Kiddushin 46a — the Talmud in English

And therefore:

the words of a disciple appear [more convincing]

—this is Rav Yirmeya bar Abba, who disputed his teacher and said: She does not eat.

Rava said: What is the reason of Rav Huna

that he permitted her to eat teruma?

Since an act of an orphan was performed with regard to her during the father’s lifetime,

that is to say: Since both the kiddushin and the marriage were performed with regard to her without his knowledge, and they treated her as though she were an orphan without a father, certainly, had he not been pleased with what they did, he would not have allowed them to disregard him to such an extent.

It was stated: A minor who was betrothed without her father’s knowledge,

and her status depends on the father’s consent when he hears:

Rav said:

Before the father consented to her kiddushin,

both she and her father can prevent it,

that is to say: She too can retract before the father consents.

And Rav Asi said: Her father

can prevent it,

but not she.

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rav Asi—and some say it was Hiyya bar Rav

who raised the difficulty

to Rav Asi,

from that which was taught in a beraita: It is written in the passage concerning one who seduces a virgin: “If a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed and lies with her, he shall surely pay her bride-price to make her his wife [and he is not liable for a fine]. If her father absolutely refuses to give her to him, [then] he shall weigh out money according to the bride-price of virgins [a fine of fifty silver pieces].”

And since Scripture said: “

If her father absolutely refuses,”

I have only

to learn

that

her

father

refuses that he take her as a wife; but

from where

do we know that she herself can refuse?

Therefore

the verse says: “If he refuses, he shall absolutely refuse” [a repetition of the wording], to teach: Refusal

in any event,

in every case,

even her refusal.

And the Gemara had thought that the verse came to innovate that although he seduced her for the purpose of kiddushin, she can refuse him and retract from that kiddushin until he betroths her with another kiddushin with her father’s knowledge; and if so, this is a difficulty for Rav Asi!?

Rav said to them

to uphold the method of Rav Asi, with whom he disagreed:

Do not follow the opposite [understanding] [do not follow an inverted matter],

[do not follow the opposite matter], that is to say: Do not bring a proof that is not a proof, for

Rav Asi can

explain it for you:

What are we dealing with here? With

a case where he seduced her not for the purpose of marriage,

and therefore she can refuse; but if she has already consented to kiddushin with him, she can no longer retract.

And we raise an objection: Is it really so that

if he seduced her not for the purpose of marriage, the verse is needed?

Does Scripture need to teach us that she is not obligated to marry him!?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: To say that

even if the father consented to give her to him and she did not consent, he

pays the fine as one who seduced her,

for the Torah said as follows: Whether the father does not want it, or whether she does not want it, he pays the fine of fifty silver pieces.

Rav Yosef said to him to assist him:

If so—

according to your explanation, that the verse is dealing with seduction not for the purpose of marriage—

this is what we learned

in the beraita:

It is written: “

He shall surely pay her bride-price to make her his wife,”

to teach:

She requires kiddushin from him, and

she requires betrothal from him, and

therefore

if

the verse is dealing with a case in which he

seduced her for the purpose of marriage, why do I need kiddushin!?

Rather, it must be that he seduced her not for the purpose of marriage, and she is still unmarried.

Abaye said to him

to Rav Yosef: This does not assist you, for it can be explained that the verse comes to say that she

requires kiddushin

other

with her father’s consent,

because the first seduction, although it was for the purpose of kiddushin, was without her father’s knowledge.

Mishna:

He

gives the woman two dates, and

says to the woman: “

Be betrothed to me with this date; be betrothed to me with this one,”

these are two acts of kiddushin, one with each date, and therefore:

If one of them

alone is

worth a peruta,

she is

betrothed; but if not—

even if together they are worth a peruta—

she is not betrothed,

because in each act of kiddushin there was not a peruta’s worth.

And if he gave her three dates and said to her: “Be betrothed to me

with this one and this one and this one”:

If all of them together are worth a peruta

she is

betrothed, but if not—

even if the three dates together are not worth a peruta—

she is not betrothed,

because this wording contains no “specification” of the acts of kiddushin, but rather “generalization,” so that all his acts and all his speech constitute one act of kiddushin.

If

she

was eating them one by one,

for he would say to her: “Be betrothed to me with this one,” and give her one date, and she would eat it; “and with this one,” and give her a date, and she would eat it,

she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a peruta,

but it is impossible to combine the dates to make a peruta’s worth, as will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Who is the tanna [who is the tanna of our Mishna] who requires specification of the kiddushin through repetition of the wording “

Be betrothed, be betrothed,”

whereas when he says only “Be betrothed to me with this date and with this one,” the wording does not imply specification into two acts of kiddushin, but rather the two dates are given for one act of kiddushin, and even if only together they are worth a peruta, she is betrothed?

Rabba said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says

with regard to one whom five claimants were suing: “Give us the deposit that each one of us has in your possession,” and the defendant said: “An oath that I have nothing belonging to you, nor to you, nor to you,” and likewise for all of them, that he is liable for only one “guilt-offering for a false denial of a monetary claim” [which a person is liable to bring when he denied under oath money in his possession], because it is one oath, and he is not liable for five offerings,

until he says the wording

“

an oath”

for each and every one.

And according to his method, the wording does not imply “specification” unless he repeats the wording “Be betrothed,” just as he must repeat the wording “oath.”

We learned in the Mishna:

With this one and this one and this one, if all of them are worth a peruta,

she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed; if she was eating them one by one, she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a peruta:

And the Gemara explains the end of the Mishna: “If she was eating them one by one,” and asks:

With regard to which

of the clauses of the Mishna does the tanna say that if she was eating them one by one, one of them must be worth a peruta for her to become betrothed?

If you say

that perhaps the final clause of the Mishna applies

to the first clause,

which deals with “specification,” namely, with one who repeated the wording “Be betrothed,” and this is what we learned: If she was eating them one by one, she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a peruta; this cannot be said, because:

Why specifically “

eating,”

why does the tanna state this law specifically when she was eating them one by one, when

even if she merely placed

the dates down and did not eat them, she is

also not betrothed unless one of them is worth a peruta,

for: “

Be betrothed to me with this one,

be betrothed to me with this one,” he

said,

which implies that each date is a separate kiddushin, as explicitly stated at the beginning of the Mishna.

Rather,

we must explain what we learned—that she is not betrothed when she eats them unless one of them is worth a peruta—as referring

to the final clause [that is, the middle clause], when he said to her: “Be betrothed to me with this one and this one and this one.” If she had merely placed them down, she would have become betrothed even by combining the three dates, whereas when she ate them, she becomes betrothed only when one of them is worth a peruta—

But this too presents a difficulty:

And

is it really so that

even if

the first one [the first, or the second but not the last] was worth a peruta, she is betrothed, as the wording of the Mishna implies!?

But this date

is a loan

to her at the time the kiddushin takes effect, for the dates are not acquired by her, and the kiddushin takes effect only through the final giving, which completes his speech,

and that first or second date no longer exists, so it is a debt that she owes him; and one who betroths with a loan does not betroth!?

—the first, or the second but not the last—was worth one peruta, she is betrothed, as the wording of the Mishna indicates?

But

this date

is a loan

to her when the betrothal takes effect. The dates are not acquired by her, and the betrothal takes effect only upon the final giving, which completes his statement. That first or second date no longer exists; it is merely a debt that she owes him, and when a man betroths a woman with a loan, she is not betrothed. Is this not so?

Rabbi Yohanan said: Here are a table, meat, and a knife, yet we have nothing to eat,

meaning: here before us is a Mishna that has been taught, and we do not know how to explain it.

Rav and Shmuel both said,

they both said [this] to explain our Mishna:

Always,

this passage

stands on the first clause,

when he said, “Be betrothed to me with this one; be betrothed to me with this one.” And what is difficult for you: If so, why do I need “she eats”? After all, even in the case of handing over, the rule is that she is betrothed only if one of them contains the value of a peruta! Do not find this difficult:

For indeed, here too, in the case of handing over, this is so,

and

“it is not necessary”

he is saying:

the tannai did not come to say that “specifically” in the case of eating is this so; on the contrary, [he means] that “even” in the case of eating is this so. And this is what he is saying:

It is not necessary [to say this] concerning handing over, for if there is the value of a peruta

in one of them,

yes,

she is indeed betrothed, and

if not

there is the value of a peruta in one of them,

no,

she is not betrothed, because each date constitutes a separate act of kiddushin, and it is impossible for her to become betrothed with less than a peruta—

But “

she eats,”

since its benefit is readily available

the benefit of it is ready for her, and she revealed her mind that she desires them,

let us say:

even if there is not the value of a peruta in one of them [and not even in all of them together], as well,

she resolves and transfers herself

she resolves in her mind and transfers herself to him for less than the value of a peruta.

Therefore

it teaches us

the tannai that even in the case of eating she requires a peruta, because there is never kiddushin for less than a peruta. Consequently, she is betrothed only when one of them contains the value of a peruta, for each date constitutes a separate act of kiddushin.

Rabbi Ami said

to explain our Mishna in another manner:

Always,

this passage stands

on the final clause,

when he did not divide the dates into a number of acts of kiddushin. And what is difficult for you: How does she become betrothed through the first and the second date, when they are a loan!?

Do not find this difficult, for indeed she does not become betrothed through the first and the second, even if each one contains the value of a peruta.

And what

“until one of them contains the value of a peruta”,

means:

until the last one contains the value of a peruta,

for that one is not a loan.

Rava said: Infer from Rabbi Ami

in his explanation of our Mishna

three

laws:

a.

Infer from this: One who betroths with a loan—she is not betrothed,

and therefore the last one must contain the value of a peruta.

b.

And infer from this: One who betroths with a loan and a peruta, her intention

of the woman

is toward the peruta

to become betrothed through it alone, and she is betrothed; for the final clause deals with one who performed one act of kiddushin with the three dates, and nevertheless, although two of them are a loan, she is betrothed through the third date when it contains the value of a peruta.