Kiddushin 60b — the Talmud in English

And we ask:

What is the difference between them—between Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? In either case, according to everyone, if you give him two hundred zuz, she is divorced, and if you do not give them, she is not divorced. And even according to Rav Huna, as long as she has not given them, she is forbidden to marry, lest the condition not be fulfilled?

between the opinions of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda? According to everyone, if she gives him two hundred dinars, she is divorced, and if she does not give them, she is not divorced. And even according to Rav Huna, as long as she has not given the money, she is forbidden to marry another man, lest the condition not be fulfilled?

A woman is divorced only if the get exists at the time when the divorce takes effect. Therefore, if he said to her, “You are divorced when you give me two hundred zuz,” the get must exist at the time of the giving of the money.

And we explain:

There is a difference between them:

for example,

the get was torn

or was lost,

before she fulfilled the condition.

According to Rav Huna, it is a valid get,

since when she fulfilled the condition, the divorce takes effect retroactively, and at the time when the divorce took effect, the get existed. But

a

ccording to

Rav Yehuda,

who holds that the divorce takes effect only at the time of the giving of the money, if the get was lost beforehand,

it is not a valid get,

and she is not divorced.

And it is necessary

to teach Rav Huna’s statement both with regard to betrothal and with regard to divorce.

Because

if it had been taught to us

only

with regard to betrothal,

we would have said:

In this case Rav Huna said

that it is merely a condition, and the betrothal takes effect immediately,

because he comes to draw her close [the betrothal comes to draw her close to him].

the betrothal is intended to draw her close to him].

But with regard to divorce, since he comes to distance her,

he

comes, one might say:

Rav Huna concedes

to Rav Yehuda

that one should say: A person does not hasten to distance his wife, and he does not conclusively decide to divorce her until she gives [the money]; perhaps they will be reconciled in the meantime.

And if their dispute was stated

with regard to

this [with regard to divorce],

one could say: Specifically

in this case he

said

Rav Huna

that she is divorced immediately, and the husband did not fear postponing the divorce until he received the money,

because he is not embarrassed to demand it from her [he is not embarrassed to demand that she give the money and fulfill the condition].

he is not embarrassed to demand that she give him the money and fulfill the condition].

But here,

with regard to betrothal,

where

he must give her money, and

she is embarrassed to demand it from him [she is embarrassed to demand it from him],

one might say

[it should be said]:

this may be suggested]:

He concedes to Rav Yehuda,

that the betrothal does not take effect until he gives [the money], since she is not reconciled to her betrothal until he gives it.

Therefore,

it is necessary to teach us Rav Huna’s statement both with regard to betrothal and with regard to divorce.

to teach Rav Huna’s statement both with regard to betrothal and with regard to divorce.

The following objection is raised, to challenge Rav Yehuda from a beraita:

against Rav Yehuda from a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

One who says to his wife: “

This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,”

even though the get was torn or was lost, she is divorced,

according to Rav Huna.

But

afterward she may not marry until she

fulfills the condition and

gives

the money, for perhaps the condition will not be fulfilled, and it will emerge that the get was void and her children are mamzerim.

And it was further taught

in accordance with Rav Huna:

He said to her: “

This is your get, on condition that you give me two hundred zuz—and he died.”

If

she gave

him the money before he died, she is “divorced,” and

she is not

disagrees and

subject to levirate marriage. But if

but if

she did not give

it, the condition was not fulfilled and it is not a get; therefore she is a “widow,” and

she is subject to levirate marriage.

or to one of his relatives

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

disagrees and

says:

Even though she did not give the money during her husband’s lifetime,

she gives [she may give now]

she may now give] the money

to his father,

the husband’s [father],

or to his brother,

or to one of the relatives

of her husband.

But behold,

up to this point they do not disagree,

the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

but one master [the Sages]

the Sages]

holds: When he said, “on condition that you give me,” his intention was

An refutation of Rav Yehuda

to me

specifically,

and not to my heirs.

And the other master [Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel]

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel]

holds: “To me” is not specifically, and

Rabbi: Anyone who states

even to my heirs

if I die.

But

in any event, according to everyone it is a condition,

and even the first tanna concedes that if he explicitly said, “On condition that you give me or my heirs,” and he died, she gives the money to his heirs and is exempt from halitza, since the get takes effect retroactively from the time it was given.

A refutation of Rav Yehuda,

who says: It is not a get until she gives [the money]. For according to him, even if he explicitly says, “On condition that you give me or my heir,” and she gives the money after his death, she is not divorced, because there is no get after death. The beraita therefore presents a difficulty for Rav Yehuda!? And we answer: It is not difficult, for

he said [Rav Yehuda will answer you]:

[

Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi’s [these beraitot follow Rabbi].

I hold

For Rav Huna said in the name of

Rabbi:

Rabbi: Anyone who states

a condition with the wording

“on condition”,

is considered as though he said: “I want this matter to take effect

from now

from now,”

he is considered.

Therefore, Rabbi holds: One who says, “You are divorced on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” is treated as one who explicitly said, “You are divorced from now if you give me two hundred zuz.” Consequently, she may give the money to his heirs [according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel] even after his death, because when she fulfills the condition, the get takes effect retroactively from the time it was given.

And the Sages disagree with him [the Sages disagree with Rabbi] and hold: She is divorced only from the time of fulfillment of the condition onward, not retroactively.

the Sages disagree with Rabbi] and hold that she is divorced only from the time the condition is fulfilled and thereafter, not retroactively.

And

Rav Yehuda will say:

I am stating my opinion

[

in accordance with the Sages.

The body of the matter:

Now the Gemara discusses Rav Huna’s statement in the name of Rabbi:

Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi: Anyone who states

a condition with the wording

“on condition”

is considered as though he said

“from now”

the matter shall take effect,

he is considered.

Rabbi Zeira said [he related]:

he related]:

When we were in Babylonia,

[

we used to say [we held] that

when one says “

what Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi: Anyone who states: “

on condition”

is considered as though he said: “

from now,”

the Sages disagree with him.

That is, we held that the Sages disagree with Rabbi and maintain that it is not considered as though he said “from now,” but Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi.

But

when I went up there [when I went up to the Land of Israel],

when I went up to the Land of Israel],

I found

Rabbi Asi sitting and saying it in the name of Rabbi Yohanan [I found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying in the name of Rabbi Yohanan]:

I found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying it in the name of Rabbi Yohanan]:

Everyone [both Rabbi and the Sages]

between Rabbi and the Sages]

agrees

that

that when one says “

on condition,”

it is considered as though he said “

from now,”

he is considered.

And

they disagreed

only when one says: “You are divorced

from today

and after death.”

they also disagree,

And it was taught

[according to Rabbi Zeira’s words]: One who says, “You are divorced from today

and after death,”

this is

a get and is not a complete get

according to

the words of the Sages.

on the condition”!? That is, according to Rav Yehuda, the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi applies both when one says “on the condition” and when one says “from today and after death.” If so, it would be preferable for them to say: In the case of one who says “on the condition,” it is a get and it is not a get, and it would follow by means of a kal va-chomer that in the case of one who says “from today and after death,” it is also a doubtful get. [Tosafot, Gittin 74b.] Why, then, did the Sages and Rabbi disagree with regard to “from today and after death,” and not with regard to “on the condition”!?

For the Sages are uncertain: When he said “after death,” was his intention a condition, as though he had said, “from today if I die,” and then, when he dies and the condition is fulfilled, the get takes effect retroactively from the time it was given?

Or perhaps, initially he wanted to divorce her “from now,” and afterward he retracted and said to her: “You are divorced after death.” If so, it is not a get, because “there is no get after death.”

Therefore, according to the Sages, this woman is doubtfully divorced and is doubtfully not divorced.

Rabbi

disagrees and

says:

A get

such as this is a

complete get, because certainly his intention was a “condition” and not a “retraction.”

And we challenge:

But according to Rav Yehuda, who says: When one

says

“on condition,”

they also disagree,

if so,

rather than disagreeing [before they disagreed] the Sages and Rabbi

until the Sages and Rabbi dispute]

when one

says

“from today and after death,”

let them disagree [let them disagree]

let them disagree]

when one

says

“on condition”!? That is, according to Rav Yehuda, the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi applies both when one says “on condition” and when one says “from today and after death.” If so, it would be preferable for them to say: One who says “on condition”—it is a get and is not a get; and from this we would know, by means of a kal va-chomer, that when one says “from today and after death,” it is a doubtful get. [Tosafot, Gittin 74b] Why, then, did the Sages and Rabbi disagree regarding “from today and after death,” and not regarding “on condition”!?

!?

And we answer: The reason the Sages and Rabbi disagreed when one says “from today and after death,” and not when one says “on condition,” was in order

to make known Rabbi’s strength, for

even when one says

“from today and after death,”

also

Rabbi holds:

this is a get,

and all the more so when one says: “On condition.”

And we again challenge:

Let them disagree when one

says

“on condition,”

to make known the strength of the Sages!?

For with regard to “on condition” there is a novelty in the words of the Sages, while with regard to “from today and after death” there is a novelty in the words of Rabbi. Why did the tanna prefer to emphasize the novelty in Rabbi’s words!?

And we answer:

The strength of the permissive ruling is preferable:

That is, it was preferable for the tanna to state a novelty concerning Rabbi’s opinion, who says that it is a completely valid get and that she is permitted to marry a stranger without halitza from the yavam, which is a novelty toward leniency, rather than to state a novelty concerning the Sages’ opinion, who hold that it is a doubtful get, and because of the doubt she is forbidden to a kohen and to a yavam, as a divorced woman, and is forbidden to a stranger without halitza, as a widow, which is a novelty toward stringency.

We learned in the Mishna: One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on condition that I give you

two hundred zuz

from now

until thirty days”—if he gave them to her within thirty days, she is betrothed; and if not, she is not betrothed.

And we raise an objection: What novelty is there in this matter? After all, if he did not give them to her within thirty days, he did not fulfill the condition, and

peshita

that she is not betrothed!?

And we answer: Indeed, there is a novelty here, for

mahu de-teima

[lest you say]:

it is not a condition,

because she is not particular about the matter,

and

what he said, “from now until thirty days,”

he said merely to urge himself

alone

he said. [To urge himself to fulfill his condition]

in order to urge himself to fulfill his condition].

It teaches us this:

It is a complete condition.

We learned in the Mishna: One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on condition that I have two hundred zuz”—

she is betrothed, and he has them [if he has them].

And we raise an objection: From the language of the Mishna it is implied that if he does not have them, she is not betrothed,

and

why

should we not be concerned

[for there is reason for concern]

perhaps he has them,

and how can we say with certainty that she is not betrothed!?

Furthermore,

this

it was taught

explicitly in a beraita:

We are concerned that perhaps he has them!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

for

this

[the Mishna] deals

with definite betrothal,

and if it is not known to us that he has them, she is not betrothed with definite status.

And

this

[the beraita] deals

with doubtful betrothal,

and indeed, even if it is not known to us that he has them, we are concerned that perhaps he has them, and she has the status of doubtfully betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna: One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me

on condition that I show you two hundred zuz”

she is betrothed, and he will show them to her.

And the

tanna

explains it

in the beraita:

This woman did not intend that he show her money without specification,

but rather to see money belonging to him

was her intention; and if he showed her money belonging to others, she is not betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if he showed her [the money] on the table

[if he is a moneychanger who exchanges coins]

she is not betrothed.

And we challenge:

Peshita,

for she intended only to see money belonging to him, whereas the money on the table does not belong to him, but to others who come to exchange their money!?

And we answer:

It is necessary, [to teach this] even though he holds business-investment money.

That is, the Mishna did not need to tell us this law except concerning a moneychanger who received money from his fellow in order to exchange it, and to receive payment for this, and afterward the moneychanger and the owner of the money divide the profit, and it follows that this money is in the moneychanger’s possession in order to profit with it.

It might enter your mind to say: Money that he received in order to conduct “business investment” [a commercial enterprise for half the profit] is like his money, and he has shown her money belonging to him.

It teaches us this! The condition was not fulfilled by this, because her intention was money that belongs entirely to him.

Mishna:

One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me,

on condition that I have a field of the measure of a kor of earth”

[a place suitable for sowing a kor—thirty se'a of grain; that is, an area of seventy-five thousand square cubits]

she is betrothed, and he has it

[if he has it].

One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me,

on condition that I have

a field of the measure of a kor of earth

in a particular place,”

if he has it in that place, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

One who says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me,

on condition that I show

you

a field of the measure of a kor of earth,”

she is betrothed, and he will show it to her

[if he shows it to her],

and if

he said this to her and

showed

her a field of the measure of a kor

in an open valley,

that is, he showed her an open valley and said to her: “Here is a large valley, and in it are several fields of the measure of a kor,”

she is not betrothed,

because they do not belong to him.

Gemara:

And we raise an objection: From the language of the Mishna: “She is betrothed, and he has it,” it is implied that if he has it, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

And

why

should we not be concerned that perhaps he has it!?

Furthermore,

this

it was taught

explicitly:

We are concerned that perhaps he has it!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult; this

[the Mishna] deals

with definite betrothal,

and if it is not known to us that he has a field of the measure of a kor of earth, she is not betrothed with definite betrothal.

This

[the beraita] deals

with doubtful betrothal,

and even if it is not known to us that he has it, we are concerned that perhaps he has it, and she has the status of doubtfully betrothed.

And we raise an objection:

Why is it necessary

for the tanna of the beraita

to state

“we are concerned that perhaps he has it”

concerning land, and why is it necessary

for him

to state it concerning zuz!?

That is, why did the tanna need to teach us this novelty twice, both with regard to land and with regard to money!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

to state it concerning both!

For if the tanna had taught us

only

concerning zuz,

I would have said: It is specifically with regard to zuz that we are concerned,

because people are accustomed to conceal

[people are accustomed to conceal their money], and there is concern that perhaps he has two hundred zuz, even though they are not known to us.

But with regard to land,

if it is not known to us that he has a field of the measure of a kor of earth,

say

[one might say]: We are not concerned about his betrothal at all, because

if he has land,

then

it has publicity

[if he indeed has land, there is a public report and publicity concerning the matter], and if there is no publicity concerning the matter, it is an indication that he has no land at all.

It teaches us this!

Even with regard to land, we are concerned that perhaps he has land that is not known to us.

We learned in the Mishna: If he said to her: “

On condition that I have it in a particular place,”

if he has it

in that particular place, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.

And we raise an objection: What novelty is there in this?

Peshita

that if he does not have it in that place, the condition was not fulfilled, even though he has land in another place!?

And we answer: Indeed, there is a novelty here, for

mahu de-teima

[lest you say]: There is no complete condition here, since he can

say to her, “What difference does it make to you

from it

[what concern is it to you] if the land is far away? After all, you do not need to trouble yourself with the matter, because

I will trouble myself and bring it

[I will trouble myself to go to that place and bring the produce].

It teaches us this!

It is a complete condition, and if he does not have it in that place, she is not betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna: “

On condition that I show you a field of the measure of a kor of earth,”

she is betrothed, and he will show it to her.

It was taught

[it is explained in a beraita]:

This woman intended only to see

a field of the measure of a kor of earth

belonging to him;

and if he shows her land belonging to others, she is not betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if he showed her [land] in an open valley, she is not betrothed.

And we challenge:

Peshita,

for the land in the open valley does not belong to him, and the condition was not fulfilled!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

for the Mishna—rather, to teach us concerning a tenant farmer

who holds

the land

as a sharecropper. [That the land is in his possession as a sharecropper].

that the land is in his possession as a tenant farmer].

For it might enter your mind to say: Since the land is in his possession, to work it and eat from its produce, it is like land belonging to him, and the condition was fulfilled.

It teaches us this! She is not betrothed, since the land does not belong to him.

The Gemara now discusses whether that same “field of the measure of a kor of earth” concerning which the betrother stipulated must be in one place, or whether the condition is fulfilled even if part of it is in one place and part of it is in another place.

For

concerning consecrated property we learned:

A. One who consecrates from his ancestral field [which he inherited from his father] and comes to redeem it from the consecrated property does not have the field evaluated according to its value. Rather, whether it is a good field or whether it is a poor field, the redemption-price of consecrated property is the same: an area fit for sowing a kor [thirty seah] of barley is redeemed for fifty silver shekels.