Kiddushin 48a — the Talmud in English

One who sells a promissory note to his fellow and then the

lender

forgives

the debt, this is

forgiven;

and even an heir

of the lender

may forgive it; and according to this reasoning, the woman is not betrothed through the receipt of a promissory note, because she does not rely on the assumption that he will not forgive it, and it is not in her mind to become betrothed; their dispute depends upon Shmuel’s ruling:

For one—

the Sages—

holds Shmuel’s ruling,

and therefore she is not betrothed.

And the other—

Rabbi Meir—

does not hold Shmuel’s ruling.

d.

And if you wish, say

to explain the dispute of the tannaim concerning a loan documented in a note:

Everyone holds Shmuel’s ruling

and he can forgive it,

and here, concerning the woman

of the betrother, whether she relies upon the assumption that he will not forgive it—

they disagree:

One

Rabbi Meir

holds: The woman

of the betrother

relies upon it,

because

she says

the woman: “

He will not

abandon me and forgive it to others” [she says in her heart: Surely he will not abandon me and go forgive it to others at my expense].

А тот

And the other,

the Sages,

holds: The woman too

like other purchasers

does not rely upon it.

And here the Gemara returns to explain the dispute of the Sages and Rabbi Meir concerning an oral loan with which he betrothed her:

With an oral loan, over what do they disagree?

If an oral loan can be transferred, and

it is in accordance with Rav Huna’s statement in the name of Rav! For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

One who says to his fellow: “

I have one hundred dinars with you; give it to so-and-so,”

and he said so

in the presence of the three [the lender, the borrower, and the purchaser],

приобрёл

the purchaser acquires it

[the purchaser].

One

the Sages

holds: When Rav said this, it applies only

to a deposit, but

with

a loan, no,

and it follows that there is no possibility of transferring an oral loan at all, and therefore she is not betrothed.

And the other

Rabbi Meir

holds: It makes no difference whether a loan or whether a deposit; it can be transferred in the presence of the three, and therefore if he betrothed her in the presence of the borrower, she is betrothed.

and both can be transferred in the presence of all three. Therefore, if he betrothed her in the presence of the borrower, she is betrothed.

And the Gemara further asks concerning Rav, who said: One who betroths with a loan is not betrothed, even if the money is present, and all the more so if it is not present:

Let us say

Rav’s law

is like the dispute of tannaim,

who disagreed concerning his law:

For it was taught in a beraita: One who says to a woman, “

Become betrothed to me with a document,”

and it explains further:

Rabbi Meir says: She is not betrothed,

even if there is in the paper—upon which the document is written—property worth a peruta.

And Rabbi Elazar says: She is betrothed,

even if there is not in the paper property worth a peruta.

And the Sages say: The paper is appraised,

upon which the document is written;

if there is in it property worth a peruta,

then she is

betrothed,

on account of the paper, which is worth money, and the woman becomes betrothed through it.

And behold,

this document

with which he betrothed her

what are its circumstances?

If you say it is another’s promissory note [and this is like one of the explanations given concerning the preceding beraita], then

then

Rabbi Meir’s statement contradicts Rabbi Meir’s statement,

for in the beraita mentioned above it is explained that according to Rabbi Meir she is betrothed with another’s promissory note!?

Rather,

the beraita must be dealing

with her own promissory note [

of the woman herself, who owed him money and he had a note for this debt],

and they disagree concerning one who betroths with a loan,

that is not present,

they disagree!

It follows that tannaim disagreed concerning Rav’s law.

Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The beraita is not dealing with one who betrothed her with a debt that has a document, but with betrothal by document—that is, he writes in the document, “Behold, you are betrothed,” and gives it to her—and

here, with what are we dealing? For example, he betrothed her with a document

of betrothal

upon which no witnesses

are signed:

And Rabbi Meir follows his own reasoning [

his method],

for he said

concerning a bill of divorce:

the witnesses of the signing effect the divorce [they make the bill of divorce a “document of severance”]; and the same applies to a betrothal document, which is not a document without witnesses of signing. Therefore, according to his method, she is not betrothed because of “betrothal by document”; and even if there is in the paper property worth a peruta, she is not betrothed by the law of “betrothal through money,” since the woman does not intend to become betrothed through the value of the paper.

сомневаются: следует ли считать, как раби Меир, или как раби Элазар

And Rabbi Elazar follows his own reasoning, for he said: The witnesses of delivery effect the divorce,

and although there are no witnesses signed upon it, the same applies to a betrothal document; therefore, according to his method, she is betrothed with this document, even when there is not in the paper property worth a peruta.

And the Sages [

the Sages of the beraita]

are uncertain whether the halakha is like Rabbi Meir or like Rabbi Elazar

concerning “betrothal by document”

; therefore:

Здесь о каком случае идёт речь? Например, если они написали документ кидушин не ради неё — ради женщины, которую он посвящает посредством этого документа, — и они расходятся во мнениях относительно вопроса, поставленного Реш Лакишем: если документ обручения написан не ради той женщины, для которой он предназначен, каков закон? Суть сомнения такова: Возможно, мы уподобляем вступление в брак расторжению брака [кидушин — герат], и требуем этого, поскольку они сопоставлены в стихе: «И выйдет [из его дома и пойдёт] и станет женой другого». -

The paper is appraised; if there is in it property worth a peruta, she is betrothed,

and if not, she is doubtfully betrothed; that is to say: Although they did not decide the essence of their dispute, namely, concerning the law of “betrothal by document,” nevertheless they disagree with Rabbi Meir concerning the law of “betrothal through money,” for he holds that even if the document is worth a peruta, she is not betrothed, because the woman does not have the paper in mind; whereas they hold that she has the paper in mind and becomes betrothed through it.

And if you wish, say

to explain the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar:

What are we dealing with here?

For example, they wrote

the betrothal document

not for the sake

of the woman whom he betroths with it,

and they disagree concerning the question of Resh Lakish: Resh Lakish raised the question: A document of betrothal that they wrote not for its sake—what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Whether

we derive betrothal from divorce [

betrothal from divorce]

by analogy,

because they were equated in the verse: “And she shall leave [his house and go] and become [the wife] of another man.” -

And

just as concerning divorce we require

that the bill of divorce be written

for its sake,

for the Torah said: “And he shall write for her a document of severance,” and we expound: for its sake,

so too concerning betrothal we require

that the document be written

for its sake

of the woman being betrothed.

Or perhaps:

on the contrary,

we derive the forms of betrothal from one another [

the methods of betrothal from one another],

by analogy,

because they were equated in the verse: “And she shall become,” which includes all the forms of betrothal—

and

just as concerning betrothal through money we do not require

that the coined money be

for its sake, so concerning betrothal through a document we do not require it to be for its sake.

After Resh Lakish had raised the question,

Resh Lakish

then resolved it,

Resh Lakish himself: “

And she shall leave and become,”

derives betrothal by analogy from divorce.

The tannaitic authorities in the beraita dispute this point:

One—

Rabbi Meir—

holds Resh Lakish’s view,

that the document is invalid when it was written not for its sake, just like a bill of divorce.

And -

Rabbi Elazar -

does not hold like Reish Lakish, and therefore she is betrothed, even though it was written not for her sake.

and therefore she is betrothed, even though it was written without the proper intention.

And if you wish, say

to explain the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar:

Everyone holds like Reish Lakish, and a bill of betrothal is not valid when it was written not for her sake!

and a bill of betrothal is not valid when it was written without the proper intention.

And here

in the beraita

with what are we dealing:

for example,

that

indeed

he wrote it for her sake, but

the bill was written

without her knowledge

[the woman did not know when the bill was written],

and they disagree concerning the dispute between Rava and Ravina, and Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya

—Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar in the beraita!

For it was stated: He wrote

the bill of betrothal

for her sake,

for the sake of the woman being betrothed,

but without her knowledge:

Rava and Ravina said: She is betrothed,

for just as in the case of a bill of divorce her knowledge is not required, since she is divorced even against her will, so too betrothal; and this is the view of Rabbi Elazar.

Rav Pappa and Rav Sherevya said: She is not betrothed,

for just as in the case of a bill of divorce the knowledge of the transferor—the husband—is required, so too in betrothal the knowledge of the woman, who is the transferor, is required; and this is the view of Rabbi Meir.

Here the Gemara returns to Rav’s words concerning one who betroths with a loan, and asks further:

Let us say,

should it be said that Rav’s words concerning one who betroths with a loan are

like these tannaitic

[these tannaim disputed this matter]!?

For it was taught:

A woman who says to a man: “Take this gold of mine, and

make bracelets for me

[a leg-bangle, a bracelet for the leg]

earrings and rings, and I shall be betrothed to you

in return for your labor”:

Once he has made them,

the woman is

betrothed, the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: She is not betrothed until money reaches her hand,

and the Gemara proceeds to explain it.

But

this money—

which the Sages required to reach her hand—

what are its circumstances

[to what money do the Sages refer]?

If we say that money,

namely, the bracelets, earrings, and rings, this cannot be said, for:

By implication, the first tanna

[Rabbi Meir]

holds: Even that money too does not

have to reach her hand for her to become betrothed!? But surely this is obviously not so, for if they have not yet reached her hand,

with what is she betrothed

[and with what, then, does she become betrothed]!?

Rather, is it not with other money—

which will be given to her for the sake of betrothal—that the Sages said that if it did not reach her hand she is not betrothed, because they hold that she is not betrothed through the payment for the labor of making the ornaments.

And infer from it: They disagree concerning one who betroths with a loan,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And they hold,

the members of the academy who sought to make Rav’s words depend on this dispute among the tannaim:

The obligation to pay a laborer can be understood in two ways:

The first: “The rental exists from the beginning until the end”: that is, as each pruta is completed, the employer becomes obligated to the laborer for the rental payment for the labor.

The second: “The rental exists only at the end”: the employer becomes obligated to the laborer only when he returns the completed work to the employer, and if he hired him—for example—to make earrings, the employer becomes obligated to the laborer only upon completion of the making of the earrings and their return to him.

Everyone—

both Rabbi Meir and the Sages—

holds:

the payment for the labor

is a loan,

for at the time the betrothal takes effect, namely, when the husband returns the earrings to the woman, the woman was already obligated to the betrother for the payment for the labor, and he betroths her with a debt that she owes him, and that is a loan —

And if so,

is it not with this that they disagree: One

Rabbi Meir

holds: One who betroths with a loan is betrothed.

And the other

the Sages

holds: One who betroths with a loan is not betrothed.

And Rav’s words are thereby dependent on a dispute among the tannaim.

And we reject this:

No,

not as you explained the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages; rather, the dispute must be explained in three other ways:

1.

Everyone:

one who

betroths with a loan is not betrothed.

And here

their dispute is whether the payment for the labor is a loan, and

in “

the rental exists from the beginning until the end,”

they disagree: