Kiddushin 43b — the Talmud in English

And likewise

the same law applies

to monetary laws,

that if the debtor sent the debt to his creditor through two people, they are his agents and they are his witnesses.

And it is necessary

for Rava to teach us this law both with regard to betrothals, and with regard to divorces, and with regard to monetary laws:

For if he had taught us

Rava only

with regard to betrothals

and not with regard to divorces, for then I would say: specifically with regard to betrothals does “an agent become a witness,” to testify about the betrothal,

because

there is no concern that perhaps he is lying,

for

behold,

he comes to forbid her [because he comes to prohibit her] to the entire world and to him, and he has no interest in lying about the matter,

that is, to render her forbidden to the entire world and to himself, and he has no reason to lie about the matter,

but

with

divorces, let us suspect that perhaps

he is lying that he divorced her, because

he set his eyes upon her

at the time when he requested to give her the bill of divorce, and he is lying that she received it from him.

And if he had taught us

Rava only with regard to betrothals and with

divorces

and not with regard to monetary laws, for then I would say that this is why they are trustworthy even with regard to divorces:

because a woman is not fit for two men [a woman is not fit for two men], and since they are two, they do not lie.

and since there are two of them, they would not lie.

But with regard to money,

when they testify about repayment of the money that was in their possession for the creditor,

I would say: these

witnesses did not deliver it to the creditor and

they are dividing it [they intend to divide the money].

[they are thinking of dividing the money among themselves].

Therefore

it is necessary,

to teach us this law in all these cases.

The version of the Gemara in the following question was written according to the version of the Bach from other books.

And the Gemara challenges what Rava said concerning his law with regard to monetary laws:

What does

Rava think!?

If

Rava thinks:

one who lends

or one who deposits with another

in the presence of witnesses must repay him in the presence of witnesses,

that is, he must bring witnesses concerning the repayment, and he is not trustworthy to say, “I repaid,” and it follows that if the creditor lent to the debtor in the presence of witnesses, and the debtor also gave the money to his agents in the presence of witnesses, then the debtor requires the testimony of the agents to testify for him concerning the repayment; and it also follows that if the agents claim: “We did not find the creditor, and we returned the money to you,” they would not be trustworthy—if so, behold, in a case where he gave them the money in the presence of witnesses, we should not have trusted them that they repaid the money to the creditor, and because

these “‘

are interested witnesses’”

they are,

they have an interest and concern in the matter in testifying about the repayment to exempt the debtor from his obligation, and every “interested witness” is not trustworthy—

For

behold,

if they say, “‘

We did not repay him’” [the creditor], that is: if they do not testify that they repaid the money to the creditor in order to exempt him from the creditor, then

that is, if they do not testify that they paid the money to the lender in order to exempt the borrower from his debt to the lender, then

he will say [he will say]

[he will say]

to them

the debtor: “‘

Repay me’” [return the money that I gave you], and they will not be trustworthy to say, “We returned it to you,” since they have no witnesses, and they are interested in saying that they repaid the money to the creditor.

and they will not be trusted to say, “We returned it to you,” since they have no witnesses, and they have a personal interest in saying that they paid the money to the lender.

And if

Rava thinks:

one who lends to another in the presence of witnesses does not need to repay him in the presence of witnesses,

if so,

why do I need these witnesses

at all, when even without the witnesses testifying about the repayment, the debtor should be trustworthy to say, “I repaid,” without witnesses!?

And we answer:

Rather, Rava always thinks

Rava:

one who lends to

another in the presence of witnesses does not need to repay him in the presence of witnesses,

and therefore they are not interested in their testimony. And as for your difficulty: if so, what need does the debtor have for their testimony? Do not challenge it, because:

For

if

the debtor said: “‘

I myself repaid you’”

that too,

if the matter had been in a case where the debtor claims to the creditor: “I myself repaid you,” indeed he would be trustworthy; but

here

behold,

with what are we dealing

with a situation

in which he said to him

the debtor to the creditor: “‘

I repaid you through an agent,’”

for he sent it through the hand of an agent,

and for this reason [and because of this]

[and for this reason] he

he needs

he

witnesses

that indeed the agent delivered the money to the creditor.

And

since Rava holds: one who lends to another in the presence of witnesses does not need to repay him in the presence of witnesses, it follows that

the witnesses too

are not “interested in their testimony,” because

since they can say, ‘We returned it to the debtor’ [since they can say: “We returned the money to the debtor”],

for this reason

they can

they

say [testify]: “‘

[testify]: “

We repaid it to the creditor.’”

And the Gemara adds, that

now that the Sages enacted the oath of heset,

for anyone who denies his fellow’s claim, it follows that if they do not testify that they repaid the creditor, when the debtor summons them and they say, “We returned the money,” the debtor will administer to them an oath of heset concerning this; if so, they are interested in their testimony, because it is possible that in truth they did not repay the creditor, and they testify that they repaid the debtor even though they did not repay him, for it is not convenient for them to claim, “We returned the money to the creditor,” because they do not wish to swear falsely, and it is more convenient for them to cause the creditor a false loss than to swear falsely to the debtor.

And since their testimony is not testimony, their law is like the law explicated in the Mishna in Shevuot [45a], concerning “a shopkeeper upon his ledger”; that is, if a person sent his workers to receive their wages from a shopkeeper, and the shopkeeper claimed that he paid them and demands payment from the employer, while the workers say, “We did not receive [the wages],” then both of them swear an oath and collect from the employer; and here too:

These witnesses swear

to the debtor

that “‘

We gave it to him’” [the witnesses swear to the debtor that they repaid the money to the creditor]; and they require an oath, for behold, we do not believe them in their testimony, and the debtor still owes the creditor, and therefore the debtor has the right to administer an oath to them that they repaid it to the creditor—

and they require an oath, because we do not trust them as witnesses, and the borrower still owes the lender. Therefore, the borrower has the right to make them swear that they paid the money to the lender—

and

on the other hand:

the creditor swears

to the debtor

that he did not take it [that he was not repaid the money],

[that the money was not repaid],

and the debtor repays

the creditor

the loan, for he has no testimony that he repaid it, and by a claim alone he is not trustworthy, since he too does not say that he repaid it, but rather that he sent an agent to repay him, and he has no testimony about this except from the “interested witnesses.”

We learned in the Mishna:

The man betroths his daughter

when she is a young woman, either personally or through his agent:

We learned there

we learned in the Mishna in Gittin 64b:

A young woman

who is betrothed ,

she and her father [or she or her father]

[either she or her father]

receive

on her behalf

her bill of divorce

from her husband.

And the reason that her father receives her bill of divorce is because the Torah equated divorce with betrothal, in the verse: “And she shall go out [from his house and go] and become [to another man],” and behold, the father betroths his daughter, as explained in our Mishna.

Rabbi Judah said: Two hands do not acquire simultaneously

in one body,

but her father

is the one who

receives her bill of divorce,

and not she.

And every

young woman

who cannot safeguard her bill of divorce,

that is, they divorce her and she returns to her husband’s house,

cannot be divorced

either through herself or through her father, for she is like an insane woman, and the Torah said in the section of divorce: “And he shall send her away from his house,” teaching that only one whom he sends away and who does not return can be divorced.

Rish Lakish said:

Just as the dispute -

in which the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Judah differed -

with regard to divorce, so is the dispute with regard to kiddushin;

and according to the Tanna Kamma: both the father betroths his maiden daughter, and she betroths herself, even without her father's knowledge; whereas according to Rabbi Judah: the father betroths his maiden daughter, but she does not betroth herself.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

The dispute

in which the Tanna Kamma and the Sages differed - and according to the Tanna Kamma, she too receives her bill of divorce herself - is only

with regard to divorce, but with regard to kiddushin, everyone agrees -

even according to the Tanna Kamma -

her father

betroths her

and not she.

And he said

he explained:

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina: What is the reason of Rabbi Yohanan according to the Sages,

that although with regard to divorce they hold that she too receives her bill of divorce, they agree that she does not betroth herself? Because:

Divorce [

from betrothal]

brings her back into her father's authority

through the divorce, therefore

both she and her father

receive her bill of divorce, because her father is pleased that she receive her bill of divorce.

But

kiddushin removes her from her father's authority

the Sages agree in this, that

her father and not she [unclear: the source text is joined].

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against this:

But there is the ma'amar [

the kiddushin of a levir with his yevama through money or a document] of a maiden whose husband died after betrothal

which removes her from her father's authority [

for she returned to her father's authority when her husband died],

and

nevertheless

we learned: