Kiddushin 51b (נא:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, is it not necessarily

necessarily

that he said to them: “

One of you

shall be betrothed to me,”

and

behold,

it teaches: “

The sisters are not betrothed,”

and necessarily the reason is that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are not kiddushin,” since each of the sisters is unfit for consummation because she may be the sister of his wife.

It follows that, on the contrary, from the latter clause of our Mishna it is demonstrated that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are not kiddushin,” the opposite of what is demonstrated from the first clause.

For Rava—

who holds that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are not kiddushin”—

the first clause is difficult!

And

for Abaye—

who holds that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are kiddushin”—

the latter clause is difficult!

And we resolve the difficulty:

Abaye explains it in accordance with his reasoning [

he interprets the Mishna according to his position], and

Rava explains it in accordance with his reasoning:

Abaye explains it in accordance with his reasoning,

as it teaches:

If one betroths a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, simultaneously, neither is betrothed; however,

if he betrothed

one of a woman and her daughter

or

one of a woman and her sister,

she is

betrothed,

but they are forbidden to him, since each one may be a relative of his wife; nevertheless, one of them is betrothed, because although this kiddushin is not fit for consummation, it is nevertheless valid kiddushin.

But

however,

if he said: “

The one fit

among you

for consummation shall be betrothed to me,”

she is not betrothed,

since neither of them is fit for consummation with him.

And there was also an incident involving five women, among them two sisters, when one person gathered a basket of figs and said: “

The one among you who is fit for me shall be betrothed to me,”

and the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed,

not even conditionally.

And Rava explains it in accordance with his reasoning:

Do not infer from the fact that it teaches: “If one betroths a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, simultaneously, neither is betrothed,” that “one of a woman and her daughter, or one of a woman and her sister, is betrothed,” because this is what it teaches:

If one betroths one of a woman and her daughter, or one of a woman and her sister, he is considered as one who betrothed a woman and her daughter

simultaneously,

or a woman and her sister simultaneously, and neither is betrothed—

and there was also an incident involving five women, among them two sisters, when one person gathered a basket of figs and said: “

Behold, all of you” [

the unrelated women]

“and one of the two sisters

are betrothed to me with this basket,”

and the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed.

The matter requires further study.

Come and hear

from the Mishna below, on 64b, which states that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are kiddushin”:

If one betroths his daughter without specifying which one,

it enters our minds that the one who betroths her said to the father, “One of your daughters is betrothed to me,”

the

daughters who are

of age are not included

in the doubt concerning the kiddushin, since the father cannot betroth his daughter who is of age.

And it follows:

However,

his daughters who are

minors are included

in the doubt concerning the kiddushin, even if he had several daughters—

But why!?

Yet

they are kiddushin that are not fit for consummation,

since each of his minor daughters may be the sister of his wife, as it is not known which of his minor daughters was betrothed to him;

and this is a refutation of Rava!?

Rava could say to you

to resolve the difficulty:

Here,

in this Mishna,

with what are we dealing? When there is only

the father does not have

but

one

older [

one of age] daughter

and

one

minor daughter, and since the older daughter is not included in the doubt, the single minor daughter is permitted, since her kiddushin are fit for consummation.

And we raise an objection to this:

We challenge this:

However, “

daughters who are of age”

it teaches,

implying that he had several daughters of age, and only they are excluded because they are of age. However, his minor daughters, who are analogous to the daughters of age in that there are several of them, each one is doubtfully betrothed, even though the kiddushin are not fit for consummation!?

And we answer:

What does “

daughters who are of age” mean?

Daughters who are of age in general—that is, any man who has a daughter of age: Those daughters of age are not included in the doubt when their father accepted kiddushin on their behalf. In every case, each man has only one daughter of age, and corresponding to her, one minor daughter.

If so—that there were only an adult daughter and a minor daughter—

We continue to challenge:

If so—

that there were only an older daughter and a minor daughter—

what is the point of stating this!?

It is obvious that the daughter who is of age is not included in the doubt, since her father has no authority over her! Granted, if the Mishna were dealing with one who had several daughters of age, it could be said that its novel point is that the minor daughters, analogous to the daughters of age, are each doubtfully betrothed, teaching us that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are kiddushin.” But according to our explanation, the difficulty remains: It is obvious!?

And we answer:

Here,

in this Mishna,

with what are we dealing? With a case where she made her

the daughter who is of age made her father

agent

to accept kiddushin for her from anyone who wished to betroth her.

And the novel point is that

lest you say: When he accepts the kiddushin, he accepts them with her interests in mind [

perhaps when he accepted kiddushin on behalf of his adult daughter, he accepted them], and neither the adult daughter nor the minor daughter will be betrothed, since each one may be the sister of his wife, and “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are not kiddushin”—

it teaches us

that since the money of the adult daughter’s kiddushin belongs to her, whereas the money of the minor daughter’s kiddushin belongs to him, it is certain

that a person does not abandon something from which he derives benefit [

a person does not abandon something from which he derives benefit] and involve himself with something from which he derives no benefit. Therefore, he certainly intended only the minor daughter, and she is betrothed.

We challenge this:

Are we not dealing

in this Mishna also with a case such as

where she said to him,

the adult daughter said to her father when she appointed him her agent: “

The money of my kiddushin

shall be

yours” [

the money of the kiddushin shall belong to you]? For the Mishna teaches its ruling without qualification and does not distinguish between whether she appointed him her agent and the kiddushin would belong to her, or whether the kiddushin would belong to him. In such a case, the difficulty arises: Why indeed should the adult daughter not also be included in the doubt concerning the kiddushin, so that neither one would be betrothed? And we answer:

Even so,

even though she told him that the money of the kiddushin would belong to him, it is reasonable that he did not intend to betroth his adult daughter, because:

he

does not abandon a mitzva incumbent upon him—as it is written [Jeremiah 29:6]: “And give your daughters to men,”

and perform a mitzva that is not incumbent upon him [

a person does not abandon a mitzva incumbent upon him, namely, betrothing his minor daughter, and engage in a mitzva that is not incumbent upon him, namely, the kiddushin of his adult daughter].

Consider as a proof

Come and hear

another proof from the Mishna below, on 64b, which states that “kiddushin that are not fit for consummation are kiddushin”:

If one has two sets of daughters from two women,

whom he married one after the other, and each bore him two daughters,

and

the father

said: I betrothed my older daughter, [

it enters our minds that the one who betrothed her said to him: “Your older daughter is betrothed to me”],

but I do not know

what this “older” daughter is:

whether the oldest of the older [

the oldest of the daughters of the first wife],

or the oldest of the younger [

the oldest of the daughters of the second wife],

or the younger of the older, who is

indeed

older than the oldest of the younger,

that is, each of the daughters of the first wife is called “older”—

All of them are forbidden

as each one of them falls within the category of “the eldest”

except the youngest of the youngest

for she certainly was not betrothed, as she is not called “the eldest”

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And this poses a difficulty for Rava: Why are they forbidden!? Since several of his daughters are included in the uncertainty, it follows that these are kiddushin that are not designated for consummation, and according to Rava none of them is betrothed.

And we answer: It is not as you thought—that the betrother betrothed her merely with the expression “the eldest,” so that from the outset several daughters were subject to uncertainty concerning the kiddushin. Rather,

with what are we dealing here? With a case in which they were identified and ultimately became intermingled,

meaning: At the time, the betrother said, “Your specific eldest daughter is betrothed to me,” but the father forgot which daughter the betrother had specified. Thus, every daughter who is called “the eldest” is now subject to uncertainty concerning the kiddushin. In such a case, since the kiddushin were specific at the time they took effect, these are kiddushin designated for consummation.

This is also precise

when we explained that there was no uncertainty at the outset of the kiddushin:

as it teaches:

“I do not know,”

which implies: I am the one who does not know,

and it does not teach

“It is not known,”

which would imply that it is not known to anyone in the world, because it was never clarified which one was the betrothed woman.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from this

as we explained.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

if so

—that they were identified and ultimately became intermingled—

what is the point of stating it [

what novel point is there in Rabbi Meir’s ruling]!?

And we answer: Rabbi Meir

comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said,

meaning: He comes to oppose Rabbi Yosei, who disagreed with him there in the Mishna and said, “All of them are permitted except the eldest of the eldest.” His reasoning is that

a person does not place himself in a situation of uncertainty [

a person does not put himself into a situation of uncertainty], and since, if it were forgotten which daughter the betrother had specified, the matter would be uncertain, he certainly would not have mentioned the designation “eldest” unless he intended the eldest of the eldest [who is certainly called “the eldest”].

Rabbi Meir teaches us

Rabbi Meir

that

at times

a person does place himself in a situation of uncertainty.

Come and hear from the Mishna in tractate Yevamot 23b, which states that “kiddushin that are not designated for consummation are valid kiddushin”:

from a Mishna in Yevamot 23b, that “betrothals that are not given over for intercourse are betrothals”:

One who betrothed one of two sisters, but does not know which one he betrothed, must give a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one.

And this poses a difficulty for Rava: Why must he give a bill of divorce at all!? These are kiddushin that are not designated for consummation, and according to Rava neither one is betrothed.

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here? With a case in which they were identified and ultimately became intermingled.

This is also precise: as it teaches:

“He does not know,”

and it does not teach

“It is not known.”

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

if so

—that they were identified and ultimately became intermingled—

what is the point of stating it!?

And we answer:

The latter clause

of that Mishna

was necessary for him [

the latter clause of that Mishna is the novel point of the Mishna]!

The sister of his yevama who is subject to him through zekika is forbidden to the yavam, because she resembles “the sister of a wife.” If there were two brothers and one of them performed halitza with the yevama [or performed yibbum with her], her sister is forbidden only to the brother who performed halitza, but she is not forbidden to his brother. Although she had been the sister of his yevama subject to zekika, the zekika of her sister was not released through his intercourse or halitza, but through the intercourse or halitza of his brother.

As the latter clause teaches:

If

the man who betrothed one of two sisters

dies, and he has one brother,

and both women are found to be subject to him through zekika, with uncertainty as to whether yibbum or halitza is required, since it is not known which one had been the wife of the deceased brother, this brother

performs halitza with both of them,

since it is not known which one is his yevama subject to zekika. But he may not perform yibbum with even one of them, because perhaps her sister is the woman subject to him through zekika, in which case the one with whom he performs yibbum is the sister of his yevama, who is forbidden to the brother who performed halitza, even after he performed halitza with her sister.

And if

he has two

brothers, both of them may not perform yibbum with the two women, because with regard to the first one who performs yibbum, there is concern that she may be the sister of the woman subject to him through zekika, so that he would be performing yibbum with the sister of his yevama. Rather, they should do the following:

The

one brother performs halitza

with one of them first,

and

the

other

may even

perform yibbum

with the second, if he wishes. In either event, she is permitted to him: If she is the woman subject to him through zekika, he has performed yibbum with her; and if her sister is the woman subject to him through zekika, it was not he who performed halitza with her, so that her sister should become forbidden to him after the halitza.

Nevertheless,

if

both of them

preceded

and married both women,

they are not compelled to take them out of their possession,

because even if you should say that one of them married the sister of his yevama subject to zekika, by the time the second one performed yibbum, the zekika of her sister had already ceased. He committed a prohibition, but the act was done, and they did not penalize him by requiring him to divorce her, since the prohibition against the sister of a woman subject to zekika is only rabbinic.

And it teaches us that when he had two brothers,

specifically, one performs halitza

first,

and afterward the other performs yibbum,

as we learned in the order of the Mishna: “One performs halitza and the other performs yibbum”

; but for one to perform yibbum

first

and afterward the other performs halitza

with the second woman

is not permitted,

because

the first one encounters

the

sister of his yevama.

Come and hear another proof from the Mishna in Yevamot there, which states that “kiddushin that are not designated for consummation are valid kiddushin”:

also from the Mishna in Yevamot there, that “betrothals that are not given over for intercourse are betrothals”:

Two men who betrothed two sisters,

it might have entered your mind that each one betrothed one of the two sisters,

this one does not know which one he betrothed, and that one does not know which one he betrothed—

this one gives two bills of divorce

to the two sisters,

and that one gives two bills of divorce

to the two sisters.

But why!? These are kiddushin that are not designated for consummation, and this is a refutation of Rava!?

And we answer:

Here too

with what are we dealing? With a case such as

one in which they were identified and ultimately became intermingled.

This is also precise: as it teaches:

“He does not know,”

and it does not teach

“It is not known”;

infer from this!

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

if so

—that they were identified and ultimately became intermingled—

what is the point of stating it!?

And we answer:

The latter clause

of that Mishna

was necessary for him!

As the latter clause teaches: If

both men

die, this is their law:

If

this one has a brother, and that one

has

a brother: this one

—the brother of the first man—

performs halitza with both of them,

since each one is possibly his yevama subject to zekika. But he may not perform yibbum, because perhaps her sister is the woman subject to him through zekika, so that he would encounter the sister of his yevama. And even after performing halitza with one, he may not perform yibbum with the other, because she remains forbidden to him even after he performed halitza with her sister,

and

likewise

this one

—the brother of the second man—

performs halitza with both of them.

And if

this one

has one

brother, and that one

has

two brothers: