Kiddushin 46b (מו:) — the Talmud in English

3.

And infer from it: ordinary money is returned,

that is: in every case of a betrothal that is not a valid betrothal, we do not say that the money was given as a gift; rather, it was a deposit, and it is returned to the one who betrothed her. Therefore, the first and second dates are considered a loan, because once she had already eaten them, and they were no longer present at the time the betrothal took effect, she could not be betrothed with them. They are thus like a deposit that she consumed and that became a loan through her consumption, with which she cannot be betrothed.

For if you should say that a betrothal that is not a valid betrothal is a gift, and if, for whatever reason, the betrothal was not completed, she need not return the money, then here too, when he completed the betrothal, this should not be considered betrothal with a loan. On the other hand, the money is not a gift either, since he gave it on the condition of betrothal, and he completed his statement.

Since the discussion of our sugya mentioned the matter of “ordinary money is returned,” the discussion turns to the law of one who betroths his sister; afterward, the Gemara returns to the law of our Mishna.

It was stated:

With regard to one who betroths his sister,

with whom betrothal does not take effect, Rav and Shmuel disagreed concerning the status of the money she received as betrothal money:

Rav said:

the

money

that she received

is returned

to her brother, who betrothed her.

And Shmuel said:

the

money

in her possession

is a gift,

and she need not return it to her brother.

The Gemara explains their reasoning:

Rav said: The money is returned:

because he holds that

a person knows that betrothal does not take effect with his sister, and the one who betrothed her completed his intention

and

gave

her the money

as a deposit.

And

if this is difficult for you:

Let him tell her that it is being given as a deposit

—that is, let him state explicitly that this is why he is giving it to her—this is not so, because

he assumes

the husband

that she will not accept

the money as a deposit.

A Shmuel schitaet, chto den'gi byli podarkom:

And Shmuel holds that the money is a gift:

because he holds that

a person knows that betrothal does not take effect with his sister, and the one who betrothed her completed his intention

and gave

her the money

as a gift.

And

if this is difficult for you:

Let him tell her that it is being given as a gift,

this is not so, because

he assumes

the husband:

she would be embarrassed by the matter

—that is, she would be ashamed to accept a gift.

Ravina vozrazil Shmuelu

Ravina raised an objection

to Shmuel from what we learned in the Mishna in Ḥalla 2:5: A dough becomes obligated in ḥalla at the time the dough is kneaded,

and

one who separates his ḥalla

from

flour is not ḥalla, and it is robbery

in the possession of the priest,

if he does not return it to the owners.

I

po mneniiu Shmuela voznik a et vopros:

And

according to Shmuel’s position,

why is it robbery in the possession of the priest!?

After all,

let us say: A person knows that one does not separate ḥalla from flour, and

the Israelite completed his intention and

gave

the ḥalla to the priest

as a gift!?

And we answer:

There it is different,

with regard to ḥalla, for the Sages obligated the priest to return it, because if they did not say so, there would be concern

that a mishap would result from it

—that is, perhaps a failure would occur—for:

Sometimes

—that is, at times—

the priest has less than five kav-measures of flour

—five quarter-kav measures according to the measure of Sepphoris, which is five log, the amount that creates an obligation in ḥalla—and intends to make from it a dough exempt from ḥalla—

and this

ḥalla that he received while it was still flour

he will knead together with it

—he will knead it together with his own flour—so that together they contain the amount of flour requiring ḥalla. By law, the dough is obligated in ḥalla, since this flour is still untithed with regard to ḥalla: The original separation had no effect, and it joins with his flour to complete the amount of dough obligated in ḥalla—

and

if he

assumes

that this flour is ḥalla and is not untithed with regard to ḥalla, and

his dough has been rendered fit

—that is, his dough is considered prepared and is not obligated in ḥalla—

he may come to eat it in its untithed state

—that is, he may come to eat it while it is still untithed—before separating ḥalla from it.

For this reason the Sages said that the priest must return it to the Israelite, so that everyone will know that this flour is still untithed with regard to ḥalla.

And

the Gemara challenges this concern:

But you said: A person knows that one does not separate ḥalla

when it is

flour,

and therefore the priest will certainly separate ḥalla if he combines it with his own flour!?

And we answer:

He knows

the priest,

but

also

does not know,

meaning:

He knows

that one

does not separate

ḥalla

from

flour when it is

flour.

But

he does not

know

the reason for the matter thoroughly,

for he assumes:

What is their reason?

What is the reason

that

one does not separate ḥalla from flour? It is

because of the priest’s exertion,

since he will have to knead the flour

; and

if so, the priest thinks to himself:

The priest’s exertion

—well,

I have waived it

—I am foregoing my exertion—and the status of ḥalla takes effect upon the flour.

And we challenge this: According to your explanation—that the Israelite indeed gave it to the priest as a gift, but because of this concern the Sages instructed him to return it—why did they tell him to return it!?

And

would it not have been sufficient for them to rely on saying:

Let

this ḥalla

be teruma,

that is, let the ḥalla remain in the priest’s possession as though it were teruma-ḥalla,

and

nevertheless

it shall not

be

eaten until he separates ḥalla on its account from elsewhere,

from another dough that is independently obligated in ḥalla?

Ved'

For

did we not learn

in the Mishna in Demai [5:10] something similar:

Thus we learned: One who contributes teruma from produce that came

from

a

perforated planter, which is obligated in teruma by Torah law,

for

produce that came from a planter

that is not perforated, which is obligated only by rabbinic law—in principle, the status of teruma does not take effect upon the produce, because this is like one who contributes from produce subject to the obligation onto produce exempt from it, so that the produce from which he contributed does not acquire the status of teruma and remains untithed with regard to teruma—

these fruits are

teruma,

and the priest need not return them,

but it may not be eaten,

this teruma, which is Torah-level untithed produce,

until he separates teruma

and tithe from elsewhere.

i vtoruiu desiatinu iz drugogo mesta.

Tosafot v traktate Ievamot 89b ot imeni RI ob"iasnili, chto slova «iz drugogo mesta» oznachaiut, chto nel'z ia otdeliat' desiatinu i vtoruiu desiatinu iz samoi otdelennoi chasti: inache liudi mogut nachat' est' ostavshiesia plody kak obychnye neosviashchennye plody, togda kak oni po postanovleniiu mudretsov iavliaiutsia desiatinoi ; eto sootvetstvuet ego mneniiu, chto po postanovleniiu mudretsov na otdelennuiu chast' rasprostraniaetsia status desiatiny ; no RasI napisal, chto eto otnositsia i k otdeleniiu iz samoi toi zhe partii, i vyrazhenie «iz drugogo mesta» ne obyazatel'no. Nel'z ia dokazat', chto RasI ne soglasen s Tosafot i schitaet, kak RIBaN: vozmozhno, RasI ne prinimaet zapret, ustanovlennyi Tosafot, ili schitaet ego «zapretom iz-za zapreta», tak kak status desiatiny ustanovlen zdes' lish' po postanovleniiu mudretsov. Trebuet raz"iasneniia, kak mozhno otdelit' na nee vtoruiu desiatinu iz drugogo mesta: ved' plody, ot kotorykh vnachale otdelili desiatinu, po postanovleniiu mudretsov ne objazanny vtoroi desiatinoi. Esli otdelit' protiv nikh vtoruiu desiatinu iz drugogo mesta, poluchitsia «umn ozh enie desiatin», tak kak desiatiny stan ov iatsia neispravnymi!? Neizbezhno, chto, khot ia na eti plody dlia usilennoi strogo sti rasprostraniaetsia status desiatiny po postanovleniiu mudretsov, vse zhe nel'z ia skazat', chto oni ne objazanny desiatinoi po postanovleniiu mudretsov: po Torah oni objazanny, i mudretsy ne vveli poslab lenie. Odnako, khot ia my otnosimsia k etim plodam kak k objazannym desiatinoi, dazhe po postanovleniiu mudretsov, po-vidimomu, nel'z ia otdelit' ee vtor ichno na drugie plody. Tem bolee nel'z ia otdelit' ee snova na gorshok bez otverst iia, objazannyi lish' po postanovleniiu mudretsov; no dazhe na drugie plody, objazannye po Torah, vozmozhno, nel'z ia otdelit' ee vtor ichno, poskol'ku ee uzhe otdelili; no eto trebuet dal'neishego izucheniia.

Iz etogo sleduet, chto mudretsy polozhil is' na to, chto on ispravit ee i ne skazhet: «Raz ona u menia v rukakh, znachit, eto nesomnenno desiatina, i ee ne nuzhno ispravliat', kak druguiu desiatinu, ne trebu iushchuiu dopolnitel'nogo ispravleniia». Tak zhe i zdes' mudretsy ob"iasniat emu, chto muka vse eshche trebuet otdeleniia khally i kak ispravit' muku, nakhodiashchuiusia u nego v rukakh, vmesto togo chtoby zastavliat' ego vtor ichno vozvrashchat' poluchennuiu v podarok khallu!?

My otvechaem: khot ia v sluchae otdeleniia desiatiny ot prokalyvannogo gorshka na gorshok bez otverst iia mudretsy ne opasalis', chto on ne poslu shaetsia ikh ukazaniiu, v sluchae otdeleniia khally ot muka mudretsy opasalis' etogo, potomu chto

This shows that the Sages relied on the assumption that he would correct it, and that he would not say: Since it is in my possession, it must necessarily be teruma, and I will not correct it as one would ordinary teruma, which requires no further correction. Here too, the Sages could instruct him that the flour is still obligated in ḥalla and tell him how to correct the flour in his possession, without having to return the ḥalla that was given to him as a gift!?

And we answer: Although, with regard to teruma separated from a perforated planter for a nonperforated planter, the Sages were not concerned that he would disobey their instruction, with regard to separating ḥalla from flour the Sages were concerned that he would disobey their instruction, because

with two vessels he obeys

—when there are two vessels, he obeys—

that is, when the Sages instruct him regarding teruma given from a perforated planter for another, nonperforated planter, telling him that it requires correction, he will indeed obey them, since their instruction is plausible to him.

Alternatively,

the reason they obligated the priest to return the flour is not concern that the priest will think that it is ḥalla, because

a priest is always

diligent and fit,

and he certainly obeys;

if the only concern were the priest, the Sages would indeed instruct him to correct it.

But

the reason for the law, that the Sages instructed him to return the flour, is because of the danger posed to the homeowner, as

the homeowner assumes that his dough has been corrected

—the dough kneaded from the flour that remained in his possession—through the separation of ḥalla while it was still flour, whereas by law his dough was not corrected,

and he may come to eat

his dough

in its untithed state

—that is, he may come to eat his dough while it is still untithed with regard to ḥalla.

The Gemara challenges this explanation as well:

But you said: A person knows that one does not separate ḥalla from flour,

so why should the homeowner err!?

And we answer:

The homeowner knows

but

does not know! He knows that one does not separate ḥalla from flour, but he does not know

the reason for the matter.

He assumes

the homeowner:

What is the reason? Because of the priest’s exertion; the priest’s exertion

—well,

the priest accepted it

and

waived it.

And we challenge this interpretation as well:

“Then let it be teruma, and he should again separate teruma”,

meaning: The Sages should instruct the homeowner that although the ḥalla remains in the kohen’s possession as teruma, nevertheless he must again rectify the flour that remains in his possession—is this so?

For

did we not learn

in tractate Demai [there] something similar: One who separates teruma

from an unperforated

one onto a perforated one, this

is teruma

in the kohen’s possession,

and the homeowner should again

separate

teruma

from the perforated produce that is obligated in teruma by Torah law. Thus, the Sages were not concerned that the homeowner might assume that his produce had been rectified, and here too we should say the same—is this so?

And we answer:

We have already established

we have already resolved this]:

With regard to two vessels, he obeys; with regard to one vessel, he does not obey,

and since the homeowner is not presumed to be scrupulous and diligent, there is concern that he will not heed us, since everything is in a single vessel.

And we wonder:

B

But is it the case that

he does not obey

the homeowner, even when everything is in a single vessel—is this so?

But didn’t we learn:

One who separates teruma from a cucumber and it is found

to be

bitter,

or one who separates teruma from

a watermelon and it is found to be rotten,

and it turns out that he separated from inferior produce for superior produce, what he separated

is teruma

;

and he should again separate teruma

from other superior cucumbers and watermelons in his possession.

Thus, the Sages relied on the homeowner to return and rectify his produce, even though he had separated the original teruma from that very produce; and they did not say that the kohen should return it, on the grounds that the homeowner would not obey and separate teruma again! And we answer:

That case is different,

as the Sages cannot tell the kohen to return it to the Israelite, thereby leaving tevel in his possession. Moreover, the concern that he might not return and separate teruma again is not so serious, and all this is because

by Torah law,

even the first teruma that he separated

is fully valid teruma, according to Rabbi Ila’i!

Therefore, the Sages did not say that the kohen should return it.

As Rabbi Ila’i said:

From where do we know that one who separates teruma

even

from inferior produce for superior produce, his teruma is teruma?

As it is stated: “

You shall not bear sin because of it when you raise its choicest portion

of the superior produce therein],” meaning: If you separate teruma from its superior produce, then you will not bear sin because of it. It follows that if you do not separate the superior produce therein, then you will bear sin because of it.

And if what he separated is not sanctified,

then he must return and separate teruma; and if so,

why is there bearing of sin?

Rather,

from here we learn that one who separates from inferior produce for superior produce, his teruma is teruma,

and therefore he bears sin because of it, since he did not raise the teruma from the choicest portion therein.

Here the Gemara returns to the law of our Mishna, where we learned: “If he betrothed her with this, and this, and this, if they all amount to the value of one peruta, she is betrothed; but if not, she is not betrothed. If she was eating them one by one, she is not betrothed until one of them [i.e., the last one] amounts to the value of one peruta”:

Rava said: