Kiddushin 52b (נב:) — the Talmud in English

And

we raise an objection to the Gemara’s resolution, that the beraita is dealing with property stolen from her, and therefore she is betrothed, for this does not resolve Rav’s position, since

this Mishna [

our Mishna ]

deals with property stolen from her, as he betrothed her with their property,

and

Rav said

that our Mishna proves that she

is not betrothed

with this stolen property [had the produce not been the produce of the Sabbatical year]!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult:

For

this—the beraita, which states that when he betrothed her with property stolen from her, she is betrothed—deals with a case in which

he had

spoken with her beforehand, before betrothing her with her property that he had stolen. In such a case, Rav concedes that, since she accepted it for the sake of betrothal, she waived her claim against him.

before betrothing her with property stolen from her. In such a case, Rav concedes that since she accepted it for the sake of betrothal, she waived her claim against him.

This—our Mishna and Rav’s statement—deal with a case

in which

he had not spoken with her beforehand, but rather he placed the stolen property in her hand and betrothed her with it; in such a case she is not betrothed.

but merely placed the stolen property in her hand and betrothed her with it. In such a case, she is not betrothed.

There was an incident involving

a certain woman who was washing her feet in a basin of water. A certain man came, snatched coins from another person, and threw them to her,

and

said to her: “

You are betrothed to me!”

And

that man came before Rava. [

There was an incident involving a woman who was washing her feet in a basin of water. A certain man came, snatched money from his fellow, threw it into the woman’s hand, and said to her: “You are betrothed to me!” That man then came before Rava to ask what would be the status of his betrothal. ]

Rava

said

to him: “There is no one who takes account of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: Ordinarily, stolen property constitutes the owner’s despair of recovering it” [there is no one who accepts the position of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that ordinarily stolen property constitutes the owner’s despair of recovering it], and we do not assume that the robbed party despaired of recovering it; therefore she is not betrothed to you.

there is no one who follows the position of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that ordinarily the owners of stolen property are presumed to have despaired of recovering it ]. We do not assume that the person who was robbed despaired of recovering his property; therefore, she is not betrothed to you. A. Ramban, Rashba, Ritva, and Ran wrote that if the owner had despaired of recovering the property, she would have become betrothed because of “despair and a change of possession.” [They needed this explanation because Rava is the master of this discussion, and Rava maintains that despair alone does not acquire property, even by rabbinic law, as Tosafot proved in Bava Kamma 67b.] B. In fact, they disagree about the nature of the matter.

There was an incident involving

a certain sharecropper,

a sharecropper who worked another person’s field, receiving half, a third, or a quarter of the produce,

who betrothed a woman with a handful of onions [

a full handful of onions ] that he had taken from his employer’s field.

The sharecropper came

the sharecropper

before Rava

to ask him whether the betrothal had taken effect.

Rava said to him

to the sharecropper:

“Who waived his share for you?” [

Who waived the employer’s share for you? ]!? Therefore she is not betrothed.

This applies only to a handful

that requires division,

but in the case of a bundle [

a bundle of greens ], which is customarily divided into bundles, and all the bundles are equal,

he can say to him

the sharecropper can say to the owner of the field:

“I took one bundle” [

I took a bundle from my share ];

“Take”

also

“a bundle” [

take another bundle in its place ], for

“one bundle for one bundle,”

that is, they are all equal.

There was an incident involving

a certain sharecropper who betrothed a woman with the froth of beer. The owner of the beer came and found him,

and

said to him: “Why did you not give her some of this stronger beer!?”

He came before Rava: [

There was an incident involving a sharecropper who worked in a brewery producing date beer. He took some of the owner’s pressed dates and betrothed a woman with them. When the brewery owner arrived, he said to the sharecropper: Why did you not give her some of the better dates, which contain a little more moisture and can be placed in additional water to make beer from them? The sharecropper came to ask Rava what would be the status of his betrothal. Had the owner not told him to take from the better dates, she certainly would not have been betrothed, because these dates were not designated for division: the sharecropper received his portion from the beer, not from the pressed dates. However, once the owner said this, he apparently revealed that he was pleased with the sharecropper’s taking dates from his supply. ]

Rava

said

to the sharecropper:

They said that the statement of the owner of produce to the person taking the produce,

“Go to the better ones,”

indicates that the owner of the produce is pleased

only with regard to teruma—

when the person taking the produce separates teruma without the owner’s knowledge—

alone,

because the produce is in any event designated for teruma. But in the case before us, no; and the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason.

And

as it is taught in a beraita,

that with regard to teruma the statement “Go to the better ones” is effective:

One who separates teruma from another person’s produce without his knowledge has not made his teruma effective.

And how did they say that one who separates teruma without the knowledge

of the owner of the produce has made

his teruma effective?

If one entered another’s field, gathered produce, and separated teruma without the permission

of the owner of the field, from the owner’s produce—

If the one who separated the teruma is concerned

about his act of separating teruma

because of theft, his teruma is not effective; but if not,

if he is not concerned because of theft,

his teruma is effective.

And how did he

know whether he was concerned because of theft or not?

If the owner of the field came, found him, and said to him:

“Go to the better ones”

from these—that is, why did you not take from the better ones!?

If

better ones than these were found,

his teruma is effective,

because he indeed intended to tell him that he should have taken from the better ones, and this reveals that he was pleased with his separation of teruma.

But if not,

if there were no better ones than these,

his teruma is not effective,

because he intended only to taunt him, saying: “If there had been better ones than what you took, you would have stolen those as well.”

And if

the owners themselves

were

gathering and adding, in either case—

whether there were better ones than these or there were not better ones than these—

his teruma is effective.

This law applies only to teruma, since the produce is designated for separation as teruma,

but here,

where the dates were not designated to be given to the sharecropper, since he received his portion from the beer and not from the pressed dates, certainly

he did it only out of embarrassment [

the brewery owner said this out of embarrassment ],

and she is not betrothed.

Mishna:

A kohen

who betroths a woman with his portion,

which he received when he divided the sacrificial meat with his fellow kohanim,

whether

the portion was from

most sacred offerings,

such as a sin-offering or a guilt-offering,

or

the portion was from

lesser sanctity offerings,

such as peace-offerings,

she is not betrothed;

for the portion does not belong to him; rather, he eats from the table of the Most High. The Gemara will explain this further.

And if a man betrothed a woman

with second tithe:

Whether

he betrothed her with it

unintentionally,

when neither he nor she knew that it was second-tithe property,

or

he betrothed her with it

intentionally—

then

he has not betrothed

the woman,

the words of Rabbi Meir,

who holds: “Second tithe is the property of the Most High,” and he cannot betroth a woman with it.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If he betrothed her with second tithe

unintentionally, he has not betrothed her ;

but if he betrothed her

intentionally,

then

he has betrothed her,

because he holds: “Second tithe is the property of an ordinary person.”

And

one who betroths a woman

with consecrated property:

If he did so intentionally, he has betrothed her,

because when he gave it to the woman, he misappropriated consecrated property, causing it to become ordinary property, and she is betrothed with it

; but if he did so unintentionally, he has not betrothed her, the words of Rabbi Meir,

as the Gemara will explain the reason.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so unintentionally, he has betrothed her,

because the consecrated property became ordinary property through his misappropriation, and she is betrothed with it,

but if he did so intentionally, he has not betrothed her,

because, according to Rabbi Yehuda, consecrated property does not become ordinary property through intentional misappropriation.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that

perhaps

the

Mishna—

in which we learned that one who betroths a woman even with a portion he received from lesser sanctity offerings does not betroth her—

is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili?

As it is taught in a beraita:

It is written in the passage concerning the oath of deposit: “When a person sins and commits a trespass against the Lord, and denies his fellow’s claim concerning an entrusted item [which his fellow entrusted to him], or a loan [a loan], or stolen property [which he stole from his fellow], or oppressed his fellow; or he found a lost item and denied it and swore falsely concerning it; or concerning any of all these matters about which one may swear falsely—and he shall repay its principal [the principal] and add its fifth to it, to the one to whom it belongs [to the one to whom the principal belongs], he shall give it on the day of his guilt. And he shall bring his guilt-offering [the ‘guilt-offering for robberies’] to the Lord, an unblemished ram from the flock, according to your valuation as a guilt-offering, to the kohen.”

And from the implication of the Torah’s saying, “And he denies it to his fellow,” we learn that if one deposits consecrated property, and the bailee denies the deposit, swears, and then admits it, he is exempt from the law of “the oath of the deposit”".

And from the implication of the Torah’s saying: "

and he acts treacherously against the Lord",

we learn

to include lesser consecrated property—

to make one liable for it under the law of “the oath of the deposit” if he swore falsely that it had not been deposited with him, and admitted that he had sworn falsely—because

it is the property

of the owners who deposited it with him, and therefore it falls within the category of “and he denies it to his fellow concerning a deposit,”

the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

If so, our Mishna is not in accordance with his view, for according to him, since lesser consecrated property is the property of the owners, if a priest betrothed a woman with his portion that he received from the lesser consecrated property, it is his property, and he can betroth a woman with it.

And we reject this:

You may even say that it is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s view;

even so, there is no difficulty, for

when Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said

that it is the property of the owners, this applies only

while the animal is alive, but after slaughter, it is not

what Rabbi Yosei said.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

When

the priests acquire their portion,

they acquire it from the table of the Most High

and it is not their property.

And the Gemara supports the answer:

It is precise as well

as we explained, from the fact that

it teaches

in our Mishna:

“Whether one betroths with his portion of offerings of the most sacred order or with lesser consecrated property, he has not betrothed.”

Thus, it is only when he betroths her “with his portion”—that is, with the portion he received after slaughter—that he has not betrothed her; but while the animal is alive, he has betrothed her. For if this were not so, it should have said: “If one betroths with lesser consecrated property, she is not betrothed”!

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from this!

The Sages taught: After Rabbi Meir’s death, Rabbi Yehuda said to his students: “Let no students of Rabbi Meir enter here, because they are contentious

[provocative],

and they do not come to study Torah; rather, they come to cut me down in matters of halakha

[to cut off our legs in matters of halakha, to demonstrate that they are sharp and that no one can stand up to them]

they come!”

Nevertheless,

Sumakhos forced his way—

who was among Rabbi Meir’s students—

and entered

Rabbi Yehuda’s house of study.

He said to them

Sumakhos said to Rabbi Yehuda and his students:

“Rabbi Meir taught me as follows: Whether one betroths with his portion of offerings of the most sacred order or with lesser consecrated property, he has not betrothed.”

Rabbi Yehuda became angry with them

[with his students], and

said to them:

“Did I not

tell you so: “

Let no students of Rabbi Meir enter here, because they are contentious, and they do not come to study Torah; rather, they come to cut me down in matters of halakha”!?

For how could one find an instance in which a person betroths a woman with his portion of an offering of the most sacred order:

After all, where would there be a woman in the Temple courtyard,

so that she would be fit to receive her betrothal there!? For if he were to take his portion out to her, even to the Women’s Courtyard, it would already become disqualified as yotzei, and it could not be used for betrothal.

Rabbi Yosei said: People will say

that

Meir lies asleep

[has died],

Yehuda is angry,

and

Yosei is silent; what will become of the

words of Torah!?

And concerning the substance of Rabbi Yehuda’s astonishment:

After all, is there no man who might receive betrothal for his daughter

a minor or a young woman [whose betrothal he is entitled to receive]

in the Temple courtyard!?

And

further, is there no woman who might appoint an agent for herself

to receive her betrothal in the Temple courtyard!?

And furthermore,

we must discuss this law in a case where

the woman forced her way

into the courtyard and

entered

it, and received betrothal there from the portion of an offering of the most sacred order;

what then!?

It was taught:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

A priest who betroths a woman with his portion—she is

betrothed.

And

Rabbi Yosei says: She is not betrothed.

Rabbi Yohanan said: Both of them expounded a single verse:

as it is written in the passage concerning the gifts of the priesthood: “

And this shall be yours

[for Aaron],

from the most sacred offerings, from the fire

all their offerings, for all their meal-offerings and for all their sin-offerings”!

Rabbi Yehuda holds: “

Yours,”

and for all your needs,

even to betroth a woman with it.

And Rabbi Yosei holds:

Your portion shall be

like

the portion given to the

fire

of the altar.

Just as

the portion given to the

fire, for consumption

of the altar, is given for consumption,

so too—

the priests’ portion—

is likewise for consumption

and is not given for anything else.

Rabbi Yohanan said: