Kiddushin 47a — the Talmud in English

They taught this only

that the first and the second—which she ate—do not combine to a pruta, because they are a loan:

but

in a case such as

where he said to her: “

Become betrothed to me

with this, and with this, and with this,”

that is, he would give her one date and say, “With this,” and she would eat it; and he would return and give her another and say, “And with this,” and she would eat it; and he would return and give her another and say, “With this.” And because at the time of giving the first and the second, his statement had not yet been completed, the betrothal is not completed and the dates are not acquired by the woman until he has completed his statement; and when his statement was completed, they were already merely a loan.

But

if

he said to her: “

Become betrothed to me

with these” [that is, with the three dates that he was holding in his hand], and he gave her the three dates one by one,

even if she eats

even if she eats

each date that was given to her,

she is likewise betrothed

—

and because

when she eats, she eats from her own [she is eating what is hers],

that is: from the moment he received the first one, the date did not come into her possession as a loan, because since the statement of betrothal had already been completed, he transferred them to her as betrothal-money. And what she ate, she ate as her betrothal-money; and even if she ate them one by one, she is betrothed if all of them together are worth a pruta.

The Gemara supports Rava:

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rava

[We learned a beraita in accordance with the words of Rava]:

One who says to a woman: “

Become betrothed to me: with an acorn, a pomegranate, and a nut,”

or who said to her: “

Become betrothed to me with these”

[with the acorn, pomegranate, and nut that he was holding in his hand], and he gave them to her:

if all of them

together are

worth a pruta,

she is

betrothed, but if not—

that even all of them together are not worth a pruta—

she is not betrothed.

And likewise, if he said to her: “Become betrothed to me

with this, and with this, and with this,”

if all of them are worth a pruta,

she is

betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed,

as in the first clause; except that in this case there is a legal novelty:

For if he said to her: “Become betrothed to me

with this,”

she took it and ate it; [“

With this,”

she took it and ate it] ; “

and also with this,”

and she took it and ate it; “

and also with this,”

and she took it,

she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a pruta.

This “ Betroth yourself to me:

The Gemara initially explains the beraita:

This “

Become betrothed to me:

with an acorn, a pomegranate, and a nut”—

what are the circumstances?

If you say that he said to her: “Become betrothed to me:

with

either an acorn, or a pomegranate, or a nut”—

this cannot be said, for the following difficulty would arise from what is taught: “

If all of them are worth a pruta, she is betrothed,”

for

but he said

“either”—

did he not say so!?

which implies that each item is itself a separate act of betrothal, and it is impossible to combine them into one act of betrothal.

But rather, interpret it as meaning that he said to her: “Become betrothed to me

you explain that he said to her: “Become betrothed to me

with an acorn, and with a pomegranate, and with a nut.”

This too cannot be said, for

that is “

with this, and with this, and with this,” which we learned in the latter clause!?

which we learned in the latter clause!?

Rather, is it not necessarily to be interpreted as

necessary to explain

where he said to her: “Become betrothed to me

Become betrothed to me

with these”?

But even this presents a difficulty, for

from the fact that the latter clause teaches: “

Or who said to her, ‘Become betrothed to me with these’,”

by inference, the first clause is not

dealing with “with these”

!?

If so, what is the meaning of the clause: “Become betrothed to me with an acorn, with a pomegranate, and with a nut”?

And we answer:

It is explaining:

one who says to a woman: “

Become betrothed to me with an acorn, with a pomegranate, and with a nut”—

how is this so? For example, where he said to her: “

Become betrothed to me with these.”

And

from this beraita it is possible to prove that when one says, “Become betrothed to me with these,” even though he gave them to her one by one and she ate each item that she received, she is betrothed, for

it teaches in the latter clause: “

With this, she took it and ate it,”

if one of them is worth a pruta, she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed; whereas

in the

in the first clause, when he said, “With these,”

with these,”

the tanna did not distinguish

between eating and leaving them—

it proves

Thus

infer from it

in accordance with the words of Rava:

wherever he says to her “

with these,”

when she eats, she eats from her own.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from it

from this beraita, as Rava said.

Here the Gemara returns to the dispute explained earlier [46a] concerning the interpretation of our Mishna, where we learned: “If she was eating them one by one, if one of them is worth a pruta, she is betrothed”; and two approaches were stated concerning this:

Rav and Shmuel hold that this clause refers to the first clause, which is “particular”—that is, a separate act of betrothal for each item. For if it referred to the latter clause, which deals with the “general,” that is, one act of betrothal with all the items, it would be impossible to say that if one of them is worth a pruta she is betrothed, because this wording implies that even if the first and the second, which she had already eaten, were together worth a pruta, she would be betrothed. But this is not so, since they had already become a loan at the time the betrothal was completed, that is, when he completed his statement.

Therefore they hold that this clause must refer to the first clause. And although the law stated concerning “eating” is also correct concerning “leaving them,” nevertheless there is a legal novelty in the law of eating, as explained above.

Rabbi Ami holds that this clause refers to the latter clause, which deals with the “general.” Indeed, the intention of the Mishna is not to say that even if the first or the second is worth a pruta she is betrothed; rather, the intention of the Mishna is: if the last one is worth a pruta.

Here the Gemara raises an objection against Rav and Shmuel from this beraita brought here, for it too says that if she was eating, she is betrothed if one of them is worth a pruta.

For

this works out well according to the one who says,

according to Rabbi Ami, who interpreted the clause concerning “eating” in our Mishna as

referring to the latter clause—

that is, to the “general”—

and what is “

until one of them is worth a pruta”

that is:

until the last one is worth a pruta.

If so, the beraita too is understandable, for

likewise

the interpretation of the beraita is: “

until the last one is worth a pruta.”

But according to Rav and Shmuel, who both say,

in interpreting the clause concerning “eating” in our Mishna, that it specifically

refers to the first clause,

which deals with the “particular,”

and refers to it, since we learned: “until one of them is worth a pruta,” which implies: even the first or the second; and Rav and Shmuel explained that the same law applies to “leaving them,”

since we learned, “until one of them is worth one peruta,” which implies even the first or second item; and Rav and Shmuel explained that the same law applies when she leaves the items intact,

and the “eating”

that we learned

which we learned

was necessary for him to teach as a novelty that even the one eating requires a pruta—

that even when she eats them, one of them must be worth one peruta—

According to their view, this beraita presents a difficulty, for it too teaches: “With this, she took it and ate it, and also with this, and also with this, she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a pruta.” And according to Rav and Shmuel, who necessarily hold that this clause refers to the “particular,” the difficulty is:

Behold,

here it counts the general, but it does not count the particular; this beraita contains no “particular” case to which we could attribute the law stated in the beraita, that if even the first or the second is worth a pruta, she is betrothed!?

it is considered individual: that is, they are two separate intentions, and it is pigul, since the intention of pigul preceded the intention that renders the offering invalid.

One who, during the service of a sacrifice, thinks with the intention of eating an olive-sized portion of the sacrifice outside its place [for example, one who thinks of eating offerings of the highest sanctity outside the Temple courtyard], renders the sacrifice invalid, but one who eats it is not liable for karet. But one who thinks of eating an olive-sized portion of the sacrifice outside its time [for example, one who thinks of eating the sin-offering after a day and a night] renders the sacrifice pigul, and one who eats it is liable for karet.

However, the sacrifice becomes pigul only if “the permitting act was performed in accordance with its requirement,” that is, only if the other sacrificial services were performed validly. Therefore, if he slaughtered the sacrifice with the intention of eating it outside its place, and it was found that the slaughtering was not performed in accordance with its requirement, then even if he received the blood with the intention of eating it outside its time, the sacrifice does not become pigul.

And if at first he slaughtered the sacrifice with the intention of eating an olive-sized portion outside its time [which makes it pigul], and afterward he received the blood with the intention of eating it outside its place, Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disputed the matter:

Rabbi Yehuda holds: Whenever the thought of time preceded the thought of place, it is pigul and one is liable for karet on its account; but if the thought of place preceded the thought of time, it is not pigul.

And the Sages hold: Both this and that are invalid, and there is no karet for it.

They likewise disputed the case where, during the slaughtering itself, he said: “I am slaughtering with the intention of eating an olive-sized portion outside its place, an olive-sized portion outside its time.” According to Rabbi Yehuda, since he preceded the thought of pigul, it is pigul and one is liable for karet on its account. But all this applies only where he used wording implying that each olive-sized portion is a separate thought, as will be explained in Rabbi’s words. But if he used wording whose meaning is one thought of eating outside its place and outside its time, then this is merely a “mixture of thoughts,” and it is not pigul even according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And we answer:

Whose view is this

[the view of whom is it] in the last clause of the beraita, that is, the law of “eating”?

It is Rabbi, who says:

according to Rabbi Yehuda:

It makes no difference

whether he used the wording: “

an olive-sized portion, an olive-sized portion,”

without the conjunction “and,” that is, he said: “I am slaughtering the sacrifice with the intention of eating an ‘olive-sized portion’ outside its time, an ‘olive-sized portion’ outside its place”;

and it makes no difference whether he said: “

an olive-sized portion and an olive-sized portion,”

that is, he said: “I am slaughtering with the intention of eating an olive-sized portion outside its time, and an olive-sized portion [with the conjunction ‘and’] outside its place”—“

particular”

it is, that is, they are two separate thoughts, and it is pigul, since the thought of pigul preceded the thought of invalidity.

The same applies according to his view: even one who says, “Become betrothed to me with this and with this,” or even one who says, “Become betrothed to me with this and also with this,” it is all “particular.” And according to his view, the latter clause of the beraita was stated; and this is the explanation of the beraita: “

With this and with this and with this, if all of them are worth a pruta, she is betrothed,” because the first tanna does not hold like Rabbi, and this wording “is general.”

Rabbi says: “With this, she took it and ate it, and also with this and also with this, she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a pruta,” because Rabbi holds that this wording means “particular,” and it is impossible to combine several dates for betrothal. Indeed, it is not specifically “eating”; the same law applies to “leaving them.” The beraita used the wording “eating” to teach incidentally that even in the case of eating, the date must be worth a pruta, and with less than this she does not become betrothed, even though its benefit is immediately available to her.

Rav said:

One who betroths

a woman

with a loan

that she owes him

does not betroth her,

even if the money he gave her is still intact, because

a loan is given for expenditure, that is: it is his, and he is permitted to spend it.

One—the first tanna—

Shall we say in accordance with a dispute between tannaim—that Rav’s ruling is subject to the following dispute between the tannaim? For it was taught:

meaning that Rav’s ruling is the subject of the following dispute between tannaitic authorities? For it was taught:

One who betroths with a loan—she is not betrothed; and some say: she is betrothed.

What, is it not

that here we are dealing with what case? For example, he betrothed her with a loan whose money was still intact, and

is this what they disagree about?

One Master—

the first tanna—

holds: a loan is given for expenditure,

and therefore she is not betrothed even if the money is intact.

And the other Master

[the one who says “some say”]

holds: a loan is not given for expenditure,

and therefore, if the money is still intact, she is betrothed. The Gemara rejects this:

But can you understand it so?

How could it enter your mind that they disagree concerning this law? For

come and hear the latter clause

of that same beraita:

And they agree

the tannaim of the beraita

concerning a sale

of land acquired with money,

that this—

the loan—

acquires

that is, if the seller said to the buyer: “The loan that I have against you shall be yours for the purchase,” and he agreed, the buyer acquires it if the money is intact.

And

if you say

that the beraita is discussing one who effects kiddushin with a loan when the money is present, and according to the tanna kamma she is not betrothed because

a loan was given for expenditure,

then even in a sale

with what does he acquire [with what will he acquire]!? For surely there is no money here with which to acquire, since a loan was given for expenditure.

[то есть чем он приобретет]? Ведь очевидно, что здесь нет денег для приобретения, поскольку заем был дан для расходования.

Rather

Rav Naḥman said: Our colleague Huna establishes it with other matters [our colleague Huna explains that the beraita is dealing with another matter], and it is not dealing at all with a woman whom he betroths with a loan that she owes him, but rather:

[то есть наш товарищ Гуна объясняет, что барайта говорит о другом случае], и она вовсе не говорит о посвящении женщины посредством долга, который она должна ему, а именно:

And here

in the beraita

with what are we dealing:

with

for example, when he said to her: “

Be betrothed to me with one hundred maneh”

that he has in his possession,

and

he gave her the one hundred maneh, and

it was found that the one hundred maneh was lacking one dinar,

and the man effecting the kiddushin said to her: “Let that dinar be a loan upon me.”

And the basis of their disagreement is:

One—

the tanna kamma—

held: It is embarrassing for her to demand it [it is embarrassing for her to demand it] after some time, so that he will pay her that dinar; therefore, from the outset she does not agree to the kiddushin.

[то есть ей будет стыдно потребовать его], чтобы он впоследствии уплатил ей этот динар. Поэтому изначально она не соглашается на посвящение.

And one held: It is not embarrassing for her to demand it [she is not embarrassed to demand it], and therefore she agrees to be betrothed with the money that he gave her, while the dinar will be a loan upon him.

[she is not embarrassed to demand payment from him], and therefore she agrees to be betrothed with the money he gave her, while the dinar will be a loan owed by him.

And we raise an objection:

But rather—

according to what we explained about the beraita—

that which Rabbi Elazar said:

“Be betrothed to me with one hundred maneh, and he gave her one dinar”

only one,

she is betrothed, and

the husband

will complete

later,

shall we say that he stated his teaching in accordance with a dispute between tannaim [shall we say that his words are taught in accordance with the dispute between the tannaim in the beraita]!?

[is it to be said that his statement is based on the dispute between the tannaim in the beraita]!?

The members of the academy said: The case of the beraita is not similar to what Rabbi Elazar said, for the beraita is dealing with a case in which only one dinar was lacking from the one hundred maneh, and

: The case in the beraita is not comparable to what Rabbi Elazar said, because the beraita is dealing with a case in which only one dinar was missing from the hundred, and

one hundred maneh lacking one dinar

which is a small matter in relation to one hundred maneh

it is embarrassing for her to demand it

according to the tanna kamma; but

one hundred maneh lacking ninety-nine

as in the case with which Rabbi Elazar deals, even the tanna kamma agrees that

it is not embarrassing for her to demand it.

He raised an objection

to Rav, who said: One who effects kiddushin with a loan is not betrothed, even when the money is still present:

One who says to a woman: “

Be betrothed to me with a deposit that I have in your possession,”

and

the woman

went and found it

the deposit

stolen or lost:

If there remained

in her possession

of it [of the deposit, that which was not stolen or lost]

[из вклада то, что не было украдено или утрачено]

the value of one peruta,

she is

betrothed

with that peruta;

but if not, she is not betrothed.

And

if he betrothed her

with a loan

that she owed him,

even though

the money that he gave her was stolen or lost, and

there did not remain of it

[of the loan that he gave her]

the value of one peruta,

she is

betrothed.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: