Kiddushin 47b — the Talmud in English

Even

a loan ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

is like a deposit,

for she is betrothed only if there still remains, in existence, a peruta's worth of the money that he gave her.

And let this be a difficulty for Rav:

the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Meir disagree only

in the following matter:

that one—

the Tanna Kamma—

holds: A loan, even though a peruta's worth has not remained from it,

she is betrothed,

whereas the other—

Rabbi Meir—

holds:

If

a peruta's worth has remained from it, yes; but if a peruta's worth has not remained from it, no—

but everyone—

both the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Meir—

holds that one who betroths with a loan,

when the money is still in existence, she is

betrothed;

and this is a difficulty for Rav!?

He said

he answered,

Rava: And can you understand that it is a properly formulated [beraita]?

It is

a corrupted one [Do you think that this beraita is properly formulated? Behold, it is demonstrably a corrupted beraita from within itself]!?

And necessarily we must explain it in a manner different from the way it was taught in the beit-midrash, and then it will no longer be a difficulty for Rav. For

this deposit

which we learned in the beraita—that if a peruta's worth did not remain from it, she is not betrothed even according to the Tanna Kamma—

what are the circumstances?

If

he accepted

she accepted

the woman

responsibility

for the theft or loss of the deposit, then

that is a loan,

where the money is not in existence; that is, she is obligated to repay it. And since the Tanna Kamma holds that with a loan she is betrothed even when the money of the loan is not in existence, why should she not be betrothed even with a deposit when a peruta's worth has not remained from it!?

And

if

the beraita is dealing with a deposit

for which he did not accept

he accepted

she accepted

the woman

responsibility,

and therefore according to everyone she is not betrothed when a peruta's worth has not remained from it, this is still difficult, for

if so:

rather than have it teach in the latter clause

in the words of the Tanna Kamma: “

And with a loan, even though a peruta's worth has not remained from it, she is betrothed,”

let it distinguish and teach it with regard to that case itself [Let the Tanna distinguish with regard to the deposit itself]:

“

In what circumstance is this statement said

that she is not betrothed if a peruta's worth has not remained from the deposit? In a case

where she did not accept responsibility; but if she accepted

responsibility, even though a peruta's worth has not remained from it,

this woman is

betrothed!?”

For this law is the same as the law of a loan.

Rather,

necessarily this beraita is corrupted, and

explain it thus [And thus resolve it]: “

‘Be betrothed to me with the deposit that I have in your possession,’ and she went and found that it had been stolen or lost,” and she had accepted responsibility for it: “If a peruta's worth remained from it, she is betrothed; and if not, she is not betrothed,” since it is a loan, and one who betroths with a loan—which is not in existence—is not betrothed according to everyone.

And with an actual loan,

even if a peruta's worth remained from it—she

is not

betrothed,

because “a loan is given for expenditure.”

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A loan is like a deposit,

so that if the money that he gave her was stolen or lost, and a peruta's worth remained from it, she is betrothed, as he explains the reason below.

And we explain:

With regard to what

do the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Meir disagree?

Rabba said: I found the Sages in the house of Rav [I found the Sages in the beit-midrash],

who were sitting and saying [who were sitting and saying] in explanation of their dispute:

Everyone always holds that a loan is given for expenditure,

and if the borrower had already begun spending some of the money, according to everyone she would not have been betrothed with it, for through this use he acquired it;

but the beraita is dealing with a case where he had not yet begun spending any of the money at all, but some of it was stolen or lost,

and it is regarding this that they disagree. And the foundation of their disagreement is: Regarding the law of a loan from which he had not begun spending anything, whether it is still in the owners’ possession for retraction [so that the lender can retract the loan],

and the same law applies

if it is in his possession

with regard to accidents [so that if the money is forcibly taken, the borrower is not obligated to repay the loan], this is what they

disagree about:

under the lender’s control with regard to retraction

[meaning that the lender can retract the loan],

and likewise

The one

the Tanna Kamma

holds: A loan

from the moment the borrower received it, even though he did not spend any of the money, already

stands in the borrower’s possession, and the owners cannot retract it, and the same law applies with regard to accidents,

for the lender is not responsible for them; rather, the borrower repays the loan. Therefore she is not betrothed even though he has not yet spent it, since the money is already hers.

And the other

Rabbi Meir

holds: A loan—

until he began spending any of it—

stands in the owners’ possession [the lender],

and the same law applies with regard to accidents;

they are in the lender’s possession, and the borrower is not obligated to repay the loan. Since they are still his, she is therefore betrothed if a peruta's worth remained in the deposit after the theft.

And Rabba adds and says:

And I said to them [I said to the Sages of the beit-midrash, who explained their dispute in this manner: I too agree with your explanation concerning the fundamental matter, but I disagree with you regarding one detail, namely]:

With regard to

the matter of

accidents, everyone—

both the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Meir—

does not disagree, for

even though he had not yet begun spending from the money of the loan, it is

standing in the borrower’s possession

and he is obligated to repay it—

And

what is the reason?

Because

it is not inferior

to a

loan

than a borrowing:

with regard to a borrowing, which returns in its substance [which returns in its substance],

he is obligated

to bear

the accidents

from the moment he received it, even though he had not yet begun using it;

a loan, all the more so,

that he should be obligated for accidents once it came into his possession, even though he had not yet begun using it!

Rather, here, a loan in the owners’ possession for retraction

alone is what

distinguishes between them:

the Tanna Kamma holds that the owners cannot retract it even before he began using the money, and if so, it is hers, and she is not betrothed with it.

And Rabbi Meir holds: Until the borrower began using the money, the lender can retract it, and if so, it is his, and he can betroth her with this money.

And we raise a difficulty against what was explained: that the tannaim in the beraita disagree whether the borrower acquires the lender’s money at least with regard to retraction until he began using it:

But rather—according to what was explained—

this statement of Rav Huna: One who borrows an axe from his fellow:

if he had already

split wood with it, he acquired it, since he began using it and the owners can no longer retract it; but if he had still

not split wood with it, he did not acquire it,

and the owners can retract it—

is the difference between them:

the first tanna holds that the lender cannot retract the loan even before the borrower began using the money; therefore it belongs to her, and she is not betrothed with it.

Rabbi Meir holds that until the borrower began using the money, the lender can retract it; therefore it belongs to him, and he can betroth her with this money.

Let us say that he stated his teaching as a dispute between tannaim [Shall we say that his statement is stated in accordance with the dispute between the tannaim in the beraita]!?

And we answer:

No,

Rav Huna’s law, which deals with a borrowing, is not dependent on the dispute between the tannaim, which deals with a loan:

The tannaim disagree only

in the beraita

with regard to a loan that does not return in its substance [which is not meant to return in its substance];

but with regard to a borrowing, which does return in its substance [which is meant to return in its substance],

everyone agrees: If he split wood with it, he did [indeed acquire the axe for his borrowing],

and if he did not split wood with it, he did not acquire it. Here the Gemara returns to Rav’s statement, that one who betroths with a loan is not betrothed even when the money is in existence, and all the more so when the money is no longer in existence, and asks: Let us say that Rav’s words are in accordance with a dispute between tannaim [That they are stated in accordance with the following dispute between tannaim]:

For it was taught: If one says to a woman: “

Be betrothed to me with a promissory note,”

and it explains the matter further:

or he had a loan in the hands of others and authorized her

over

them [others owed him money, and he wrote the woman an authorization concerning them], meaning: he transferred the loan to the woman:

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed.

And the Sages say: She is not betrothed.

And this

promissory note

with which he betrothed her,

what are the circumstances?

If you say it is another’s promissory note,

where others owed him under a promissory note, and he gave this debt to the woman for the sake of betrothal,

then

this is a loan in the hands of others,

and why were two laws taught in the beraita that are one and the same!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that he betrothed her with

her promissory note [that she owed him money under a promissory note],

and

if so,

with regard to one who betroths with a loan—

which is not in existence—

they disagree,

and Rav’s words are found to depend on a dispute between tannaim!

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed.

And we reject this:

In fact, this statement that we learned in the beraita: “Be betrothed to me with a promissory note,” refers to

another’s promissory note—

promissory note”

with which he betrothed her—

what are the circumstances?

If we say it is another person’s promissory note,

that is, others owed him money under a promissory note, and he gave that debt to the woman for the sake of betrothal, then

this is the loan in the hands of others

And if this is difficult for you: “This is a loan in the hands of others,” concerning which they disagree in the beraita”—it is not difficult,

and

because

here

in the beraita

they disagree concerning a loan by a promissory note and a loan by oral agreement,

that is: they disagree in two separate disputes. One is concerning a loan owed by others, for which he possesses a promissory note, and the second is concerning a loan owed by others, which he possesses orally; and the reason for this one is not the reason for that one.

And the Gemara first explains their dispute concerning the promissory note in several possible ways, and afterward the Gemara explains their dispute concerning the oral loan.

With regard to a loan by a promissory note—

which he has against others—

with regard to what do they disagree? And the Gemara explains it in four ways:

A. In a case where he gave her the promissory note that was in his possession, but did not write a deed of sale for the debt, and

they disagree in the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis! For it was taught:

Documents are acquired through delivery,

meaning: a debt that a person has against his fellow in a document can be transferred by giving the promissory note to the purchaser,

the words of Rabbi.

And as for the difficulty that this is the loan in the hands of others mentioned in the beraita, there is no difficulty,

because

the reason is that

here,

in the beraita,

they disagree concerning a loan documented in writing and a verbal loan

—that is, there are two separate disputes: one concerns a debt owed by others that he holds in the form of a promissory note, and the other concerns a verbal debt owed by others. The reason for one is not the reason for the other.

The Gemara first explains their dispute concerning a documented loan through several possibilities, and afterward explains their dispute concerning a verbal loan.

Concerning a loan documented in writing

that he holds against others—

with regard to what do they disagree?

The Gemara explains the dispute in four ways:

a. For example, he gave her the promissory note in his possession but did not write a document transferring ownership of the debt, and

they disagree in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages, as it was taught in a beraita:

Documents are acquired through delivery,

that is, a debt that one person has against another and that is recorded in a document can be transferred to the purchaser by handing over the promissory note,

the words of Rabbi.

And the Sages say: whether he wrote

a deed of sale for the sale of the debt [and gave it to her]],

but did not give

the promissory note itself to the purchaser, and

whether he gave

the promissory note to the purchaser,

but did not write

a deed of sale for the sale of the debt and give it to her,

the purchaser does not acquire

the debt,

until the lender writes

a deed of sale for him and gives it to him,

and gives

him also the promissory note.

And in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages, the tannaim disagreed concerning a loan documented by a promissory note that he has against others, which he gave to a woman in order to become betrothed through it:

One—

Rabbi Meir

holds like Rabbi,

for through the giving alone she acquired the debt, and therefore she is betrothed.

And one—

the Sages

do not hold like Rabbi,

and since he did not write a deed of sale for her, she is not betrothed.

b.

And if you wish, say

in explaining their dispute concerning a loan documented by a promissory note:

According to everyone—

both Rabbi Meir and the Sages—

they do not hold like Rabbi,

and through the giving alone he does not acquire it,

and here

in the beraita we are dealing with a case in which he also wrote a deed of sale for her, in which it was written: “Acquire this promissory note for yourself” only, and

over the matter of Rav Pappa—

who holds that this wording is insufficient—

they disagree:

For Rav Pappa said:

One who sells a promissory note to his fellow

the one who sells a promissory note to his fellow,

must write for him

in the deed of sale: “

Acquire it for yourself, together with all its liens

acquire for yourself the promissory note and all its liens]”.

One—

the Sages

holds like Rav Pappa,

and therefore she is not betrothed, for the wording of the document that he wrote for her is insufficient, and she did not acquire the debt in the document, and therefore she is not betrothed.

And one—

Rabbi Meir

does not hold like Rav Pappa,

and the wording that he wrote in the deed of sale is sufficient to acquire the promissory note, together with the giving of the promissory note itself.

c.

And if you wish, say

to explain the dispute of the tannaim concerning a loan documented by a promissory note:

According to everyone, they hold like Rav Pappa, and here

we are dealing with a case in which he wrote the proper wording, and the woman indeed acquired the debt in the document, and

over the matter of Shmuel—

who, according to his view, nevertheless she is not betrothed—

they disagree! For Shmuel said: