Kiddushin 35a (לה.) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

And according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, who says: “It applies to both of them,”

both the man and the woman,

as he says: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply,”

Genesis 1

, and the woman is also obligated in the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying,

what can be said?

Why do we not derive from the mitzva of Torah study with regard to the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound that women are exempt, when it is only with regard to the mitzva of Torah study that there is a teaching that women are exempt? This should not be a case of two verses that come as one, which do not teach beyond themselves.

And we answer: According to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, one cannot derive from the mitzva of Torah study with regard to the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound that women are exempt,

because

there is also a teaching with regard to the mitzva of the redemption of the firstborn that women are exempt,

as Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn are two verses that come as one, and whenever there are two verses that come as one, they do not teach beyond themselves.

And we raise an objection:

And according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,

who holds that with regard to the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying, which is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, it is explicitly stated that women are obligated,

also

there is a difficulty: How can one derive from the mitzva of reverence with regard to the other positive mitzvot that are not time-bound that women are obligated?

Let

the mitzvot of

being fruitful and

the mitzva of

reverence be two verses that come as one, and they do not teach beyond themselves !

And we answer: According to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, the reason the Torah repeated explicitly with regard to these two mitzvot that women are obligated is not that two verses that come as one do not teach beyond themselves. Rather, each of these mitzvot contains a rationale that cannot be derived from the other, and with regard to both mitzvot

it is necessary

to state explicitly that women are obligated in them.

Because

if the Merciful One had written

only with regard to the mitzva of

reverence and had not written

with regard to the mitzva of

being fruitful and multiplying

that women are obligated,

I would have thought

that, since with regard to the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying the Torah says

“and conquer it,”

and a man’s way is to conquer the land through war, whereas it is not a woman’s way to conquer it, we would therefore have thought that only

a man, whose way is to conquer—

yes,

is obligated in the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying, but

a woman, whose way is not to conquer—

no,

she is not obligated, because whoever is not included in “and conquer it” is not included in the mitzva of “be fruitful and multiply.” Therefore, the Torah had to repeat explicitly with regard to the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying that women are obligated in it.

And if

the Merciful One had written only with regard to the mitzva of

being fruitful and multiplying and had not written

with regard to the mitzva of

reverence

that a woman is obligated,

I would have thought

that only

a man, who has the ability to carry it out

and honor his father, since he is not subject to the authority of others,

yes,

is obligated in the mitzva of reverence, but

a woman, who does not have the ability to carry it out

after she marries, since she is under her husband’s authority,

no,

she is not obligated in the mitzva of reverence.

And since

a married woman

does not have the ability to carry it out,

we would have thought that

she would not be obligated at all

even while she is unmarried.

For this reason,

it is necessary.

The Torah had to state explicitly both with regard to the mitzva of being fruitful and multiplying and with regard to the mitzva of reverence that women are obligated. Therefore, they are not two verses that come as one that do not teach beyond themselves.

And we raise an objection [here as well, like the objection raised above]: The answer we gave—that one cannot derive from Torah study, with regard to which women are exempt, that they are exempt from positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, because this is also stated with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, and they are therefore two verses that come as one and do not teach beyond themselves—

is satisfactory

only

according to the one who says

that

two verses that come as one do not teach beyond themselves.

But according to the one who says

that even two verses that come as one

do teach beyond themselves, what can be said?

Why do we not derive from Torah study, with regard to all positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, that women are exempt?

In summary:

The question raised by the one who asks throughout the entire discussion is as follows: With regard to positive mitzvot that are time-bound, we find two mitzvot in the Torah in which women are obligated: the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel [Abaye excluded the mitzva of rejoicing from the mitzvot in which women are obligated]. Since there is no tzrikhuta explaining why the Torah repeated in the mitzva of hakhel that women are obligated, these become two verses that come as one. With regard to exempting women from positive mitzvot that are time-bound, we find three mitzvot: sukka, tefillin, and the mitzva of appearing at the Temple. Since there is a tzrikhuta for all three, they do not come as one. Therefore, according to the one who holds that two verses that come as one do not teach beyond themselves, there is no difficulty: Since the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel, in which women are obligated, do not teach beyond themselves, we derive from the mitzvot in which women are exempt, since those mitzvot do not come as one. But the difficulty remains according to the one who holds that two verses that come as one do teach beyond themselves, for we should derive from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are time-bound.

The same question applies to positive mitzvot that are not time-bound: We find two mitzvot from which women are exempt: Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn [and being fruitful and multiplying according to the Rabbis]. With regard to the mitzva of the redemption of the firstborn, there is no tzrikhuta explaining why the Torah repeated in it that women are exempt, and through this they become two verses that come as one. We also find three mitzvot in which women are obligated: reverence, mezuzah [and being fruitful and multiplying according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka]. Since there is a tzrikhuta for all of them, they do not come as one. Therefore, according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach beyond themselves, there is no difficulty: We cannot derive from Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn that women are exempt from positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, and we derive from the mitzvot in which women are obligated, since those mitzvot do not come as one. But according to the one who says that they do teach beyond themselves, the difficulty remains, for we should derive from Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn that women are exempt.

And we answer:

Rava said: The scholars of Papunya,

the students who lived in Papunya,

know the reason for this matter

that women are exempt from positive mitzvot that are time-bound and obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound.

And who is he

who knows the reason for this matter and lives in Papunya?

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov

from Papunya.

And the reason for the matter is that

the verse says:

Exodus 13:9,

“And it shall be for you as a sign upon your hand and as a remembrance between your eyes, so that the Torah of the Lord shall be in your mouth,”

thus

the entire Torah was compared to tefillin,

and whenever there is both a comparison and a binyan av, the derivation from the comparison takes precedence. Therefore, we do not derive the rule concerning positive mitzvot that are time-bound by means of a binyan av from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel, nor do we derive the rule concerning positive mitzvot that are not time-bound by means of a binyan av from Torah study and the redemption of the firstborn. Rather, we derive it from the comparison in which the entire Torah was compared to tefillin:

Just as tefillin—

is a positive mitzva that is time-bound and women are exempt from it, so too, every positive mitzva that is time-bound—

women are exempt .

And from the fact that, with regard to positive mitzvot that are time-bound, the Torah needed to write a comparison that

women are exempt, it follows

that we derive

that with regard to positive mitzvot that are not time-bound, women are obligated.

There is a dispute in tractate Eruvin [95b] as to whether the mitzva of tefillin is a positive mitzva that is time-bound or a positive mitzva that is not time-bound.

And we raise an objection:

This is satisfactory

only

according to the one who says

that the mitzva of

tefillin

is

a positive mitzva that is time-bound,

and since the entire Torah was compared to tefillin, we derive from tefillin that women are exempt from every positive mitzva that is time-bound.

But according to the one who says

that the mitzva of

tefillin

is

a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, what can be said?

How can one derive anything from the comparison? The opposite would be derived from it: that women are exempt from every positive mitzva that is not time-bound.

And we answer:

Who is the one whom you hear say

in tractate Eruvin that

tefillin

is

a positive mitzva that is not time-bound?

Rabbi Meir!

And according to Rabbi Meir, we do not require the comparison. Rather, we derive by means of a binyan av from the mitzva of appearing at the Temple, which is a positive mitzva that is time-bound and from which women are exempt. The difficulty raised above—that we should derive from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel that women are obligated—is not difficult according to Rabbi Meir, because:

And he holds

that Rabbi Meir holds that they are

two verses that come as one. And

according to Rabbi Meir,

any two verses that come as one do not teach beyond themselves .

And we raise an objection:

And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says

in Sanhedrin [67b] that

two verses that come as one do teach, and

he also said in Eruvin [96b] that

tefillin

is

a positive mitzva that is not time-bound,

what can be said?

From where, according to his opinion, do we derive that women are exempt from positive mitzvot that are time-bound? One cannot derive this by means of a binyan av from the mitzva of appearing at the Temple, from which women are exempt, since there are two verses—the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel—that concern positive mitzvot that are time-bound and in which women are obligated. Nor can one say that the entire Torah was compared to tefillin, from which women are exempt, since according to his opinion tefillin is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, and throughout the entire Torah women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time-bound.

And we answer: According to Rabbi Yehuda, we derive by means of a binyan av from the mitzva of appearing at the Temple, which is a positive mitzva that is time-bound and from which women are exempt, and we do not derive from the mitzva of eating matza and the mitzva of hakhel, in which women are obligated,

because

they do not hold like Abaye above, who says that a woman has no obligation of rejoicing except that her husband must make her rejoice. Rather, they hold that a woman is commanded in the mitzva of rejoicing on the Festival.

For

the mitzva of eating

matza

and the mitzva of

rejoicing

on the Festival,

and

the mitzva of

hakhel are three verses that come as one, and three verses that come as one,

also Rabbi Yehuda concedes that they

do not teach beyond themselves.

We learned in the Mishna:

And with regard to all prohibitions,

whether they are time-bound or not time-bound, men and women alike are obligated.

And we inquire:

From where are these matters derived?

[from where do we learn this] ?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and likewise it was taught in the school of Rabbi

Ishmael: The verse says

Numbers 5:6:

“Whether a man or a woman commits any of the sins of man.” The verse equates a woman with a man with regard to all punishments stated in the Torah,

and a prohibition entails the punishment of lashes. Therefore, women and men are equated with regard to prohibitions: both are obligated whether in prohibitions that are time-bound or in prohibitions that are not time-bound .

As an aside to the fact that the Gemara brought a teaching concerning punishments, the Gemara brings a teaching concerning the source from which women are included in monetary law and in laws involving the death penalty, so that one who kills them is put to death on their account.

In the academy of Rabbi Eliezer, it was taught: Scripture says: [

Exodus 21:1] "

And these are the laws

which you shall set before them,” Scripture equated woman with man with regard to all laws [

monetary laws]

in the Torah.

In the academy of Hizkiya, it was taught: Scripture says [

Exodus 21:29]

“and it kills a man or a woman,” Scripture equated woman with man with regard to all deaths stated in the Torah,

so that one who kills them becomes liable to death, and likewise an ox that kills them is liable for ransom.

And it is necessary:

a source is needed to equate woman with man both with regard to punishments, with regard to monetary law, and with regard to the fact that one who kills them becomes liable to death; and one cannot derive one of these from the other.

Because

if you were to hear only this first teaching,

[if the Torah had stated only the first derivation] equating woman with man with regard to punishments, we might reason that

because of atonement, the Merciful One has compassion on her

[on the woman], so that she receives punishment and achieves atonement.

But

with regard to

laws [

monetary law]—

say

[we might say] that only

a man, who is involved in commercial transactions, yes,

[yes,] monetary laws are stated with regard to him. But

a woman,

who does not engage in commercial transactions,

no,

monetary laws were not stated with regard to her.

And if you were to hear only this

[and if the Torah had stated only with regard to monetary law], we might say that it is only with regard to monetary law that the law of woman is equivalent to that of man

because her life depends on it,

for if she were not included in monetary law, she would have no livelihood: everyone would rob her, and she would rob others, and everyone would keep away from her.