Kiddushin 51a — the Talmud in English

Produce that is untithed with regard to the first tithe: he takes a tenth and says, “These produce shall be tithe for the rest of the produce,” and the tithe becomes permitted for eating, because the designation “tithe” took effect upon it; while the rest of the produce became permitted, since he separated the tithe in order to rectify it.

But

one who increases the tithe,

who separated more than a tenth of the produce:

His produce

indeed

is rectified,

for within what he separated there is a tenth upon which the designation “tithe” took effect,

but

the

tithes are defective

and he cannot eat them at all. Since the excess over the prescribed measure was given the designation “tithe,” he did not permit it through the separation of the tithe as he did the rest of the produce. And since the designation “tithe” does not take effect beyond the prescribed measure, it follows that that excess over the prescribed measure is still untithed with regard to the tithe, and it is mixed with the rectified produce of the tithe; therefore everything is forbidden.

And according to Rabba, this is difficult: Since he separated at one time more than the measure of the tithe, something which he cannot do after he has already separated the proper measure of the tithe, then

why

is his produce rectified, and why are his tithes defective? After all, the designation “tithe” should not have taken effect at all, even upon the measure fit for the tithe! And because of this

let us say: “

Whatever cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect at one time,”

and the tithe should not take effect at all.

He

answered

him:

Rabba answered Abaye:

The tithe is different, since it exists in halves,

that is,

if he says: “

Let half of each wheat grain be consecrated,”

it is consecrated

Had he said, “Let half of each wheat grain of these wheat grains be consecrated with the sanctity of tithe,” the tithe would take effect in this manner. Therefore, when he separates at one time more than the prescribed measure, one may say that the designation “tithe” is seized by all the produce according to the calculation. But when he consecrated two sisters, it is impossible to say that a little consecration will be seized by each one; therefore the consecration did not take effect at all.

How does one separate the animal tithe? He gathers all the lambs, or all the calves, into the pen, and makes a small opening for it, so that two will not leave at once. And when they leave the pen one after the other, he begins and counts them with a staff: one, two, three, four, five, six,

seven, eight, nine; and the one that comes out tenth, he marks with red paint, and says, “This is tithe.”

If he erred and called the one that came out tenth “ninth,” and called the one that came out after it “tenth,” the first is consecrated with the sanctity of animal tithe, and the sanctity of a peace-offering is upon the second.

Again, we raise an objection to Rabba:

But there is animal tithe, which does not exist in halves,

for if he counted nine lambs, he can no longer bring out two lambs and say, “Half of each of them shall be animal tithe,” with each one being offered in halves.

Nor is there

also

one after the other,

for after he called the tenth lamb “tenth,” if he goes back and calls the one that came out after it “tenth,” it is not consecrated at all with the sanctity of animal tithe.

And

nevertheless

Rabba himself said

that:

If two came out as the tenth, and he called them: “

Tenth,”

then

the tenth and the eleventh are intermingled with one another—

that is, the sanctity of animal tithe took effect upon one of them, while the second is consecrated with the sanctity of a peace-offering. For its law is like that of the eleventh one that he called “tenth” after he had mistakenly called the one preceding it “ninth,” in which case it is consecrated with the sanctity of a peace-offering; and this one, too, after he called the one preceding it “ninth,” he called “tenth”—

However, it is not known which one is consecrated with the sanctity of animal tithe and which with the sanctity of a peace-offering. Therefore, they remain until a blemish occurs in them, and he brings an animal and says, “Wherever they are peace-offerings, let their sanctity be transferred onto this animal,” and he offers it as a peace-offering. Thus both of them may be eaten, because the peace-offering has been transferred wherever it is, while the second, which is animal tithe, may be eaten by its owners when it has its blemish.

And now this is difficult to Rabba: Why did the sanctity of animal tithe take effect at all when two came out as the tenth? After all, if, after he called one of them “tenth,” he had called the fellow that came after it “tenth,” it would not have been consecrated at all. If so, when two came out as the tenth and he called them “tenth,” we should say that the sanctity of animal tithe should not take effect upon either of them, because “whatever cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect at one time”!

And we answer:

Animal tithe is different, since it exists in error,

for if he erred in calling the tenth by its name, it is nevertheless tithe.

For

this

we learned

in tractate Bekhorot:

If he called the ninth “

tenth,”

and the tenth

he called

“ninth,”

and the eleventh

he called

“tenth,”

then

all three of them are consecrated;

how so?

The ninth, which he called “tenth,” is eaten when it has its blemish; the tenth, which he called “ninth,” is animal tithe; and the eleventh is offered as a peace-offering. This law is learned from the verses—

Therefore, just as its designation took effect upon the error—for he erred and called it “ninth”—so it takes effect even when the eleventh came out with it, and it did not lose its designation on account of this.

This too is the Gemara’s intention here: Since the emergence of the tenth animal sanctifies it even when he erred and did not call it “the tenth,” this is sanctity that arises on its own, and we do not apply to it the principle, “Anything that cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect all at once.” [However, from Rashi’s discussion of a thanksgiving-offering, which cannot take effect through an error, it appears that he does not explain the matter this way; see the comment of the Chazon Ish on Rashi there ; and the words of Tosafot Rid, who raised the objection that, concerning two prohibitions that took effect simultaneously, we should say, “Anything that cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect all at once,” also demonstrate that he did not accept Tosafot’s principle, as written in Birkat Avraham ; see Birkat Avraham.

The slaughtering of the todah-offering consecrates the breads of the todah.

Again, we raise an objection to Rabba:

But

the breads of

the todah do not exist in error,

for if he slaughtered the todah over forty loaves, intending black loaves, and white ones were found, which had not been in his mind, the loaves were not consecrated, since this is an “erroneous consecration,” which is not consecration according to Beit Hillel.

Nor does it exist one after the other,

for if he slaughtered the offering over forty loaves, and then said concerning another forty loaves that they too should be consecrated, the additional loaves were not consecrated, because it is the slaughtering of the offering that consecrates the loaves.

And

nevertheless

it was stated:

A todah that was slaughtered over eighty loaves,

that is, he brought eighty loaves to the Temple courtyard together with the todah:

Hezekiah said: Forty loaves are consecrated for it

loaves

from among

the

eighty

that he brought.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Not even

forty

from among eighty

are consecrated for it, and all the loaves are unconsecrated, because “whatever cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect at one time.”

But Hezekiah was Rabbi Yohanan’s teacher, and the halakha follows him when his student disputes him. This is therefore difficult from his words to Rabba: Why were the forty consecrated? We should say, “Whatever cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect at one time.”

And we answer: Is it so that

it was not stated concerning it

that

Rabbi Zeira said: All—

Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan—

agree wherever he says: “

Let forty be consecrated for it”

let them be consecrated

from among eighty,”

that is, if he intended that only forty loaves should be consecrated, while he brought the rest for replacement, so that if these were lost or became impure, the others would take their place—then

forty are consecrated

from among eighty.

And all agree that if he said: “

Let forty not be consecrated unless eighty are consecrated,”

that is, he did not intend that forty should be consecrated unless all eighty were consecrated, for we examined him and he said, “I intended all of them”—then

forty are not consecrated

from among eighty, because “whatever cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect at one time.”

They did not disagree—

Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan—

except in an unspecified case:

One master—

Hezekiah—

held: He intends them for replacement

with the addition of the remaining forty, and he does not want anything but forty to be consecrated; therefore forty from among eighty were consecrated.

And the other master,

Rabbi Yohanan,

held: He intends a large offering,

and therefore not even forty were consecrated, because “whatever cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect at one time.”

a. Here the Gemara returns to Rabba’s words, who challenged the reason of Rami bar Hama, who explained the reason for our Mishna—that one who betroths a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, at one time, has not betrothed them—on the basis of the verse, “And a woman to her sister you shall not take, to make her a rival.” Rabba challenged this: If so, he should not incur karet. For this reason Rabba explained the reason of the Mishna on the basis of Rabba’s principle: “Whatever cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect at one time.”

b. Later in the sugya, the dispute between Abaye and Rava is explained concerning one who performed a betrothal that does not enable him to have intercourse with the woman—for example, one who betroths one of two sisters. Because of the uncertainty as to which one is his wife and which one is her sister, he cannot have intercourse with either of them. This is called “betrothals that are not given for intercourse,” and Rava holds that the betrothals do not take effect.

And

we challenge

Rava: Why did he need to answer

why Rava needed to explain the reason for our Mishna

like Rabba!?

After all,

it follows

from the reason of our Mishna that even if you should say that one of the women is betrothed, because of the uncertainty—he does not know which of them is betrothed to him and which is her sister—he cannot have intercourse with either of them. It follows that they are “

betrothals that are not given for intercourse,”

they are, and Rava himself holds below that they are not betrothals. Why, then, did Rava not explain the reason for our Mishna in this manner!?

And we answer: Rava

spoke according to the position of Rami bar Hama:

According to your method, by which you learn the reason of the Mishna from the verse, “And a woman to her sister you shall not take, to make her a rival,” your words are difficult: If so, why does it say, “and the persons shall be cut off”? It follows that you do not need to say that the verse is speaking when he betrothed them at one time. Rather, the verse is always speaking of one after the other, but neither of them becomes betrothed automatically because of Rabba’s principle: “Whatever cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect at one time.”

It was stated: Betrothals that are not given for intercourse,

such as one who betroths one of two sisters, so that he cannot have intercourse with even one of them, since each one is possibly a wife’s sister—Abaye and Rava disputed this:

Abaye said: They are betrothals.

Rava said: They were not kiddushin.

Rava said: Bar Ahina

[the name of a sage]

explained it to me

the reason for the matter, in a manner by which I can bring proof for it from Scripture: “

For it is written: [Deuteronomy 24]: “

When a man takes a woman

[with money]

and has intercourse with her,”

thus the Torah made the kiddushin performed with money conditional upon the permissibility of intercourse, and to teach:

kiddushin that are fit for intercourse are kiddushin; kiddushin that are not fit for intercourse are not kiddushin.

And we challenge Rava from that which

we learned

in our Mishna:

One who betroths a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, simultaneously—they are not betrothed,

and because anything that cannot take effect one after the other cannot take effect simultaneously either; thus it follows:

but

if he betrothed

one of a woman and her daughter

without specifying which one,

or

one

of a woman and her sister

without specifying which one, she is

betrothed—

but why!?

For they are

kiddushin that are not fit for intercourse,

and this is

a refutation of Rava,

who said: They are not kiddushin!?

Rava could say to you: And according to your reasoning,

that you hold: They are kiddushin,

say

to me

the latter clause

of our Mishna, from which it can be proven according to my position, that “kiddushin that are not fit for intercourse are kiddushin”:

For the latter clause teaches:

An incident involving five women, among them two sisters: one man gathered a basket of figs, and it belonged to them, and it was produce of the Sabbatical year, and he said: “

Behold, all of you are betrothed to me with this basket,”

and the Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed—

and it follows:

It is the sisters who are not betrothed; but the unrelated women are betrothed—

And if so, that the unrelated women are betrothed,

what are the circumstances

[in which the Mishna is dealing]?

If you say

according to its simple meaning, such as

he said

the one betrothing: “Behold,

all of you

are betrothed to me,” this cannot be said, for if so, even the unrelated women would not be betrothed, because this is like

“You and the donkey acquire”

and

“acquire,”

you and the donkey,

does not acquire—

that is, one who gives a gift to a person born together with a fetus in its mother’s womb, which is like a donkey that is not fit to acquire, does not cause even the one born to acquire, for he did not grant to this one without that one—

And here as well, since he betrothed the unrelated women simultaneously with the sisters, who are like a donkey, with whom kiddushin cannot take effect, as a matter of law even the unrelated women should not be betrothed.