Kiddushin 47b (מז:) — the Talmud in English

Even

a loan

exact page location

is like a deposit:

she is betrothed only if at least the value of one peruta of the money he gave her still exists intact.

And one can raise an objection to Rav:

The disagreement extends only this far

the first tanna and Rabbi Meir,

but one sage—

the first tanna—

holds: Even though a loan no longer has a peruta’s worth remaining

she is betrothed,

while the other—

Rabbi Meir—

holds:

If

a peruta’s worth remains, yes; but if a peruta’s worth does not remain, no—

But everyone—

both the first tanna and Rabbi Meir—holds that one who

betroths with a loan

when the money still exists intact, she is

betrothed;

so this is an objection to Rav!

Rava

replied:

And can you understand that it is a properly formulated

beraita?

It is a corrupted one [Do you think that this beraita is properly formulated? It is intrinsically evident that it is corrupted!]

[Therefore, we must interpret it differently from the way it was taught in the beit-midrash, and there will no longer be an objection to Rav. For] this

deposit

that we learned in the beraita, where it says that if a peruta’s worth did not remain, she is not betrothed even according to the first tanna—

what are the circumstances?

If

she accepted

or: he accepted

the woman

responsibility

for theft or loss of the deposit, then

that is a loan

where the money no longer exists intact; that is, she is liable to repay it. Since the first tanna holds that with a loan she is betrothed even when the loan money no longer exists intact, why should she not be betrothed even with a deposit when a peruta’s worth of it did not remain!?

And

if

the beraita is dealing with a deposit

for which

she accepted

or: he accepted

the woman

responsibility,

then everyone agrees that she is not betrothed when a peruta’s worth did not remain; but this presents a difficulty,

for if so:

Rather than teach in the latter clause

in the words of the first tanna: “

And with regard to a loan, even if a peruta’s worth did not remain, she is betrothed,”

let him distinguish and teach it in that case itself [Let the tanna make the distinction within the case of a deposit itself]:

In what case is this statement said

that she is not betrothed if a peruta’s worth did not remain from the deposit? In a case

such as

where she did not accept responsibility, but if she accepted

responsibility, even though a peruta’s worth did not remain

this woman is

betrothed!?

For this law is the same as the law of a loan.

Rather,

the beraita is necessarily corrupted, and

interpret it as follows [and thus resolve it]: “Be betrothed to me with the deposit that I have in your possession,” and she went and found that it had been stolen or lost, and she had accepted responsibility for it: “If a peruta’s worth remains, she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed,” since it is a loan, and one who betroths with a loan—that does not exist intact—is not betrothed according to everyone.

‘Be betrothed to me with the deposit that I have in your possession,’ and she went and found that it had been stolen or lost,” and she had accepted responsibility for it: “If a peruta's worth remained from it, she is betrothed; and if not, she is not betrothed,” since it is a loan, and one who betroths with a loan—which is not in existence—is not betrothed according to everyone.

And with an actual loan,

And with an actual loan,

in the case

even if a peruta’s worth remains—

she is not betrothed,

because “a loan is given to be spent.”

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A loan is like a deposit,

so that if the money he gave her was stolen or lost, and a peruta’s worth of it remained, she is betrothed, as the reason for this ruling will be explained below.

And we explain:

With regard to what do

the first tanna and Rabbi Meir disagree?

Rabba said: I found the Sages at the house of Rav

[I found the Sages in the beit-midrash],

who were sitting and saying

[and saying] the following explanation of their disagreement:

Everyone always agrees that a loan is given to be spent, and if the borrower had already begun spending the money, everyone agrees that she would not have been betrothed with it, since through this use he acquired it; however, the beraita is dealing with a case where he had not yet begun spending any of the money at all, but some of it was stolen or lost, and it is concerning this that they disagree. The basis of their disagreement is:

The

law of a

loan

from which he has not begun spending anything: whether it is still

in the owners’ possession with regard to retraction

[so that the lender can retract the loan],

and likewise

whether it is in his possession

with regard to accidents

[so that if the money is lost through circumstances beyond his control, the borrower is not obligated to repay the loan], is the matter over which they

disagree:

stands in the borrower’s possession, and the owners cannot retract it, and the same law applies with regard to accidents,

For one sage,

the first tanna,

holds: A loan,

as soon as the borrower received it, even though he has not spent any of the money, already

stands in the borrower’s possession,

and the owners cannot retract it.

And likewise, with regard to accidents,

the lender is not responsible for them; rather, the borrower must repay the loan. Therefore, she is not betrothed even though he has not yet spent the money, since the money already belongs to her.

And the other,

Rabbi Meir,

holds: A loan—

until he has begun spending it—

remains in the owners’ possession

[the lender],

and likewise, with regard to accidents, they remain in the lender’s possession, and the borrower is not obligated to repay the loan. Since they still belong to him, she is therefore betrothed if a peruta’s worth remained in the deposit after the theft.

even though he had not yet begun spending from the money of the loan, it is

And Rabba adds and says:

And I said to them

[I said to the Sages of the beit-midrash, who had explained their disagreement in this way]: I too fundamentally agree with your interpretation, but I disagree with you concerning one detail, namely:

With regard

to

accidents, everyone

—both the first tanna and Rabbi Meir—

agrees that they do not disagree, for

even though he has not yet begun spending the lender’s money, it

is in the borrower’s possession

and

stands

there, and he is obligated to repay it—

And

what is the reason?

Because

a loan is not inferior

to a

borrowed item: Just as in the case of a borrowed item, which must be returned intact

[and returns intact], he

is obligated

to bear responsibility

for accidents

from the moment he received it, even though he has not yet begun using it,

so in the case of a loan, all the more so

that he should become liable for accidents when it came into his possession, even though he has not yet begun using it!

Rather, here the issue is a loan in the owners’ possession with regard to retraction

alone; this is the matter over which they

differ:

The first tanna holds that the owners cannot retract it even before he has begun using the money, and therefore it belongs to her, so she is not betrothed with it.

And Rabbi Meir holds that until the borrower begins using the money, the lender can retract it; therefore it still belongs to him, and he can betroth her with this money.

And we challenge what was established: that the tannaim in the beraita disagree over whether the borrower acquires the lender’s money at least with regard to retraction, before he has begun using it:

But rather—

according to what was explained—

what of Rav Huna’s statement: One who borrows an axe from another?

If he has already

chopped with it, he acquires it,

since he has begun using it and the owners can no longer retract it; but if he has

not chopped with it, he has not acquired it,

and the owners can retract it—

Should we say that he stated his teaching as a dispute between the tannaim

Shall we say that he stated his teaching as a dispute between tannaim

[that his statement is based on the dispute between the tannaim in the beraita]!?

No,

Rav Huna’s ruling concerning a borrowed item is not dependent on the disagreement between the tannaim concerning a loan:

The disagreement extends only this far

the tannaim in the beraita:

They disagree only with regard to a loan that is not returned intact

[which is not meant to be returned in its original form],

but with regard to a borrowed item that is returned intact

[which is meant to be returned in its original form],

everyone agrees: If he chopped with it, he has

[indeed acquired the axe for the duration of the loan];

if he did not chop with it, he has not acquired it.

where others owed him under a promissory note, and he gave this debt to the woman for the sake of betrothal,

Here the Gemara returns to Rav’s statement, that one who betroths with a loan is not betrothed even when the money remains intact, and certainly when the money no longer remains intact, and asks:

Shall we say that the words of

Rav are

a dispute between tannaim

[that they are based on the following dispute between tannaim]:

As it is taught in a beraita: If a man says to a woman, “

Be betrothed to me with a promissory note,”

and the beraita proceeds to explain:

Or he had a loan with others and authorized her

to collect it

from them

[others owed him money, and he wrote the woman an authorization concerning those debts], meaning that he transferred the loan to the woman:

Rabbi Meir says: She is betrothed.

And the Sages say: She is not betrothed.

And this

particular

promissory note

with which he betrothed her,

what are the circumstances?

If we say it is the promissory note of others,

who owed him money by written obligation, and he gave this debt to the woman for the sake of betrothal,

that is the loan with others,

so why were two laws that are identical taught in the beraita!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that he betrothed her with

her promissory note

[she owed him money by written obligation],

and

if so,

they disagree concerning one who betroths with a loan—

that does not exist intact—

and disagree; thus Rav’s words are shown to depend on a dispute between tannaim!

with regard to what do they disagree? And the Gemara explains it in four ways:

And we reject this:

Actually,

the case that we learned in the beraita, “Be betrothed to me with a promissory note,” is referring to

the promissory note of others—

the words of Rabbi.

And as for your difficulty—“that is the loan with others” over which they already disagreed in the beraita—there is no difficulty,

for

because

here,

in the beraita,

they disagree concerning a loan secured by a promissory note and an oral loan,

meaning that there are two separate disagreements: one concerning a loan owed by others for which he possesses a promissory note, and the other concerning an oral loan that others owe him. The reason for one is not the reason for the other.

The Gemara first explains their disagreement concerning the promissory note in several possible ways, and afterward explains their disagreement concerning an oral loan.

With regard to a loan secured by a promissory note

that others owe him,

with regard to what do they disagree?

The Gemara explains it in four ways:

a. For example, he gave her the promissory note in his possession, but did not write a deed of sale transferring the debt;

and they disagree in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages, as it is taught in a beraita:

Documents are acquired through delivery,

meaning that a debt a person has against another, documented in a promissory note, can be transferred to a purchaser by handing over the promissory note,

the words of Rabbi.

And the Sages say: Whether he wrote

a deed of sale for the sale of the debt [and handed it to him],

but did not hand over

the debt document itself to the purchaser, or

whether he handed over

the debt document to the purchaser,

but did not write

a deed of sale for the sale of the debt and hand it to him,

the purchaser does not acquire it

the debt

until he writes

a deed of sale for him and hands it to him,

and hands over

the debt document as well.

And in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages, the tannaim disagree concerning a documented loan that one has against others, which he handed to a woman so that she would become betrothed to him with it:

One

—Rabbi Meir—

holds in accordance with Rabbi

that by the handing over alone she acquired the debt, and therefore she is betrothed.

And one

—the Sages—

does not hold in accordance with Rabbi,

and since he did not write a deed of sale for her, she is not betrothed.

b.

Alternatively,

the dispute can be explained as concerning a documented loan:

Everyone

—both Rabbi Meir and the Sages—

does not hold in accordance with Rabbi,

and by the handing over alone the purchaser does not acquire it.

And here

we are dealing in the beraita with a case in which he also wrote a deed of sale for her, in which it was written only: “Acquire this debt document for yourself,” and

they disagree concerning the ruling of Rav Pappa

who holds that this formulation is insufficient:

This is the dispute:

For Rav Pappa said:

One who sells a document to another

[the seller of a debt document to his fellow]

must write for him

in the deed of sale: “

Acquire it for yourself, together with all its liens

[acquire for yourself the debt document and all its liens].”

One

—the Sages—

holds in accordance with Rav Pappa,

and therefore she is not betrothed, since the wording of the deed that he wrote for her is insufficient, and she did not acquire the debt recorded in the document; therefore, she is not betrothed.

And one

—Rabbi Meir—

does not hold in accordance with Rav Pappa,

and the wording that he wrote in the deed of sale is sufficient to acquire the debt document, together with the handing over of the debt document itself.

c.

Alternatively,

the dispute between the tannaim can be explained as concerning a documented loan:

Everyone holds in accordance with Rav Pappa, and here

we are dealing with a case in which he wrote the proper wording, and the woman indeed acquired the debt recorded in the document; and

they disagree concerning the ruling of Shmuel

who, according to his opinion, says that nevertheless she is not betrothed—

as Shmuel said: