Kiddushin 34a — the Talmud in English

And

so

tefillin,

for there is a mitzva to put them on only on weekdays, and not on Shabbatot and Festivals.

And similarly, there are other positive mitzvot that apply at a particular time and do not apply always, and women are exempt from them.

And which is the positive mitzva whose time does not cause it?

For example:

mezuzah, a parapet,

the returning of

a lost object, and the sending away of the nest.

And likewise, in every similar case, women are exempt from the other mitzvot whose time does not cause them.

And we raise an objection against our Mishna:

And is it a general rule?

Can one say a fixed general rule concerning all the mitzvot, and say that every positive mitzva whose time causes it, women are exempt from, and every positive mitzva whose time does not cause it, women are obligated in?! But there are several mitzvot that are exceptions to this rule! As follows:

Behold,

the mitzva of eating

matza,

and the mitzva of

rejoicing

on the Festival, and the mitzva of

Hakhel,

all of these are

positive mitzvot

whose time causes them, and

nevertheless

women are obligated

in them!

And furthermore,

and additionally:

behold,

the mitzva of

Torah study,

and the mitzva of

procreation, and

the mitzva of

the redemption of the firstborn,

all of these

are not positive mitzvot whose time causes them, and

nevertheless

women are exempt

from them!

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One does not derive

halakha

from generalizations

[the generalizations] mentioned in the Mishnayot, everywhere that a generalization was mentioned. Because there are matters that depart from the generalization.

And even

where it is stated

in that generalization

“except

for a certain matter,” one does not say that here it implies that specifically that certain matter departs from the generalization, and that all the other matters are included in the generalization. Rather, it is possible that there are additional matters that also depart from the generalization.

And proof of this is from that which

we learned

in tractate Eruvin concerning courtyard eruvs and alleyway partnerships [26b]:

It is forbidden to carry on Shabbat from a private domain to a public domain.

A courtyard to which several houses open: By Torah law, it is permitted to take out from the houses into the courtyard, because the courtyard is surrounded by partitions. And it is a private domain.

Similarly, an “alleyway,” which is a lane surrounded by partitions on three sides and open to the public domain at the head of the alleyway [on the fourth side], with several courtyards opening onto the alleyway: By Torah law, it is permitted to carry from the courtyards into the alleyway, because the alleyway is considered a private domain [since it is surrounded by partitions on three sides].

But the Sages prohibited carrying from the houses into the shared courtyard, because each house belongs to a different resident, whereas the courtyard is shared by all; therefore, the shared courtyard appears like a separate domain [or it appears similar to a public domain] with respect to each house. And the Sages were concerned that if we permit carrying from the houses into the courtyard, people will come to permit carrying from a private domain to a public domain. Therefore the Sages instituted “courtyard eruv,” whereby all the members of the courtyard prepare bread for themselves in one of the houses. Through this, they are all considered joined, as though all the houses and the courtyard belong to all of them as one, because the place where a person’s food is found is considered his dwelling place, and it is as though they all dwell in one place.

Similarly, in an alleyway, it is forbidden for the members of the courtyards to carry from the courtyard into the alleyway, because it appears like a separate domain, since all the members of the courtyards surrounding it leave through it to the public domain. And the Sages decreed that one may not take out from the courtyards into the alleyway unless all the members of the courtyards participated in food that they place in one of the courtyards, and the Sages called it “an alleyway partnership.”

And concerning this we learned [there]:

With every

food or drink

one may establish

courtyard eruvs,

and participate in

alleyway partnerships,

except for water and

salt.

Because

only something that nourishes a person makes the place into his dwelling, whereas water and salt do not nourish a person.

And one must wonder about the words of the Mishna:

And are there no others?!

Are there no additional foods that do not nourish?

But there are

also

mushrooms and fungi,

which are foods that do not nourish, and one does not establish eruvs with them! And why did the Mishna not mention them as well?

Rather,

by the force of this objection Rabbi Yoḥanan proves his statement above: From here,

one does not derive

halakha

from generalizations

mentioned in the Mishnayot,

even where it is stated “except

for a certain matter.” For example, concerning an eruv, although we learned that “with every” food one may establish an eruv, “except” water and salt, nevertheless there are additional things that depart from the generalization, such as mushrooms and fungi.

And now the Gemara returns to discuss the words of our Mishna:

And we inquire concerning it:

And positive mitzvot whose time causes them—women are exempt; from where do we know this?

From where do we know that women are indeed exempt from them?

And we answer:

It was derived,

the tan[n]a learned this

from tefillin,

for Scripture exempted women from the mitzva of tefillin, as will be explained below; and the exemption of women from the other positive mitzvot whose time causes them is learned from the mitzva of tefillin by a mah matzinu derivation:

Just as

as we find concerning the mitzva of

tefillin,

which is a positive mitzva whose time causes it,

women are exempt

from it.

So too every positive mitzva

similar to tefillin, that is, a positive mitzva

whose time causes it—women are exempt

from it.

And

the mitzva of

tefillin

itself, from carrying out which women are exempt,

he derived it,

the tan[n]a learned it

from

the mitzva of

Torah study,

which is stated in the Torah [in the section of the recitation of the Shema] adjacent to the mitzva of tefillin [Deuteronomy 6:7–8]: “And you shall teach them [the words of Torah] to your sons, and speak of them. And you shall bind them [the tefillin] as a sign upon your hand.”

Just as

as concerning the mitzva of

Torah study

we find that

women are exempt

from it, as it is stated [there, 11:19]: “And you shall teach them to your sons”; Scripture teaches “your sons,” and not your daughters,

so too

the mitzva of

tefillin—women are exempt

from it.

And we ask: Why should we juxtapose the mitzva of tefillin specifically to Torah study because it was written adjacent to it? Is not the mitzva of mezuzah also adjacent to tefillin? For it is stated: “And you shall bind them as a sign upon your hand, and you shall write them upon the doorposts”!

And

why do we not

juxtapose tefillin to mezuzah,

and say: Just as women are obligated in the mitzva of mezuzah [as will be explained below], so women are obligated in tefillin!

And we answer:

Tefillin was juxtaposed to Torah study;

it was written adjacent to it, both

in the first section

of the recitation of the Shema, as explained above,

and in the second section

of the recitation of the Shema, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 11:14–15]: “And they shall be as frontlets [tefillin] between your eyes, and you shall teach them [the words of Torah] to your sons.”

Whereas

tefillin was not juxtaposed to mezuzah in the second section.

It was not written adjacent to it; rather, the mitzva of Torah study interrupts between them.

Therefore it is preferable to learn tefillin from Torah study, which was stated adjacent to it in both sections.

And we ask:

And

since we learned tefillin from Torah study because they were juxtaposed to one another,

let us juxtapose

also

mezuzah to Torah study,

for mezuzah was juxtaposed to Torah study in the second section of the recitation of the Shema! And why did we learn in the beraita above that women are obligated in mezuzah? And we answer:

It does not enter your mind;

do not entertain the thought of exempting women from the mitzva of mezuzah.

Since it is written [Deuteronomy 11:20–21]: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house and upon your gates,

so that your days may be multiplied.”

And Scripture teaches that the reward of the mitzva of mezuzah is the multiplication of days.

If so, is it that only

men require life,

whereas

women do not require life!?

Would it enter one’s mind to say that only men need long life, whereas women do not need it?! Rather, necessarily, the mitzva of mezuzah was stated also for women.

In summary: A. The law of tefillin is learned from the law of Torah study, which is juxtaposed to it in both sections of the recitation of the Shema. And just as women are exempt from Torah study, so they are exempt from tefillin.

B. Mezuzah is not learned from Torah study, since Scripture said that its reward is long life, and women too need long life.

C. The positive mitzvot whose time causes them are learned from tefillin, and just as women are exempt from tefillin, so they are exempt from the other positive mitzvot whose time causes them.

And we ask:

But behold, sukkah, which is a positive mitzva whose time causes it,

is

as it is written

[Leviticus 23:42]:

“In sukkot you shall dwell for seven days.”

And one can prove from it that women are obligated in positive mitzvot whose time causes them. As follows: It is stated [Leviticus 23:42]: “All the native-born in Israel shall dwell in sukkot.”

The letter heh in the word “the native-born” is superfluous.

And the Sages expounded in a beraita: “The native-born,” to exclude women. That is: Specifically the important among the native-born is obligated in sukkah; namely, a man, but a woman is exempt.

And one may infer from the words of the beraita:

The reason

for all the reason that women are exempt is only

that the Merciful One wrote “the native-born” to exclude women;

it implies:

if not for this,

if “the native-born” had not been stated, I would say that

women are obligated

despite the fact that sukkah is a positive mitzva whose time causes it.

And how, then, did we learn that women are exempt from positive mitzvot whose time causes them?

And we answer with two answers:

A.

Abaye said:

Certainly women are exempt from positive mitzvot whose time causes them. Nevertheless,

it was necessary

for Scripture to say “the native-born” concerning sukkah, because it might have entered our mind that the mitzva of sukkah differs from the other positive mitzvot whose time causes them. As follows:

It might enter your mind to say:

It might enter your mind to say:

Since it is written, “In sukkot you shall dwell”

and the Sages expounded

“you shall dwell in the manner

of your dwelling,” therefore dwelling in a sukkah must be in the manner in which a person dwells in his dwelling.

Just as in a dwelling

they dwell

a man and his wife

together,

so too in a sukkah

they are obligated

a man and his wife.

Therefore it was stated “the native-born” to exclude women.

B.

And Rava said

another answer: