Kiddushin 34b — the Talmud in English

Although women are exempt from time-bound mitzvot, nevertheless

it was necessary,

the verse had to state “the citizen” concerning sukka, in order to explicitly exclude women, because

it might enter your mind,

you might have thought to say as follows:

Let us derive

that women are obligated in the mitzva of sukka by means of a

fifteenth

of Tishrei,

fifteenth

of Nisan,

from the Festival of Matzot.

Just as there,

in the mitzva of eating matza,

women are obligated

to eat matza on the first night [because anyone who is included in the prohibition “do not eat leaven” is included in the command “rise and eat matza”],

so too here,

in sukka,

women are obligated.

Therefore

it was necessary,

the verse had to exclude them, and for this reason it says, “the citizen.”

And we raise an objection:

But

we find the positive mitzva of

appearing,

to appear during the three Pilgrimage Festivals before the Lord in the Temple with an offering, as it is written: “Three times in the year every one of your males shall appear before the Lord God, the Master,”

which is a time-bound positive mitzva,

because this mitzva applies only at three particular times of the year, on Passover, Shavuot, and Sukkot,

and

nevertheless,

the reason

only because

the Merciful One wrote

there

“your males”

did we learn to exclude and

to exclude

the

women.

Were it not so

but for this exclusion, the law would be that

women are obligated!

And it is proven that we do not derive from tefillin regarding all time-bound positive mitzvot, from which women are exempt. For the mitzva of appearing is a time-bound positive mitzva, and nevertheless it requires a special derivation to exclude women from it.

And we answer: It cannot be proven from the fact that there is a special derivation in the mitzva of appearing to exclude women that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot, since in the mitzva of appearing

it was necessary

to have a special derivation.

For without the special derivation to exclude women,

it might enter your mind

that is, we would have thought to say,

let us derive

the law of the mitzva of appearing by means of a gzera shava,

“appearing,” “appearing,” from

the mitzva of

“Hakhel,”

in which women are obligated, since it is written: “When all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God, in the place that He will choose, you shall read this Torah before all Israel, in their hearing.” Therefore, in the mitzva of appearing, the Torah had to make known a special derivation to exclude women from this mitzva.

But regarding the other time-bound positive mitzvot, we derive from tefillin that women are exempt from them.

And we raise an objection to the Mishna:

And while we derive

that the Mishna learns by means of a binyan av

from tefillin for exemption,

to exempt women from time-bound positive mitzvot,

let us derive

by a binyan av

from

the mitzva of

joy

on the three Pilgrimage Festivals, concerning which it is written: “And you shall rejoice in your Festival, you, and your son, and your daughter”—and just as we find regarding the mitzva of joy, which is a time-bound positive mitzva, that women are obligated in it, so too all time-bound positive mitzvot should be derived from there

and come!

Abaye said:

We cannot learn from the mitzva of joy that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot, since regarding the mitzva of joy, the obligation of joy is not imposed upon her, but

a woman—

her husband makes her rejoice,

as the reading of the verse is “and you shall gladden,” and if so, the mitzva belongs to the husband and not to the woman .

And we raise an objection: It is mentioned in the verse that there is also an obligation of joy for a widow, who has no husband, as it is written: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God, you and your son and your daughter and your male slave and your female slave and the Levite who is within your gates and the convert and the orphan

and the widow

who are among you, in the place that the Lord your God will choose to cause His Name to dwell there.” And if we say that the obligation of joy is not upon the woman but upon the husband, who is obligated to make her rejoice,

a widow—what can be said?

How can this be explained regarding a widow who has no husband?

And we answer: The verse is speaking

of

a poor widow who

resides with him,

for the master of the house has an obligation to make her rejoice from his own resources, with food, drink, and clothing, on the three Pilgrimage Festivals .

And we raise an objection:

Let us derive

the rule for all time-bound positive mitzvot

from

the mitzva of

“Hakhel,”

which is a time-bound positive mitzva and women are obligated in it, since this mitzva applies once every seven years, at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year.

And we answer: We do not derive from the mitzva of “Hakhel”

because there was

the mitzva of eating

matza,

which is a time-bound positive mitzva on the fifteenth of Nisan, and there is a derivation that women are obligated in it [as explained in Tractate Pesachim 43b],

and

the mitzva of

Hakhel

also has a special derivation that women are obligated in it. If so, they are

two verses that come as one

[teaching us one matter], that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot.

And whenever there are two verses that come as one, they do not teach.

For the fact that the Torah repeated itself twice to explain the same law is a sign that the derivations were not written in order to teach it in other places.

For if one of the derivations had been written in order to teach it in other places, the Torah would not have needed to repeat and teach an additional derivation for the same law. Therefore, we do not derive from the mitzva of Hakhel and the mitzva of eating matza that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot; rather, we derive from tefillin that women are exempt from it.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if the reason that we do not derive from the mitzva of Hakhel is that they are two verses that come as one, and they do not teach in other places, then how do we derive from tefillin? After all, the mitzva of

tefillin and

the mitzva of

appearing as well,

they are

two verses that come as one, and do not teach!

And we answer: The reason that the Torah explained both in the mitzva of tefillin and in the mitzva of appearing that women are exempt is not because they do not teach, but because each of the mitzvot has a reason that makes it impossible to learn one from the other, and both mitzvot

are necessary

to state in them that women are exempt.

Because

if the Merciful One had written

only concerning the mitzva of

tefillin, and had not written

concerning the mitzva of

appearing

that women are exempt,

we would have thought: let us derive

by means of a gzera shava

“appearing,” “appearing,” from Hakhel

that women are obligated; therefore, the Torah explained regarding the mitzva of appearing that women are exempt.

And if the Merciful One had written

only concerning the mitzva of

appearing, and had not written

concerning the mitzva of

tefillin

that women are exempt,

we would have thought: I will compare tefillin to mezuzah

to obligate women in the mitzva of tefillin , for after the passage of tefillin it is stated: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts,” and we would have said: Just as regarding the mitzva of mezuzah women are obligated, so too regarding tefillin women are obligated.

Therefore

it is necessary

for the Torah to explain both in the mitzva of appearing and in the mitzva of tefillin that women are exempt.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if the mitzva of tefillin and the mitzva of appearing are not considered two verses that come as one, because in both there is a reason that required the verse to explain that women are exempt, then the mitzva of eating

matza and

the mitzva of

Hakhel as well,

have a reason that

makes it necessary

to explain in them that women are obligated, and it is impossible to learn from one to the other. If so, they are not two verses that come as one, and if so, it is possible to derive from the mitzva of Hakhel regarding all time-bound positive mitzvot that women are obligated.

And we examine this:

For what purpose are they necessary,

[for what purpose was it necessary] to explain both regarding the mitzva of Hakhel and regarding the mitzva of eating matza that women are obligated, and why can we not learn from one mitzva to the other by a binyan av, together with all the other time-bound positive mitzvot?!

Granted, if the Merciful One had written

only concerning the mitzva of

Hakhel, and had not written

regarding the mitzva of eating

matza

that women are obligated, there is a rationale for saying that we do not learn the mitzva of eating matza from the mitzva of Hakhel by a binyan av, because

we would have thought: let us derive

the mitzva of eating matza by means of a gzera shava,

“fifteenth

—fifteenth” from the Festival of Sukkot,

just as there women are exempt, since it is written “the citizen” to exclude women, so too regarding the mitzva of eating matza women are exempt. For this reason it is necessary to explain regarding the mitzva of eating matza that women are obligated.

But

why was it necessary for the verse to explain also regarding the mitzva of Hakhel that women are obligated? It would have been sufficient if

the Merciful One had written

only concerning eating

matza, and had not needed

concerning

Hakhel. And I would have said

that women are obligated in the mitzva of Hakhel by logical reasoning: If even

children

[minors]

are obligated

in the mitzva of Hakhel, since it is written concerning it “and the children” [Deuteronomy 31:12],

women—does it not follow all the more so

that they are obligated ?

Therefore

the Gemara concludes: Since it was also explained regarding the mitzva of Hakhel that women are obligated,

they are two verses that come as one, and they do not teach.

And we raise an objection: What we answered—that we do not derive from the mitzva of eating matza and from the mitzva of Hakhel that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot, because they are two verses that come as one and do not teach—

that is satisfactory

only

according to the one who says

that

they do not teach.

But according to the one who says

that even two verses that come as one

teach

, what can be said

[what is possible to say], why do we not derive from there regarding all time-bound positive mitzvot that women are obligated?

Furthermore

[there is another] difficulty:

The positive mitzvot that are not time-bound—women are obligated; from where do we know this?

[from where do we know] ?

The Gemara first answers the second question: From where do we know that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound?

Because

we derive

[we learn]

from reverence,

as it is stated: “A man shall revere his mother and his father,” and there is a derivation there that women are also obligated in it, since “you shall revere” is written in the plural, to include the woman. And from there we learn by a binyan av regarding the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound:

Just as regarding reverence—

women are obligated, so too regarding every positive mitzva that is not time-bound—

women are obligated.

And we raise an objection:

Let us derive from Torah study,

which is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, and women are exempt from it, as it is stated: “And you shall teach them to your sons”—and not to your daughters; and let us derive from there by a binyan av regarding the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, that women are exempt.

And we answer:

Because it was

the mitzva of

Torah study and

the mitzva of

procreation,

which is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, and women are exempt from them [as it is stated: “And subdue it,” and only a man, whose way is to subdue, is included in “be fruitful and multiply”],

two verses that come as one. And whenever there are two verses that come as one—

they do not teach.

Therefore, we do not learn from there by a binyan av regarding the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound that women are exempt; rather, we learn by a binyan av from the mitzva of reverence, in which women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound.