Kiddushin 43a — the Talmud in English

Let us derive from it

from me'ila for the entire Torah, that there is an agent for a transgression

?

And we answer: Even according to Beit Shammai, we cannot learn from me'ila

that Scripture expanded agency for a transgression in

me'ila, and

Scripture expanded agency for a transgression in

the slaughter and sale

of a thief, [as it will explain and proceed to explain,] to make him liable for four and five even when his agent slaughtered or sold —

two verses that come as one, and whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach!

And we explain: The verse in

me'ila

which teaches that there is an agent for a transgression is

that which we said:

“transgression, transgression,” from teruma.

But the verse which teaches agency for a transgression in

the slaughter and sale — what is it?

For

the verse says:

“When a man steals an ox or a sheep

and slaughters it or sells it,

five cattle he shall pay in place of the ox, and four sheep in place of the sheep.” Thus the Torah likened slaughter to sale, in order to teach:

Just as sale

his liability is

through another,

for sale is impossible without a seller and a buyer,

so too slaughter

he becomes liable when he slaughters

through another,

and this includes one who slaughters through an agent.

The academy of Rabbi Ishmael taught

another source for the slaughter and sale, by which the thief becomes liable through his agent:

Because it is stated:

“or” —

“and slaughters it or sells it”; it should have written “and slaughters it and sells it,”

to include

it comes

the agent.

The academy of Hezekiah taught

another source for this law:

Since the Torah said

“in place of”

twice — “five cattle he shall pay in place of the ox, and four sheep in place of the sheep” — and one of them is superfluous,

to include

it comes

the agent.

And we still ask:

This works for the one who says: Two verses that come as one do not teach,

for indeed we cannot learn from places in which the Torah revealed that there is an agent for a transgression that this is the law throughout the entire Torah; and the Mishna of “one who sends the fire,” which exempts the sender from a transgression, is thereby satisfactorily explained.

But according to the one who says:

Even two verses that come as one

do teach, what can be said!?

For we have to learn from these verses that there is an agent for a transgression, to make the sender liable for sending the fire by the hand of an intelligent person, and to exempt the agent

!?

The Merciful One revealed,

the Torah revealed that there is no agent for a transgression

in the case of slaughter outside

[sacrifices slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard], as it is stated [Leviticus 17:3]:

“Any man, any man of the house of Israel, who slaughters an ox or a sheep or a goat in the camp, or who slaughters it outside the camp, and does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer an offering to the Lord,

blood shall be reckoned to that man; he has shed blood,

and that man shall be cut off from among his people.” Therefore the Torah said: “to that man,” and it did not say merely “to a man,” in order to teach:

He

who slaughtered himself is made liable for karet,

but not his agent

who slaughtered is made liable for karet.

And we still ask:

We find concerning slaughter outside

that there is no agent for a transgression, but

throughout the entire Torah

— for example, in the case of one who sends the fire —

from where do we know

that there is no agent for a transgression?

And we answer:

He derives

agency for a transgression throughout the entire Torah

from slaughter outside.

And we object:

Rather than deriving from slaughter outside

that there is no agent for a transgression,

let us derive from these

[from me'ila, the taking of a deposit, and the slaughter and sale] that there is an agent for a transgression, according to the one who holds that two verses that come as one do teach.

And we answer: Behold,

the Merciful One again wrote

[the verse returned and said] concerning slaughter outside:

“And that man shall be cut off”,

which implies excluding him from karet when he slaughtered through an agent; and for slaughter outside itself, an additional verse is unnecessary, since it was already stated: “blood shall be reckoned to that man.” Rather:

If it is not —

the second exclusion in the case of slaughter outside —

a matter concerning itself,

that is, concerning slaughter outside itself,

assign it

this verse

as a matter concerning the entire Torah,

to teach that throughout the entire Torah there is no agent for a transgression.

The Gemara returns and asks:

And according to the one who says: Two verses that come as one

which teach that there is an agent for a transgression

do not teach

for the entire Torah that there is an agent for a transgression, while from reasoning we know that there is no agent for a transgression — if so:

These

two

“that man, that man”

what does he expound from them

[what do they come to teach us? For we already know that there is no agent for a transgression, and a special exclusion in slaughter outside is unnecessary]!?

And we explain the verses according to this view:

One

“that man”

excludes two who hold a knife and slaughter

the sacrifices outside, so that neither one of them is liable for karet.

And one

“that man” comes to teach:

He

is liable for karet; that is, when he is in his normal state and of sound mind, then he is liable for karet,

but not

when he is

coerced,

and likewise

he, and not

when he is

unwitting

on his own, and likewise

he, and not one misled

by others.

The Gemara again explains the view of the opposing authority:

But the other

And the other

who holds that two verses that come as one do teach, and needed “that man, that man” to teach that there is no agency for a transgression in slaughter outside and throughout the entire Torah — from where does he derive the exclusion of all these from karet

?

From “he, that man,”

that is, it should have written: “blood shall be reckoned to a man, he,” and likewise, “and that man shall be cut off, he”; but the Torah said “that man” in both verses. Thus you have two teachings: to exclude two holding the knife, and to exclude the coerced, the unwitting, and the one who was misled.

The Gemara returns and explains the view of the disputant:

And the other

— the tanna who holds that two verses that come as one do not teach, who learned from the essential “that man” to exclude two holding the knife, and likewise the coerced, the unwitting, and the one who was misled — if so, what does he expound from the additional heh in the two verses

?

This tanna

does not expound “he, that man.”

And once it has been explained that there is no agent for a transgression, the following difficulty arises:

But that which was taught

in a beraita:

One who says to his agent, “Go and kill a person,” he

the agent

is liable, and

whereas

his sender is exempt.

The Elder Shammai says in the name of the prophet Haggai:

His sender is liable,

and because

it is stated

concerning David regarding Uriah: “And it came to pass in the morning that David wrote a letter to Joab and sent it by the hand of Uriah. And he wrote in the letter, saying: Set Uriah opposite the strongest battle, and withdraw from behind him, so that he will be struck and die” [II Samuel 11:14–15]:

“Him”

[Uriah the Hittite]

you killed by the sword of the children of Ammon,

so the verse attributed Uriah’s killing in the war of the children of Ammon to David.

And the difficulty arises:

What is the reason of the Elder Shammai,

who holds that there is an agent for a transgression? For from the verses we cannot learn this, since “two verses that come as one do not teach”; and even if they teach, one should learn from the exclusion in slaughter outside; and from reasoning we should say: When the words of the Master and the words of the student conflict, whose words does one obey

!?

We answer:

He holds,

the Elder Shammai,

that two verses that come as one do teach, and we learned from me'ila and the slaughter and sale that throughout the entire Torah as well there is an agent for a transgression.

And as for the repetition of the expression “that man,” which the Torah said concerning slaughter outside, the Elder Shammai holds that it does not come to exclude the agent, neither in slaughter outside itself nor throughout the entire Torah; rather, it exempts two holding the knife, and exempts the coerced, the unwitting, and the one who was misled

; and

the Elder Shammai

“he, that man”

does not expound,

so that we should learn these laws [or that there is no agent for a transgression] from this superfluity.

And if you wish, say: In truth, he expounds

“he, that man,” and even according to his view one must learn that in slaughter outside there is no agent for a transgression, and likewise throughout the entire Torah; and

what

“liable”

does the Elder Shammai mean when he says to his agent, “Go and kill a person

” —

liable in the laws of Heaven

alone.

And we wonder:

By implication,

the first tanna holds: He is exempt even according to the laws of Heaven, one who says to his fellow, “Go and kill a person.” For otherwise, in what did the first tanna disagree with Beit Shammai? Are we to say that the first tanna exempts him even according to the laws of Heaven

!?

Rather, a great law and a lesser law are between them,

that is: Certainly, according to the first tanna as well, the sender is liable according to the laws of Heaven; rather, they disagree whether he is punished with a great punishment like the murderer himself, or with only a lesser punishment, merely as one who causes death. According to the Elder Shammai, he is punished with a great punishment, whereas according to the first tanna, he is punished only with a lesser punishment.

And if you wish, say

to explain the view of the Elder Shammai: Shammai said that the sender is liable only in the case of murder, and because

there it is different,

in the case of murder,

the Merciful One revealed

concerning David and Uriah:

“Him you killed by the sword of the children of Ammon.”

And

we explain the reason of

the other,

that is, the first tanna who disagrees with the Elder Shammai: Because he holds that the Merciful One said this:

Behold for you

— the killing of Uriah —

like the sword of the children of Ammon

who killed the Israelites.

Just as you are not punished for the sword of the children of Ammon,

for they went out to war with them lawfully,

so too you are not punished for Uriah the Hittite,

even according to the laws of Heaven, although you caused him to die.

And

what is the reason

that David is not punished for him, at any rate, as one who causes death to his fellow? Because Uriah

was rebellious

against the kingship

of David,

as he said to him,

Uriah said to David:

“And my lord Joab, and all my lord’s servants, are encamped in the open field,”

and he should not have called Joab “my lord” in the presence of his king.

Rava said:

If you should conclude

concerning the reason of the Elder Shammai, that it is because

Shammai holds: Two verses that come as one do teach, and

“he, that man”

he does not expound,

and it follows that Shammai makes one who sends an agent for a transgression liable throughout the entire Torah and in human courts —

Nevertheless,

Shammai admits

the Elder Shammai

in the case of one who says to his agent:

“Go and have forbidden intercourse with the naked woman,”

and

“Eat the forbidden fat,”

[or he said to his agent: “Go and eat the forbidden fat”],

he

— the agent —

is liable, and

whereas

his sender is exempt,

since this agent benefited.

And because

we have not found throughout the entire Torah this: this one

— the agent —

benefited

from the forbidden woman and the forbidden fat,

and this one

— the sender —

becomes liable

through the benefit of his agent.

It was stated: Rav said: An agent

who was sent to betroth a woman or to repay money

becomes

himself

a witness

to establish the betrothal that he performed, or to testify concerning its establishment, and to testify concerning repayment of the money.

And

the academy of Rabbi Shila

[in Rabbi Shila’s academy]

say: An agent does not become a witness.

And we explain:

What is the reason of the academy of Rabbi Shila,

that an agent does not become a witness?

If you say,

that perhaps you will say:

Because he did not say to him

— the betrothed man and the betrothed woman, or the borrower — at the time he saw the testimony:

“Be a witness for me” —

This cannot be said, for

if that is so,

if

a man betrothed

a

woman before two, and did not say to them, “You are my witnesses,”

would the betrothal indeed not be valid

[and would the betrothal not take effect], because he did not say to them: Be witnesses for us, so that the betrothal will be established through you

!? Rather,

this is what they disagree about:

Rav said: An agent becomes a witness,

because

we strengthen the matter

[we strengthen the testimony] when it is performed by the agent himself.

Whereas

the academy of Rabbi Shila say: An agent does not become a witness, since the Master said:

“A person’s agent is like himself,”

he is

the witness who is an agent

like his body

of the sender, and a person cannot be a witness for himself.

An objection was raised

against Rav, who holds that an agent becomes a witness, from that which was taught:

He said to three

men:

“Go and betroth for me

the

woman,”

one

becomes

an agent

to betroth her,

and two

the others will be

witnesses, the words of Beit Shammai,

because they hold: Only the agent who actually performs the agency does not become a witness, but the other two, although he appointed them as agents, since they do not actually perform the agency, become witnesses.

And Beit Hillel say: They are all agents,

that is, he appointed all of them to be agents,

and an agent does not become a witness,

even though in practice only one of them will perform the act of betrothal.

The Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, explains that the contradiction to Rav’s statement comes not only from the words of the House of Hillel, but even from the words of the House of Shammai, as

They disagree only -

the House of Shammai with the House of Hillel -

in the case of three

where not all of them actually carry out the agency,

but in the case of two

where one of them actually performs the betrothal,

everyone agrees -

even according to the House of Shammai -

they cannot

both serve as witnesses, because the one who performed the betrothal cannot become a witness. This would therefore be a difficulty for Rav, who holds that an agent can become a witness.

And we answer:

he

[Rav]

says in accordance with this tanna, as it was taught: Rabbi Natan says:

This is how the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disputed the matter:

The House of Shammai say:

If he said to three people, “Go and betroth the woman for me,”

the agent and one witness

from the two remaining people may testify, because even an agent who actually carried out the agency can become a witness.

And the House of Hillel say: an agent and two witnesses,

meaning: one becomes the agent and is not fit to serve as a witness, because he himself carries out the agency, while the other two testify about the matter.

And we ask: What have we accomplished with this answer!?

But

is it so that

Rav follows the House of Shammai -

that is, does he hold the view that an agent can become a witness!?

And we answer:

Reverse it -

according to Rav, reverse the words of the House of Shammai with those of the House of Hillel, and the words of the House of Hillel with those of the House of Shammai. Rav’s statement will then accord with the opinion of the House of Hillel.

And Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, taught -

the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Sheila -

the reverse,

and he taught it as follows:

Rav said: An agent cannot become a witness.

The scholars of Rabbi Sheila’s academy said: An agent can become a witness.

And the Gemara rules the law in practice:

And the halakha is: An agent can become a witness!

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman:

If he said to two people: “

Go and betroth the woman for me,”

they themselves are his agents, and they themselves are his witnesses,

because “an agent can become a witness,”

and likewise

the law

applies to divorce

if he sent a bill of divorce to his wife through two people -