Kiddushin 46a (מו.) — the Talmud in English

And therefore:

the student's statement appears more reasonable

—this is Rav Yirmeya bar Abba, who disagreed with his teacher and said: She does not eat.

Rava said: What is the reason of Rav Huna—

who permitted her to eat teruma?

Since an act appropriate for an orphan was performed with her during her father's lifetime,

that is, since both the betrothal and the marriage were performed without his knowledge, and she was treated as though she were an orphan without a father, it is certain that had he not been pleased with what they did, he would not have allowed them to disregard him to such an extent.

It was stated:

A minor who was betrothed without her father's knowledge, and whose status depends on her father's consent once he hears:

Rav said:

Before the father consented to her betrothal,

both she and her father can prevent it,

that is, she too can retract before the father consents.

And Rav Asi said: Her father

can prevent it,

but not she.

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rav Asi—and some say it was Hiyya bar Rav

who raised the objection

to Rav Asi,

from that which was taught in a beraita: It is written in the passage concerning one who seduces a virgin: “If a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed and lies with her, he shall surely pay her bride-price to take her as his wife [and he is not liable for a fine]. If her father utterly refuses to give her to him, [then] he shall weigh out money according to the bride-price of virgins [a fine of fifty silver pieces].”

And since the verse says: “

If her father utterly refuses,”

I have

learned

only

that

her father

refuses to allow him to take her as a wife; but

from where

do I know that she herself can refuse?

Therefore,

the verse states: “If he utterly refuses” [the repetition of the expression], to teach: Refusal

in any case,

in every circumstance,

even her refusal.

The Gemara had assumed that the verse was coming to teach that even though he seduced her for the purpose of betrothal, she can refuse him and retract that betrothal until he betroths her again with the knowledge of her father. If so, this is a difficulty for Rav Asi?!

Rav

said to them, to reconcile the view of Rav Asi, with whom he disagreed:

Do not follow the reverse approach [do not follow an inverted argument];

that is, do not bring a proof that is no proof, for

Rav Asi can

answer you:

What are we dealing with here? It is a case

where he seduced her not for the purpose of marriage,

and therefore she can refuse; but if she had already consented to betrothal by him, she can no longer retract.

The Gemara asks: Is that so?

Does a verse need to teach a case where he seduced her not for the purpose of marriage?

Does the verse need to teach us that she is not obligated to marry him?!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It teaches that

even if the father consented to give her to him but she did not consent, he

pays the fine of one who seduced her,

as the Torah said: Whether the father does not wish it or she does not wish it, he pays the fine of fifty silver pieces.

Rav Yosef said to him,

in support of the explanation:

If so—

according to your interpretation, that the verse is dealing with seduction not for the purpose of marriage—

this is what we already learn

in a beraita:

It is written: “

He shall surely pay her bride-price to take her as his wife,”

to teach:

She requires betrothal from him, and

if

the

verse is dealing with a case where he

seduced her for the purpose of marriage, why would she need betrothal?!

Rather, it must be that he seduced her not for the purpose of marriage, and she is still unmarried.

Abaye said

to Rav Yosef: This does not support you, for the verse can be interpreted as saying that she

requires betrothal

from another man,

with her father's knowledge,

because although the first seduction was for the purpose of betrothal, it was without her father's knowledge.

Mishna:

He

gives a woman two dates, and

says to the woman: “

Be betrothed to me with this date; be betrothed to me with this one,”

these constitute two acts of betrothal, one with each date, and therefore:

If one of them

by itself is

worth a peruta,

she

is betrothed; but if not—

even if together they are worth a peruta—

she is not betrothed,

because in each act of betrothal there was not a peruta's worth.

And if he gave her three dates and said to her: “Be betrothed to me

with this one, this one, and this one”:

If all of them together are worth a peruta,

she is

betrothed; but if not—

even if the three dates together are not worth a peruta—

she is not betrothed,

because this wording does not specify the acts of betrothal; rather, it generalizes them, so that all his actions and all his speech constitute one act of betrothal.

If

she

was eating them one at a time,

as he would say to her, “Be betrothed to me with this one,” and give her one date, which she would eat, and then say, “And with this one,” and give her a date, which she would eat,

she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a peruta,

but the dates cannot be combined to reach the value of a peruta. The Gemara will explain this.

Gemara:

Who is the tanna [who is the tanna of our Mishna] who requires specification of the betrothals, namely, repetition of the expression “

Be betrothed, be betrothed,”

whereas when he says only, “Be betrothed to me with this date, and with this one,” the wording does not indicate specification into two acts of betrothal; rather, the two dates are given as part of a single act of betrothal, and even if only together they are worth a peruta, she is betrothed?

Rabba said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says

with regard to one who was sued by five claimants, each of whom said, “Give us the deposit that each of us has with you,” and the defendant said, “An oath that I have nothing belonging to you, nor to you, nor to you,” and so he said concerning all of them: He is liable for only one guilt-offering for an oath of denial concerning property in his possession, because it is one oath; he is not liable for five offerings

until he says the term

“

oath”

for each and every one

of them.

According to his view, the wording does not imply specification unless he repeats the expression “Be betrothed,” just as he must repeat the term “oath.”

We learned in the Mishna:

“With this one, this one, and this one: If all of them are worth a peruta,”

she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed; if she was eating them one at a time, she is not betrothed until one of them is worth a peruta:

The Gemara explains the end of the Mishna: “If she was eating them one at a time,” and asks:

With regard to which

clause of the Mishna does the tanna say that if she was eating them one at a time, one of them must be worth a peruta for her to become betrothed?

If you say

that the latter clause of the Mishna applies

to the first clause,

which deals with specification—namely, one who repeated the expression “Be betrothed”—and this is what we learned: If she was eating them one at a time, she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a peruta, this cannot be said, because:

Why specifically

“eating”?

Why does the tanna state this law specifically when she was eating them one at a time?

Even if she merely leaves them

aside and does not eat them,

also

she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a peruta,

for he

said, “

Be betrothed to me with this one; be betrothed to me with this one,”

which means that each date constitutes a separate betrothal, as explicitly stated at the beginning of the Mishna.

Rather,

we must explain what we learned—that she is not betrothed when she eats them unless one of them is worth a peruta—as referring

to the latter clause

[that is, the middle clause], where he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with this one, this one, and this one.” If she had merely left them aside, she would have become betrothed through the combination of the three dates, whereas when she ate them, she becomes betrothed only when one of them is worth a peruta—

But this too presents a difficulty:

And

is it so that

even if

the

first one

[or the second but not the last] was worth a peruta, she is betrothed, as the wording of the Mishna indicates?!

But

this date

is a loan

to her at the time the betrothal takes effect,

for the dates are not acquired by her and the betrothal takes effect only with the final act of giving, which completes his statement, and that first or second date no longer exists; it is a debt that she owes him, and one who betroths with a loan does not effect betrothal?!

Rabbi Yohanan said: Here are the table, the meat, and the knife, but we have nothing to eat,

meaning: Here is a Mishna that has been taught before us, but we do not know how to interpret it.

Rav and Shmuel both said,

They both came to interpret our Mishna:

Actually,

this clause

stands on the opening clause,

when he said, “Be betrothed to me with this; be betrothed to me with this.” And what is difficult for you is: If so, why do I need the phrase “she eats”? After all, even in the case where he sets them down, the law is that she is betrothed only if one of them is worth a peruta! This is not difficult:

For indeed, even in the case where he sets them down, that is also the law, and

“it is not necessary to state”

“it is not necessary to state”

is what

the tanna said. That is, the tanna did not come to say that the law applies specifically in the case where she eats; on the contrary, he came to say that the law applies even in the case where she eats. And this is what he is saying:

It is not necessary to state that in the case where he sets them down, if one of them is worth a peruta

then she is

she is

indeed betrothed, and

if not

if one of them is not worth a peruta,

she is not

betrothed, because each date constitutes a separate act of betrothal, and she cannot be betrothed with less than a peruta—

But in the case of

“she eats,”

since the benefit is readily available

the benefit is prepared for her, and she has revealed her דעת that she desires them,

one might say:

even if none of them is worth a peruta [and even if all of them together are not worth a peruta], she nevertheless

resolves and grants herself to him

[she resolves in her mind and grants herself to him] for less than a peruta.

Therefore,

it teaches us

that the tanna teaches us that even in the case where she eats, she requires a peruta, because betrothal is never effected with less than a peruta. Consequently, she is betrothed only when one of them is worth a peruta, since each date constitutes a separate act of betrothal.

Rabbi Ami said

to interpret our Mishna in another manner:

Actually,

this clause

stands on the concluding clause,

when he did not divide the dates into a number of separate acts of betrothal. And what is difficult for you is: How can she become betrothed through the first and second dates, when they are a loan?!

This is not difficult, because indeed she does not become betrothed through the first or the second date, even if each one is worth a peruta.

And what is meant by

“until one of them is worth a peruta”

is:

until the last one is worth a peruta,

since that one is not a loan.

Rava said: Derive from Rabbi Ami

in his interpretation of our Mishna

three

laws:

1.

Derive from it: One who betroths with a loan is not betrothed,

and therefore the last one must be worth a peruta.

2.

And derive from it: When one betroths with a loan and a peruta, her intention

of the woman

is on the peruta

to become betrothed through it alone, and she is betrothed. For the concluding clause deals with one who performed a single act of betrothal with all three dates, and nevertheless, although two of them are a loan, she becomes betrothed through the third date when it is worth a peruta.