Kiddushin 44a — the Talmud in English

A minor girl

who became subject to yibbum

from the betrothal,

whom a man betrothed and then died,

one performs a maamar with her only with the knowledge of her father, and

if

the maiden

who became subject to yibbum from the betrothal, one performs a maamar with her

either with her own knowledge or with the knowledge of her father.

According to the words of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina in the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is difficult: What is different about betrothals, concerning which the Sages agree that the maiden does not betroth herself, whereas concerning a maamar they hold that one performs a maamar with a maiden even with her knowledge alone?

Rather, if it was stated

the words of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina,

this is what was stated: Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Ḥanina said:

What is Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason, according to the Sages?

Betrothals

in general are performed only

with her knowledge [of the woman],

therefore

her father

betroths her

and not she.

But

divorces

in general are performed even

against her will [of the woman],

and likewise, when one divorces his fellow’s daughter, he does not require the knowledge of her father, even when she is in his domain; therefore:

both she

and

her father

receive her bill of divorce, for what have we to do with his knowledge?

And the Gemara is astonished at the answer, for apparently we have accomplished nothing through it:

And

behold, a maamar

in general is performed only

with her knowledge, and

nevertheless

it teaches: “

both she and her father,”

as we learned: “And the maiden, either with her own knowledge or with the knowledge of her father”?

And we answer:

There, it is a maamar performed against her will, and it is Rabbi’s opinion,

that is, that Mishna holds like Rabbi, who says that an ordinary maamar is performed even against the woman’s will; if so, the maamar resembles a divorce and not betrothal;

as it was taught:

One who performs a מאמר with his yevama

One who performs a maamar with his yevama without her knowledge:

Rabbi says: He acquires her.

And the Sages say: He does not acquire her.

And since the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages was brought, the Gemara explains their reasons:

What is Rabbi’s reason?

Because

he derives

a maamar with a yevama

from intercourse with a yevama: just as intercourse with a yevama

also

against her will

acquires her,

so here too,

with a maamar,

also,

even

against her will

he acquires her.

And

if

the Sages hold: We derive

a maamar with a yevama

from

other

betrothals

not involving a yevama,

just as betrothals are with her knowledge, so here too

with a maamar

also with her knowledge.

And we explain:

In what do they disagree, what is the reason for their dispute, that this one derives from intercourse with a yevama, while that one derives from the betrothal of a woman?

Rabbi holds: Matters concerning a yevama should have been derived from a yevama [the laws of a yevama from the laws of a yevama]

[the laws of a yevama from the laws of a yevama];

he should have derived [we have to derive].

[we should derive it].

And

if

the Sages hold: Betrothals [a maamar with a yevama, which is governed by the law of betrothals of another woman]

[a מאמר with a yevama, which is governed by the law of betrothal of an ordinary woman]

he should have derived from betrothals.

And here the Gemara returns to what was explained concerning the reason for the law regarding a maamar: that it is because it is Rabbi’s opinion, that a maamar is performed ordinarily against her will; and it supports this explanation:

This too is reasonably so, as Rabbi Yoḥanan explains

that same beraita concerning a maamar: It speaks specifically of a maamar, whereas concerning betrothals the law is “her father and not she,”

as it teaches in the latter clause

of that beraita concerning a maamar: “

Which is not so with betrothals,” thus, concerning betrothals the Sages agree that it is her father and not she.

which indicates that with regard to betrothal the Sages concede that it is her father and not she.

And the Gemara explains:

Rather, shall we say

that

this be

this beraita

a refutation of Reish Lakish, since this beraita states explicitly that according to the Sages, concerning betrothals: her father and not she?

ведь из этой барайты ясно, что, по мнению мудрецов, в отношении обручения действует правило: отец, а не она сама?!

And we answer:

Reish Lakish can say to you: Whose opinion is this?

This beraita is

Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, who says

concerning divorces, and the same applies to betrothals:

Two hands do not acquire simultaneously.

And we ask:

If it is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion,

then how does the tanna teach: “

Which is not so with be

t

rothals,”

whereas

“Which is not so with divorces”

he should have stated, to teach us that even with divorces, which are performed against her will, nevertheless it is her father and not she?

teaching us that even with regard to divorce, which is effected against her will, it is nevertheless her father and not she?!

And we answer:

Indeed,

the tanna could have said: “Which is not so with divorces,” but

since he taught maamar,

because the tanna is dealing with a maamar

which resembles betrothals,

therefore

he also taught: “

Which is not so with betrothals.”

And we still challenge Reish Lakish, who establishes the beraita—which distinguishes between a maamar, which is performed with the knowledge of both, and betrothals—as Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion:

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, what is different about a maamar

that it is performed even with the daughter’s knowledge, whereas with divorces and betrothals it is performed only with the father’s knowledge?

And we explain: A maamar is different

since she is subject

to it

and standing, and therefore the maamar takes effect with her in any manner.

in that status; therefore the מאמר takes effect with her by any means.

And the Gemara adds:

Now that you have arrived at this, now that the reasoning “since she is subject and standing” has been introduced—

new rationale, “since she is subject to it and is standing”—

Then the opinion of

Rabbi Yoḥanan too should not have been difficult for you from the outset, you should not raise at all what the Gemara asked above—according to what the Gemara thought was Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason for distinguishing between betrothals and divorces, namely, that with betrothals she removes herself from her father’s authority—a maamar also removes her from her father’s authority, and nevertheless it is performed even with her knowledge; this is not difficult:

There is no longer any difficulty from the question raised above: according to the Gemara’s initial understanding of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason for distinguishing between betrothal and divorce—that in betrothal she removes herself from her father’s control—a מאמר likewise removes her from her father’s control, and yet is effected even with her own knowledge. This is no difficulty:

Because

a maamar is different—

which is performed even with her knowledge alone—

since she is subject

to it

and standing.

The Gemara challenges the view of Reish Lakish from that which

we learned

in our Mishna:

A man betroths his daughter when she is a maiden, either by himself or through his agent.

It follows:

By himself and through his agent, yes,

indeed he betroths his maiden daughter, but

through her and through her agent, no,

she is not betrothed, and

a refutation of Reish Lakish, who holds that according to the Sages it is both she and her father!?

который считает, что, по мнению мудрецов, принимать обручение могут и она сама, и ее отец?!

And we answer:

Reish Lakish can say to you: Whose opinion is this?

Our Mishna is

Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, who holds that both with divorces and with betrothals it is her father and not she.

который считает, что и при разводе, и при обручении действует правило: отец, а не она сама.

And we ask:

Can you really establish it

as our Mishna

according to Rabbi Yehuda [is it actually possible to say that our Mishna is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion]!?

[Can it possibly be said that our Mishna is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion]?!

But it teaches in the latter clause [in the following Mishna, below, 46a]: “

[in the following Mishna, below, 46a]: “

He

gives two dates and

says to the woman: ‘Be betrothed to me with this date; be betrothed to me with that one,’

if one of them is worth a peruta, she is betrothed, and if not [if neither of them is worth a peruta, even if together they are worth a peruta], she is not betrothed,” because the repetition of the expression “be betrothed” means that each date is a separate betrothal, and in each betrothal there is not a peruta’s worth.

And we say

about it in the Gemara below, 46a:

Who is the tanna [who is the tanna of our Mishna], who requires, for separating the betrothals, the repetition of the expression

[who is the tanna of our Mishna] who requires, for the betrothals to be considered separate, repetition of the expression

“be betrothed, be betrothed,”

whereas when he said only, “Be betrothed to me with this date and with that one,” the wording does not mean two acts of betrothal, but that both dates are given for one act of betrothal; and even if only together they are worth a peruta, she is betrothed?

And Rabba said

there:

One who denies to his fellow a monetary obligation owed to him, swears concerning it, and then admits that he swore falsely, brings an “offering of guilt for false denial” and pays the principal and a fifth. This section is called “the oath concerning a deposit.”

It is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, who says

concerning one whom five claimants were suing: “Give us the deposit that each one of us has in your possession,” and the defendant said: “An oath that I have nothing belonging to you, nor to you, nor to you,” and likewise concerning all of them, he is liable only for one “offering of guilt for false denial” [which a person is liable to bring when he denied under oath money in his possession], because it is one oath; and he is not liable for five offerings,

until he says the expression

слово

“an oath”

for each one and each one;

and the same applies concerning betrothals: until he repeats the expression “be betrothed,” there are not two acts of betrothal, but one act of betrothal with two dates.

If so, this is difficult for Reish Lakish: How shall we explain the first clause [which is our Mishna] according to Rabbi Yehuda, when we necessarily explain the latter clause according to Rabbi Shimon!?

And if you would say,

to answer:

The whole—

both the first clause and the latter clause—

is Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion,

it is,

but

nevertheless

in particulars [concerning the specification and separation of betrothals and oaths]

he holds

he holds—

Rabbi Yehuda—

like Rabbi Shimon,

and now both the first clause and the latter clause are satisfactory: For Rabbi Yehuda holds that a maiden is not betrothed through herself, which is the first clause; and likewise Rabbi Yehuda holds that to separate betrothals one must repeat the expression “be betrothed,” which is the latter clause.

Thus, it is impossible to say that

Rabbi Yehuda holds

like Rabbi Shimon in particulars!?

But it was taught:

This is the rule:

A general statement,

if he included several monetary denials in one oath,

he is liable for only one [one offering of guilt for false denial], whereas

[one asham gezelot];] whereas if he

a specification,

he is liable for each and every one, the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If he said:

“An oath: not to you, not

to you, not to you,”

he is liable for each and every one, because they are three oaths.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

If he said:

“Not to you, not to you, and not to you—an oath,”

he is liable for each and every one,

but if he placed the expression “an oath” first, it is one oath.

Rabbi Shimon says: He is never liable

for several offerings

until he says

“an oath”

for each one and each one.

Thus, in particulars Rabbi Yehuda does not hold like Rabbi Shimon; and if so, since the latter clause is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion and not Rabbi Yehuda’s, how shall we establish the first clause—which is our Mishna—according to Rabbi Yehuda!?

Rather,

the Gemara resolves our Mishna according to Reish Lakish in another manner:

The whole—

our Mishna, both the first clause and the latter clause—

is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, and concerning agency

that is, concerning the law of the daughter’s divorces and betrothals by herself in place of her father,

he holds like Rabbi Yehuda,

that she cannot do so; but the Sages disagree with both of them, and in their view both her father and she receive her betrothals.

Rabbi Asi did not enter the house of study [one day Rabbi Asi was not in the house of study], and

[one day Rabbi Asi was not in the study hall], and

he found

Rabbi Asi

Rabbi Zeira [Rabbi Asi found Rabbi Zeira] and

[Rabbi Asi found Rabbi Zeira] and

said—

he asked

him

Rabbi Zeira:

What do they say nowadays in the house of study [what was renewed today in the house of study]?

[what new matter was discussed today in the study hall]?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira to Rabbi Asi:

I too did not enter [I too was not there], but

[I too was not there], but

it was Rabbi Avin who entered, and he said [Rabbi Avin was there, and told me when he came out of the house of study]:

[Rabbi Avin was there and told me when he left the study hall]:

The entire fellowship is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan,

all the fellowships in the house of study joined together and reached the conclusion that the halakha is according to Rabbi Yoḥanan: According to the Sages, there is a distinction between divorces and betrothals; for although with divorces she too receives her bill of divorce, nevertheless she is not betrothed through herself.

And Reish Lakish cried out

in the house of study

like a crane [like a crane]: Behold,

[like a heron]: But

“And she shall go out and she shall become”

the Torah said, and one may not distinguish between divorces and betrothals

! And there is no one who pays attention to him [and there is no one who attends to his words].

[and there was no one who heeded his words].

He said

he asked

him

Rabbi Asi to Rabbi Zeira: Are you familiar with

Rabbi Avin

who

is reliable

and does not forget?

He said to him

Rabbi Zeira to Rabbi Asi:

Yes,

it is certain that he did not forget what they said in the house of study, because

he is like the distance from the sea to the frying pan,

his words were stated immediately upon his leaving the house of study, before enough time had passed for one who pulls a fish from the sea to place it in a frying pan that is already on the fire.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

I did not

hear—in this account brought by the Gemara—whether

Rabbi Avin son of Rabbi Ḥiyya

was the one who said it,

nor

did I hear whether

Rabbi Avin son of Rabbi Kahana

was the one who said it,

rather

I heard the report in the name of

Rabbi Avin without qualification,

without his father’s name, and I do not know which Rabbi Avin he is.

And we explain:

What practical difference is there

which Rabbi Avin he is?

To raise a contradiction between his statement and his statement [to challenge Rabbi Avin’s words from Rabbi Avin’s words],

that is, it is impossible to ask a contradiction in Rabbi Avin’s words, since we do not know which Rabbi Avin said it.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: