Kiddushin 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

But

in the case of an ordinary person

, if a person says, “This ox is given to so-and-so [an ordinary person

does not acquire it

until he pulls

the ox,

and

until he

takes possession

of it.

This is the explanation of what we learned in the Mishna: “His declaration to the Most High is like his transfer to an ordinary person”; that is: just as an ordinary person acquires an item when the money or property reaches his possession through pulling or taking possession , so too the authority of the Most High acquires it through a declaration alone, without any additional act of acquisition.

Thus far, the beraita has explained the wording of our Mishna.

The implication of the Mishna is that there are two forms of acquisition that acquire an item for hekdesh but do not acquire it for an ordinary person: a. Money [for movable property]. b. A declaration.

The beraita elaborates on the matter of acquisition through money in the case of hekdesh:

a. If a person wished to redeem an object from hekdesh—that is, to pay its value to hekdesh and acquire it for himself—and it happened that he

pulled it

from the treasurer

when it was

still worth

one hundred zuz, but he did not manage to redeem it

[to give its value]

until

it became more expensive and

was worth two hundred

, he gives hekdesh

two hundred.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Because hekdesh acquires or sells only through acquisition by money, and not through pulling. With regard to hekdesh it is stated:

“And he shall give the money, and it shall be his.” Thus, as long as he has not paid the money to hekdesh, he has not yet acquired the object. Now, after he pulled it and comes to pay hekdesh and thereby redeem it, it is already worth two hundred; therefore, he must pay for the object according to its value at the time of acquisition, which is the time of payment, and not the time when he pulled it from hekdesh.

The beraita continues:

b. If he

pulled it when it was

worth

two hundred, but did not manage to redeem it until

it became cheaper and

was worth one hundred

, he also

gives

hekdesh

two hundred, according to what it was worth at the time of pulling.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Why does he pay two hundred?

Why indeed does he pay two hundred? Pulling does not acquire an item for hekdesh; it follows that he did not acquire it until its price fell, and therefore he should pay only one hundred, its value at the time of acquisition, which is the time of payment!

The Gemara answers: because the Sages stated a principle:

“The power of an ordinary person shall not be stronger

than the power of

hekdesh.”

That is: when someone acquires an object from an ordinary person and pulls it while it is worth two hundred, and its price then falls, he pays two hundred, because pulling acquires the object from an ordinary person, and he must pay according to the value of the object at the time of acquisition.

Therefore, it is not proper for the power of hekdesh to be weaker than that of an ordinary person. Accordingly, the Sages instituted that even one who acquires an object from hekdesh, pulls it while it is worth two hundred, and its price then falls, is obligated to pay two hundred zuz, even if the object became cheaper before payment. Thus far, the beraita spoke of someone who pulled an object from hekdesh before paying its value. The beraita now discusses someone who paid hekdesh for an object before pulling it:

a.

If he redeemed it

from hekdesh [by giving its value to the treasurer]

when

it was still worth

two hundred, but did not manage to pull it

from the domain of hekdesh

until

its price fell and it was worth

one hundred, he gives two hundred.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Because hekdesh acquires through money, as it is stated:

“And he shall give the money, and it shall be his.”

At the time the money was given, the object was worth two hundred, and he must pay its value at the time of acquisition.

The beraita continues:

b.

If he redeemed it when

it was still worth

one hundred, but did not manage to pull it until it became worth two hundred, what he redeemed is redeemed, and he gives no more

to hekdesh than

one hundred.

This is because hekdesh acquires through money, and at the time the money was given the object was worth only one hundred.

We ask:

Why?

Why does he not pay hekdesh two hundred? If one pulled an object from hekdesh when it was worth two hundred and its price fell before he paid its value, he pays two hundred, according to its value at the time of pulling, because “the power of an ordinary person shall not be stronger than the power of hekdesh. And if so,

here too

, when he paid hekdesh in exchange for an object worth one hundred and its price rose before he pulled it,

let us say

[let it be said]

“The power of an ordinary person shall not be stronger than the power of hekdesh,”

and let him pay two hundred, according to its value at the time of pulling!

We answer: An ordinary person also cannot retract after giving the money, even if he did not pull the object. However, if he retracts from the transaction, his retraction is effective.

Is that so?

That is, does

an ordinary person

who wishes to retract after giving money

not stand under

“He Who exacted payment”

?

Does he not thereby accept upon himself the curse of “He Who exacted payment”?! Certainly he does!

Since an ordinary person cannot retract after giving money without accepting a curse, hekdesh too, having received one hundred for an object whose price then rose, does not retract from the redemption. Therefore, the owners need not add anything.

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains with regard to which mitzvot women are obligated and with regard to which they are exempt. Five principles are stated concerning this:

a.

Every

mitzva included in

“the mitzvot of the son upon the father,”

as will be explained in the Gemara,

men are obligated

in it,

and women are exempt.

b.

Every

mitzva included in

“the mitzvot of the father upon the son,”

and this principle too will be explained in the Gemara,

both men and women are obligated

in it.

c.

Every positive mitzva

whose performance is occasioned by time,

meaning that time causes it to occur, such as eating matza on Pesaḥ and the like,

men are obligated, and women are exempt.

d.

Every positive mitzva not occasioned by time,

such as the mitzva of mezuzah, returning a lost object, and the like,

both men and women are obligated.

e.

Every negative mitzva, whether or not its performance is occasioned by time,

both men and women are obligated.

Except for

the following mitzvot, for although they are negative mitzvot, women are nevertheless exempt from them:

a.

“You shall not round”

—the mitzva not to round off the corners of the head.

b.

And “you shall not destroy”

—the mitzva not to destroy the corners of the beard.

c.

And “you shall not defile yourself for the dead”

—the mitzva stated with regard to kohanim that they may not contract corpse impurity.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “All the mitzvot of the son upon the father: men are obligated and women are exempt.”

The Gemara explains what the Mishna intended:

We discussed this:

What does “all the mitzvot of the son upon the father” mean?

At first glance, it could be explained as follows: all the mitzvot that the son is commanded to perform for his father, namely honoring one’s father and mother and revering them. Men are obligated and women are exempt.

But the Gemara rejects this and says:

If you say

that this is what the tanna intended to say:

“All the mitzvot that a son is obligated to perform for his father,”

all the mitzvot that a son is obligated to perform for his father, then this is difficult:

Are

women exempt

from these mitzvot?

But it was taught

in a beraita that women are obligated!

For it was taught: It is stated in the Torah concerning the mitzva of revering one’s father and mother [Leviticus 19:3]: “Every man shall fear his father and his mother.”

“A man.”

I know only that a man

is obligated, but not a woman.

From where

do I know that a woman is also obligated to revere her father and mother?

Since the verse addresses a “man,” it should have said, “A man, his father and mother shall you fear” [in the singular]. Why does it say “you shall fear” [in the plural]?

Therefore,

when it says “you shall fear”

[in the plural],

there are two here,

a man and a woman. Thus, a woman too is commanded to revere her father and mother.

These are the words of the beraita.

We learn from the words of the beraita that women are commanded regarding the mitzva of revering one’s father and mother. Therefore, it cannot be said that our Mishna intended to refer to all the mitzvot that a son is commanded to perform for his father, and to say that women are exempt.

The question raised above returns: What does “all the mitzvot of the son upon the father” mean?

Rav Yehuda said: This is what it means,

this is what the tanna intended to say:

“All the mitzvot that the father is obligated to perform for his son,

as will be explained below—

men are obligated and women are exempt.”

We have already learned this

, Rav Yehuda’s explanation of our Mishna, in a beraita as well.

The Gemara cites a beraita explaining which mitzvot a father is obligated to perform for his son:

For the Sages taught,

that is: in light of Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of our Mishna, support for what was taught in the following beraita can be found in the Mishna:

And so we learned in a beraita:

The father is obligated regarding his son to circumcise him, and

if he is a firstborn, he is obligated

to redeem him

[the redemption of the firstborn],

and

he is obligated

to teach him Torah, to marry him to a woman, and to teach him a trade; and some say: even to teach him to swim,

to teach him how to swim, lest he travel on a ship and the ship sink, and if he does not know how to swim, he will be in danger.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone

who

does not teach his son a trade

teaches him banditry

[robbery].

The Gemara immediately expresses astonishment at Rabbi Yehuda’s statement: “He teaches him

banditry

—could this enter your mind?

Can it enter your mind that he teaches him banditry? He merely sits and teaches him nothing!

Rather,

Rabbi Yehuda must have said this: Anyone who does not teach his son a trade

is as though

he

teaches him banditry.

Since he is not proficient in any trade, it may be that he will have no livelihood, and hunger will cause him to rob people.

These are the words of the beraita.

The Gemara now explains: [a] From where did the beraita learn that a father is obligated to perform each of these mitzvot for his son? [b] From where did the Mishna learn that only the father is obligated in this, and not the mother?

We learned in the beraita: The father is obligated regarding his son

to circumcise him,

and it was explained in our Mishna that only the father is obligated in this, and not the mother.

From where do we know

that the father is obligated to circumcise his son?

As it is written

[Genesis 21:4]:

“And Abraham circumcised Isaac his son

as God had commanded him.” From here it follows that a father is commanded to circumcise his son.

The Gemara adds and explains that at times the obligation to circumcise the son rests upon others:

And where his father did not circumcise him, the court is obligated to circumcise him,

if it happened that the father did not circumcise his son, the court is obligated to circumcise him.

As it is written

[Genesis 17:10]:

“Every male among you shall be circumcised.”

And where the court did not circumcise him, he is obligated to circumcise himself.

If it happened that the court did not circumcise him, he is obligated to circumcise himself when he grows up,

as it is written

[ibid., verse 14]:

“An uncircumcised male who will not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off

from his people.” From here it follows that he himself is obligated to circumcise himself.

The Gemara now explains how our Mishna learned that a woman is not obligated to circumcise her son:

As for her, from where do we know that she is not obligated?

From where do we know that a woman is not commanded in this?

It is stated concerning circumcision [Genesis 21:4]: “And Abraham circumcised Isaac his son,

as God commanded ‘him.’”

The word “him” is a limiting expression, teaching you that only

“him,”

Abraham, the father, did God command to circumcise his son,

and not

“her,”

Sarah, the mother.

The Gemara returns to discuss what was stated above, that the source of the father’s obligation to circumcise his son is the verse: “And Abraham circumcised Isaac his son, as God commanded him”:

We have found an immediate obligation,

indeed, we find that at that time Abraham was commanded to circumcise his son. But

from where do we know it applies for generations,

from where do we know that all Israel throughout the generations is likewise obligated in this?

This can be learned from the following beraita:

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael

—a tanna who learned in the study hall of Rabbi Yishmael—taught:

Every place where it is stated

in the Torah the expression

“command,”

it is only

an expression of

urgency,

teaching that a person should be quick and diligent in the matter. And it applies

immediately

at that time,

and

it also applies

for generations

after him.

And the tanna brings a source for his statement: [a] “Command” is an expression of

“urging”

—

as it is written

: “And command Joshua: ‘Strengthen him and fortify him.’” Thus, the expression “command” is stated in the context of strengthening and fortifying, meaning that he should strengthen himself to act with alacrity in the matter.

Thus, the expression “command” is used in the context of strengthening and encouraging—that is, that he should strengthen himself to act promptly in the matter.

And it applies

immediately and for all generations

—

as it is written

: “From the day that the Lord commanded and onward, throughout your generations.”

From here it follows that wherever an expression of command is stated, it applies from that day onward, for all generations.

And since, in the matter of circumcision, “commanded” was stated, as above, it can be learned from this that the mitzva of circumcision applies immediately and for all generations.

We learned in a beraita: The father is obligated with regard to his son

to redeem him.

[a] The Gemara explains from where we know that the father is obligated to redeem his son:

And we inquire:

From where do we derive this,

from where did we learn this?

And we answer:

As it is written

:

“You shall redeem every firstborn of your sons.”

The Gemara adds:

And where his father did not redeem him, he himself is obligated to redeem himself,

if it happened that the father did not redeem his son, the son himself is obligated to redeem himself when he grows up.

And the source of this law is:

As it is written

:

“You shall surely redeem

the firstborn of man.” The repetition of the expression teaches that the son too is obligated to redeem himself if his father did not redeem him.

[b] The Gemara explains from where our Mishna learned that a woman is not obligated to redeem her son:

And we inquire about it:

And as for her, from where do we know that she was not commanded,

from where do we know that the woman was not commanded in this matter?

And we answer:

As it is written “

you shall redeem,” without vocalization. This can be read in two ways: [a]

“You shall be redeemed,”

when the letter pe is vocalized with a kamatz, implying that the mitzva is incumbent upon the firstborn to redeem himself . [b] [b]

“You shall redeem,”

when the letter pe is vocalized with a sheva, implying that another person is to redeem him. And since both matters are learned from one word, they are to be compared with one another; therefore,

everyone

who

is commanded to redeem himself

is commanded to redeem others, and anyone who is not commanded to redeem himself is not commanded to redeem others.

And a woman is not commanded to redeem herself, and therefore she is not commanded to redeem others [her son].

And immediately the Gemara asks: We have stated simply that a woman is not commanded to redeem herself. But this still requires examination:

And as for her, from where do we know that she is not obligated to redeem herself?

From where do we know this very matter—that a woman is not commanded to redeem herself?

And we answer:

As it is written “

you shall redeem,” and this can be read in two ways: [a]

“You shall redeem”

[others], [b]

“You shall be redeemed”

[you yourself], as above. And they are to be compared with one another with regard to an additional matter:

Anyone whom others are commanded to redeem is commanded to redeem himself.

And anyone whom others are not commanded to redeem is not commanded to redeem himself.

And with regard to a woman, her father is not obligated to redeem her [as will be explained below], and therefore she too is not obligated to redeem herself once she grows up.

And immediately the Gemara asks:

And from where

is it obvious to us

that others are not commanded to redeem her?

The Gemara answers: Because

the verse states

:

“You shall redeem every firstborn ‘of your sons.’”

This implies:

Your sons, but not your daughters.

And in connection with the discussion of the father’s obligation to redeem his firstborn son, and the firstborn’s obligation to redeem himself, the Gemara cites a beraita that discusses which obligation takes precedence:

The Sages taught:

A man upon whom both of the aforementioned obligations rest—that is,

he

must

redeem

himself, because his father did not redeem him, and he also has a son who was born to him,

and his son

is incumbent upon him

to redeem.

But he can perform only one redemption, which of them takes precedence?

He takes precedence over his son,

and he should redeem himself.

But

Rabbi Yehuda says: His son takes precedence,

because

this one,

he himself,

his mitzva

was incumbent

upon his father.

And this one,

his son,

the mitzva

of redeeming

his son

is incumbent

upon him.

And seemingly, Rabbi Yehuda’s intention was to say that the mitzva incumbent upon him to circumcise his son is always more important than the mitzva of his own redemption, which in essence was incumbent upon his father.