Kiddushin 45b (מה:) — the Talmud in English

He concedes that

we do not say: Perhaps the son consented

.

And this is because a father is willing to accept any match for his daughter, as we say : “It is better to sit as a couple than to sit as a widow,” but a man is not willing to accept just any match.

The Sages said

[they challenged]

Ravina:

And

if so, just as we are concerned that perhaps the father consented, even though we did not hear that he consented, so too, let us be concerned

perhaps he appointed him as an agent

[perhaps the son appointed his father as his agent] to betroth a woman on his behalf!?

Ravina said to them:

A person is not so brazen as to appoint his father as an agent

[there is no concern that a person would be brazen enough to appoint his father as an agent].

And

the Sages in the study hall still challenged him:

Perhaps he spoke favorably about her before him

[perhaps the son praised before his father the daughter of a certain man] and revealed to him that he desired her; and if so, the father automatically became his agent, because one may confer a benefit upon a person even in his absence

? Rabba bar Shimi said to them

[to the Sages]:

Explicitly

the Master said

[Ravina]

that he does not accept the view of Rav and Shmuel

, who are concerned that perhaps the father consented. He holds that there is no such concern unless we heard that the father consented, and therefore we are not concerned that the son consented on his behalf or appointed an agent.

There was an incident involving

a certain man who betrothed a woman with a bundle of vegetables in the marketplace

[an incident involving a man who betrothed the daughter without her father’s knowledge, using a bundle of vegetables].

Ravina said:

There is no concern with regard to his betrothal, because

even according to the one who says: We are concerned that perhaps the father consented

when he heard,

that statement applies

when she was betrothed

in a respectful manner, but

when she was betrothed

in a contemptuous manner

as in this incident,

no

concern is expressed that the father consented.

He said

asked

Rav Aḥa of Difti asked Ravina:

What is the contempt?

Is it the contempt of the vegetables, or the contempt of the marketplace?

[What is the contempt in this incident, on account of which we are not concerned with the betrothal? Is the contempt the fact that he betrothed her with a bundle of vegetables, or perhaps the contempt is the fact that he betrothed her in the marketplace?]

And the Gemara explains that

there is a practical difference

in this uncertainty, for example,

if he betrothed her with money

[he betrothed her with money], which is an important item,

but the place was

the marketplace,

or he indeed betrothed her

with

a bundle of vegetables, but the place was

in a house—

What

would be the status of the betrothal? Are we concerned that perhaps the father consented? He said to him

Ravina said to Rav Aḥa of Difti:

Both this and that

[each one individually]

are a contemptuous manner.

Whether he betrothed her with money in the marketplace or betrothed her with vegetables in a house, it is a contemptuous manner, and she is not betrothed.

There was an incident involving

a certain

man

who said

to his wife:

To my relative

[to my relative] I want to give our daughter;

and

if

she

[his wife]

said:

Not so; rather,

to her relative

[to her relative].

She bound him,

the woman bound her husband

until he said to her:

Let it be as you say, and

let

our daughter

be given to her relative.

While they were eating and drinking, her relative came up to the roof and betrothed her,

[at the time when the father and mother were sitting and engaged in the meal they had prepared in honor of this decision, the husband’s relative came and secretly betrothed their daughter on the roof, without her father’s knowledge].

Abaye said:

There is no concern with regard to his betrothal. Although in every other case we are concerned that perhaps the father consented, in this case there is no such concern, because once the father had promised his wife that he would give their daughter to her relative, he would not retract his word, as

it is written: “

The remnant of Israel shall not do injustice, nor speak lies,”

and one who does not keep his word is a liar.

Rava said

a different reason why there is no concern with regard to the betrothal:

It is presumed that a person does not trouble himself with a feast and then ruin it,

and if he were to retract his decision, he would thereby lose the feast that he had prepared for the earlier match.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the difference between them

, what practical difference in law is there between Abaye’s reason and Rava’s reason?

There is a difference between them

, for example,

if he did not trouble himself

with a feast, but merely made a promise. According to Abaye, there is no concern with regard to the relative’s betrothal, whereas according to Rava, there is concern with regard to the relative’s betrothal.

a. By Torah law, an Israelite woman betrothed to a kohein may eat teruma. However, the Sages decreed that a betrothed woman may not eat teruma until marriage. The amoraim disagreed regarding the reason for this law: Is the reason that, since she is still in her father’s home, she might give some of the teruma she receives to her Israelite brothers and sisters; or is the reason that, as long as the husband has not taken her into his home, he does not examine her through his female relatives, and there is concern that she may have a defect [simpon] that invalidates the betrothal?

b. A husband inherits his wife only after she has married him.

c. Just as a daughter may not be betrothed without her father’s knowledge, so too she may not marry without her father’s knowledge, even if her father betrothed her. In the passage before us, the Gemara discusses several cases in which she married without her father’s knowledge and examines the law governing each case.

a.

If the daughter was betrothed

to a kohein

with her father’s knowledge, and her father went to a distant country, and she arose and married

the kohein to whom she was betrothed, without her father’s knowledge:

Rav said: She may eat teruma

on the assumption that the father approves of this marriage,

until her father comes and protests

and then she must stop eating teruma. That is, we are not presently concerned that the father may protest; this concern arises only once we see it happen.

Rav Asi said: She may not eat

teruma, because

perhaps her father will come and protest, and she will thereby be a non-kohein

by rabbinic law.

She may eat teruma retroactively.

And the Gemara relates:

There was an incident, and Rav was concerned for this ruling of Rav Asi,

[there was an incident like this, and Rav did not permit her to eat teruma, because he was concerned for Rav Asi’s view].

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: And Rav concedes—

who holds, with regard to teruma, that we attribute consent to the father—

that

this applies only with regard to teruma, because by Torah law she may eat it even if she has not married him,

but if she dies,

his wife, whom he married without her father’s knowledge,

he does not inherit her,

because with regard to inheritance, which by Torah law he does not acquire before marriage, we treat the matter as uncertain, and

we leave property in the possession of its presumptive owner

[the inheritance remains in the possession of the woman’s relatives].

b. The Gemara further explains:

If

the daughter was betrothed

to a kohein

with

her father’s knowledge,

and she married

him

without her father’s knowledge,

that is, she married without informing him beforehand,

and

however

her father is here

at the place of the marriage and knows about it, but remains silent:

Rav Huna said: She may not eat

teruma, and the Gemara proceeds to explain his view.

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: She

is

permitted to eat

teruma, and the Gemara proceeds to explain his view.

The Gemara explains their respective methods and reasons:

Rav Huna said, she may not eat: Even according to Rav, who says

in the previous dispute that if the father was in a distant country, she

may eat

on the assumption that the father is pleased with it,

there

the reason is

that he is not present,

the father

[it is only because the father is not at the place of the marriage];

but here, where the father is present,

[the father is present] and knows about the marriage but says nothing, we say:

The reason he was silent

is because

he is angry

[he is angry] about the marriage that was conducted against his will.

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said, she may eat: Even according to Rav Asi, who said that

when the father is in a distant country she

may not eat; there

the reason is

that perhaps her father will come and protest, but here,

where the father knows and remains silent, we say:

Since he is silent, he has certainly become reconciled to it

[since he remains silent, he is certainly pleased with it].

c. The Gemara further explains:

If

the daughter was betrothed

to a kohein

without her father’s knowledge, and

even

married

him

without

her father’s knowledge,

and her father is here:

Rav Huna—who said in the previous case that she may not eat—

said

in this case that

she

may eat

teruma.

Whereas

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba—who said in the previous case that she may eat teruma—

who said in the previous case that she may eat teruma

said

in this case that she

may not eat,

because in the previous case, at least by Torah law she was certainly fit to eat teruma, since even a betrothed woman may eat teruma. But in this case, where even the betrothal is uncertain, since perhaps the father did not consent to the betrothal, she may not eat teruma.

Ulla said

regarding Rav Huna’s statement:

This ruling of Rav Huna

is as harmful

as vinegar

[which is harmful]

to the teeth and as smoke

[which is harmful]

to the eyes, because

:

Now, if there—

when she was betrothed with her father’s knowledge—

the betrothal is by Torah law,

and by Torah law she is fit to eat teruma,

you say—you, Rav Huna—

that she

may not eat

because we attribute to the father a lack of consent to the marriage,

here—where her betrothal is not certainly a betrothal by Torah law—

where her betrothal is not certainly valid by Torah law,

all the more so

that she should not eat teruma!?