Kiddushin 51b — the Talmud in English

Rather, is it not

necessarily

that he said to them: “

One of you

will be betrothed to me,”

and

behold,

it teaches: “

The sisters are not betrothed,”

and necessarily the reason is that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are not kiddushin,” because each one of the sisters is unfit for consummation on account of the uncertainty that she is the sister of a wife.

It follows that, on the contrary, from the latter clause of our Mishna it is proven that kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are not kiddushin, the opposite of what is proven from the first clause.

For Rava—

who holds: “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are not kiddushin”—

the first clause is difficult!?

And

for Abaye—

who holds: “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are kiddushin”—

the latter clause is difficult!?

And we answer:

Abaye explains it according to his position

[interpreting the Mishna according to his view], and

Rava explains it according to his position:

Abaye explains it according to his position,

for this is what it teaches:

One who betroths a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, simultaneously, they are not betrothed; this

means, if he betrothed

one of a woman and her daughter,

or

one of a woman and her sister,

she

is betrothed,

but they are forbidden to him, because each one is possibly a relative of his wife; nevertheless, one of them is betrothed, for although these kiddushin are not fit for consummation, they are nevertheless kiddushin.

But

however,

if he said: “

The one who is fit

among you

for consummation shall be betrothed to me,”

she is not betrothed,

for none of them is fit for consummation with him.

And there was also an incident involving five women, among whom were two sisters, and one person gathered a basket of figs and said: “

The one among you who is fit for me shall be betrothed to me,”

and the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed,

not even as a matter of uncertainty.

And Rava explains it according to his position:

Do not infer from what it teaches: “One who betroths a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, simultaneously, they are not betrothed,” that “one of a woman and her daughter, or one of a woman and her sister, is betrothed”; rather, this is what it teaches:

One who betroths one of a woman and her daughter, or one of a woman and her sister, is considered as one who betrothed a woman and her daughter

simultaneously

or a woman and her sister simultaneously, and they are not betrothed—

and there was also an incident involving five women, among whom were two sisters, and one person gathered a basket of figs and said: “

Behold, all of you”

[the unrelated women]

“and one of the two sisters

are betrothed to me with this basket,”

and the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed.

The matter requires further study.

Come and hear from the Mishna below, on page 64b, which states that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are kiddushin”:

from a Mishna below, on page 64b, which states that betrothals that do not allow for permitted marital relations are valid betrothals:

One who betroths his daughter without specification,

it enters our minds that the one who betroths said to the father, “One of your daughters will be betrothed to me,”

the

daughters

who are of age are not included

in the uncertainty of kiddushin, since the father cannot betroth his daughter who is of age.

And it implies:

but his daughters who are

his daughters who are

minors are included

in the uncertainty of kiddushin, even if he had several daughters—

But why!?

For behold,

they are kiddushin that are not fit for consummation,

since each one of his minor daughters is possibly the sister of his wife, for it is not known which of his minor daughters was betrothed to him,

and this is a refutation of Rava!?

Rava could say to you

to resolve it:

Here,

in this Mishna,

with what are we dealing? With a case in which there is no

father

other than

one

elder

[adult] daughter

and one

daughter

who is a minor,

and since the adult is not included in the uncertainty, the single minor daughter is permitted, for her kiddushin are fit for consummation.

We raise an objection to this:

but “

adult daughters”

it teaches,

implying that he had several adult daughters, and only they are not included because they are adults; but his minor daughters, analogous to the adult daughters in that there are several of them—each one is possibly betrothed, even though the kiddushin are not fit for consummation!?

And we answer:

what does “

adult daughters” mean?

Adult daughters in general,

that is, any man who has a daughter who is of age: those adult daughters are not included in the uncertainty when their father accepted kiddushin; and in every case, each man has only one adult daughter, and alongside her one minor daughter.

And we still raise an objection:

if so—

that there were only an adult daughter and a minor daughter—

what does it teach us!?

For it is obvious that the adult daughter is not included in the uncertainty, since her father has no authority over her!? Granted, if the Mishna were dealing with one who had several adult daughters, then it could be said that the innovation is: The minor daughters, analogous to the adult daughters, are each possibly betrothed, teaching us that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are kiddushin.” But according to what we have explained, it is difficult: It is obvious!?

And we answer:

here,

in this Mishna,

with what are we dealing? With a case in which she made her

adult daughter make her father

an agent

to accept kiddushin for her from anyone who wished to betroth her.

And the innovation is that

lest you say: When he accepts the kiddushin, he accepts them with her intention

[perhaps, when he accepted kiddushin on behalf of his adult daughter, he accepted them], and neither the adult nor the minor daughter will be betrothed, since each one is possibly the sister of his wife, and “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are not kiddushin”—

it teaches us

that since the money of the adult daughter’s kiddushin belongs to her, whereas the money of the minor daughter’s kiddushin belongs to him, it is certain

that a person does not relinquish something from which he derives benefit

[a person does not leave what he derives benefit from] and occupy himself with something from which he derives no benefit; surely, he intended only the minor daughter, and she is betrothed.

We raise an objection to this:

are we not dealing

in this Mishna also with a case such as

where she said to him,

the adult daughter to her father when she made him an agent: “

The money of my kiddushin

shall be

for you”

[the money of the kiddushin shall be yours]!? For the Mishna states this without qualification, and did not distinguish between whether she made him an agent and the kiddushin would belong to her, or whether the kiddushin would belong to him; and in such a case it is difficult: Why indeed should even the adult daughter not be included in the uncertainty of the kiddushin, and why should neither of them be betrothed? And we answer:

even so,

even though she told him that the money of the kiddushin would be his, it is reasonable that he did not intend to betroth his adult daughter, because:

For

a person does not relinquish a mitzva incumbent upon him

as it is written [Jeremiah 29:6]: “And give your daughters to men,”

and perform a mitzva that is not incumbent upon him

[a person does not leave a mitzva incumbent upon him—that is, to betroth his minor daughter—and occupy himself with a mitzva that is not incumbent upon him—that is, the kiddushin of his adult daughter].

Come and hear

another proof from the Mishna below, on page 64b, which states that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are kiddushin”:

One who has two groups of daughters from two wives,

whom he married one after the other, and each one bore him two daughters,

and he said,

the father: “

I betrothed my eldest daughter,”

[it enters our minds that the one who betrothed said to him, “Your eldest daughter will be betrothed to me”],

but I do not know

what this “eldest” is:

whether the eldest of the eldest

[the eldest of the daughters of the first wife],

or the eldest of the youngest

[the eldest of the daughters of the second wife],

or the youngest of the eldest, who is

behold,

older than the eldest of the youngest,

that is, each one of the daughters of the first wife is called “eldest”—

All of them are forbidden,

for each one of them is included in the category of “the eldest,”

except for the youngest of the youngest,

for she certainly was not betrothed, since she is not called “the eldest,”

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And let the difficulty be raised against Rava: Why are they forbidden!? For since several of his daughters are included in the uncertainty, it follows that these are “betrothals that are not given over for intercourse,” and according to Rava none of them is betrothed.

And we answer: It is not as you had thought—that the betrother betrothed her only with the expression “the eldest,” and from the beginning of the betrothal several daughters were in doubt as to the betrothal—but

here, with what are we dealing? With a case where they were recognized and ultimately became mixed up,

meaning: At the time, the betrother said, “Your particular eldest daughter is betrothed to me,” but the father forgot which one the betrother specified, and every daughter who is called “the eldest” is now in doubt as to the betrothal; and in this manner, since at the time of the betrothal the betrothal was specific, these are betrothals that are given over for intercourse.

It is also precise

as we explained, that at the beginning of the betrothal there was no uncertainty:

for it teaches: “

I do not know,”

which implies: I am the one who does not know,

and it does not teach “

It is not known,”

which would imply that it is not known even to everyone else, because it was never clarified which one is the betrothed.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from it

as we explained.

And we raise an objection to it:

If so—

that they were recognized and ultimately became mixed up—

what is it saying this for

what novelty is there in Rabbi Meir’s ruling?!

And we answer: Rabbi Meir

comes to exclude the view of Rabbi Yose, who said,

meaning: He disputed him there in the Mishna and said, “All of them are permitted except for the eldest of the eldest”; he comes, and his reason is that

a person does not place himself in uncertainty

a person does not put himself into a state of uncertainty, and since, if he were to forget which one the betrother specified, the matter would be uncertain, he certainly would not mention the name “eldest” unless he intended the eldest of the eldest which is certainly called “the eldest.”

He teaches us this

Rabbi Meir

that

sometimes

a person does place himself into uncertainty.

Come and hear

from a Mishna in Yevamot 23b, that “betrothals that are not given over for intercourse are betrothals”:

One who betrothed one of two sisters, and does not know which one he betrothed, gives a bill of divorce to this one, and a bill of divorce to that one.

And according to Rava, a difficulty arises: Why does he need to give a bill of divorce at all!? For these are “betrothals that are not given over for intercourse,” and according to Rava neither one is betrothed.

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where they were recognized and ultimately became mixed up.

It is also precise: for it teaches: “

He does not know,”

and it does not teach “

It is not known.”

And we raise an objection to it:

If so—

that they were recognized and ultimately became mixed up—

what is it saying this for!?

And we answer:

The latter clause

of that same Mishna

was necessary for him

the latter clause of that Mishna is the novelty of the Mishna!

The sister of his yevama who is subject to him is forbidden to the yavam, because she resembles a “wife’s sister”; and if there were two brothers, and one of them performed halitza with the yevama [or performed yibbum], then her sister is forbidden only to the one who performed halitza, and is not forbidden to his brother, even though she had been the sister of his yevama subject to him, since the bond of her sister was not released through his intercourse or his halitza, but through his brother’s intercourse or his halitza.

For the latter clause teaches:

If the one who betrothed

the one who betrothed one of two sisters

dies, and he has one brother,

and both of them are found to be subject to him in uncertainty for yibbum or halitza, for it is not known which one was the wife of the deceased brother: this brother

performs halitza with both of them,

for it is not known which one is his yevama subject to him, but he may not perform yibbum with even one of them, because perhaps her sister is the one subject to him, and this one with whom he performs yibbum is the sister of his yevama subject to him, who is forbidden to the one who performed halitza himself, even after he performed halitza with her sister.

And if

he had two

brothers, the two of them may not perform yibbum with the two women, because with regard to the first one who performs yibbum, there is concern that perhaps her sister is the one subject to him, and it follows that he performs yibbum with the sister of his yevama subject to him; rather, this is what they shall do:

The

one performs halitza

with one of them first,

and

the

one

even

performs yibbum—

if he wishes—with the second one; for in either event she is permitted to him: if she is subject to him, he has performed yibbum with her, and if her sister is the one subject to him, then he is not the one who performed halitza with her, so that her sister should be forbidden to him after halitza.

And nevertheless,

if they preceded

both of them

and married

both of them,

they are not removed from their possession,

for even if you should say that one of them married the sister of his yevama subject to him, when the second one performed yibbum with her, the bond had already ceased with regard to her sister, and the prohibition that he committed, he committed, but they did not penalize him to remove her, since the prohibition of the sister of a yevama subject to him is only rabbinic.

And it teaches us this: when he had two brothers,

specifically, one performs halitza

the one

and afterward the other performs yibbum

the second, and as we learned in the order of the Mishna: “The one performs halitza and the other performs yibbum

; but for one to perform yibbum

the one

and afterward the other performs halitza

the second—

no,

and because

the first encounters

the first

the sister of his yevama subject to him.

Come and hear

also from the Mishna in Yevamot there, that “betrothals that are not given over for intercourse are betrothals”:

Two men who betrothed two sisters,

it enters our mind that each one betrothed one of the two sisters,

this one does not know which one he betrothed, and this one does not know which one he betrothed—

this one gives two bills of divorce

to the two sisters,

and this one gives two bills of divorce

to the two sisters.

And why!? For these are “betrothals that are not given over for intercourse,” and this is a refutation of Rava!?

And we answer:

here too

with what are we dealing? With a case such as

where they were recognized and ultimately became mixed up.

It is also precise: for it teaches: “

He does not know,”

and it does not teach “

It is not known,”

infer from it!

And we raise an objection to it:

If so—

that they were recognized and ultimately became mixed up—

what is it saying this for!?

And we answer:

The latter clause

of that same Mishna

was necessary for him!

For the latter clause teaches: If

both of them died,

the two of them, this is their law:

If there is

for this one a brother, and for that one

there is

a brother: this one—

the brother of the one—

performs halitza with both of them,

for each one is possibly his yevama subject to him, but he may not perform yibbum, because perhaps her sister is the one subject to him, and it follows that he encounters the sister of his yevama subject to him; and even after he performed halitza with one, he may not perform yibbum with the second, because she is forbidden to him even after he performed halitza with her sister,

and

so

this one

the brother of the second one—

performs halitza with both of them.

And if there is

for this one

a brother

one, and for that one

there are brothers

two: