Kiddushin 34a (לד.) — the Talmud in English

And

so too with

tefillin,

for the mitzva to put them on applies only on weekdays, and not on Shabbat and Festivals.

Similarly, there are other positive commandments that apply at specific times and do not apply constantly, and women are exempt from them.

And what is a positive commandment that is not time-bound?

For example:

a mezuzah and a parapet,

the returning of

a lost article and sending away the mother bird.

Similarly, with regard to all other mitzvot of this kind, other mitzvot that are not time-bound, women are exempt from them.

We raise a difficulty concerning our Mishna:

Is this an absolute rule?

Can one state a fixed rule regarding all mitzvot, saying that women are exempt from every positive commandment that is time-bound, and obligated in every positive commandment that is not time-bound?! Surely there are many mitzvot that are exceptions to this rule, as follows:

Consider

the mitzva of eating

matza,

the mitzva of

rejoicing

on a Festival, and the mitzva of

Hakhel,

all of these are

positive commandments

that are time-bound, and

nevertheless

women are obligated

in them!

Furthermore,

and additionally:

consider

the mitzva of

Torah study,

the mitzva of

procreation, and

the mitzva of

redemption of the firstborn,

all of these

are not positive commandments that are time-bound, and

nevertheless

women are exempt

from them!

Rabbi Yohanan said: One does not derive

halakha

from general rules

mentioned in the Mishnayot wherever a general rule is stated. Because there are matters that depart from the general rule.

And even

where it is stated

in that general rule

“except

for a certain matter,” one does not say that this implies that specifically that particular matter is excluded from the general rule, while everything else is included in it. Rather, it is possible that there are additional matters that also depart from the general rule.

And there is proof of this from

what we learned

in tractate Eruvin, concerning courtyard eruvs and alleyway partnerships [26b]:

It is prohibited to carry on Shabbat from a private domain to a public domain.

A courtyard to which several houses open: By Torah law, it is permitted to carry from the houses into the courtyard, because the courtyard is enclosed by partitions and is therefore a private domain.

Similarly, a mavoy, an alleyway enclosed by partitions on three sides and open to the public domain at its entrance [on the fourth side], with several courtyards opening onto it: By Torah law, it is permitted to carry from the courtyards into the alleyway, because the alleyway is considered a private domain [since it is enclosed by partitions on three sides].

However, the Sages prohibited carrying from the houses into the jointly owned courtyard, because each house belongs to a different resident, whereas the courtyard is jointly owned by everyone. Therefore, the shared courtyard appears to each house to be a separate domain [or to resemble a public domain]. The Sages were concerned that if they permitted carrying from the houses into the courtyard, people would come to permit carrying from a private domain to a public domain. Therefore, the Sages instituted “a courtyard eruv,” whereby all the members of the courtyard prepare bread for themselves in one of the houses. Through this, they are all considered joined together, as though all the houses and the courtyard belong to everyone collectively, because the place where a person’s food is found is considered his place of residence, and it is therefore as though they all live in one place.

Similarly, in an alleyway, it is prohibited for the members of the courtyards to carry from a courtyard into the alleyway, because it appears to be a separate domain, since all the members of the courtyards surrounding it pass through it on their way to the public domain. The Sages decreed that one may not carry from the courtyards into the alleyway unless all the members of the courtyards have joined in food placed in one of the courtyards, and the Sages called this “an alleyway partnership.”

And we learned concerning this [there]:

With every

food or drink

one may establish

a courtyard eruv,

and join in

an alleyway partnership,

except for water and

ordinary

salt.

Because specifically something that nourishes a person renders the place his residence, whereas water and salt do not nourish a person.

And one may raise a difficulty concerning the wording of the Mishna:

Is that all there is?!

Are there not additional foods that do not nourish?

For there are

also

mushrooms and fungi,

which are foods that do not nourish, and one may not establish an eruv with them! Why did the Mishna not mention them as well?

Rather,

on the basis of this difficulty, Rabbi Yohanan proves his earlier statement: From here it follows that

one does not derive

halakha

from general rules

mentioned in the Mishnayot,

even where it is stated, “except

for a certain matter.” For example, regarding an eruv, although we learned that “with every” food one may establish an eruv “except” water and salt, nevertheless there are additional matters that depart from the general rule, such as mushrooms and fungi.

The Gemara now returns to discuss the statement of our Mishna:

We inquire into it:

And with regard to a positive commandment that is time-bound, from where do we know that women are exempt?

From where do we know that women are indeed exempt from them?

And we answer:

He derived

that the tanna learned this

from tefillin,

for the verse exempted women from the mitzva of tefillin, as will be explained below. The exemption of women from the other time-bound mitzvot is learned from tefillin through the derivation of “what do we find”:

Just as

we find with regard to the mitzva of

tefillin,

which is a time-bound mitzva,

women are exempt

from it.

So too, every positive commandment

similar to tefillin—that is, a positive commandment

that is time-bound, women are exempt

from it.

And

the mitzva of

tefillin

itself, from which women are exempt,

he derived it;

the tanna learned it

from

the mitzva of

Torah study,

which is stated in the Torah [in the passage of the recitation of the Shema] adjacent to the mitzva of tefillin [Deuteronomy 6:7–8]: “And you shall teach them [the words of Torah] to your children, and you shall speak of them. And you shall bind them [the tefillin] as a sign upon your hand.”

Just as

with regard to the mitzva of

Torah study

we find that

women are exempt

from it, as it is stated [ibid. 11:19]: “And you shall teach them to your children”—the verse teaches “your sons,” but not your daughters,

so too

the mitzva of

tefillin, women are exempt

from it.

And we challenge this: Why should we associate the mitzva of tefillin specifically with Torah study because it is written adjacent to it? Mezuzah, too, is adjacent to tefillin, as it is stated: “And you shall bind them as a sign upon your hand, and you shall write them on the doorposts”!

And

why not

associate tefillin with mezuzah

and say: Just as women are obligated in the mitzva of mezuzah [as will be explained below], so too women should be obligated in tefillin?

And we answer:

Tefillin was associated with Torah study;

it is written adjacent to it, both

in the first passage

of the Shema, as explained above, and

in the second passage

of the Shema, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 11:14–15]: “And they shall be as frontlets [tefillin] between your eyes, and you shall teach them [the words of Torah] to your children.”

Whereas

tefillin was not associated with mezuzah in the second passage.

It is not written adjacent to it; rather, the mitzva of Torah study intervenes between them.

Therefore, it is preferable to learn the law of tefillin from Torah study, which is stated adjacent to it in both passages.

We challenge this:

And

since we learned the law of tefillin from Torah study because they are juxtaposed to one another,

let us associate

also

mezuzah with Torah study,

for mezuzah is juxtaposed to Torah study in the second passage of the Shema! Why, then, did we learn in the beraita above that women are obligated in mezuzah? And we answer:

It does not enter your mind

to exempt women from the mitzva of mezuzah.

Since it is written [Deuteronomy 11:20–21]: “And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates,”

“so that your days may be increased.”

The verse teaches that the reward for the mitzva of mezuzah is an increase of days.

If so, is it the case that only

men require life,

whereas

women do not require life?!

Would it enter your mind to say that only men need longevity, whereas women do not need it?! Rather, it necessarily follows that the mitzva of mezuzah was stated for women as well.

In summary: A. The law of tefillin is learned from the law of Torah study, which is juxtaposed to it in both passages of the Shema. Just as women are exempt from Torah study, so they are exempt from tefillin.

B. Mezuzah is not learned from Torah study, since the verse states that its reward is longevity, and women too require longevity.

C. The time-bound positive commandments are learned from tefillin: Just as women are exempt from tefillin, so they are exempt from the other time-bound positive commandments.

We challenge this:

But there is sukkah, which is a time-bound positive commandment

is

as it is written [Leviticus 23:42]:

[Leviticus 23:42]: “You shall dwell in sukkot for seven days.”

“You shall dwell in sukkot for seven days.”

This should prove that women are obligated in a time-bound positive commandment, as follows: It is stated [Leviticus 23:42]: “All the native-born in Israel shall dwell in sukkot.”

The letter heh in the word “the native-born” is superfluous.

And the Sages expounded in a beraita: “The native-born,” to exclude women. That is, specifically the distinguished among the native-born are obligated in sukkah—namely, men—but a woman is exempt.

And one can infer from the words of the beraita:

The reason—the entire reason women are exempt is

because

the Merciful One wrote, “the native-born,” to exclude women;

it follows that

if not for this,

if “the native-born” had not been stated, I would say that

women are obligated

despite the fact that sukkah is a time-bound positive commandment.

But how, then, did we learn that women are exempt from time-bound positive commandments?

And we answer with two answers:

A.

Abaye said:

Women are certainly exempt from time-bound positive commandments. Nevertheless,

it was necessary

for the verse to state “the native-born” regarding sukkah, because we might have thought that the mitzva of sukkah differs from other time-bound positive commandments, as follows:

It might enter your mind to say:

You might have thought to say:

Since it is written, “You shall dwell in sukkot,”

and the Sages expounded

“You shall dwell as

you reside,” therefore, dwelling in a sukkah must be in the manner in which a person lives in his dwelling.

Just as a dwelling

is inhabited by

a man and his wife

together,

so too a sukkah

is one in which

a man and his wife

are obligated. Therefore, “the native-born” was stated to exclude women.

B.

And Rava said

another answer: