Kiddushin 44a (מד.) — the Talmud in English

A minor girl

who became subject to yibbum

from betrothal,

whom a man had betrothed and then died,

one may perform only a מאמר with her with the knowledge of her father, and

if

the young woman

who became subject to yibbum from betrothal, one may perform a מאמר with her

either with her own knowledge or with the knowledge of her father.

According to the explanation of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reasoning, a difficulty arises: What is the difference between betrothal, regarding which the Sages concede that the young woman cannot betroth herself, whereas regarding a מאמר they maintain that one may perform a מאמר with a young woman even with her knowledge alone?!

Rather, if it was stated

that these were the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina,

this is how they were stated: Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina said:

What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan, according to the Rabbis?

Betrothal

in general is effected only

with her knowledge

of the woman; therefore

her father

betroths her

and not she herself.

But

divorce

in general is effected even

against her will [

of the woman]; likewise, when one divorces his fellow’s daughter, he does not require her father’s knowledge, even when she is in his domain. Therefore:

both she

and

her father

may receive her bill of divorce, for what relevance is his knowledge?

The Gemara challenges this answer, since seemingly it has accomplished nothing:

And

what of a מאמר, which

in general is effected only

with her knowledge, and

nevertheless

it is taught: “

Both she and her father,”

as we learned: “And the young woman, either with her own knowledge or with the knowledge of her father”?!

And we answer:

There, it is a מאמר effected against her will, and it is Rabbi’s opinion

; that is, that Mishna follows Rabbi, who maintains that a מאמר in general is effected even against the woman’s will. If so, the מאמר resembles divorce and not betrothal;

as it is taught:

One who performs a מאמר with his yevama

without her knowledge:

Rabbi says: He acquires her.

And the Sages say: He does not acquire her.

Since the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages has been cited, the Gemara explains their reasoning:

What is Rabbi’s reasoning?

Because he

derives

a מאמר with a yevama

from intercourse with a yevama: Just as intercourse with a yevama

acquires her

against her will,

so too

here,

with regard to a מאמר,

also,

it acquires her

against her will.

And

if

the Rabbis hold: We derive

a מאמר with a yevama

from

other

betrothals

not involving a yevama,

just as betrothal is with her knowledge, so too here

with regard to a מאמר

it too is with her knowledge.

And we explain:

With regard to what do they disagree—what is the basis of their dispute, one deriving from intercourse with a yevama and the other deriving from the betrothal of a woman?

Rabbi holds: Matters concerning a yevama should have been derived from a yevama

[the laws of a yevama from the laws of a yevama];

it should have been derived

[we should derive it].

And

if

the Rabbis hold: Betrothal

[a מאמר with a yevama, which is governed by the law of betrothal of an ordinary woman]

should have been derived from betrothal.

The Gemara now returns to the explanation previously given for the law concerning a מאמר—that it is because the beraita follows Rabbi, who holds that a מאמר is effected in general against her will—and supports this explanation:

It is also reasonable that it is as Rabbi Yoḥanan explained

that the beraita concerning a מאמר applies specifically to a מאמר, whereas with regard to betrothal the law is “her father and not she”;

as the latter clause teaches

of that beraita concerning a מאמר: “

Unlike betrothal,”

which indicates that with regard to betrothal the Sages concede that it is her father and not she.

The Gemara explains:

Rather, shall we say

that

this beraita is

this beraita

a refutation of Reish Lakish, since it states explicitly that according to the Sages, with regard to betrothal, it is her father and not she?!

And we answer:

Reish Lakish can say to you: Whose opinion is this?

This beraita is

the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says

with regard to divorce—and the same applies to betrothal:

Two hands cannot acquire simultaneously.

We ask:

If it is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion,

how can the tanna teach: “

Unlike betrothal,”

and

betrothal

whereas

“unlike divorce”

should have been stated,

teaching us that even with regard to divorce, which is effected against her will, it is nevertheless her father and not she?!

And we answer:

Indeed, that is so;

the tanna could have said “unlike divorce,” but

since he taught the law of a מאמר,

because the tanna is discussing a מאמר

which resembles betrothal,

therefore he

also taught: “

Unlike betrothal.”

The Gemara still challenges Reish Lakish, who establishes the beraita—which distinguishes between a מאמר, effected with the knowledge of both, and betrothal—as Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion:

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, what is different about a מאמר

that it is effected even with the daughter’s knowledge, whereas divorce and betrothal are effected only with the father’s knowledge?!

And we explain: A מאמר is different,

since she is subject to

it

and is standing

in that status; therefore the מאמר takes effect with her by any means.

The Gemara adds:

Now that you have arrived at this

new rationale, “since she is subject to it and is standing”—

then Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion

also need not trouble you from the outset.

There is no longer any difficulty from the question raised above: according to the Gemara’s initial understanding of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason for distinguishing between betrothal and divorce—that in betrothal she removes herself from her father’s control—a מאמר likewise removes her from her father’s control, and yet is effected even with her own knowledge. This is no difficulty:

Because

a מאמר is different—

it is effected even with her knowledge alone—

since she is subject to

it

and is standing in that status.

The Gemara challenges Reish Lakish’s view from what

we learned

in our Mishna:

A man may betroth his daughter when she is a young woman, either personally or through his agent.

The implication is:

“Personally or through his agent”—yes;

he may indeed betroth his young daughter, but

“through her or through her agent”—no;

she cannot be betrothed through herself or through her agent,

a refutation of Reish Lakish, who holds that according to the Sages it is either she or her father?!

And we answer:

Reish Lakish can say to you: Whose opinion is this?

Our Mishna is

the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that both with regard to divorce and with regard to betrothal, it is her father and not she.

We ask:

Can you really establish

our Mishna

as Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion

[Can it possibly be said that our Mishna is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion]?!

But the latter clause teaches

[in the following Mishna, below, 46a]: “

He

gives two dates and

says to the woman: ‘Be betrothed to me with this date; be betrothed to me with that one,’

if one of them is worth a peruta, she is betrothed, but if not [if neither one is worth a peruta, even if together they are worth a peruta], she is not betrothed.” The repetition of the expression “be betrothed” indicates that each date is a separate act of betrothal, and in each betrothal there is not a peruta’s worth.

And we say

there in the Gemara below, 46a:

Who is the tanna

[who is the tanna of our Mishna] who requires, for the betrothals to be considered separate, repetition of the expression

“be betrothed, be betrothed,”

whereas when he says only, “Be betrothed to me with this date and with that one,” the wording does not indicate two acts of betrothal; rather, both dates are given for one act of betrothal, and even if together they are worth only a peruta, she is betrothed?

And Rabba said

there:

One who denies to another a monetary obligation owed to him and swears to that effect, and then admits that he swore falsely, brings an asham gezelot and pays the principal and an additional fifth; this passage is called “the oath of the deposit.”

It is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, who says

with regard to one whom five people claim against: “Give us the deposit that each of us has in your possession,” and the defendant says: “I swear that I have nothing belonging to you, nor to you, nor to you,” and so with all of them, he is liable for only one asham gezelot [which a person is liable to bring when he denies under oath money in his possession], because it is one oath; he is not liable for five offerings,

until he says the expression

“I swear”

to each and every one. The same applies to betrothal: until he repeats the expression “be betrothed,” there are not two acts of betrothal, but one act of betrothal involving two dates.

If so, this is a difficulty for Reish Lakish: How can we interpret the first clause [our Mishna] as Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, when we necessarily interpret the latter clause as Rabbi Shimon’s opinion?!

And should you say

to resolve this:

The entire—

both the first clause and the latter clause—

is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion,

it is,

but

with regard to specification

[concerning the specification and separation of betrothals and oaths],

he holds

that Rabbi Yehuda

agrees with Rabbi Shimon,

and now both the first clause and the latter clause are understandable: Rabbi Yehuda holds that a young woman cannot be betrothed through herself, which is the first clause; and he likewise holds that to separate acts of betrothal, one must repeat the expression “be betrothed,” which is the latter clause.

But this cannot be said, for

does Rabbi Yehuda really agree

with Rabbi Shimon concerning specification?!

But it is taught:

This is the rule:

If one makes a general statement,

and included several monetary denials in one oath,

he is liable for only one

[one asham gezelot];] whereas if he

specifies,

he is liable for each and every one—this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If he says:

“

I swear: not to you, not

to you, not to you,”

he is liable for each and every one, because these are three oaths.

Rabbi Eliezer says: If he says:

“Not to you, not to you, nor to you—I swear,”

he is liable for each and every one;

but if he placed the expression “I swear” first, this is one oath.

Rabbi Shimon says: He is never liable

for several offerings

until he says

“I swear”

to each and every one.

It follows that concerning specification Rabbi Yehuda does not agree with Rabbi Shimon. If so, since the latter clause is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion and not Rabbi Yehuda’s, how can we establish the first clause—our Mishna—as Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion?!

Rather,

the Gemara offers a different way of establishing our Mishna according to Reish Lakish:

The entire—

our Mishna, both its first clause and its latter clause—

is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, and with regard to agency

that is, concerning whether the daughter herself can effect her divorce or betrothal in place of her father,

he agrees with Rabbi Yehuda,

that she cannot do so. But the Sages disagree with both of them, maintaining that both her father and she can receive her betrothal.

Rabbi Asi did not enter the study hall

[one day Rabbi Asi was not in the study hall], and

Rabbi Asi found

Rabbi Asi

Rabbi Zeira

[Rabbi Asi found Rabbi Zeira] and

said—

he asked

him,

Rabbi Zeira:

What are they saying today in the study hall

[what new matter was discussed today in the study hall]?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi:

I too did not enter

[I too was not there], but

it was Rabbi Avin who entered, and he said

[Rabbi Avin was there and told me when he left the study hall]:

The entire group agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan;

all the study groups in the study hall joined together and reached the conclusion that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan: according to the Sages, there is a distinction between divorce and betrothal. Although with regard to divorce she too may receive her bill of divorce, nevertheless she cannot be betrothed through herself.

And Reish Lakish cried out

in the study hall

like a crane

[like a heron]: But

“And she shall leave and become”

is stated by the Torah, and there is no distinction between divorce and betrothal

! Yet no one paid attention to him

[and there was no one who heeded his words].

He

asked

him,

Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Zeira: Are you familiar with

Rabbi Avin

who

is reliable

and does not forget?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi:

Yes,

he certainly did not forget what was said in the study hall, because

he is like the distance from the sea to the frying pan: his words were spoken immediately upon leaving the study hall, before enough time had elapsed for a person to draw a fish from the sea and place it in a frying pan already on the fire.

his words were stated immediately upon his leaving the house of study, before enough time had passed for one who pulls a fish from the sea to place it in a frying pan that is already on the fire.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

I did not

hear—in this account cited by the Gemara—whether it was

Rabbi Avin bar Rabbi Ḥiyya

who said it,

nor

did I hear whether it was

Rabbi Avin bar Rabbi Kahana

who said it,

but

I heard the report in the name of

Rabbi Avin without specification,

without his father’s name, and I do not know which Rabbi Avin it was.

And we explain:

What practical difference is there

which Rabbi Avin it was?

To raise a contradiction between his statement and his other statement

[to challenge Rabbi Avin’s words from Rabbi Avin’s words]; that is, one cannot raise a contradiction between Rabbi Avin’s statements, since we do not know which Rabbi Avin said it.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: