Kiddushin 52a — the Talmud in English

The brother

the one

[the sole one]

performs halitza with both of them,

since each one is of uncertain status as a woman bound to him by levirate bond, and he should not perform yibbum with either one, for perhaps she is the sister of the woman bound to him, who is forbidden to him even after he has performed halitza with her sister

; and the two: one

of them

performs halitza

with one,

and one

even

performs yibbum

if he wishes to [take] the second one [after the sole one has performed halitza, and after his brother’s halitza], since in either case she is permitted to him: if she is his yevama, all is well; and if she is the sister of his yevama, it is her brother who performed halitza for his yevama, and this one is not forbidden to him.

If

the two brothers of the one

preceded

and took the two women [as wives] after the sole brother had performed halitza with both of them,

they do not remove them from their possession,

for even if you say that one of them encountered the sister of the woman bound to him by levirate bond, the levirate bond of her sister had already been removed through his brother’s yibbum, and the prohibition—the rabbinic prohibition against one who encounters the sister of the woman bound to him by levirate bond—which he committed, he committed.

And it teaches us

specifically: performing halitza

the sole brother

and afterward performing yibbum

one of the two after his brother’s halitza, as we learned: “The one performs halitza with both of them, and the two: one performs halitza and one performs yibbum

; but performing yibbum

one of the two

and afterward performing halitza

the sole one—

no;

and even if he took her [as a wife], he must divorce her, because

he encounters

at the time of yibbum

a yevama to the market [who is forbidden to him by Torah law], for she may be bound by levirate bond to the sole brother, who has not yet performed halitza with her.

[since she is forbidden to him by Torah law], for she may be bound to the only brother, who has not yet performed chalitza with her.

Ta shma

that the statement “Kiddushin that are not suited for consummation are valid kiddushin” [can be derived] from this,

as Tavyomi taught

a beraita:

If

this one

[one of the men in the marketplace]

had five sons

who appointed him as an agent to betroth a woman for them,

and this one

[another man in the marketplace]

had five daughters, and he said

to his fellow: “

One of your daughters is betrothed to one of my sons”:

Each and every one

of the five daughters

requires five divorce documents

from each of the five sons, for each one of them is of uncertain status as betrothed to each of the sons.

One of them died

of the five sons,

each and every one

of the daughters

requires four divorce documents

from the four remaining brothers, for each one is of uncertain status as betrothed to each of these four,

and

she additionally requires

halitza from one of them,

for perhaps she is the wife of the deceased brother, and the halitza of one of the brothers permits her.

And for Rava there is a difficulty: Why were the kiddushin valid at all? They are “kiddushin that are not suited for consummation”!

And if you say, here too

what are we dealing with?

When they were identified and ultimately became mixed up;

it is impossible to establish it this way, for

this “

One of your daughters to one of my sons”

it teaches,

and it implies that this was the wording he said to the father of the daughters.

And we conclude:

a refutation of Rava—

a refutation!

And the halakha is in accordance with Abaye in “

Lamed-Gimel

”,

which is a mnemonic for six halakhot in which Abaye and Rava disagreed and in which the halakha follows Abaye, and this is one of them: “

K

iddushin that are not suited for consummation.”

We learned in the Mishna: “And

an incident involving five women

among whom were two sisters: one man gathered a basket of figs, and it belonged to them, and it was produce of the Sabbatical year, and he said: ‘Behold, all of you are betrothed to me with this basket,’ and one of them received it on behalf of them all; and the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed”:

Rav said: Learn from the Mishna

[from our Mishna]

four

laws—

And

the Gemara, however, adds that

Rav held in his hand

only

three [only three laws were established in his possession, which he arranged in the version of the Gemara], and later it explains the reason.

[only three laws were established in his version, in the order in which they appear in the Gemara], and below it explains why.

These are the three laws that Rav arranged in the order of his version:

a.

Learn from this: One who betroths

a woman

with produce of the Sabbatical year,

she is

betrothed,

as was the case in the incident brought in our Mishna; and we learn that one does not say: It is not the property of the one who acquires it; rather, once he acquired it, it is his property for every matter. b.

And learn from this: If he betrothed her with stolen property, she is not betrothed,

and

even with property stolen from her [property that he stole from the woman being betrothed], she is not betrothed, and one does not say: Since she received it from him for the purpose of kiddushin, she waived her claim.

And we explain:

From where,

how is this law learned from our Mishna?

From the fact that it teaches

in our Mishna: “

It belonged to them, and it was produce of the Sabbatical year,”

it therefore implies:

The reason

that the unrelated women are betrothed with produce with which the one who betrothed them betrothed them, because it was produce

of the Sabbatical year,

it

was ownerless,

and the one who betrothed them acquired it;

this

but if he betrothed them with their produce

of the other years of the seven-year cycle,

which is not ownerless, and is stolen property in his possession,

no,

the unrelated women whose produce was stolen from them would not be betrothed. c.

And learn from this,

from the fact that the three unrelated women became betrothed through one of them receiving it:

A woman may become an agent for her fellow, even in a case where she becomes her rival wife.

And we explain:

And the other—

the fourth law, which Rav did not arrange in the version of the Gemara—

what is it,

what is the additional law that can be learned from our Mishna?

d. “Betrothals that do not allow for intercourse,”

whether they are valid betrothals or not.

And we challenge:

And should he count it,

that is, why did Rav not arrange it in his version of the Gemara!?

And we answer:

Because it is uncertain to him

to Rav, in the interpretation of our Mishna:

If

the interpretation interpreted by

Abaye

[above, 51b] in our Mishna is correct, then according to his interpretation it follows that one can prove from our Mishna: “Kiddushin that are not suited for consummation are valid kiddushin,” for according to his words it is explained in our Mishna that one who betroths one of two sisters, she is betrothed.

If

the interpretation interpreted by

Rava

[there] in our Mishna is correct, then according to his interpretation it follows that one can prove from our Mishna: “Kiddushin that are not suited for consummation are not valid kiddushin,” for according to his interpretation it is explained in our Mishna that one who betroths one of two sisters—even one of them is not betrothed.

And since Rav was uncertain, he therefore said: it is certainly proven from our Mishna the law of “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation,” but nevertheless he cannot arrange it in the version of the Gemara, because he does not know whether it proves that they are kiddushin, or perhaps it proves that they are not kiddushin.

When Rabbi Zeira ascended [

when he ascended]

Rabbi Zeira

from Babylonia to the Land of Israel,

he stated this teaching

of Rav

before Rabbi Yohanan [

he stated the aforementioned teaching in the name of Rav, who was in Babylonia, to Rabbi Yohanan, who was in the Land of Israel]!

Rabbi Yohanan said to him

Rabbi Yohanan to Rabbi Zeira:

Did Rav say this

that “if he betrothed her with stolen property, she is not betrothed, even with property stolen from her”?!

And it entered our understanding that Rabbi Yohanan was astonished: is it possible that Rav would say so? Therefore we ask concerning Rabbi Yohanan:

And

is it that

he [

Rabbi Yohanan himself]

did not say

this—that stolen property in the robber’s possession is not his property, and consequently he cannot betroth her with it?!

But Rabbi Yohanan said

himself:

If one stole

a person’s property

and the owners did not despair, both of them—

the robber and the person robbed—

cannot consecrate

the object in the robber’s possession,

this one—

the robber—cannot consecrate it

because it is not his, and this one—

the person robbed—cannot consecrate it,

because it is not in his possession [

under his control]?! Thus, even according to Rabbi Yohanan himself, stolen property is not the robber’s property, and consequently he cannot betroth a woman with it, just as Rav said. What, then, was Rabbi Yohanan astonished at Rav?! And we answer: Rabbi Yohanan was not astonished at the law; rather,

this is what Rabbi Yohanan said to him

Rabbi Yohanan to Rabbi Zeira:

Did Rav say according to my view [

did Rav indeed say like me]?!

They raised an objection

against Rav from what was taught in a beraita:

If he betrothed her with stolen property

belonging to others,

with property taken by force [

an object purchased with money against its owner’s will],

or with theft, or he snatched a sela from her hand and betrothed her

with it, she is

betrothed,

so she is betrothed even with property stolen from others, and this is unlike Rav?!

And we answer:

There—

where we taught: “If he betrothed her with stolen property”

— what are we dealing with?

With property stolen from her,

and therefore she is betrothed, as he proceeds to explain. And we challenge this:

But since the latter clause teaches: “

or he snatched a sela [

belonging to her] [

from her hand],

by inference,

it necessarily follows that

the first clause

of the beraita: “If he betrothed her with stolen property, with property taken by force, and with theft,” is not dealing with property stolen from her, but

with ordinary stolen property [

from others]

we are dealing;

and nevertheless it teaches that she is betrothed?!

And we answer:

It is explaining

the first clause through the latter clause. And this is what it says:

If he betrothed her with stolen property, with property taken by force, or with theft—how so? For example, he snatched a sela from her hand,

and betrothed her with it,

she is betrothed; and the beraita is never dealing with property stolen from others, and she is not betrothed with it.