Kiddushin 45a (מה.) — the Talmud in English

And they agree -

the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer -

that he may sell her

the father may sell his minor daughter when she is

a widow, to a High Priest

so that she will be his maidservant, or when she is

a divorcee or a ḥalutza, to an ordinary priest

so that she will be his maidservant, even though they are prohibited by a negative commandment from designating them as wives -

And because, although these women are prohibited to them, after the fact kiddushin take effect with regard to them in these cases, as we hold in accordance with the Sages, that kiddushin take effect with regard to those liable for violating negative commandments.

And now a difficulty arises against Ulla: But

this widow -

whose father has come to sell her -

what are the circumstances [

from whose kiddushin did this widowhood result]?

If we say that her father betrothed her, and she was widowed from this kiddushin, then

and indeed

can

the father

sell her [

can the father really sell her]?

But no person may sell

his daughter into servitude after marriage ,

and how, then, did we learn: And they agree that he may sell her?!

Rather, is it not

necessarily

that

at her first marriage

she betrothed herself [

she betrothed herself during her father's lifetime without his knowledge, and therefore he can sell her, because he did not betroth her]

; and

nevertheless

the Mishna calls her

the Mishna

“a widow” [

the Mishna calls her by the name “a widow”; that is, the status of a widow applies to her, meaning that she is prohibited to a High Priest] -

And a difficulty still arises against Ulla, who holds that she does not even require mi'un!?

Said

he answered:

Rav Amram said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Here

in this beraita

we are dealing

with a widow widowed from

kiddushei yi'ud

-

And one cannot again raise the difficulty: But no person may sell his daughter into servitude after marriage,

and

because this beraita

is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda

itself,

who says: The initial money -

that the father received when he sold her -

was not given for kiddushin,

and the kiddushin do not take effect through the father's receipt of the money of acquisition; rather, they take effect when the master deducts one peruta's worth of work that she owes him. It follows that these are her own kiddushin, and this does not prevent her father from selling her again into servitude when she is widowed from this yi'ud.

A woman whose husband died and left no sons requires yibbum, and becomes permitted only through ḥalitza.

If the brother performed yibbum with her through intercourse, she is his full-fledged wife and leaves him only through a bill of divorce; but if he performed ma'amar with her [kiddushin through money or a document], then in order to become permitted she requires a bill of divorce by rabbinic law for his ma'amar, and ḥalitza to release her from the bond of yibbum.

It was stated:

If a man betrothed a minor girl without her father's knowledge, so that she requires a bill of divorce and requires mi'un, and

her husband died

before the bill of divorce and mi'un,

and she fell before his brother for yibbum,

the amoraim disagreed as to how she becomes permitted if the brother performed ma'amar with her, and how she becomes released from her bond to the brother:

Rav Huna said that Rav said: She performs mi'un with regard to his ma'amar,

that is, if he performed ma'amar with her, she also requires mi'un in order to become permitted; and he proceeds to explain this.

But she does not perform mi'un with regard to her bond,

and if he has not yet performed ma'amar with her, she does not require mi'un in order to become permitted, as he proceeds to explain.

How so:

If

he performed

the brother

ma'amar with her,

then she

requires a bill of divorce, and requires

also

ḥalitza, and requires

also

mi'un -

And the reason is: She

requires

a

bill of divorce, lest the father consented to the second kiddushin,

and in either event she requires a bill of divorce: If he did not consent to the first kiddushin, and therefore she is not subject to yibbum, then she is betrothed to the second man by Torah law, and requires a bill of divorce by Torah law in order to permit her; and if he consented to the first kiddushin, so that this is only ma'amar with a yevama, then in any event she requires a bill of divorce by rabbinic law, like any ma'amar that the yavam performs with his yevama.

And

requires

also

ḥalitza, lest the father consented to the first kiddushin,

and she is not permitted to the wider world without ḥalitza, like any woman with whom ma'amar was performed who still requires ḥalitza.

And

requires

also

mi'un, lest the father consented neither to the first kiddushin nor to the second kiddushin,

and she is not a fully divorced woman by Torah law.

And

if people

would say,

since we required her to receive a bill of divorce from the second man:

kiddushin do not take effect

with the second man

with her sister,

because she is the sister of his divorcee. This is what Rav meant when he said: “She performs mi'un with regard to his ma'amar.” And as for what he said: “But she does not perform mi'un with regard to her bond”—how so:

If

he did not perform

the brother

ma'amar with her, she requires only ḥalitza.

And the reason is:

What can you say [

what concern do you have, and what can you claim]:

She should also require mi'un, lest people say:

since we required her to undergo ḥalitza,

kiddushin do not take effect

for him

with her sister,

because she is the sister of his ḥalutza—there is no concern for this, because

everyone knows: the sister of a ḥalutza is prohibited by rabbinic law,

and kiddushin do take effect for him with her -

for

indeed

Reish Lakish said: Here

in the Mishna in Yevamot 41a

Rabbi taught

us

Rabbi [

in this Mishna, Rabbi, the editor of the Mishna, taught us]:

the sister of a divorcee

is prohibited to him

by Torah law,

whereas

the sister of a ḥalutza

is prohibited only

by rabbinic enactment, [

as is explained in the Gemara there, which derives proof of this from the Mishna there].

There was an incident involving

two men who were drinking wine beneath willow trees in Babylonia. One of them took a cup of wine

and

gave it to his companion,

and

said

to him: “

Your daughter is betrothed to my son”! [

There was an incident involving two men who were sitting and drinking wine in Babylonia beneath tzaftzafa trees, a species of willow, and one of them, who had an adult son, took a cup of wine and gave it to his companion, who had a minor or adolescent daughter, and said to him: “Your daughter shall be betrothed to my son”]!

Ravina said:

These kiddushin have no effect, since a father has no authority to betroth his son! And if it is because of “perhaps the son consented,” then

even according to the one who says [

Shmuel in the preceding sugya]:

we are concerned that “

perhaps the father consented,”