Kiddushin 35a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge it:

And according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, who says: “For both of them,”

both the man and the woman,

he says: “And God blessed them, be fruitful and multiply”

Genesis 1, ,

and the woman too is obligated in the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying,

what is there to say?

Why do we not learn from the mitzva of Torah study to the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound that women are exempt, when it is only with regard to the mitzva of Torah study that there is a teaching that women are exempt, and here there are not two verses that come as one, from which one does not derive?

And we answer: According to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, one does not learn from the mitzva of Torah study to the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound that women are exempt,

because

with regard to the mitzva of redemption of the firstborn son as well there is a teaching that women are exempt,

for Torah study and redemption of the firstborn son are two verses that come as one, and from any two verses that come as one one does not derive.

And we challenge it:

And according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,

who holds that with regard to procreation, which is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, it was specified in it that women are obligated,

also

there is a difficulty: How do we learn from the mitzva of reverence to the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound that women are obligated?

Let

the mitzvot of

procreation and

the mitzva of

reverence be two verses that come as one, and one does not derive from them!

And we answer: According to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, the fact that the Torah repeated and specified with regard to these two mitzvot that women are obligated is not because one does not derive from two verses that come as one, but because in each of the mitzvot there is a rationale that makes it impossible to learn it from the other, and with regard to both mitzvot

it is necessary

to specify that women are obligated in them.

Because

if the Merciful One had written

only with regard to the mitzva of

reverence and had not written

with regard to the mitzva of

procreation

that women are obligated,

I would have said

we would have said: Since with regard to the mitzva of procreation—the expression

“and conquer it” the Merciful One said

the verse says—and a man’s way is to conquer the land in war, whereas it is not a woman’s way to conquer, if so, we would have thought to say that only

a man, whose way is to conquer—

yes

is obligated in the mitzva of procreation, but

a woman, whose way is not to conquer—

no,

she is not obligated, because anyone who is not included in “and conquer it” is not included in the mitzva of “be fruitful and multiply.” Therefore, the Torah needed to repeat and specify with regard to the mitzva of procreation that women are obligated in it.

And if He had written

the Merciful One only with regard to the mitzva of

procreation and had not written

with regard to the mitzva of

reverence

that a woman is obligated,

I would have said

we would have said that only

a man, whose ability is in his hand to act

and to honor his father, since no other person’s authority is over him—

yes

he is obligated in the mitzva of reverence, but

a woman, whose ability is not in her hand to act

after she marries, since she is under her husband’s authority—

no,

she is not obligated in the mitzva of reverence.

And since

a married woman

does not have the ability in her hand to act,

we would have thought to say that she

would not be obligated at all,

even while she is unmarried.

Because of this

it is necessary.

The Torah needed to specify both with regard to the mitzva of procreation and with regard to the mitzva of reverence that women are obligated; therefore, they are not two verses that come as one from which one does not derive.

And we challenge it [here too, like the challenge raised above]: The answer that we gave—that one does not learn from Torah study, in which women are exempt, that women are exempt from positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, because it was also stated with regard to redemption of the firstborn son, and they are two verses that come as one from which one does not derive—

that works

this answer is good only

according to the one who says

who holds that

two verses that come as one do not teach.

But according to the one who says

who holds that even two verses that come as one

teach, what is there to say

what can be said? Why do we not learn from Torah study to all positive mitzvot that are not time-bound that women are exempt?

In summary:

The challenge of the one who raises the challenge throughout the entire sugya is as follows: With regard to positive mitzvot that are time-bound, we found in the Torah two mitzvot in which women are obligated: the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel [Abaye excluded the mitzva of rejoicing from the category of mitzvot in which women are obligated]. And since there is no necessity for the fact that it was stated with regard to hakhel that women are obligated, through this they become two verses that come as one. And to exempt women from positive mitzvot that are time-bound, we found three mitzvot: sukka, tefillin, and the mitzva of appearing [at the Temple]. And since there is a necessity in all three of them, they do not come as one. Therefore, according to the one who holds that two verses that come as one do not teach, there is no difficulty, since from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel, in which women are obligated, one does not derive, and one learns from the mitzvot in which women are exempt, since they do not come as one. But the difficulty remains according to the one who says that two verses that come as one teach: Let us learn from the mitzva of eating matza and from the mitzva of hakhel to obligate women in positive mitzvot that are time-bound.

The same challenge exists with regard to positive mitzvot that are not time-bound: We found two mitzvot in which women are exempt: Torah study and redemption of the firstborn son [and procreation according to the Rabbis]. And with regard to the mitzva of redemption of the firstborn son there is no necessity explaining why it was stated in it that women are exempt, and through this they become two verses that come as one. And we found three mitzvot in which women are obligated: reverence, mezuzah [and procreation according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka]. And since there is a necessity in all of them, they do not come as one. Therefore, according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach, there is no difficulty, since one cannot learn from Torah study and redemption of the firstborn son to exempt women from positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, and one learns from the mitzvot in which women were made obligated, since they do not come as one. But according to the one who says that they teach, the difficulty remains: Let us learn from Torah study and redemption of the firstborn son that women are exempt.

And we answer:

Rava said: The people of Pappuna,

the students who live in Pappuna,

know the reason for this matter

that women are exempt from positive mitzvot that are time-bound and obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound.

And who is he

who knows the reason for the matter and lives in Pappuna?

Rav Aha bar Yaakov

from Pappuna.

And the reason for the matter is that

the verse says:

Exodus 13:9,

“And it shall be for you as a sign upon your hand and as a remembrance between your eyes, so that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth,”

behold,

the entire Torah was compared to tefillin,

and when there is an analogy and a binyan av, the teaching of the analogy is preferable. Therefore, we do not learn positive mitzvot that are time-bound by a binyan av from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel, and likewise we do not learn positive mitzvot that are not time-bound by a binyan av from Torah study and redemption of the firstborn son; rather, we learn from the analogy through which the entire Torah was compared to tefillin:

Just as tefillin—

are a positive mitzva that is time-bound and women are exempt, so too, every positive mitzva that is time-bound—

women are exempt.

And from the fact that with regard to positive mitzvot that are time-bound the Torah needed to write an analogy that

women are exempt, it follows

that we learn

that with regard to positive mitzvot that are not time-bound women are obligated.

There is a dispute in tractate Eruvin [95b] whether the mitzva of tefillin is a positive mitzva that is time-bound or a positive mitzva that is not time-bound.

And we challenge it:

That works

the explanation that we gave is good only

according to the one who says

who holds that the mitzva of

tefillin

is

a positive mitzva that is time-bound,

and since the entire Torah was compared to tefillin, we learn from tefillin to every positive mitzva that is time-bound that women are exempt.

But according to the one who says

who holds that the mitzva of

tefillin

is

a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, what is there to say

what can be said? How is it possible to learn from the analogy—for from the analogy the opposite is learned, that women are exempt from every positive mitzva that is not time-bound?

And we answer:

Who is the one from whom you hear that he says

who is the one who holds, in tractate Eruvin, that

tefillin

is

a positive mitzva that is not time-bound?

Rabbi Meir!

And according to Rabbi Meir we do not need the analogy; rather, we learn by a binyan av from the mitzva of appearing [at the Temple], which is a positive mitzva that is time-bound and women are exempt from it. And that which we challenged above—that we should learn from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel, in which women are obligated—is not difficult according to Rabbi Meir, because:

And he holds

Rabbi Meir, that they are

two verses that come as one. And

according to Rabbi Meir,

any two verses that come as one do not teach.

And we challenge it:

And according to Rabbi Judah, who says

in Sanhedrin [67b]:

two verses that come as one teach, and

he also said in Eruvin [96b] that

tefillin

is

a positive mitzva that is not time-bound,

what is there to say?

From where, according to him, will we learn with regard to positive mitzvot that are time-bound that women are exempt? For it is impossible to learn by a binyan av from the mitzva of appearing [at the Temple], that women are exempt from positive mitzvot that are time-bound, since there are two verses—the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel—which are positive mitzvot that are time-bound, and women are obligated in them. And it is also impossible to say that the entire Torah was compared to tefillin, from which women are exempt, since according to him it is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, and throughout the entire Torah women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound.

And we answer: According to Rabbi Judah, we learn by a binyan av from the mitzva of appearing [at the Temple], which is a positive mitzva that is time-bound, and women are exempt from it, and we do not learn from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel, in which women are obligated,

because

we do not hold like Abaye above, who says that a woman has an obligation of rejoicing only through her husband making her rejoice; rather, we hold that a woman is commanded in the mitzva of rejoicing on the festival,

for there were

the mitzva of eating

matza

and the mitzva of

rejoicing

on the festival

and

the mitzva of

hakhel—three verses that come as one, and with regard to three verses that come as one

even Rabbi Judah agrees that

one does not derive.

We learned in the Mishna:

And with regard to every negative mitzva,

whether it is time-bound or whether it is not time-bound, both men and women are obligated.

And we inquire concerning it:

From where are these matters derived

from where do we learn these matters?

Rav Judah said in the name of Rav, and likewise the school of Rabbi

Ishmael taught: The verse says

Numbers 5:6:

“Whether a man or a woman, when they commit any sin of man.” The verse compared a woman to a man with regard to all punishments in the Torah,

and with regard to a negative mitzva there is the punishment of lashes. If so, a woman was compared to a man with regard to negative mitzvot, so that both of them are obligated both in negative mitzvot that are time-bound and in negative mitzvot that are not time-bound.

In connection with this, since the Gemara brought a derivation concerning punishment, the Gemara brings a derivation of where women were included in civil laws and in liability to death, so that one who kills them is put to death through them.

The school of Rabbi Eliezer taught: Scripture says: [

Exodus 21:1] "

and these ordinances

which you shall set before them,” Scripture equated a woman with a man for all laws [

monetary laws]

in the Torah.

The school of Hezekiah taught: Scripture says [

Exodus 21:29]

“and it kills a man or a woman,” Scripture equated a woman with a man for all death penalties in the Torah,

for one who kills them becomes liable to death, and likewise an ox that kills them is liable for ransom.

And it is necessary,

a derivation is needed to equate a woman with a man both with regard to punishments, and with regard to monetary laws, and with regard to the fact that one who kills them becomes liable to death; and it is impossible to derive one from the other.

Because

if he had taught us this first one, [

if the Torah had taught only the first derivation] to equate a woman with a man with regard to punishments, we would have thought to say that

because of atonement Scripture had mercy on her [

on the woman], so that she should receive punishment and attain atonement.

But

with regard to

laws [

monetary laws] —

say [

we would have said] that only

a man, who engages in commerce, [yes, monetary laws apply] [

yes] monetary laws are stated concerning him. But

a woman,

who does not engage in commerce,

not

monetary laws were stated concerning her.

And if he had taught us this [

and if the Torah had taught only with regard to monetary laws], we would have said that only with regard to monetary laws is the law of a woman equal to that of a man

because it is her life,

for if she is not included in monetary laws, she has no life, since everyone would rob her, and she would rob others, and everyone would keep away from her.