Kiddushin 43a (מג.) — the Talmud in English

Let us derive it from it

from me'ila for the entire Torah, that there is an agent for a transgression!?

And we answer: Even according to Beit Shammai, we cannot derive this from me'ila,

because

the verse that expands the law of agency to a transgression in

me'ila, and

the verse that expands the law of agency to a transgression in

slaughter and sale

of a thief’s animal [as the Gemara explains below], making him liable to pay fourfold or fivefold even when his agent slaughtered or sold it—

are two verses that come as one, and whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach a general principle!

And we explain: The verse

in me'ila

that teaches that there is an agent for a transgression is

that which we said: “sin, sin,” derived from the laws of teruma.

But what is the verse that teaches agency for a transgression in

slaughter and sale

?

For

the verse says: “

When a man steals an ox or a sheep

and slaughters it or sells it,

he shall pay five cattle in place of the ox and four sheep in place of the sheep.” The Torah thus compares slaughter to sale, in order to teach:

Just as sale

has liability

through another,

for sale is impossible without a seller and a buyer,

so too slaughter

he becomes liable when he slaughters

through another,

and this includes one who has the animal slaughtered through an agent.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught

another source for slaughter and sale, for which the thief becomes liable through his agent:

Since it is stated:

“or” in the verse “and slaughters it or sells it,” whereas it should have written “and slaughters it and sells it,”

it uses the word “or”

it comes to include

the

agent.

The school of Hezekiah taught

another source for this law:

Since the Torah stated

“in place of”

twice—“He shall pay five cattle in place of the ox, and four sheep in place of the sheep”—and one of them is superfluous,

it comes to include

the

agent.

The Gemara nevertheless asks:

This works according to the one who says: Two verses that come as one do not teach,

for indeed one cannot derive from the places where the Torah revealed that there is an agent for a transgression that this is the law throughout the Torah; and this resolves the Mishna’s ruling that one who sends a fire is exempt from liability for the transgression.

But according to the one who says that

even two verses that come as one

do teach, what can be said!?

For we should derive from these verses that there is an agent for a transgression, making the one who sent the fire liable when he sent it through a competent person, while exempting the agent!?

And we answer:

The Merciful One revealed

that there is no agent for a transgression

in the case of slaughter outside

[sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard], as it is stated [Leviticus 17:3]: “

Any man of the house of Israel who slaughters an ox, or a sheep, or a goat in the camp, or who slaughters it outside the camp, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it as an offering to the Lord,

blood shall be accounted to that man; he has shed blood,

and that man shall be cut off from among his people.” Therefore, the Torah said: “to that man,” rather than merely “to the man,” in order to teach:

He

who slaughtered it himself is liable to karet,

but not his agent

who slaughtered it, who would thereby make him liable to karet.

The Gemara nevertheless asks:

We find with regard to slaughter outside

that there is no agent for a transgression, but

throughout the Torah—

for example, in the case of one who sends a fire—

from where do we know

that there is no agent for a transgression?

And we answer:

We derive

the law of agency for a transgression throughout the Torah

from slaughter outside.

And we ask:

Before deriving it from slaughter outside

that there is no agent for a transgression,

let us derive it from these

[from me'ila, misappropriation of a deposit, and slaughter and sale], which teach that there is an agent for a transgression, according to the view that two verses that come as one do teach.

And we answer:

The Merciful One again wrote

[the verse returned and stated] with regard to slaughter outside: “

And that man shall be cut off,”

which indicates that he is excluded from karet when he slaughtered through an agent. There is no need for an additional verse concerning slaughter outside itself, since it was already stated: “Blood shall be accounted to that man.” Rather:

If it is not

the second exclusion in the case of slaughter outside

a matter concerning itself,

that is, concerning slaughter outside itself,

assign it

this verse

to a matter concerning the entire Torah,

to teach that throughout the Torah there is no agent for a transgression.

The Gemara returns and asks:

And according to the one who says: Two verses that come as one

that there is an agent for a transgression

do not teach

a principle for the entire Torah that there is an agent for a transgression—and by logical reasoning we already know that there is no agent for a transgression—if so:

These

two instances of

“that man, that man,”

what does he expound from them

[what do they come to teach us? We already know that there is no agent for a transgression, and there is no need for a special exclusion in the case of slaughter outside]!?

And we explain the verses according to this view:

One instance of

“that man”

excludes two people holding one knife and slaughtering

sacrificial animals outside, for neither one of them is liable to karet.

And one instance of

“that man” comes to teach:

He

is liable to karet; that is, when he acts of his own free will and with full awareness, he is liable to karet,

but not

when he is

coerced; and likewise,

and likewise,

he, but not

when he is

unaware on his own; and likewise,

he, but not

he, but not one who was misled

by others.

The Gemara returns and explains the view of the disputant:

But the other

who holds that two verses that come as one do teach, and therefore needed “that man, that man” to teach that there is no agency for a transgression in the case of slaughter outside and throughout the Torah—if so, from where does he derive the exclusion of all these people from karet!?

And we explain:

From the words

“that man, that man,”

meaning that the Torah could have written: “Blood shall be accounted to a man; he,” and likewise, “And a man shall be cut off; he.” Since the Torah said “that man” in both verses, you have two teachings: to exclude two people holding one knife, and to exclude one who was coerced, one who acted unknowingly, and one who was misled.

The Gemara returns and explains the view of the disputant:

But the other

tanna, who holds that two verses that come as one do not teach, and derived the exclusion of two people holding one knife, as well as that of one who was coerced, one who acted unknowingly, and one who was misled, from the essential word “that man”—if so, what does he expound from the additional letter heh in both verses!?

And we explain: This tanna

“

does not expound ‘he is that man.’”

Once it has been established that there is no agent for a transgression, the following difficulty arises:

But what of the teaching

in a beraita:

If one says to his agent, ‘Go and kill a person, he,’

the

agent is liable, and

whereas

the one who sent him is exempt.

The Elder Shammai says in the name of Haggai the Prophet:

The one who sent him is liable,

because

it is stated

concerning David: “And it was morning, and David wrote a letter to Joab and sent it by the hand of Uriah. And he wrote in the letter, saying: Set Uriah opposite the fiercest battle [with the children of Ammon], and withdraw from him, so that he will be struck and die” [II Samuel 11:14–15]: “

Him”

[Uriah the Hittite]

you killed by the sword of the children of Ammon,”

so the verse attributed the killing of Uriah in the war with the children of Ammon to David.

And the Gemara asks:

What is the reason of the Elder Shammai,

who holds that there is an agent for a transgression? We cannot derive this from the verses, because “two verses that come as one do not teach”; and even if they do teach, we should derive from the exclusion in the case of slaughter outside; while by logical reasoning we should say: When the words of the Master and the words of the student conflict, whose words does one obey!?

And we answer:

He holds,

the Elder Shammai, that

two verses that come as one do teach,

and we derive from me'ila and slaughter and sale that throughout the Torah there is an agent for a transgression.

And as for the repetition of the expression “that man” that the Torah stated concerning slaughter outside, the Elder Shammai holds that it does not come to exclude the agent, neither with regard to slaughter outside itself nor with regard to the entire Torah. Rather, it exempts two people holding one knife, and exempts one who was coerced, one who acted unknowingly, and one who was misled

; and

the Elder Shammai

“

does not expound ‘he is that man,’

so that we should derive these laws [or the law that there is no agent for a transgression] from this superfluity.

And if you wish, say: He does expound

“he is that man,” and even according to his view one should derive that in the case of slaughter outside there is no agent for a transgression, and likewise throughout the Torah. And

what

“liable”

does the Elder Shammai mean when he says that one who tells his agent, “Go and kill a person”—

liable by the laws of Heaven

alone.

And we wonder:

By inference,

if so, necessarily

the first tanna holds: He is exempt even by the laws of Heaven,

when one says to another, “Go and kill a person.” For otherwise, in what do the first tanna and Beit Shammai disagree? Could it be that the first tanna exempts him even by the laws of Heaven!?

Rather, they differ with regard to a greater and a lesser judgment,

meaning: Certainly, according to the first tanna as well, the one who sent him is liable by the laws of Heaven. Rather, they disagree over whether he is punished with a great punishment, like the murderer himself, or only with a lesser punishment, merely as one who caused a death. According to the Elder Shammai, he is punished with the greater punishment, whereas according to the first tanna, he is punished only with the lesser punishment.

And if you wish, say

to explain the view of the Elder Shammai: The Elder Shammai said that the one who sent him is liable only in the case of murder, because

there it is different,

with regard to murder,

for the Merciful One revealed

concerning David and Uriah: “

Him you killed by the sword of the children of Ammon.”

And

we explain the reasoning of

the other,

that is, the first tanna who disagrees with the Elder Shammai: He holds that this is what the Merciful One said:

Behold, you have

the killing of Uriah

like the sword of the children of Ammon,

who killed Israelites.

Just as you are not punished for the sword of the children of Ammon,

since they went out to war against them lawfully,

so too, you are not punished for Uriah the Hittite,

even by the laws of Heaven, despite the fact that you caused his death.

And

what is the reason

that David is not punished for this, at least as one who causes the death of another? Because Uriah

was rebellious

against the monarchy

of David,

as he said to him

Uriah said to David: “

And my lord Joab, and all my lord’s servants, are encamped in the open field.” He should not have called Joab “my lord” in the presence of his king.

and he should not have called Joab “my lord” in the presence of his king.

Rava said:

If you should say

that the reason of the Elder Shammai is that

Shammai holds: Two verses that come as one do teach, and “

he is that man”

is not expounded,

so that Shammai holds the one who sent an agent for a transgression liable throughout the Torah and by human law—

Nevertheless,

the Elder Shammai concedes

that the Elder Shammai,

when one says to his agent: “

Go violate the forbidden sexual relation,”

and “

Eat the forbidden fat,”

[or he said to his agent: “Go and eat the forbidden fat,”]

he

the agent

is liable, and

whereas

the one who sent him is exempt,

since this agent derived benefit.

And because

we have not found anywhere in the entire Torah that this one

the agent

derives benefit

from the forbidden sexual relation and the forbidden fat,

and this one

the sender

becomes liable

through the benefit derived by his agent.

It was stated: Rav said: An agent

who was sent to betroth a woman or to repay money

becomes

he himself

a witness

to establish the betrothal that he performed, or to testify that it was effected, and to testify concerning repayment of the money.

And

the school of Rabbi Sheila

[in Rabbi Sheila’s academy]

said: An agent does not become a witness.

And we explain:

What is the reason of the school of Rabbi Sheila,

that an agent does not become a witness?

If you say,

suppose one might say:

Because he was not told

by the man who betrothed the woman, the woman who was betrothed, or the borrower—at the time he observed the event: “

Be a witness for me”—

This cannot be said, because

if that is so,

if

a man betrothed

a

woman in the presence of two people and did not say to them, ‘You are my witnesses,’

would the betrothal likewise not be valid

[would the betrothal really not take effect], merely because he did not tell them that they should be witnesses for him through whom the betrothal would be established!?

Rather,

this is the point of their disagreement:

Rav said: An agent becomes a witness,

because

we strengthen the matter

[we reinforce the testimony] when it is performed by the agent himself.

Whereas

the school of Rabbi Sheila said: An agent does not become a witness, since the Master said: “

A person’s agent is like himself,”

he is

the witness who is an agent

like his body,

and a person cannot testify concerning himself.

The following objection

is raised against Rav, who holds that an agent becomes a witness, from that which was taught in a beraita:

He said to three

men: “

Go and betroth for me

the

woman,”

one

became

an agent

to betroth her,

and two

of the others shall be

witnesses, the statement of Beit Shammai,

because they hold that only the agent who actually performs the agency cannot become a witness; but the other two, although he appointed them as agents, since they do not actually perform the agency, do become witnesses.

And Beit Hillel say: They are all agents,

that is, he appointed all of them to be agents,

and an agent does not become a witness,

even though in practice only one of them will perform the act of betrothal.

The Gemara explains that not only do the words of Beit Hillel contradict the statement of Rav, but even the words of Beit Shammai, as

Until here they disagree -

Beit Shammai with Beit Hillel -

only in the case of three

where not all of them actually carry out the agency,

but in the case of two

where one of them actually performs the kiddushin,

everyone agrees -

even according to Beit Shammai -

no

can both of them be witnesses, because the one who performed the kiddushin cannot become a witness; and this would contradict Rav, who holds that an agent can become a witness.

And we answer:

He [

Rav]

says in accordance with this tanna, as it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Natan says:

This is how Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed in this matter:

Beit Shammai say:

If he said to three, “Go and betroth the woman for me,” the

agent and one witness

of the two remaining can testify, because even an agent who actually carried out the agency can become a witness.

And Beit Hillel say: One agent and two witnesses,

meaning: one becomes the agent and is not fit to testify, because he himself carries out the agency, while the other two testify concerning the matter.

And we ask: What have we gained from this answer?!

But

is it so that

Rav follows Beit Shammai -

who hold that an agent can become a witness - does he indeed hold that way?

And we answer:

Reverse it -

according to Rav, the statements of Beit Shammai are those of Beit Hillel, and the statements of Beit Hillel are those of Beit Shammai, so Rav’s statement accords with Beit Hillel.

And Rav Aha, son of Rava, taught

the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Shila

the opposite,

and this is how he taught it:

Rav said: An agent cannot become a witness.

The scholars of Rabbi Shila’s academy say: An agent can become a witness.

And the Gemara concludes the halakha in practice:

And the halakha is: An agent can become a witness!

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said:

If he said to two: “

Go and betroth the woman for me,”

they are both his agents and both his witnesses,

because “an agent can become a witness,”

and so

the law

is in the case of divorce

if he sent a bill of divorce to his wife through two agents -