Kiddushin 29b (כט:) — the Talmud in English

However, Rabbi Yirmeya explained Rabbi Yehuda’s statement differently:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: Everyone agrees

that

wherever there are not

any,

in any case where a person has no assets

except

the value of

five sela

alone, then certainly

he takes precedence over his son.

What is the reason? —

Because

the mitzva that concerns his own person takes precedence;

the mitzva concerning his own person takes precedence.

And

when they disagree,

the matter over which they disagree is

where there are,

for example, where he had land worth ten sela and sold land worth five sela before his son was born, so that he now has before him

five liened properties,

and he also had in his possession

five unencumbered properties,

assets worth five sela that he had in his possession [and had not sold to others].

And the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda disagree as to what he should do with those five unencumbered sela in his possession: The Sages maintain that he should redeem himself with them. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that he should redeem his son.

And the explanation of their disagreement is as follows:

Since we have already said that everyone agrees that the mitzva concerning his own person takes precedence, it is certainly impossible that a person should first redeem his son with the five unencumbered sela in his possession, unless the koen can collect the five liened properties for his own redemption.

Now, a creditor who wishes to collect his debt from liened property may collect only if the loan was documented in a deed. But an oral loan cannot be collected from purchasers.

The debt of five sela that a person owes the koen for his own redemption is not documented in a deed. If so, seemingly, it should be said that the koen cannot collect it from liened property.

However, there is a special reason to say that the koen can nevertheless collect the redemption payment from liened property:

Rabbi Yehuda held:

A loan

that is written in the Torah is considered like one documented in a deed.

That is, any debt that the Torah imposed upon a person, such as the redemption of the firstborn, is considered a loan documented in a deed and can be collected from liened property.

In the case before us, since the person sold his assets after he had reached maturity and had already become obligated to redeem himself, it follows that the five sela in the purchasers’ possession are subject to a lien in favor of the koen, who can collect his redemption payment from them.

But the koen cannot collect the redemption payment for that person’s son from the land worth five sela in the purchasers’ possession, because the purchasers acquired the land before his son was born. The assets are not subject to that debt.

It follows that if he redeems himself with the five sela in his possession, he will be unable to fulfill the mitzva of redeeming his son, since the koen cannot collect the redemption payment for his son from the purchasers.

Therefore,

with these five, he redeems his son.

With those five sela in his possession, he redeems himself.

And

afterward, when he no longer has assets with which to redeem himself,

the koen will go and seize the five

liened properties for him,

the koen will go and seize five sela from the purchasers for his own redemption.

But this still requires examination: How is he permitted to take precedence and redeem his son with the five sela in his possession? Does he not thereby cause the purchasers an unjustified loss and distress? After all, the assets in their possession are subject only to the lien for his own redemption, and he could have redeemed himself from the assets in his possession without causing his redemption payment to be collected from them!

To answer this, Rabbi Yehuda said: “This is his mitzva incumbent upon his father, whereas that is his son’s mitzva incumbent upon him,” meaning: His son’s mitzva is incumbent upon him more than his own mitzva; therefore, he is permitted to give precedence to his son’s redemption over his own redemption.

And the Sages hold: A loan written in the Torah

such as the redemption of the firstborn

is not considered like one written in a deed;

rather, it is like an oral loan, and it cannot be collected from purchasers. It follows that if he redeems his son with the five sela in his possession, he will be unable to redeem himself, since the koen will be unable to collect the five liened sela.

And therefore,

since he can perform only one redemption,

the mitzva concerning his own person takes precedence.

The Gemara brings another disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda concerning the redemption of the firstborn, similar to the disagreement cited above:

The Sages taught:

A person upon whom two mitzvot are incumbent,

to redeem his son and to ascend for the Festival pilgrimage,

and both mitzvot entail financial expenditure—for to redeem his son he needs five sela, and to ascend for the pilgrimage he needs money for travel expenses—and he does not have enough money for both, which of them takes precedence?

The first tanna says:

He redeems

now

his son, and afterward,

when he obtains money,

he ascends for the pilgrimage.

And

Rabbi Yehuda says: He ascends

now

for the pilgrimage.

And afterward,

when he obtains money,

he redeems his son.

Because

this

is the mitzva of ascending for the pilgrimage

a time-bound mitzva,

and if he delays fulfilling it now, he will not be able to fulfill it later.

Whereas this

mitzva of redeeming the firstborn is

not a time-bound mitzva.

Even if he refrains from fulfilling it now, he can fulfill it later.

The Gemara discusses this:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, his reason is as he stated.

Indeed, Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is understood, as he himself explained in the beraita.

But the Sages—

what is their reason?

What is the reason for the Sages’ statement? Why did they say that he redeems his son and only afterward ascends for the pilgrimage?

And we answer: Because

the verse says [Exodus 34:20]:

[Exodus 34:20]:

“Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem,” and afterward

immediately afterward, in the same verse, it is written

“and they shall not appear before Me empty-handed.”

The order of the verse indicates that first a person must redeem his son and only afterward ascend for the pilgrimage.

The beraita now brings another exposition of the verse, “Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem.”

The Sages taught: From where

do we know

that if he had

a person

five sons from five women,

and each of these sons is the firstborn of his mother but is not the firstborn of his father, from where do we know

that he is obligated to redeem

them

all,

even though they are not firstborn with regard to him?

The verse states [ibid.]:

[there]:

“Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem,”

the word “every” includes anyone who is not the firstborn of his father but only of his mother.

The beraita is challenged: Why was it necessary to derive this from the word “every”?

It is obvious

that the law of the redemption of the firstborn depends upon the mother and not the father, for

the Merciful One made it dependent upon the opening of the womb.

The law of the redemption of the firstborn is stated concerning “the one who opens the womb” , that is, the child who emerges first from his mother’s womb; it follows that everything depends upon the mother and not the father!

And we answer:

What might you say?

Perhaps you would say:

Let us derive

the definition of “firstborn” with regard to the redemption of the firstborn by means of a gzera shava of

“firstborn” “firstborn” from inheritance.

The term “firstborn” is mentioned with regard to the redemption of the firstborn,

and the term “firstborn” is also stated with regard to the inheritance of the firstborn:

Just as there,

with regard to inheritance, it is stated that the firstborn is

“the first fruit of his potency”

of the father, so that with regard to inheritance everything depends upon the father and not the mother,

so too

the firstborn mentioned

here,

with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, means

the first fruit of his potency

of the father.

It teaches us,

the verse comes and teaches us, through the word “every” in “Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem,” that the redemption of the firstborn depends upon the mother.

We learned in a beraita: The father is obligated with regard to his son

to teach him Torah.

The Gemara explains from where we know that the father is obligated in this:

From where do we know it,

from where did we learn this?

From that which

is written [Deuteronomy 11:19]:

[Deuteronomy 11:19]:

“And you shall teach them to your sons.”

And the Gemara adds:

And where his father did not teach him, he is obligated to teach himself.

If it happened that the father did not teach his son, the son himself is obligated to study Torah once he reaches maturity.

And the source of this law is:

As it is written [Deuteronomy 5:1]: “Hear, Israel, the statutes and the ordinances,”

[Deuteronomy 5:1]: “Hear, Israel, the statutes and the ordinances

and you shall learn

them and observe them to perform them.” The verse indicates that a person is commanded to study Torah himself.

The Gemara now explains from where our Mishna learned that a woman is not commanded to teach her son Torah:

As for her, from where do we know that she is not obligated,

from where do we know that the mother is not obligated in this?

And we answer:

As it is written, “And you shall teach

them to your sons,” and the word “you shall teach” is written in the Torah in defective spelling [without the letter yod], and it can also be read as though it said “and you shall learn” [with the letter lamed vocalized with a sheva]. Since both matters are derived from a single word, they are to be equated with one another; therefore,

anyone who is commanded to learn

himself [“and you shall learn”]

is commanded

also

to teach

also his son. But a woman, who is not commanded to learn herself, as will be explained below, is likewise not commanded to teach her son.

The Gemara immediately asks: We assumed simply that a woman is not commanded to study herself, but this too requires examination:

And as for her, from where do we know that she is not obligated to teach herself?

From where do we know this very point—that a woman is not commanded to study Torah herself?

And we answer:

As it is written

in this verse, “and you shall teach,” and this can be read in two ways: a.

“And you shall teach.”

b.

“And you shall learn.”

And they are to be equated with one another with regard to an additional matter:

Anyone whom others

[the father]

are commanded to teach,

he too

is commanded to teach himself. And anyone whom others

[the father]

are not commanded to teach,

he too

is not commanded to teach himself.

As for a woman, her father is not obligated to teach her Torah [as will be explained below], and therefore she too is not obligated to study herself once she reaches maturity.

The Gemara immediately asks:

And from where

is it obvious to us

that others are not commanded to teach her?

The Gemara answers: Because

the verse says

:

“And you shall teach them to your sons.”

This indicates specifically your sons, but not

your daughters.

And in connection with the discussion of the father’s obligation to teach his son and a person’s obligation to study himself, the Gemara cites a beraita discussing which of these obligations takes precedence:

The Sages taught:

A person upon whom two obligations rest, namely,

he

must

study, and his son

is obligated

to study,

but he is unable to fulfill more than one of them, which of them takes precedence?

He takes precedence over his son.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If his son is quick and sharp, and his learning endures in his possession,

then

his son takes precedence over him.

And the Gemara cites an incident involving Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov, who held that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda:

A similar incident,

like the incident

involving Rav Yaakov, son of Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov, whom his father sent to Abaye,

at first his father, Rav Aḥa, sent him to study Torah from Abaye, and

when he came,

when Rav Yaakov returned home,

he saw that his learning was not sharp,

his father saw that his studies were not clear in his possession, and then

he said to him: I am superior to you.

You stay here, and I will go.

I am more astute than you. Therefore, you remain at home, and I will go study from Abaye.

Incidentally, the Gemara continues and relates what happened when Rav Aḥa came to study before Abaye:

Abaye heard that he was coming,

that Rav Aḥa was coming to study with him,

there was a certain harmful spirit in Abaye’s house of study,

there was a harmful spirit that regularly inhabited the house of study where Abaye’s students studied, and the power of that harmful spirit was so great

that when two students entered, they were harmed even during the day,

when two students entered, they were harmed by it even during the day.

And when Rav Aḥa arrived,

Abaye said to them

to his students:

Let no one provide him with lodging; perhaps a miracle will occur!

No one should host Rav Aḥa in his home, and he will necessarily have to spend the night in the house of study; due to Rav Aḥa’s piety, it is possible that a miracle will occur and he will kill the harmful spirit.

And indeed, this is what happened.

He went in,

Rav Aḥa entered the house of study,

and he came

and spent the night

in that house of study,

in that house of study. And that harmful spirit appeared before him.

It appeared to him in the form of a serpent with seven heads,

it appeared before him in the form of a serpent with seven heads.

Rav Aḥa prayed that the harmful spirit should be killed, and

with every bow that he bowed

in his prayer,

one of its heads fell off,

one head fell from the harmful spirit, until all its heads had fallen off and it died.

Rav Aḥa said to them

to Abaye’s students

the next day: Had a miracle not occurred, you would have endangered me!

Had a miracle not occurred for me, you would have endangered me. The Gemara cites another baraita, which was stated adjacent to the baraita cited above [“If he is to study and his son is to study”].

The Sages taught:

A person upon whom two mitzvot devolve:

to study Torah and to marry a woman,

first

he should study Torah, and afterward marry a woman.

But if it is impossible for him to remain without a wife

because his inclination overpowers him, then, first,

he should marry a woman, and afterward study Torah.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is: he marries

a

woman

so that sinful thoughts will not enter his heart,

and afterward he studies Torah.

Whereas

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

How can a person marry a woman and then study Torah? Are

millstones

placed

around his neck, and he will engage in Torah study?!

That is, he is responsible for providing for his household, so how can he engage in Torah study? Rather, he should study Torah and only afterward marry a woman.

And they do not disagree,

Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan do not disagree with one another; rather, each of them spoke only about the people of his own locale:

Here, for us,

what Shmuel said—that one should marry a woman and afterward study Torah—Shmuel said to the people of his locale in Babylonia, because they were accustomed, after marrying, to leave their homes and travel to Eretz Yisrael to review Mishnayot from the tannaim who lived there. Since they were not at home, the needs of the household did not devolve upon them, and they could engage in Torah study even after marriage. Therefore, it was preferable for them to marry first and be free of sinful thoughts.

And there, for them,

what Rabbi Yoḥanan said, “Are millstones around his neck, and he will engage in Torah study?” applies to the people of his locale, in Eretz Yisrael, because they were accustomed to studying Torah in their own cities. If they married first, the needs of the household would devolve upon them and cause them to neglect their studies. Therefore, it was preferable for them to study Torah before marrying. And now the Gemara explains at what age a person is forbidden to delay marrying a woman:

Rav Ḥisda praised

before

Rav Huna Rav Hamnuna, saying that he was a great man.

Rav Huna said to him

Rav Huna said to Rav Ḥisda:

When

Rav Hamnuna

comes to you, bring him to me

so that I may meet him.

When he came,

when Rav Hamnuna came before Rav Huna,

he saw that he was not spreading a cloth over his head,

Rav Huna saw that Rav Hamnuna was not covering his head with a cloth, as married men were accustomed to do.

Rav Huna said to him

Rav Huna said to him:

Why are you not spreading a cloth over your head?

Why do you not cover your head with a cloth?

He said to him,

Rav Hamnuna replied to him: Because

I have not married,

because I have not married a woman.

He turned his face away from him,

Rav Huna turned his face away from Rav Hamnuna. And

he said to him: See that you will not see my face until you marry,

take heed that you will not look upon my face until you marry.

And

Rav Huna

acted in this way

in accordance with his approach,

according to his position,

as he said: “One who is twenty years old and has not married,

let

all his days be in sin”

[as explained below], and Rav Hamnuna was already twenty years old. Therefore, Rav Huna did not want him to see his face until he married.

And we raise a difficulty concerning the statement cited in the name of Rav Huna:

“In sin”—can it enter your mind?

Would it enter your mind to say that a person who has not married is actually in a state of sin? After all, he is merely sitting and doing nothing!

Rather, say

that Rav Huna said as follows: One who is twenty years old and has not married, let

all his days be in “sinful thoughts”

[and not in actual sin].

The Gemara cites further statements concerning this matter:

a.

Rava said, and likewise a baraita was taught

in the

house of

[the household of]

Rabbi Yishmael: Until

the age of

twenty years, the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and waits for a person to marry a woman.

And

once he reaches

the age of

twenty and has not married, He says:

the Holy One, Blessed be He:

May his bones swell!

b.

Rav Ḥisda said: The reason that I am superior to my colleagues

is

that I married at sixteen,

that I married at the age of sixteen.