Kiddushin 29b — the Talmud in English

However, Rabbi Yirmeya explained Rabbi Yehuda’s words in a different manner:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: All agree,

that

wherever ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

there is not,

in every case where a person has no assets

except

the value of

five sela,

alone, then certainly

he takes precedence over his son.

What is the reason? —

Because

the mitzva concerning his own body is preferable,

the mitzva concerning his own body is preferable.

And

when they disagree,

what they disagree about is

where there is,

as, for example, where he had land worth ten sela and sold land worth five sela before his son was born, and it turns out that he now has before him

five liened [sela],

and he also had in his possession

five unencumbered [sela],

assets worth five sela that were in his possession [and he did not sell them to others].

And the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed about what he should do with those five unencumbered sela in his possession: The Sages hold that he should redeem himself with them. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that he should redeem his son.

And the explanation of their disagreement is:

Since we have already said that all agree that the mitzva concerning his own body is preferable, it is therefore certainly impossible that a person should advance and redeem his son with the five unencumbered [sela] in his possession, unless the kohen will be able to collect the five liened [sela] from the purchasers for his own redemption.

, Now, a creditor who wishes to collect his debt from liened assets may collect only if it was a loan for which there is a document. But an oral loan is not collected from purchasers.

The debt of five sela that a person owes to the kohen for the redemption of his own body has no document. If so, seemingly, it would be appropriate to say that the kohen cannot collect this from liened assets.

However, there is a special reason to say that the kohen can nevertheless collect the redemption from liened assets:

Rabbi Yehuda held:

A loan

that is written in the Torah is considered like one written in a document.

That is, every debt that the Torah imposed upon a person, such as the redemption of the firstborn, is considered like a loan written in a document, and is collected from liened assets.

And in our case, where the person sold his assets after he matured and had already become obligated to redeem himself, it turns out that the five sela in the possession of the purchasers are liened to the kohen, so that he may collect his redemption from them.

But the kohen cannot collect the redemption of that person’s son from the land worth five sela in the possession of the purchasers, because the purchasers bought the land before his son was born. And the assets are not liened for that debt.

It follows that if he redeems himself with the five sela in his possession, he will not be able to fulfill the mitzva of redeeming his son, since the kohen cannot collect the redemption of his son from the purchasers; the kohen cannot collect the redemption of his son from the purchasers.

And therefore,

with these five, he redeems his son.

With those five sela in his possession, he redeems his son.

And

afterward, when no assets remain in his possession with which to redeem himself,

the kohen goes and seizes the five

liened [sela], for him,

the kohen goes and seizes five sela from the purchasers for his own redemption.

However, this requires discussion: How is he permitted to advance and redeem his son with the five sela in his possession? Does he not thereby cause the purchasers to suffer a loss and distress unlawfully? For the assets in their possession are liened only for his own redemption, and he could have redeemed himself from the assets in his possession without causing his redemption to be collected from them!

And in order to answer this, Rabbi Yehuda said: “This is his mitzva upon his father, and this is his son’s mitzva upon him,” meaning: The mitzva concerning his son is imposed upon him more than his own mitzva; therefore, he is permitted to advance the redemption of his son before his own redemption.

And the Sages hold: A loan written in the Torah

[such as the redemption of the firstborn]

is not considered like one written in a document,

but is like an oral loan, and it is not collected from purchasers. It follows that if he redeems his son with the five sela in his possession, he will not be able to redeem himself, since the kohen will not be able to collect the five liened sela.

And therefore,

since he can perform only one redemption,

the mitzva concerning his own body is preferable.

The Gemara brings another disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda concerning the redemption of the firstborn, similar to the disagreement brought above:

The Sages taught:

A person upon whom two mitzvot are imposed,

to redeem his son and to go up for the pilgrimage festival,

and both of these mitzvot involve a monetary expenditure—for to redeem his son he needs five sela, and to go up for the pilgrimage festival he needs money for travel expenses—and he does not have money sufficient for both of them, which of them takes precedence?

The first tanna says:

He redeems

now

his son, and afterward,

when money becomes available to him,

he goes up for the pilgrimage festival.

And

Rabbi Yehuda says: He goes up

now

for the pilgrimage festival.

And afterward,

when money becomes available to him,

he redeems his son.

Because

this

going up for the pilgrimage festival is

a time-bound mitzva,

and if he delays fulfilling it now, he will not be able to fulfill it afterward.

And this,

the mitzva of redeeming the firstborn, is

a mitzva that is not time-bound.

And even if he refrains from fulfilling it now, he will be able to fulfill it afterward.

And we raise the matter:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, as he stated the reason.

Indeed, Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is understood, as he himself explained in the beraita.

But the Sages—

what is their reason,

what is the reason for the words of the Sages? Why did they say that he redeems his son and only afterward goes up for the pilgrimage festival?

And we answer: Because

the verse says

[Exodus 34:20]:

“Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem,” and afterward

and immediately afterward it is written in that same verse

“and they shall not appear before Me empty-handed.”

And from the order of the verse it follows that first a person must redeem his son and only afterward go up for the pilgrimage festival.

And now it brings another beraita that expounds the verse, “Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem.”

The Sages taught: From where

do we know

that if he had

a person

five sons from five women,

and each of these sons is a firstborn to his mother but is not a firstborn to his father, from where do we know

that he is obligated to redeem

all

of them,

despite the fact that they are not firstborn with regard to him?

The verse states

[there]:

“Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem”;

the word “every” includes anyone who is not a firstborn to his father but only to his mother.

And we object to the beraita: Why did we need to derive this from the word “every”? Is it not

obvious

that the law of redemption of the firstborn depends upon the mother and not upon the father? For

the Merciful One made it dependent upon the one who opens the womb,

the law of redemption of the firstborn is stated concerning “the one who opens the womb” , that is, a son who emerges first from his mother’s womb, and from here it follows that everything depends upon the mother and not upon the father!

And we answer:

What might you have said?

Perhaps you would have said:

Let us derive

the definition of “firstborn” in the matter of redemption of the firstborn by a gzera shava of

“firstborn,” “firstborn,” from inheritance.

In the matter of redemption of the firstborn, “firstborn” was mentioned,

and also in the matter of the inheritance of the firstborn, “firstborn” was stated:

Just as there,

in the matter of inheritance, it is stated that the firstborn is

“the beginning of his vigor”

of the father, so that, concerning inheritance, everything depends upon the father and not upon the mother, in the same way

also

the firstborn mentioned

here,

in the redemption of the firstborn, is

the beginning of his vigor

of the father.

It teaches us,

the verse came and taught us “every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem,” teaching that redemption of the firstborn depends upon the mother.

We learned in a beraita: The father is obligated concerning his son

to teach him Torah.

And the Gemara explains: From where do we know that the father is obligated in this?

From where do we know it,

from where did we learn this?

From that which

is written

[Deuteronomy 11:19]:

“And you shall teach them to your sons.”

And the Gemara adds:

And where his father did not teach him, he is obligated to teach himself.

If it happened that the father did not teach his son, then the son himself is obligated to study Torah once he matures.

And the source of this law is:

For it is written

[Deuteronomy 5:1]: “Hear, Israel, the statutes and the ordinances

and learn

them, and observe them to perform them.” And it follows from the verse that a person is commanded to study Torah himself.

And now the Gemara explains: From where did our Mishna learn that a woman is not commanded to teach her son Torah?

As for her, from where do we know that she is not obligated,

from where do we know that the mother is not obligated in this?

And we answer:

For it is written, “And you shall teach

them to your sons,” and the word “you shall teach” is written in the Torah in a defective spelling [“and you shall learn,” without the letter yod], and it can also be read as though it said “and you shall learn” [the letter lamed vocalized with a sheva]. And since both matters are learned from one word, they should be equated with one another, and therefore

everyone who is commanded to learn

by himself [“and you shall learn”]

is commanded

also

to teach

his son. But a woman, who is not commanded to learn herself, as will be explained below, is also not commanded to teach her son.

And immediately the Gemara asks: We stated simply that a woman is not commanded to learn herself, but this requires discussion:

And as for her, from where do we know that she is not obligated to learn herself?

From where do we know this very matter, that a woman is not commanded to study Torah herself?

And we answer:

For it is written

in this verse, “and you shall teach,” and this can be read in two ways: a.

“And you shall teach.”

b.

“And you shall learn.”

And they should be equated with one another with regard to an additional matter:

Everyone whom others

[the father]

are commanded to teach,

he too

is commanded to teach himself. And everyone whom others

[the father]

are not commanded to teach,

he too

is not commanded to teach himself.

And in the case of a woman, her father is not obligated to teach her Torah [as will be explained below], and therefore she too is not obligated to study herself once she matures.

And immediately the Gemara asks:

And from where

is it obvious to us

that others are not commanded to teach her?

The Gemara answers: Because

the verse says:

“And you shall teach

“them to your sons.”

This implies specifically your sons, and not

your daughters.

And in connection with having spoken about the father’s obligation to teach his son and a person’s obligation to study himself, the Gemara brings a beraita discussing which of these obligations takes precedence:

The Sages taught:

A person upon whom two obligations rest, namely

he

must

study, and his son

is obligated

to study,

and he cannot fulfill but one of them, which of them takes precedence?

He takes precedence over his son.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If his son is swift and sharp, and his learning remains with him,

then

his son takes precedence over him.

And the Gemara brings an incident involving Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov, who held that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda:

For this,

like the incident

of Rav Yaakov, the son of Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov, whom his father sent before Abaye,

at first his father, Rav Aḥa, sent him to study Torah from Abaye, and

when he came,

when Rav Yaakov came to his home,

he saw that his teachings were not sharp,

his father saw that his learning was not clear in his possession, and then

he said to him: I am superior to you.

You return; I shall go.

I am more incisive than you. Therefore, you stay at home and I shall go to study from Abaye.

And incidentally, the Gemara continues and relates what occurred when Rav Aḥa came to study before Abaye:

Abaye heard that he was coming,

that Rav Aḥa was coming to study with him,

there was a certain harmful spirit in Abaye’s house of study,

there was a harmful spirit that was accustomed to be in the house of study where Abaye’s students studied, and the power of that harmful spirit was so great

that when two would enter, they would be harmed even during the day,

when two students would enter, they would be harmed by it even during the day.

And when Rav Aḥa came,

Abaye said to them

to his students:

Let no person give him lodging; perhaps a miracle will occur!

No person should host Rav Aḥa in his house, and against his will he will have to spend the night in the house of study, and because of Rav Aḥa’s piety it is possible that a miracle will be performed and he will kill the harmful spirit.

And indeed, that is what happened.

He entered,

Rav Aḥa entered the house of study,

he slept

and spent the night

in that house of study,

in that house of study. And that harmful spirit appeared before him. And

it appeared to him in the form of a serpent with seven heads,

it appeared to him in the form of a serpent possessing seven heads.

Rav Aḥa prayed; he prayed that the harmful spirit be killed, and

with every bowing that he bowed

in his prayer,

one of its heads fell off,

one head fell from the harmful spirit, until all its heads fell off and it died.

He said to them

Rav Aḥa said to Abaye’s students

the next day: Had a miracle not occurred, you would have endangered me!

Had a miracle not occurred for me, you would have endangered me. The Gemara brings another beraita, which was stated near the beraita that we brought above [“He is to study and his son is to study”].

The Sages taught:

A person upon whom two mitzvot are imposed:

to study Torah and to marry a woman,

first

he should study Torah, and afterward he should marry a woman.

And if it is impossible for him without a woman

because his inclination overcomes him, then, first,

he should marry a woman, and afterward he should study Torah.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is: he marries

a person

a woman

so that thoughts of transgression should not come into his heart,

and afterward he should study Torah.

Whereas

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

How can a person marry a woman and afterward study Torah? Are

millstones

placed

around his neck, and he will engage in Torah?!

That is: he is required to concern himself with providing for his household, and how will he engage in Torah? Rather, he should study Torah and only afterward marry a woman.

And they do not disagree,

Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan do not disagree with one another; rather, each one spoke about the people of his own place:

Here for us,

what Shmuel said, that he should marry a woman and afterward study Torah, Shmuel said this to the people of his place in Babylonia, because they were accustomed to leave their homes after their marriages and travel to the Land of Israel to review Mishnayot from the tannaim who lived there. And since they were not in their homes, the needs of the household were not imposed upon them, and they could engage in Torah even after their marriages. Therefore, it was preferable for them to marry first and be without thoughts of transgression.

And there for them,

what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, “millstones around his neck, and he will engage in Torah,” refers to the people of his place, in the Land of Israel, because they were accustomed to study Torah in their city; and if they married first, the needs of the household would be imposed upon them and would cause them to neglect their study, therefore it was preferable for them to study Torah before they married. And now the Gemara explains at what age it is forbidden for a person to delay marrying a woman:

Rav Ḥisda praised him to

before

Rav Huna, saying that Rav Hamnuna was a great man.

Rav Huna said to him

Rav Huna said to Rav Ḥisda:

When

Rav Hamnuna

comes to you, bring him to me

so that I may know him.

When he came,

when Rav Hamnuna came before Rav Huna,

he saw that he did not spread a scarf,

Rav Huna saw that Rav Hamnuna did not cover his head with a scarf, as married men were accustomed to cover their heads.

He said to him

Rav Huna said to him:

Why do you not spread a scarf?

Why do you not cover your head with a scarf?

He said to him,

Rav Hamnuna answered him: Because

I have not married,

because I have not married a woman.

He turned his face away from him,

Rav Huna turned his face away from Rav Hamnuna. And

he said to him: See that you will not see my face until you marry,

see that you will not be able to look at my face until you marry a woman.

And

Rav Huna

did this

according to his position,

according to his approach,

for he said: “A man of twenty years who has not married a woman

shall be

all his days in transgression,”

as explained below, and Rav Hamnuna was already twenty years old. Therefore, Rav Huna did not want him to see his face.

And we question the statement that we brought in the name of Rav Huna:

“In transgression”—does this enter your mind?

Would it enter your mind to say that a person who did not marry a woman would actually be in transgression? Is he not sitting and doing nothing?!

Rather, say

say that Rav Huna said as follows: A man of twenty years who has not married a woman shall be

all his days “in thoughts” of transgression

and not in actual transgression.

And the Gemara brings additional statements concerning this matter:

A.

Rava said, and likewise the tanney

in a beraita

of the house of

[from the house of]

Rabbi Yishmael: Until

the age of

twenty years, the Holy One, blessed is He, sits and waits for a person, asking when he will marry a woman,

and

once he reaches

the age of

twenty and has not married, He says

the Holy One, blessed is He:

May his bones swell!

B.

Rav Ḥisda said: The reason that I am superior to my colleagues,

the reason that I am greater than my colleagues is

that I married at sixteen,

that I married a woman at the age of sixteen.