Kiddushin 48a (מח.) — the Talmud in English

One —

One

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The paper is evaluated; if it is worth one peruta, she is betrothed,

and if not, she is betrothed doubtfully. That is to say: Although the Sages did not decide the main issue in their dispute—namely, the law of betrothal by document—they nevertheless disagree with Rabbi Meir concerning betrothal by money. He holds that even if the document is worth one peruta she is not betrothed, because the woman does not intend the paper; they hold that she does intend the paper and becomes betrothed through it.

Alternatively,

the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar can be explained as follows:

that the bill of divorce be written

for her sake,

as the Torah says, “And he shall write for her a document of severance,” which is interpreted to mean: for her sake,

on the contrary,

the various forms of betrothal are compared to one another [

the different methods of betrothal to one another]; that is what

is compared,

because they were compared in the biblical verse “and she shall become,” which includes all forms of betrothal —

and

just as in betrothal with money we do not require

that the minted money be

for her sake, so too in betrothal with a document we do not require that it be written for her sake.

After Reish Lakish raised the question,

Reish Lakish

then resolved it himself: “

Resh Lakish himself: “

And she shall leave and become”;

this compares betrothal to divorce.

The tannaitic authorities in the beraita dispute this point:

One —

Rabbi Meir —

holds like Reish Lakish

that a document is invalid when it was not written for the sake of the woman, just as a bill of divorce is.

But -

Rabbi Elazar -

does not accept the principle of Reish Lakish, and therefore she is betrothed, even though it was written not for her sake.

and therefore she is betrothed, even though it was written without the proper intention.

Alternatively, if you wish, say

to explain the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar:

Everyone agrees that they accept the principle of Reish Lakish, and a bill of betrothal is not valid when it was written not for her sake!

and a bill of betrothal is not valid when it was written without the proper intention.

Here

in the beraita

with what are we dealing:

for example,

that

indeed,

he wrote it for her sake, but

the bill was written

without her knowledge [

the woman did not know when the bill was written],

and Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar are disputing the same issue as Rava and Ravina, and Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya

in the beraita!

For it was stated: If they wrote

the bill of betrothal

for her sake,

for the sake of the woman being betrothed,

but without her knowledge:

Rava and Ravina say: She is betrothed,

for just as a bill of divorce does not require her knowledge, since she can be divorced even against her will, so too betrothal; and this is the view of Rabbi Elazar.

Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya say: She is not betrothed,

for just as a bill of divorce requires the knowledge of the one transferring ownership, namely, the husband, so too betrothal requires the knowledge of the woman, who is the one transferring ownership; and this is the view of Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara now returns to Rav’s statement concerning one who betroths with a loan, and asks further:

Shall we say

that Rav’s statement concerning one who betroths with a loan is

like these tannaic opinions [

these tannaim disputed this matter]!?

For it was taught:

A woman who says to a man: “Take my gold, and

make me bracelets [

an anklet, a bracelet for the leg]

earrings and rings, and I will become betrothed to you

as payment for your labor”:

Once he has made them,

the woman is

betrothed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: She is not betrothed until money reaches her possession,

and the Gemara proceeds to explain this.

But

this money -

which the Sages required to reach her possession -

what are the circumstances [

to which money do the Sages refer]?

If we say it is that money,

namely, the bracelets, earrings, and rings, this cannot be said, because:

By inference, the first tanna [

Rabbi Meir],

holds: Even that money as well need not reach her possession

for her to become betrothed!? But surely this is obviously not so, since if the items have still not reached her possession,

with what is she betrothed [

and with what, then, does she become betrothed]!?

Rather, is it not referring to other money -

which will be given to her for the sake of betrothal - that the Sages said that if it did not reach her possession she is not betrothed, because they hold that she is not betrothed through payment for the labor of making the jewelry.

And conclude from this: They dispute the case of one who betroths with a loan,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And they hold

the members of the academy who sought to make Rav’s statement dependent on this dispute between the tannaim:

The obligation to pay a worker can be understood in two ways:

The first: “The rental obligation accrues from beginning to end”; that is, as each peruta’s worth of work is completed, the employer becomes obligated to the worker for the payment for that labor.

The second: “The rental obligation exists only at the end”; the employer becomes obligated to the worker only when he returns the completed work to the employer, and if he hired him - for example - to make earrings, the employer becomes obligated to the worker only upon completion of the earrings and their return to him.

Everyone -

both Rabbi Meir and the Sages -

holds: The rental obligation accrues from beginning to end,

and it follows that the payment for the labor

is a loan,

for at the time the betrothal takes effect, namely, when the husband returns the earrings to the woman, the woman was already obligated to the man for payment for the labor, and he betroths her with the debt that she owes him, which is a loan -

And if so,

is it not with regard to this that they dispute: One master

Rabbi Meir

holds: One who betroths with a loan effects betrothal.

And the other

the Sages

holds: One who betroths with a loan does not effect betrothal.

And Rav’s statement would thus be dependent on a dispute between tannaim.

And we reject this:

No,

not as you explained the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages; rather, their dispute must be explained in one of three other ways:

1.

Everyone:

one who

betroths with a loan does not effect betrothal.

Here,

their dispute is whether the payment for the labor is a loan, and

with regard to

“the rental obligation accrues from beginning to end,”

they dispute: