Kiddushin 43b (מג:) — the Talmud in English

And likewise

the same law applies

in monetary matters:

if the borrower sent repayment of a debt to his creditor through two people, they are both his agents and his witnesses.

And it is necessary for Rava to teach us this law both with regard to betrothal, with regard to divorce, and with regard to monetary matters:

For had Rava taught us

only

that

with regard to betrothal

and not with regard to divorce, I would have said: It is specifically with regard to betrothal that “an agent may become a witness” to testify concerning the betrothal,

because

there is no concern that he may be lying,

as

he

has come to render her forbidden

[for he comes to prohibit her] to the entire world and to himself, and he has no interest in lying about the matter;

but

with regard to

divorce, let us suspect that

he is lying when he says that he divorced her, because

he set his eyes upon her

when he asked to give her the bill of divorce, and he is lying when he says that she received it from him.

And had Rava taught us

only with regard to betrothal and

divorce

and not with regard to monetary matters, I would have said that this is why they are believed even with regard to divorce:

because a woman is not fit for two men

[a woman cannot be married to two men], and since there are two of them, they will not lie.

But with regard to money,

when they testify concerning repayment of the money that was in their possession for the creditor,

I would say: These

witnesses did not deliver it to the creditor, but

they intend to divide it

[they are thinking of dividing the money among themselves].

Therefore

it is necessary

to teach us this law in all these cases.

The version of the Gemara in its next question was written in accordance with the version cited by the Bach from other texts.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s statement of his law with regard to monetary matters:

What does

Rava think?!

If Rava thinks:

the

creditor

or the one who deposits an item with his fellow

in the presence of witnesses must repay him in the presence of witnesses,

that is, he must bring witnesses to testify concerning the repayment, and he is not believed to say, “I repaid,” it follows that if the creditor lent money to the borrower in the presence of witnesses, and the borrower also handed the money to his agents in the presence of witnesses, the borrower requires the testimony of the agents to testify for him concerning the repayment. It also follows that if the agents claim, “We did not find the creditor, and we returned the money to you,” they would not be believed—if so, in a case where he handed them the money in the presence of witnesses, we should not have believed them that they repaid the money to the creditor, because

these

are interested parties in the testimony

they are,

they have a personal interest and concern in testifying concerning the repayment in order to exempt the borrower from his obligation, and any “interested party in testimony” is not believed—

As

he

if they say, “

We did not repay him”

[the creditor]—that is, if they do not testify that they repaid the money to the creditor in order to exempt the borrower from liability to the creditor, then

he will say

[he will say]

to them,

the borrower: “

Repay me”

[return the money that I gave you], and they will not be believed to say, “We returned it to you,” since they have no witnesses, and they have a personal interest in saying that they repaid the money to the creditor.

And if Rava thinks

that

one who lends money to his fellow in the presence of witnesses need not repay him in the presence of witnesses,

then

why do I need these witnesses

at all? Even without the witnesses testifying concerning the repayment, the borrower would be believed to say, “I repaid,” without witnesses!?

And we answer:

Rather, Rava actually thinks

that

one who lends

money to his fellow in the presence of witnesses need not repay him in the presence of witnesses,

and therefore they do not have a personal interest in their testimony. And as for your difficulty—if so, what need does the borrower have for their testimony?—it is not difficult, because:

For

if

the borrower says, “

I repaid you,”

that is indeed so:

if the case were one in which the borrower claimed to the creditor, “I myself repaid you,” he would indeed be believed. But

here

the case

with which are we dealing

is one

in which

the borrower says to the creditor: “

I repaid you through an agent,”

since he sent the money through an agent,

and therefore

[and for this reason] he

requires

the

witnesses

to establish that the agent indeed delivered the money to the creditor.

And

since Rava holds that one who lends money to his fellow in the presence of witnesses need not repay him in the presence of witnesses, it follows that

the witnesses too

are not “interested parties in their testimony,” because

since they could say, ‘We returned it to the borrower’

[since they could say, “We returned the money to the borrower”], for this reason

they can

they

say

[testify]: “

We repaid the creditor.”

And the Gemara adds that

now that the Sages enacted the shevuat heset,

for anyone who denies his fellow’s claim, it follows that if they do not testify that they repaid the creditor, when the borrower sues them and they say, “We returned the money,” the borrower will administer a shevuat heset to them concerning this. If so, they have a personal interest in their testimony, because it is possible that they did not in fact repay the creditor, and they testify that they repaid him even though they did not, since they do not find it preferable to claim, “We returned the money to the creditor,” because they do not wish to swear falsely, and they prefer to cause the creditor a loss through a lie rather than swear falsely to the borrower.

And since their testimony is not testimony, their law is like the law stated in the Mishna in Shevuot [45a], concerning “the shopkeeper regarding his ledger.” That is, if a person sent his workers to receive their wages from a shopkeeper, and the shopkeeper claimed that he had paid them and demanded payment from the employer, while the workers said, “We did not receive it,” then both parties swear an oath and collect from the employer; here too:

These witnesses take an oath

to the borrower

that “

We gave it to him”

[the witnesses swear to the borrower that they repaid the money to the creditor]; and they require an oath, for we do not believe them through their testimony, and the borrower still owes the creditor. Therefore, the borrower is entitled to administer an oath to them that they repaid the creditor—

and

on the other hand:

the creditor takes an oath

to the borrower

that he did not receive it

[that the money was not repaid],

and the borrower repays

the creditor

the loan, for he has no testimony that he repaid it, and he is not believed on the basis of a claim alone, since he does not say that he repaid it himself but that he sent an agent to repay it, and his only testimony concerning this comes from witnesses who have a personal interest in their testimony.”

We learned in the Mishna:

A man betroths his daughter

when she is a na'ara, either personally or through his agent:

We learned there

in the Mishna in Gittin 64b:

A

betrothed na'ara ,

she and her father

[either she or her father]

receive

on her behalf

her bill of divorce

from her husband.

The reason that her father receives her bill of divorce is that the Torah compares divorce to betrothal, in the verse: “And she shall leave [his house and go] and become [the wife of another man],” and the father betroths his daughter, as explained in our Mishna.

Rabbi Yehuda said: Two legal hands cannot acquire simultaneously

in a single person;

rather, her father

is the one who

receives her bill of divorce,

and not she.

And any

na'ara

who cannot safeguard her bill of divorce,

that is, when she is divorced she returns to her husband’s home,

cannot be divorced

either through herself or through her father, for she is like an mentally incompetent woman, and the Torah said in the passage concerning divorce: “And he shall send her out from his house,” teaching that only a woman whom he sends away and who does not return can be divorced.

Reish Lakish said:

Just as the dispute -

between the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda -

concerning divorce, so is the dispute concerning kiddushin;

According to the first tanna, both the father betroths his daughter who is a na'arah, and she betroths herself, even without her father's knowledge; whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda, the father betroths his daughter who is a na'arah, but she does not betroth herself.

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

The dispute

between the first tanna and the Sages—and according to the first tanna, she too receives her get herself—is only

concerning divorce, but with regard to kiddushin, everyone -

even according to the first tanna -

her father

betroths her

and not she.

And he said

explaining:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Hanina: What is the reason of Rabbi Yohanan according to the Sages,

who, although they maintain with regard to divorce that she too receives her get, nevertheless agree that she does not betroth herself? Because:

Divorce [

from betrothal ]

causes her to reenter her father's authority

through the divorce; therefore,

both she and her father

receive her get, because her father is pleased that she receive her get.

But

kiddushin, which removes her from her father's authority,

the Sages agree in this case that

her father, and not she, betroths her.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning this:

And what of a ma'amar [

the levirate betrothal of a yevama by her yavam, through money or a document] in the case of a na'arah whose husband died after betrothal,

which removes her from her father's authority [

for she returned to her father's authority when her husband died],

and

nevertheless

we learned: