Kiddushin 45b — the Talmud in English

He concedes that

we do not say: perhaps the son consented

. This is because the father is willing to accept any match for his daughter, as we say: “

It is better to sit with a two-bodied one than to sit a widow,” but a man is not willing to accept every match.

The Sages said to

the scholars raised this difficulty

Ravina:

And

just as we are concerned that perhaps the father consented, even though we did not hear [him do so], so too let us be concerned

perhaps he made him an agent [the son perhaps made his father an agent] to betroth a woman for him!?

perhaps the son appointed his father as his agent to betroth a woman for him

Ravina said to them:

A person is not so brazen as to make his father an agent [there is no concern that a person would be so brazen as to make his father an agent].

A person is not so insolent as to appoint his father as an agent

And

the Sages in the beit-midrash still objected:

Perhaps he praised her before him [perhaps the son praised before his father the daughter of that particular man] and revealed to him his opinion that he desired her, and if so, the father became his agent on his own, because one may confer a benefit upon a person in his absence!?

perhaps the son praised before his father the daughter of a certain man and revealed to him that he wanted her; and, if so, the father automatically became his agent, because one may act for a person’s benefit even in his absence

Rabba bar Shimi said to them [to the Sages]:

[to the Sages]:

Explicitly

the master said [Ravina],

Ravina

that he does not hold like this ruling of Rav and Shmuel, who are concerned that perhaps the father consented; and he holds that there is no concern for this unless we heard [it], and therefore we are not concerned for consent or the making of an agent by the son.

who are concerned that perhaps the father consented. He holds that there is no such concern unless we heard that he consented, and therefore we are not concerned that the son consented on his father’s behalf or appointed him as an agent. A case occurred involving

There was an incident involving

a certain man who betrothed [her] with a bundle of vegetables in the marketplace [an incident involving a man who betrothed the daughter without her father’s knowledge].

the man betrothed the daughter without her father’s knowledge

Ravina said:

There is no concern for his betrothals, because

even according to the one who says: We are concerned that perhaps the father consented

when he heard,

this applies—

that we are concerned for this—when they betrothed his daughter

in a dignified manner, but

when they betrothed her

in a contemptuous manner,

as in this incident,

we do not

have concern that the father consented.

He said

asked

Rav Aḥa of Difti asked Ravina:

What contempt?

If the contempt is that of the vegetables, or if the contempt is that of the marketplace? [what is the contempt in this incident, on account of which we are not concerned for the betrothal—is the contempt the betrothal with a bundle of vegetables, or perhaps the contempt is the betrothal in the marketplace?]

What is considered degrading in this case, so that we are not concerned about the betrothal? Is it the fact that he betrothed her with a bundle of vegetables, or the fact that he betrothed her in the marketplace?

And we explain that

the practical difference

in this uncertainty, for example, is

if he betrothed with money [he betrothed with money],

which is a significant item, but the place was

in the marketplace, or

if he indeed betrothed

with a bundle of vegetables,

but the place was

in the house—

What

will be the law of the betrothal? Shall we be concerned that perhaps the father consented?

He said to him

Ravina said to Rav Aḥa of Difti:

Both this and that [each one separately]

each factor by itself

is a contemptuous manner, whether he betrothed with money in the marketplace or whether he betrothed with vegetables in the house, it is a contemptuous manner, and she is not betrothed.

Whether he betrothed her with money in the marketplace or betrothed her with vegetables in a house, it is a contemptuous manner, and she is not betrothed.

There was an incident involving

a certain

man

who said

to his wife:

“To my relative” [to my relative] I wish to give our daughter,

“I wish to give our daughter to my relative,”

and

if

she [his wife]

his wife

said:

Not so, but

“to her relative” [to her relative].

to her own relative,

She tied him up,

the woman tied up her husband,

until he said to her:

Let it be according to your words, and

let our daughter be

our daughter

“to her relative.”

While I was eating and drinking, her relative came to the roof and betrothed her, [at that time when the father and mother were sitting and occupied with the meal that they had made over this decision, the husband’s relative came and betrothed their daughter on the roof secretly, without her father’s knowledge].

at that time, while the father and mother were sitting and engaged in the meal they had prepared to celebrate this decision, the husband’s relative came and secretly betrothed their daughter upstairs, without her father’s knowledge

Abaye said:

There is no concern for his betrothals, because although everywhere we are concerned that perhaps the father consented, nevertheless in this incident there is no concern, because once the father had already promised his wife that he would give their daughter to her relative, he would not retract, for

it is written: “

The remnant of Israel shall not do injustice and shall not speak falsehood,”

and one who does not stand by his word is “falsehood.”

Rava said another reason that there is no concern for the betrothal: because

there is another reason not to be concerned about the betrothal:

it is an established presumption that a person does not trouble himself with a feast and then ruin it,

and if he retracts, it turns out that he loses the feast that he made for the earlier match.

And the Gemara explains:

What is between them—

what practical difference for the law is there between the reasons of Abaye and Rava?

There is [a difference] between them,

for example,

where he did not trouble himself

with the feast, but only promised: according to Abaye, there is no concern for the betrothal of his relative, whereas according to Rava, there is concern for the betrothal of his relative.

a. By Torah law, an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest indeed eats teruma, but the Sages decreed that a betrothed woman should not eat until the marriage; and the amoraim disputed the reason for the law: whether the reason is that, since she is still in her father’s house, perhaps she will give from the teruma that she receives to her Israelite brothers and sisters, or whether the reason is that as long as the husband has not brought her into his house, he does not examine her through his female relatives, and there is concern that she may have a defect [“simpon”] that annuls the betrothal.

b. The husband’s inheritance of his wife applies only after she has married.

c. Just as the daughter is not betrothed without her father’s knowledge, so she is not married without her father’s knowledge, even if her father betrothed her; and in our sugya the Gemara discusses several ways in which she married without her father’s knowledge, and what her law is.

a.

If the daughter was betrothed

to a priest

with her father’s knowledge, and her father went to a distant country, and she arose and married

her betrothed, the priest, without the father’s knowledge:

Rav said: She eats teruma

on the assumption that the father is pleased with this marriage,

until her father comes and protests

and then she stops eating teruma; that is, we are not now concerned that the father will protest, until we see it with our own eyes.

Rav Asi said: She does not eat

teruma, because

perhaps her father will come and protest, and she will be found to be a non-priestly woman

by rabbinic law;

she eats teruma retroactively.

And the Gemara relates:

There was an incident, and Rav was concerned for this ruling of Rav Asi, [an incident of this kind occurred, and Rav did not permit her to eat teruma, because he was concerned for Rav Asi’s position].

there was such a case, and Rav did not permit her to eat teruma, because he was concerned in accordance with Rav Asi’s position.

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: And Rav concedes—

who holds, with regard to teruma, that we attribute consent to the father—

that

this applies only with regard to teruma, because by Torah law she eats even if she did not marry, but

if she dies

the wife who married him without the father’s knowledge,

he does not inherit her,

because with regard to inheritance, which by Torah law he does not have before marriage, we hold the matter to be uncertain, and

leave money in the presumption of its owner [and the inheritance remains in the possession of the woman’s relatives].

so the inheritance remains in the possession of the woman’s relatives.

b. The Gemara further explains:

If

the daughter was betrothed

to a priest

with the knowledge

of her father,

and she married

him

without the knowledge

of her father—that is, she married without informing him beforehand—

and

however

her father was here

at the place of the marriage and knew of it, but remained silent:

Rav Huna said: She does not eat

teruma, and he proceeds to explain it.

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: She

She

eats

teruma, and he proceeds to explain it.

And the Gemara explains their positions and their reasons:

Rav Huna said: She does not eat; and even according to Rav, who said

in the previous dispute that if the father was in a distant country, she

eats

on the assumption that the father is pleased with this,

there it is

because

he is not present

the father [this is only because the father is not at the place of the marriage],

that is, this applies only because the father is not at the place of the marriage

but here, where the father is present [where the father is present], knows about the marriage, and said nothing, we say:

and knows about the marriage but says nothing, we say:

The fact that the father was silent

is because

he is angry [he is angry] about the marriage that took place against his will.

about the marriage, which took place against his wishes.

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: She eats; and even according to Rav Asi, who said:

when the father is in a distant country

she does not eat, there it is

because

perhaps her father will come and protest, but here,

where the father knows and is silent, we say:

Since he was silent, he is certainly pleased with it [since he is silent, he is certainly pleased with it].

because he remains silent, he certainly approves.

c. The Gemara further explains:

If

the daughter was betrothed

to a priest

without her father’s knowledge, and

also

married

him

without the knowledge

of her father,

and her father is here:

Rav Huna—

who said in the preceding case that she does not eat—

said

in this case that she

eats

teruma.

Whereas

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba—

who said in the preceding case that she eats teruma—

said

in this case that she

does not eat,

because in the preceding case, at any rate, by Torah law she is certainly fit to eat teruma, since even a betrothed woman eats teruma; but in this case, where even the betrothal is uncertain, because perhaps the father did not consent to the betrothal, she does not eat teruma.

Ulla said

about Rav Huna’s words:

This ruling of Rav Huna

is difficult

as vinegar [which is harmful]

which harms

to the teeth and as smoke [which is harmful]

which harms

to the eyes,

for:

Now, if there—

when she was betrothed with her father’s knowledge—

the betrothal is by Torah law

and she is fit to eat teruma by Torah law,

you say—

you, Rav Huna—

that she does not eat

because we attribute to the father that he is not pleased with the marriage,

here—

where her betrothal is not certainly a betrothal by Torah law—

all the more so

that she should not eat teruma!?