Kiddushin 46b — the Talmud in English

3.

And infer from it: ordinary money is returned,

that is: any betrothal that is not a betrothal, we do not say that the money is a gift; rather, it is a deposit, and it returns to the betrother. And for this reason the first and the second dates are considered a loan: since she already ate them and they are not present at the time of the betrothal taking effect, she is not betrothed through them. They are therefore like a deposit that she ate and that became a loan through her eating it, through which she is not betrothed.

For if you should say that betrothals that are not betrothals are a gift, and if, for whatever reason, the betrothals were not completed, she need not return them, then here too, when he completed his betrothals, this is not considered betrothing with a loan; but, on the other hand, they are not a gift either, for he gave them on condition of betrothal, and he completed his words.

Since the matter of “ordinary money is returned” was mentioned in our sugya, the matter leads into the law of one who betroths his sister; and afterward the Gemara returns to the law of our Mishna.

It was stated:

One who betroths his sister,

with whom betrothals do not take effect—the matter of the money that she received as betrothal money was disputed by Rav and Shmuel:

Rav said:

The

money

that she received

returns

to her brother, the betrother.

And Shmuel said:

The

money

in her possession is

a gift,

and she need not return it to her brother.

And the Gemara explains their reasons:

Rav said: the money is returned:

because he holds that

a person knows that betrothals do not take effect with his sister, and the betrother completed

and

gave

her the money

as a deposit.

A

nd if this is difficult for you:

let him say to her: as a deposit

[that is, let him explicitly say to her that he is giving it to her for this purpose], this is not so, for

he thinks

the husband

that she will not accept

the money as a deposit.

And Shmuel holds that the money is a gift:

because he holds that

a person knows that betrothals do not take effect with his sister, and the betrother completed

and

gave

her the money

as a gift.

A

nd if this is difficult for you:

let him say to her: as a gift,

this is not so, for

he thinks

the husband:

the matter is embarrassing for her

[it is embarrassing for her to accept a gift].

Ravina vozrazil Shmuelu

Ravina challenged Shmuel, from what we learned in the Mishna in Challah 2:5:

A mass of dough becomes obligated in challaa at the time of kneading the dough, and

one who separates his challaa

from the

flour is not challaa, and it is robbery

flour is not ḥalla, and it is robbery

in the possession of a koen,

if he does not return it to the owners.

A

nd according to Shmuel’s method, this is difficult:

why

would it be

robbery in the possession of the koen!?

For

let us say: a person knows that one does not separate challaa from flour, and

the Israelite completed and

gave

the challaa to the koen

as a gift!?

And we answer:

it is different there,

regarding challaa, for the Sages obligated the koen to return it, because if they do not say so, there is concern

that harm will emerge from it

[lest a mishap result], because:

sometimes

[at times]

the koen has less than five quarter-kav of flour

[five quarter-kav according to the measure of Sepphoris, which are five log, the amount that creates an obligation in challaa], and he intends to make from it dough exempt from challaa—

and this

challaa that he received while it was still flour

he will knead together with his own

[he will knead it together with his flour], in such a manner that together they have the measure of challaa; and according to the law, the dough is obligated in challaa, for this flour is still untithed with regard to challaa, since its separation had no effect, and it joins with his flour to complete the measure of dough obligated in challaa—

and

if he

thinks:

this flour is challaa and is not untithed with regard to challaa, and

his dough has been rectified

[his dough is rectified], that is, it is not obligated in challaa,

and he will come to eat it in its untithed state

[and will come to eat it in its untithed state], before he separates challaa from it.

And for this reason the Sages said that the koen should return it to the Israelite, so that everyone will know that this flour is still untithed with regard to challaa.

A

nd the Gemara expresses astonishment at this concern:

But you said: a person knows that one does not separate challaa

when it is

flour,

and if so, surely the koen will separate challaa if he combines it with his flour!?

And we answer:

He knows

the koen

a

nd also

does not know, that is:

meaning:

He knows

that he

does not separate

ḥalla

challaa

when it is

flour.

A

nd yet

he does not know

the reason for the matter well,

for he thinks:

their reason

the reason

what

is the reason that one does not separate challaa from flour?—

because of the exertion of the koen

who would have to knead the flour,

and

if so, the koen thinks to himself:

the exertion of the koen

this

I have waived

[I waive my exertion], and the status of challaa takes effect upon the flour.

And we challenge: according to your words, that you say that the Israelite indeed gave it to the koen as a gift, but because of this concern the Sages instructed him to return it, if so, why did they tell him to return it!?

A

nd behold, they should have relied on this and said:

let

this challaa

be a contribution,

that is, let the challaa remain in the koen’s possession as though it were a contribution of challaa,

and

nevertheless

it shall not

be

eaten until he separates challaa for it from another place

from another dough independently obligated in challaa.

For

did we not learn

in the Mishna in Demai [5:10] something similar to this:

Thus we learned: one who contributes produce that came

from the

unperforated

flowerpot

which is obligated in a contribution by Torah law,

upon

produce that came from the flowerpot

that is not perforated,

which is obligated only by rabbinic law—in principle, the status of a contribution does not take effect upon the produce, for this is like one who contributes from that which is obligated upon that which is exempt, so that the status of a contribution does not apply to that which he contributed, and it is still untithed with regard to a contribution—

behold, this produce is

a contribution

and the koen need not return it,

and it shall not be eaten

this contribution, which is untithed by Torah law,

until he separates a contribution

and a tithe from another place.

Tosafot v traktate Ievamot 89b ot imeni RI ob"iasnili, chto slova «iz drugogo mesta» oznachaiut, chto nel'z ia otdeliat' desiatinu i vtoruiu desiatinu iz samoi otdelennoi chasti: inache liudi mogut nachat' est' ostavshiesia plody kak obychnye neosviashchennye plody, togda kak oni po postanovleniiu mudretsov iavliaiutsia desiatinoi ; eto sootvetstvuet ego mneniiu, chto po postanovleniiu mudretsov na otdelennuiu chast' rasprostraniaetsia status desiatiny ; no RasI napisal, chto eto otnositsia i k otdeleniiu iz samoi toi zhe partii, i vyrazhenie «iz drugogo mesta» ne obyazatel'no. Nel'z ia dokazat', chto RasI ne soglasen s Tosafot i schitaet, kak RIBaN: vozmozhno, RasI ne prinimaet zapret, ustanovlennyi Tosafot, ili schitaet ego «zapretom iz-za zapreta», tak kak status desiatiny ustanovlen zdes' lish' po postanovleniiu mudretsov. Trebuet raz"iasneniia, kak mozhno otdelit' na nee vtoruiu desiatinu iz drugogo mesta: ved' plody, ot kotorykh vnachale otdelili desiatinu, po postanovleniiu mudretsov ne objazanny vtoroi desiatinoi. Esli otdelit' protiv nikh vtoruiu desiatinu iz drugogo mesta, poluchitsia «umn ozh enie desiatin», tak kak desiatiny stan ov iatsia neispravnymi!? Neizbezhno, chto, khot ia na eti plody dlia usilennoi strogo sti rasprostraniaetsia status desiatiny po postanovleniiu mudretsov, vse zhe nel'z ia skazat', chto oni ne objazanny desiatinoi po postanovleniiu mudretsov: po Torah oni objazanny, i mudretsy ne vveli poslab lenie. Odnako, khot ia my otnosimsia k etim plodam kak k objazannym desiatinoi, dazhe po postanovleniiu mudretsov, po-vidimomu, nel'z ia otdelit' ee vtor ichno na drugie plody. Tem bolee nel'z ia otdelit' ee snova na gorshok bez otverst iia, objazannyi lish' po postanovleniiu mudretsov; no dazhe na drugie plody, objazannye po Torah, vozmozhno, nel'z ia otdelit' ee vtor ichno, poskol'ku ee uzhe otdelili; no eto trebuet dal'neishego izucheniia.

It follows that the Sages relied on the fact that he would rectify it and would not say: since it is in my possession, it is necessarily a contribution, and I will not rectify it like an ordinary contribution that requires no further rectification; and the same applies here: the Sages would instruct him that the flour is still untithed with regard to challaa, and how he should rectify the flour in his possession, and he would not be forced to return the challaa that had been given to him as a gift!?

And we answer: although regarding a contribution from the perforated upon the unperforated the Sages were not concerned that he would disobey their instruction, nevertheless regarding separating challaa from flour the Sages were concerned that he would disobey their instruction, because

with two vessels he obeys

[with two vessels, he will obey], that is, when the Sages instruct him regarding a contribution given from one perforated vessel upon another unperforated vessel, that it requires rectification, indeed he will obey their words, for they are acceptable to him.

But

with one vessel, he does not obey

[with flour challaa that was removed upon the rest of the flour in that same vessel, he will not obey], that is, when the Sages instruct him that this challaa is not challaa, even though it was removed upon the flour in that same vessel, he will not obey them, and will come to eat it as challaa without separating another challaa for it; therefore the Sages instructed him to return it.

And if you wish, say

that the reason for the matter that they obligated the koen to return the flour is not because perhaps the koen will think that it is challaa, for

a koen always

who is diligent and fit

certainly obeys,

and if the concern were only because of the koen, indeed the Sages would instruct him to rectify it.

A

nd yet the reason for the law that the Sages instructed him to return the flour is because of the mishap of the householder, for

the householder thinks that his dough has been rectified

[the dough made from the flour remaining in his possession] through separating the challaa while it was flour, whereas according to the law his dough was not rectified,

and he will come to eat

his dough

in its untithed state

[and he will come to eat his dough while it is still untithed with regard to challaa].

And we challenge this explanation as well:

But you said: a person knows that one does not separate challaa from flour,

so why would the householder err!?

And we answer:

He knows

the householder

and he does not know! He knows that one does not separate challaa from flour, and he does not know

the reason for the matter;

for he thinks

the householder:

What is the reason? Because of the exertion of the koen; the exertion of the koen

this

he accepted

the koen

upon himself.

And we raise an objection even according to this interpretation:

then let it be teruma, and let him return and separate teruma, that is to say: let the Sages instruct the owner that although the hallah remains in the priest’s possession as teruma, nevertheless he must return and rectify the flour that remains in his possession!?

that is, the Sages should instruct the owner of the house that although the piece of dough remains with the kohen—a member of the priestly family—as teruma, nevertheless he must return and properly rectify the flour that remains in his possession.!

For

did we not learn in tractate Demai [there], in a similar case: one who separates teruma

in tractate Demai [there] something similar: One who separates teruma

from an unperforated [plant] for a perforated [plant],

this is

teruma

in the priest’s possession,

and let the owner

the owner

return and separate teruma from the perforated [plant], from produce obligated in teruma by Torah law; so it is evident that the Sages did not fear that the owner would think that his produce had been rectified, and here too let us say so!?

from the produce in the perforated container, using produce that is obligated in teruma by Torah law. Thus, the Sages were not concerned that the owner of the house might think that his produce had already been properly prepared; and here too, the same should be said.!

And we answer:

did we not already establish this [that is, we already resolved it]:

[that we have already resolved this]:

with two vessels he obeys; with one vessel he does not obey, and concerning an owner who is not presumed to be reliable and diligent, there is reason for concern that he will not heed us, since it is in one vessel.

and since the owner of the house is not presumed to be especially reliable and diligent, there is concern that he will not heed our instruction when everything is in a single vessel.

And we wonder:

and

is it so that

the owner does not obey,

the owner, even when it is in one vessel!?

But did we not learn:

One who separates teruma from a cucumber and it is found

to be

bitter, or one who separated teruma from

or if he separates teruma from

a watermelon and it was found to be rotten, and it turns out that he separated from the inferior for the superior, then what he separated

and it turns out that he separated from inferior produce for superior produce, then what he separated

is teruma

it is, and

he shall return and separate teruma another teruma from the superior cucumbers and watermelons that are in his possession.

another portion of teruma from the superior cucumbers and melons in his possession.

It is therefore evident that the Sages relied on the owner to return and rectify his produce, even though the teruma that he initially separated was from among that produce itself, and they did not say that the priest should return it, on the grounds that the owner would not obey and separate teruma again!? And we answer:

there it is different, since it is impossible for the Sages to tell the priest to return it to the Israelite, so that it would be tevel in his possession; and the concern lest he not return and separate teruma is not such a serious concern, and all this is because

because the Sages cannot tell the kohen to return it to the Israelite, thereby causing it to become tevel—produce from which the required gifts have not yet been separated—in his possession. Also, the concern that he might not return and separate teruma again is not sufficiently serious. All this is because

by Torah law even the first teruma that he separated

even the first teruma that he separated

is fully valid teruma, according to Rabbi Ilai! Therefore the Sages did not say that the priest should return it.

Therefore, the Sages did not say that the kohen should return it.

For Rabbi Ilai said:

From where [do we know] concerning one who separates teruma

even

from the inferior for the superior, that his teruma is teruma,

as it is stated: “

And you shall not bear sin because of it when you separate its choicest

[the superior in it],” that is to say: if you separate from the superior in it, then you will not bear sin because of it; and it follows: if you do not separate the superior in it, then you will bear sin because of it, and

if it is not consecrated, what he separated from the inferior, then he must return and separate teruma, and if so,

then, since what he separated from the inferior produce is not valid teruma, he must return and separate teruma again. If so,

why is there bearing of sin!?

Rather,

from here [we learn] concerning one who separates from the inferior for the superior, that his teruma is teruma, and therefore he bears sin because of it, for he did not raise the teruma from the choicest portion in it.

Rava said:

Here the Gemara returns to the law in our Mishna, where we learned: “With this one, and this one, and this one: If the value of a peruta—the smallest monetary amount relevant for these laws—is found in all of them together, she is betrothed; but if not, she is not betrothed. If she was eating each one as she received it, she is not betrothed until one of them [that is, the last one] has the value of a peruta”:

Rava said: