Kiddushin 52a (נב.) — the Talmud in English

The brother

alone

[the only one]

performs chalitza for both of them

since each of them is of uncertain status as his zekuka, and he should not perform yibum with either of them, lest she be the sister of his zekuka, who remains forbidden to him even after he has performed chalitza with her sister

; and if there are two brothers, one

of them

performs chalitza

with one of them,

and one

even

performs yibum

with the second if he wishes [after the only brother has performed chalitza, and after his brother has performed chalitza], since whichever way one looks at it, she is permitted to him: If she is his yevama, all is well; and if she is the sister of his yevama, then it was her brother who performed chalitza with his yevama, and this woman is not forbidden to him.

If

the two brothers of the one brother

preceded

and married the two women after the only brother had performed chalitza with both of them,

they do not remove them from their possession

because even if you say that one of them encountered the sister of his zekuka, the bond of the sister of his zekuka had already been severed through his brother’s yibum, and as for the prohibition—the rabbinic prohibition against encountering the sister of one’s zekuka—what was done was done.

And this teaches us:

specifically, he performs chalitza

the only brother

and afterward performs yibum

one of the two brothers after his brother’s chalitza, as we learned: “The one brother performs chalitza with both of them, and of the two brothers, one performs chalitza and one performs yibum

; but performing yibum

by one of the two brothers

and afterward performing chalitza

by the only brother—

not

permitted; and even if he married her, he must divorce her, because

he encounters

at the time of the yibum

a yevama forbidden to the outside world

[since she is forbidden to him by Torah law], for she may be bound to the only brother, who has not yet performed chalitza with her.

Ta shma

that “a betrothal that is not designated for intercourse is a valid betrothal,” from this

which Taviומי taught

in a beraita:

If

this man

[one of the men in the marketplace]

had five sons

who appointed him as an agent to betroth a woman on their behalf,

and that man

[another man in the marketplace]

had five daughters, and he said

one to the other: “

One of your daughters is betrothed to one of my sons”:

Each and every one

of the five daughters

requires five bills of divorce

from each of the five sons, since each of them is of uncertainly betrothed status to each of the sons.

If one of them died

of the five sons,

each and every one

of the daughters

requires four bills of divorce

from the four remaining brothers, because each of them is of uncertainly betrothed status to each of these four,

and

she additionally requires

chalitza from one of them

because she may be the wife of the deceased brother, and the chalitza of one of the brothers permits her.

And for Rava this is difficult: Why did the betrothals take effect at all? Aren’t these “betrothals that are not designated for intercourse”?

And if you say, here too

with what are we dealing

? With a case where they were identified and ultimately became intermingled;

it is impossible to explain it this way, for

this “

One of your daughters to one of my sons”

is what it teaches,

which indicates that this was the wording he said to the father of the daughters.

And we conclude:

A refutation of Rava—

a refutation!

And the halakha follows Abaye in

the six

cases

This is a mnemonic for the six halakhot in which Abaye and Rava disputed and the halakha follows Abaye, and this is one of them: “

B

etrothals that are not designated for intercourse.”

We learned in the Mishna:

And there was an incident involving five women

including two sisters: One man gathered a basket of figs, which belonged to them and were produce of the Sabbatical year, and said: “Behold, all of you are betrothed to me with this basket,” and one of them accepted it on behalf of them all; and the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed:

Rav said: Learn from the Mishna

[from our Mishna]

four

halakhot—

But

the Gemara adds that

Rav had in his possession

only

three

[only three halakhot were established in his memory, which he arranged in the version of the Gemara], and below it explains the reason.

These are the three halakhot that Rav arranged in the order of his version:

a.

Learn from this: One who betroths

a woman

with produce of the Sabbatical year

she is

betrothed,

as occurred in the incident cited in our Mishna. We learn that one does not say: The produce does not belong to the person who acquired it; rather, once he acquired it, it is his property in every respect. b.

And learn from this: If he betrothed her with stolen property, she is not betrothed,

and

even with property stolen from her

[property that he stole from the woman being betrothed], she is not betrothed, and one does not say: Since she accepted it from him for the sake of betrothal, she waived her claim. And we explain:

From where

how can this law be learned from our Mishna?

As it teaches

in our Mishna: “

It belonged to them, and it was produce of the Sabbatical year,”

it follows that

the reason

the non-sisters are betrothed with produce with which the betrother betrothed them, which belonged to them, is that the produce

of the Sabbatical year

is

ownerless

and the betrother acquired it;

but

if he betrothed them with their produce

of the other years of the seven-year cycle,

which is not ownerless, it would be stolen property in his possession,

not

and the non-sisters whose produce had been stolen from them would not be betrothed. c.

And learn from this

from the fact that the three non-sisters became betrothed through one of them accepting it:

A woman may act as an agent for her fellow, even in a case where she thereby becomes her rival wife.

And we explain:

And the other—

the fourth law, which Rav did not arrange in his version of the Gemara—

what is it—what additional law can be learned from our Mishna?

And we answer:

d. “Betrothals that do not allow for intercourse,”

whether they are valid betrothals or not.

And we ask:

And should we count it,

that is, why did Rav not arrange this law in his version of the Gemara!?

And we answer:

Because it was uncertain to him

how to interpret our Mishna:

If

the interpretation given

by Abaye

[above, on 51b] to our Mishna is correct, then according to his interpretation one can prove from our Mishna: “A betrothal that is not designated for intercourse is a valid betrothal,” since according to him our Mishna clearly teaches that one who betroths one of two sisters has betrothed her.

If

the interpretation given

by Rava

[there] to our Mishna is correct, then according to his interpretation one can prove from our Mishna: “A betrothal that is not designated for intercourse is not a valid betrothal,” since according to his interpretation our Mishna clearly teaches that one who betroths one of two sisters has not betrothed either of them.

And because Rav was uncertain, he therefore said: It is certainly proven from our Mishna that the law of kiddushin that cannot lead to permissible intercourse applies; nevertheless, he could not formulate it in the version of the Gemara, because he did not know whether it proves that they are valid kiddushin, or perhaps proves that they are not valid kiddushin.

When he ascended

from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael,

Rabbi Zeira

said this teaching

of Rav

in the presence of

Rabbi Yohanan

[he recited to Rabbi Yohanan, who was in Eretz Yisrael, the aforementioned teaching in the name of Rav, who had been in Babylonia]!

Rabbi Yohanan said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

Did Rav actually say this,

that “if he betrothed her with stolen property, she is not betrothed, even if it was stolen property belonging to her”!?

The initial understanding was that Rabbi Yohanan was astonished: Is it possible that Rav said this? Therefore, we challenge Rabbi Yohanan:

And

was it the case that

he

[Rabbi Yohanan himself]

did not say

that stolen property in the robber’s possession does not belong to him, and consequently he cannot betroth her with it!?

But Rabbi Yohanan himself said

:

If a person stole

property from another

and the owners did not despair of recovering it, neither of them—

the robber and the one robbed—

can consecrate

the object in the robber’s possession:

the one

—the robber—cannot consecrate it

because it is not his, and the other

—the one robbed—cannot consecrate it

because it is not in his possession

[under his control]!? Thus, even according to Rabbi Yohanan himself, stolen property does not belong to the robber, and consequently he cannot betroth a woman with it, just as Rav said. Why, then, was Rabbi Yohanan astonished at Rav!? And we answer: Rabbi Yohanan was not astonished at the law. Rather,

this is what he said to him

Rabbi Yohanan to Rabbi Zeira:

Did Rav say in accordance with my view

[did Rav indeed say what I say]!?

Meytivi

to Rav from the following beraita:

If he betrothed her with stolen property

belonging to others,

by coercion

[an object purchased with money against its owner’s will],

or through theft, or if he snatched a sela from her hand and betrothed her

with it, she is

betrothed

, thus indicating that she is betrothed even with property stolen from others, contrary to Rav!?

And we answer:

There,

where we taught: “If he betrothed her with stolen property

—what case are we discussing?

Property stolen from her,

and therefore she is betrothed, as will be explained .” We challenge this:

From the fact that the latter clause teaches: “

Or if he snatched a sela

belonging to her

from her hand,”

by inference,

it must be that the

first clause

of the beraita: “If he betrothed her with stolen property, by coercion, or through theft,” is not discussing property stolen from her. Rather,

we are discussing ordinary stolen property

[stolen from others],

and

nevertheless it teaches that she is betrothed!?

And we answer:

It is explaining

the first clause through the latter clause! This is what it is saying:

“If he betrothed her with stolen property, by coercion, or through theft”—how so? For example, if he snatched a sela from her hand,

and betrothed her with it, she is betrothed; and the beraita is never discussing property stolen from others, and she is not betrothed with it.

, she is betrothed. The beraita is never dealing with property stolen from others; and she is not betrothed with such property.