Kiddushin 34b (לד:) — the Talmud in English

Although women are exempt from time-bound mitzvot, nevertheless

it was necessary;

the verse had to state “the citizen” with regard to sukka, explicitly excluding women, because

it might enter your mind

to say as follows:

Let us derive

that women are obligated in the mitzva of sukka by means of a

“fifteenth”

[of Tishrei]

“fifteenth”

[of Nisan]

gezerah shavah from the festival of matzot.

Just as there,

with regard to the mitzva of eating matza,

women are obligated

to eat matza on the first night [as anyone included in the prohibition against eating leaven is included in the command to rise and eat matza],

so too here,

with regard to sukka,

women are obligated.

Therefore

it was necessary;

the verse had to exclude them, and that is why it says “the citizen.”

And we challenge this:

But

we find a positive mitzva of

appearing,

to appear before God in the Temple with an offering on the three pilgrimage festivals, as it is written [Exodus 23:17]: “Three times in the year every male of yours shall appear before the Lord, the Master,”

which is a time-bound positive mitzva,

since this mitzva applies only at three specific times of the year—on Passover, Shavuot, and Sukkot—

and

nevertheless,

the reason

[it is only because]

the Merciful One wrote

[there]

“every male of yours”

that we learn to exclude and

remove

the

women.

If not for this,

[but without this exclusion], the law would be that

women are obligated!

This proves that the rule that women are exempt from time-bound positive mitzvot is not derived from tefillin for all such mitzvot. For the mitzva of appearing is a time-bound positive mitzva, and nevertheless a special derivation is required there to exclude women.

And we answer: It cannot be proven that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot from the fact that there is a special derivation in the mitzva of appearing to exclude women, because with regard to the mitzva of appearing

it was necessary

to have a special derivation.

For without the special derivation excluding women,

it might enter your mind

[we would have thought] that

we should derive

[the law of] the mitzva of appearing by means of a gezerah shavah,

“appearing,” “appearing,” from

the mitzva of

“assembly,”

in which women are obligated, as it is written [Deuteronomy 31:11]: “When all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God, in the place that He will choose, you shall read this Torah before all Israel, in their hearing.” Therefore, with regard to the mitzva of appearing, the Torah must teach us by a special derivation to exclude women from this mitzva.

But with regard to other time-bound positive mitzvot, we derive from tefillin that women are exempt.

And we challenge the Mishna:

And while the Mishna derives

[the ruling] by means of a binyan av

from tefillin for exemption,

to exempt women from time-bound positive mitzvot,

let us derive

[it] by means of a binyan av

from

the mitzva of

rejoicing

on the three pilgrimage festivals, as it is written: “And you shall rejoice on your festival, you, your son, and your daughter.” Just as we find with regard to the mitzva of rejoicing, which is a time-bound positive mitzva, that women are obligated in it, so too all time-bound positive mitzvot should be derived from there

and come along with it!

Abaye said:

It cannot be derived from the mitzva of rejoicing that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot, because with regard to the mitzva of rejoicing, the obligation to rejoice is not imposed upon her; rather,

a woman—

her husband makes her rejoice,

as the verse is read “and you shall gladden,” in the causative form. If so, the mitzva belongs to the husband and not to the woman .

And we challenge this: The verse mentions that there is also an obligation of rejoicing for a widow, who has no husband, as it is written [Deuteronomy 16:11]: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God, you and your son and your daughter and your male slave and your female slave and the Levite who is in your gates and the stranger and the orphan

and the widow

who are among you, in the place that the Lord your God will choose to cause His Name to rest there.” And if we say that the obligation of rejoicing does not rest upon the woman but upon the husband, who is obligated to make her rejoice,

with regard to a widow, what can be said

how can this be explained with regard to a widow who has no husband?

And we answer: The verse is speaking

about

a poor widow

who resides with him,

meaning that the head of the household is obligated to make her rejoice from his own resources, with food, drink, and clothing on the three pilgrimage festivals .

And we challenge this:

Let us derive

[the law] for all time-bound positive mitzvot

from

the mitzva of

“assembly,”

which is a time-bound positive mitzva and in which women are obligated. This mitzva takes place once every seven years, at the conclusion of the Sabbatical year.

And we answer: We do not derive from the mitzva of “assembly”

because it is

the mitzva of eating

matza,

which is a time-bound positive mitzva on the fifteenth of Nisan, and there is a derivation that women are obligated in it [as explained in tractate Pesachim 43b],

and

the mitzva of

assembly

also has a special derivation that women are obligated in it. If so, they are

two verses that come as one

[teaching us one matter]: that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot.

And whenever there are two verses that come as one, they do not teach.

For the fact that the Torah repeated itself and explicitly stated the same law twice is an indication that these derivations were not written to teach the rule in other contexts.

For if one of the derivations had been written in order to teach the rule in other contexts, the Torah would not have needed to repeat and provide an additional derivation for the same law. Therefore, we do not derive from the mitzva of assembly and the mitzva of eating matza that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot; rather, we derive from tefillin that women are exempt from it.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if the reason that we do not derive from the mitzvot of assembly and eating matza is that they are two verses that come as one and therefore do not teach laws for other contexts, then how do we derive from tefillin? After all, the mitzva of

tefillin and

the mitzva of

appearing as well

are

two verses that come as one, and they do not teach!

And we answer: The reason that the Torah specified, both with regard to the mitzva of tefillin and with regard to the mitzva of appearing, that women are exempt is not that they do not teach laws for other contexts. Rather, each mitzva has a reason why it was impossible to derive the other from it, and both mitzvot

were necessary

to state that women are exempt.

Because

if the Merciful One had written

only with regard to the mitzva of

tefillin, and had not written

with regard to the mitzva of

appearing

that women are exempt,

it might have entered our minds to derive

[it] by means of a gezerah shavah,

“appearing,” “appearing,” from assembly, in which women are obligated. Therefore, the Torah specified with regard to the mitzva of appearing that women are exempt.

that women are obligated; therefore, the Torah explained regarding the mitzva of appearing that women are exempt.

And if the Merciful One had written

only with regard to the mitzva of

appearing, and had not written

with regard to the mitzva of

tefillin

that women are exempt,

it might have entered our minds to compare tefillin to mezuzah,

to obligate women in the mitzva of tefillin , for after the passage of tefillin it is stated: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts,” and we would have said: Just as women are obligated in the mitzva of mezuzah, so too women are obligated in tefillin.

Therefore

it was necessary

for the Torah to specify, both with regard to the mitzva of appearing and with regard to the mitzva of tefillin, that women are exempt.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if the mitzva of tefillin and the mitzva of appearing are not considered two verses that come as one, because in both cases there is a reason why the verse had to specify that women are exempt, then the mitzva of eating

matza and

the mitzva of

assembly as well

have a reason why they

were necessary

to specify that women are obligated in them, and it is impossible to derive one from the other. If so, they are not two verses that come as one, and therefore it is possible to derive from the mitzva of assembly that women are obligated in all time-bound positive mitzvot.

And we examine this:

For what purpose were they necessary

[why was it necessary] to specify both with regard to the mitzva of assembly and with regard to the mitzva of eating matza that women are obligated, and why can we not derive one mitzva from the other by means of a binyan av, along with all other time-bound positive mitzvot?!

Granted, if the Merciful One had written

only with regard to the mitzva of

assembly, and had not written

with regard to the mitzva of eating

matza

that women are obligated, there would be reason to say that the mitzva of eating matza should not be derived from the mitzva of assembly by means of a binyan av, because

it might have entered our minds to derive

[the mitzva of eating matza] by means of a gezerah shavah,

“fifteenth”—

“fifteenth” from the festival of Sukkot. Just as there women are exempt, since it is written “the citizen,” to exclude women, so too with regard to the mitzva of eating matza women would be exempt. For this reason, it was necessary to specify with regard to the mitzva of eating matza that women are obligated.

just as there women are exempt, since it is written “the citizen” to exclude women, so too regarding the mitzva of eating matza women are exempt. For this reason it is necessary to explain regarding the mitzva of eating matza that women are obligated.

But

why was it necessary for the verse to specify also with regard to the mitzva of assembly that women are obligated? It would have been sufficient if

the Merciful One had written

only with regard to eating

matza, and had not needed

to write with regard to

assembly. And I would have said

[we would have reasoned] that women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly: For if even

minors

[young children]

are obligated

in the mitzva of assembly, as it is written concerning it “and the children” [Deuteronomy 31:12],

are women not certainly

obligated ?

Therefore

the Gemara concludes: Since it was also specified with regard to the mitzva of assembly that women are obligated,

they are two verses that come as one, and they do not teach.

And we challenge this: What we answered—that we do not derive from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of assembly that women are obligated in time-bound positive mitzvot, because they are two verses that come as one and do not teach—

is satisfactory

as an answer only

according to the one who says

that

they do not teach.

But according to the one who says

that even two verses that come as one

do teach

, what can be said

[what can we say]? Why do we not derive from them that women are obligated in all time-bound positive mitzvot?

Furthermore

[there is another difficulty]:

How do we know that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound

[from where do we know this] ?

The Gemara first answers the second question: From where do we know that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound?

Because

we derive

[the rule]

from reverence,

as it is stated: “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” and there is a derivation that women are also obligated in it, since the verse says “you shall fear” in the plural, thereby including a woman. From there we derive by means of a binyan av with regard to the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound:

Just as with regard to reverence—

women are obligated, so too with regard to every positive mitzva that is not time-bound—

women are obligated.

And we challenge this:

Let us derive from Torah study,

which is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, yet women are exempt, as it is stated: “And you shall teach them to your sons”—and not to your daughters. Let us derive from there by means of a binyan av that women are exempt from other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound.

And we answer:

Because there are

the mitzva of

Torah study and

the mitzva of

procreation,

which is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, and women are exempt from them [as it is stated: “And conquer it,” and only a man, whose way it is to conquer, is included in “Be fruitful and multiply”],

two verses that come as one. And whenever there are two verses that come as one—

they do not teach.

Therefore, we do not derive from there by means of a binyan av that women are exempt from other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound. Rather, we derive by means of a binyan av from the mitzva of reverence, in which women are obligated, that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound.