regard to land and with regard to money!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

to state it with regard to both!

For if the tannai had taught us

only

with regard to money, I would have said: We are concerned specifically with regard to money,

because

people are accustomed to conceal it [

people are accustomed to conceal their money], and there is concern that perhaps he has two hundred zuz even though we do not know of it.

But with regard to land, if we do not know that he has a beit kor of land,

one might say [

we should say]: We should have no concern at all regarding his betrothal, because

if he has land,

then

there would be publicity [

if he indeed has land, the matter would be known and publicized], and if there is no publicity concerning it, this indicates that he has no land at all.

This teaches us otherwise!

We are concerned even with regard to land that perhaps he has land of which we are unaware.

We learned in the Mishna: If he said to her: “

On the condition that I have it in a particular place,”

if he has it

in that particular place, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

And we raise an objection: What novel point is there in this?

It is obvious

that if he does not have it in that place, the condition was not fulfilled, even though he has land elsewhere!?

And we answer: Indeed, there is a novel point here, for

you might say [

perhaps you would say]: There is no full-fledged condition here, since he could

say to her, “What difference does it make to you

” [

what do you care] if the land is far away? You do not need to trouble yourself over the matter, because

I will take the trouble and bring it

[

I will take the trouble to go to that place and bring the produce]. This teaches us otherwise!

It is a full-fledged condition, and if he does not have it in that place, she is not betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna: “

On the condition that I show you a beit kor of land,”

she is betrothed, and he must show it to her.

The tannai

[

explains it in a beraita]:

This woman intended only to see a beit kor of land

of his own;

and if he shows her land belonging to others, she is not betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if he showed it to her in an open plain, she is not betrothed.

And we challenge this:

It is obvious,

for the land in the open plain does not belong to him, and the condition was not fulfilled!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

for the Mishna to teach this, in order to teach us the case of a tenant farmer

who holds

the land

as an aris [

that the land is in his possession as a tenant farmer].

For one might have thought that since the land is in his possession in order to work it and eat from its produce, it is like land of his own, and the condition has been fulfilled.

This teaches us otherwise! She is not betrothed, since the land does not belong to him.

The Gemara now discusses whether that “beit kor of land” stipulated by the betrother must be in one place, or whether the condition is fulfilled even if part of it is in one place and part in another.

For

with regard to consecrated property we learned:

1. One who consecrates a field from his ancestral estate [which he inherited from his father] and comes to redeem it from the consecrated property does not have the field assessed according to its value. Rather, whether it is a good field or a poor field, the redemption valuation of consecrated fields is the same: land suitable for sowing a kor [thirty se'a] of barley is redeemed for fifty silver shekels.