Kiddushin 47a (מז.) — the Talmud in English

This was taught only

that the first and second dates—which she ate—do not combine to form a peruta, because they are a loan:

Rather,

it is in a case where

he said to her: “

Be betrothed to me

with this, and with this, and with this,”

that is, he would give her one date and say, “With this,” and she would eat it; he would then give her another and say, “And with this,” and she would eat it; and he would again give her another and say, “With this.” Since, at the time he gave her the first and second dates, he had not yet completed his statement, the betrothal was not completed and the dates were not acquired by the woman until he completed his statement. By the time he completed his statement, they were merely a loan.

But

if

he said to her: “

Be betrothed to me

with these” [with the three dates that he was holding in his hand], and he gave her the three dates one by one,

even if she eats

each date that was given to her,

she is also betrothed

to him—

and this is because

when

she eats, she eats from her own possession [she is eating what is hers]; that is, from the moment she received the first date, it did not come into her possession as a loan. Since he had already completed his statement of betrothal, he transferred the dates to her as betrothal money. Thus, she ate her betrothal money; and even if she ate them one at a time, she is betrothed if all of them together are worth a peruta.

that is: from the moment he received the first one, the date did not come into her possession as a loan, because since the statement of betrothal had already been completed, he transferred them to her as betrothal-money. And what she ate, she ate as her betrothal-money; and even if she ate them one by one, she is betrothed if all of them together are worth a pruta.

The Gemara supports Rava:

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rava [we learned a beraita in accordance with Rava’s statement]:

One who says to a woman: “

Betroth yourself to me

with an oak, a pomegranate, and a nut,”

or who said to her: “

Betroth yourself to me with these” [with the oak, pomegranate, and nut that he is holding in his hand], and he gave them to her:

if all of them together

are

worth a peruta,

she is betrothed, and if not

—if even all of them together are not worth a peruta—

she is not betrothed.

And likewise, if he said to her: “Betroth yourself to me

with this, and with this, and with this,”

if all of them are worth a peruta,

she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed,

as in the first clause. However, this formulation contains a novel legal point:

If he said to her: “Betroth yourself to me

with this,”

she took it and ate it; [“

With this,”

she took it and ate it] ; “

and with this as well,”

and she took it and ate it; “

and with this as well,”

and she took it,

she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a peruta.

and also with this one,”

and she took it,

The Gemara initially explains the beraita:

This “ Betroth yourself to me:

with an oak, a pomegranate, and a nut,”

what are the circumstances?

If you say that he said to her: “

Betroth yourself to me:

either with an oak, or with a pomegranate, or with a nut”—

this cannot be said, because the following clause would be difficult:

“

If all of them are worth a peruta, she is betrothed.”

But

he said “

or”!

Does he not mean

that each item constitutes a separate act of betrothal, and they cannot be combined into a single act of betrothal?

Rather,

you should explain that he said to her: “Betroth yourself to me

with the oak, the pomegranate, and the nut.”

This too cannot be said, since

that is “

with this, and with this, and with this,” which we learned in the latter clause!?

that is identical to “

with this one, and with this one, and with this one,”

Rather, is it not necessarily the case that he said to her: “Betroth yourself to me

with these”? But this too is difficult: for since the latter clause teaches: “

Or he said to her, ‘Betroth yourself to me with these,’”

by inference, the first clause is not “

with these”

that we are discussing!?

If so, what is the meaning of the clause: “Betroth yourself to me with an oak, with a pomegranate, with a nut”?

And we answer:

It is explaining the meaning:

one who says to a woman: “

Betroth yourself to me with an oak, with a pomegranate, and with a nut”—

how so? For example, he said to her: “

Betroth yourself to me with these.”

And

this beraita proves that when one says, “Betroth yourself to me with these,” even if he gave them to her one by one and she ate each item she received, she is betrothed, for

the latter clause teaches: “

With this, she took it and ate it;

if one of them is worth a peruta, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed; whereas

in the first clause, when he said, “With these,”

the tanna does not distinguish

between

her eating and her merely holding them—

this

proves

Rava’s statement:

Whenever he says to her “

with these,”

when she eats, she eats from her own possession.

We conclude: Indeed,

it proves

from this beraita that Rava’s statement is correct.

The Gemara now returns to the dispute explained above [46b] concerning the interpretation of our Mishna, where we learned: “If she was eating them one by one, she is betrothed if one of them is worth a peruta.” Two approaches were stated:

Rav and Shmuel hold that this clause refers to the first clause, which is “individual”—that is, a separate act of betrothal for each item. For if it referred to the latter clause, which deals with a “collective” formulation, meaning one act of betrothal involving all the items, it would be impossible to say that if one of them is worth a peruta she is betrothed. That wording implies that even if the first and second items, which she already ate, were together worth a peruta, she would be betrothed. But this is not so, since by the time the statement of betrothal was completed—that is, when he finished speaking—they had already become a loan.

Therefore, they hold that this clause must refer to the first clause. Although the law stated concerning “eating” is also correct concerning “holding,” there is nevertheless a novel point in the law concerning eating, as explained above.

Rabbi Ami holds that this clause refers to the latter clause, which deals with the “collective” formulation. Indeed, the Mishna does not mean that even if the first or second item is worth a peruta she is betrothed. Rather, the Mishna means: If the last one is worth a peruta.

Here the Gemara raises an objection to Rav and Shmuel from this beraita cited here, which likewise states that if she was eating, she is betrothed if one of them is worth a peruta.

For

this works well according to the one who says—Rabbi Ami, who interpreted the “eating” clause in our Mishna as referring

to the latter clause—that is, to the “collective” formulation—

it refers to it; and what is the meaning of “

until one of them is worth a peruta”?

It means: “

until the last one is worth a peruta.”

Accordingly, the beraita too is understandable, for

here too

the meaning of the beraita is: “

until the last one is worth a peruta.”

But according to Rav and Shmuel, who both say that the “eating” clause in our Mishna refers specifically

to the first clause, which deals with “individual” formulations,

it refers to it, since we learned: “Until one of them is worth a peruta,” which implies even the first or second one; and Rav and Shmuel explained that the same law applies when she merely holds them.

And the word

“eating,” which we learned,

was necessary for it to teach that even in the case of eating, an item must be worth a peruta—

according to their view, this beraita is difficult, for it too states: “With this, she took it and ate it; and with this, and with this, she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a peruta.” If, according to Rav and Shmuel, this clause necessarily refers to an “individual” formulation, the difficulty is:

Here,

a collective formulation is mentioned, but an individual formulation is not mentioned. There is no “individual” formulation in this beraita to which we could attribute the law stated in it—that even if the first or second item alone is worth a peruta, she is betrothed!?

One who, during the sacrificial rites, has the intention to eat an olive-bulk of the offering outside its designated place [for example, one who intends to eat offerings of the highest sanctity outside the Temple courtyard], renders the offering invalid, but one who eats it is not liable to karet. By contrast, one who intends to eat an olive-bulk of the offering beyond its designated time [for example, one who intends to eat a sin-offering after its day and night have passed] renders the offering pigul, and one who eats it is liable to karet.

However, an offering becomes pigul only if “the permitting rite was performed in accordance with its requirements,” meaning only if the other sacrificial rites were performed validly. Therefore, if he slaughtered the offering with the intention of eating it outside its designated place, so that the slaughter was not performed in accordance with its requirements, then even if he received the blood with the intention of eating it beyond its designated time, the offering does not become pigul.

And if at first he slaughtered the offering with the intention of eating an olive-bulk beyond its designated time [which would make it pigul], and afterward received the blood with the intention of eating it outside its designated place, Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disputed the matter:

Rabbi Yehuda holds: Whenever the intention concerning the time preceded the intention concerning the place, it is pigul and one is liable to karet for it; but if the intention concerning the place preceded the intention concerning the time, it is not pigul.

The Sages hold: Both this and that are invalid, but there is no liability to karet for it.

They also disputed the case in which, during the slaughter itself, he said: “I am slaughtering with the intention of eating an olive-bulk outside its designated place, an olive-bulk beyond its designated time.” According to Rabbi Yehuda, since he stated the intention that would make it pigul first, it is pigul and one is liable to karet for it. However, this applies only when he used wording indicating that each olive-bulk constituted a separate intention, as will be explained in Rabbi’s statement. But if he used wording indicating a single intention to eat outside its designated place and beyond its designated time, this is merely a “mixture of intentions,” and it is not pigul even according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this [whose opinion is expressed in the last clause of the beraita, namely, the law concerning “eating”]?

It is Rabbi’s, who says—

according to Rabbi Yehuda:

It makes no difference whether he used the wording

“

an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,” without the conjunction “and”—that is, he said: “I am slaughtering the sacrifice with the intention of eating an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, an olive-bulk outside its designated place”—

or it makes no difference whether he said “

an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” meaning that he said: “I am slaughtering with the intention of eating an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and an olive-bulk [with the conjunction ‘and’] outside its designated place”—

it is considered individual: that is, they are two separate intentions, and it is pigul, since the intention of pigul preceded the intention that renders the offering invalid.

The same applies according to his position when one says, “Betroth yourself to me with this and with this,” or even when he says, “Betroth yourself to me with this and additionally with this”: all of these are considered individual formulations, and the latter clause of the beraita was stated according to his position. This is the meaning of the beraita: “

With this, and with this, and with this, if all of them are worth a peruta, she is betrothed,” because the first tanna does not hold like Rabbi, and considers this wording “collective.”

Rabbi says: “With this, she took it and ate it, and additionally with this, and additionally with this, she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a peruta.” This is because Rabbi holds that this wording means “individual,” and several dates cannot be combined for the betrothal. Indeed, “eating” is not specifically mentioned; the same law applies to “holding.” The beraita used the wording “eating” to teach incidentally that even in the case of eating, the date must be worth a peruta, and if it is worth less, she is not betrothed, despite the fact that she has immediate benefit from it.

Rabbi Yehuda maintains: Whenever the intention concerning the time preceded the intention concerning the place, the offering is piggul and one who eats it is liable to karet. But if the intention concerning the place preceded the intention concerning the time, it is not piggul.

The Sages maintain: Both this and that are disqualified, but there is no liability of karet for eating it.

They likewise disagree when, during the slaughter itself, he said: “I am slaughtering this offering with the intention of eating an olive-size portion outside its designated place and an olive-size portion after its permitted time.” According to Rabbi Yehuda, since he expressed the piggul intention first, the offering is piggul and one who eats it is liable to karet. However, this applies only when he used wording that implies that each olive-size portion was a separate intention, as Rabbi will explain. But if he used wording that implies one single intention—to eat outside its designated place and after its permitted time—then this is merely a “mixture of intentions,” and it is not piggul even according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And we answer:

Rav said:

One who betroths

a woman

with a loan

that she owes him

has not betrothed her,

even if the money he gave her is still physically present, because

a loan is given for expenditure—that is, it belongs to him, and he is permitted to spend it.

and it likewise makes no difference whether he said “

an olive-size portion and an olive-size portion,”

that is, he said: “I am slaughtering it with the intention of eating an olive-size portion after its permitted time, and an olive-size portion [with the conjunction ‘and’] outside its designated place,” “

individual”

it is—meaning that these are two separate intentions, and the offering is piggul, since the piggul intention preceded the intention that disqualifies the offering.

The same applies according to his view: Even one who says, “Become betrothed to me with this one and with this one,” or even one who says, “Become betrothed to me with this one and also with this one,” is using an individual formulation in every case. According to his view, the latter clause of the beraita was stated. This is the explanation of the beraita: “

With this one, and with this one, and with this one: If all of them together are worth one peruta, she is betrothed,” because the first tanna does not agree with Rabbi, and considers this wording a collective formulation.

Rabbi says: “With this one, she took it and ate it; and also with this one, and also with this one—she is not betrothed until one of them is worth one peruta.” This is because Rabbi understands this wording to be an individual formulation, and several dates cannot be combined for the purpose of betrothal. In fact, the law applies not only when she eats them, but also when she leaves them intact. The beraita uses the wording “eating” incidentally, to teach that even when she eats the date, it must be worth one peruta; if it is worth less, she is not betrothed, even though she has immediate benefit from it.

Rav said:

One who betroths

a woman

with a loan

Shall we say that this is subject to a dispute between tannaim? Is Rav’s ruling based on the following dispute between tannaim? For it was taught:

One who betroths with a loan has not betrothed her; and some say: she is betrothed.

What, is it not the case here that we are dealing with a loan whose money is still physically present, and

do they disagree about this?

One—the first tanna—

holds: a loan is given for expenditure, and therefore she is not betrothed even if the money is still physically present. And the other [the some who say] holds: a loan is not given for expenditure, and therefore, if the money is still physically present, she is betrothed. The Gemara rejects this: But can you understand it? How could it enter your mind that they disagree about this matter? After all, consider the latter clause of that same beraita: And they agree—the tannaim of the beraita— with regard to a sale of land acquired with money, that this—the loan— acquires the land: If the seller said to the buyer, “The loan that I have against you shall be yours in payment for the sale,” and he agreed, the buyer acquires the land if the money is physically present.

meaning that Rav’s ruling is the subject of the following dispute between tannaitic authorities? For it was taught:

One who betroths a woman with a loan has not betrothed her; and some say: he has betrothed her.

Is it not

the case here that he betrothed her with a loan whose money was still intact, and

is this what they disagree about?

One—

the first tanna—

holds that a loan is given to be spent,

and therefore she is not betrothed even if the money is still intact.

And the other [the dissenting authorities]

some say

holds that a loan is not given to be spent,

and therefore, if the money is still intact, she is betrothed. The Gemara rejects this:

But can this be understood?

How could you think that they disagree about this law, when

consider the latter clause

of that same beraita:

And the tannaitic authorities agree

the tannaitic authorities of the beraita

with regard to a sale

of land acquired through payment of money,

that this—

the loan—

effects the acquisition.

For if the seller said to the buyer, “The loan that I have against you shall serve you for the purchase,” and the buyer agreed, the buyer acquires the land if the money is still intact.

And

if you say

that the beraita is discussing one who betroths with a loan when the money is present, and according to the first tanna she is not betrothed because

a loan was given to be spent,

then even with regard to a sale,

with what does he acquire [with what will he acquire it]!? After all, there is certainly no money here with which to make the purchase, since a loan was given to be spent.

Rather,

Rav Naḥman said: Our colleague Huna establishes it in another matter [our colleague Huna explains that the beraita is dealing with a different matter], and it is not dealing at all with a woman whom he betroths with a loan that she owes him. Rather:

And here

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing:

With

a case where he said to her: “

Be betrothed to me with one hundred dinars”

that he has in his possession,

and

he gave her the one hundred dinars,

and it was found that the hundred was lacking one dinar,

and the man who betrothed her said to her: “Let that dinar be a loan that I owe you.”

And the basis of their disagreement is:

One—

the first tanna—

held: She is embarrassed to demand it [she is embarrassed to demand payment from him] after some time, when he will repay her that dinar, and therefore initially she does not agree to the kiddushin.

And the other held: She is not embarrassed to demand it

[she is not embarrassed to demand payment from him], and therefore she agrees to be betrothed with the money he gave her, while the dinar will be a loan owed by him.

And we raise an objection:

But rather—

according to what we have explained about the beraita—

that which Rabbi Elazar said:

“Be betrothed to me with one hundred dinars, and he gave her one dinar”

only one,

she is betrothed, and

the husband

shall complete

it later,

shall we say that he stated his teaching in accordance with the dispute between the tannaim

[is it to be said that his statement is based on the dispute between the tannaim in the beraita]!?

The scholars said

: The case in the beraita is not comparable to what Rabbi Elazar said, because the beraita is dealing with a case in which only one dinar was missing from the hundred, and

a hundred lacking one dinar

which is a small amount relative to a hundred

she is embarrassed to demand it

according to the first tanna, whereas

a hundred lacking ninety-nine

the case with which Rabbi Elazar is dealing—even the first tanna agrees that

she is not embarrassed to demand it.

Meytivi

to Rav, who said: One who betroths with a loan is not betrothed, even when the money is still present:

One who says to a woman: “

Be betrothed to me with a deposit that I have in your possession,”

and

the woman

went and found it

the deposit

stolen or lost:

If there remains

in her possession

of it [of the deposit, what was not stolen or lost]

the value of one peruta,

she is

betrothed

with that peruta;

but if not, she is not betrothed.

And

if he betrothed her

with a loan

that she owed him,

even though

the money he gave her was stolen or lost, and

nothing remained of it

[of the loan that he gave her]

the value of one peruta,

she is

betrothed.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: