Kiddushin 29a — the Talmud in English

But

with an ordinary person

, if a person said, “This ox is given to so-and-so [an ordinary person],”

he has not acquired it

(precise page location)

until he pulls

the ox,

and

until he

takes possession

in the house.

And this is the meaning of what we learned: “His statement to the sacred domain is like his delivery to an ordinary person,” meaning: just as an ordinary person acquires when the money has reached his hand through pulling or taking possession, so the sacred domain acquires even through a statement alone, without any additional acquisition.

Thus far the beraita explained the wording of our Mishna.

What emerges from the words of the Mishna is that there are two acquisitions by which one acquires in consecrated property but does not acquire with an ordinary person: a. money [with movable property]. b. a statement.

And the beraita elaborates on the matter of acquisition through money in consecrated property:

a. If a person wished to redeem an object from consecrated property, meaning: to pay its value to the consecrated property and acquire it for himself, and it happened that he

pulled

it from the treasurer

while

it was still worth

one hundred zuz, and he did not manage to redeem it

[to give its value]

until

it became more expensive and

stood at two hundred.

He gives the consecrated property

two hundred.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Because consecrated property acquires or sells only through acquisition by money and not through pulling. It is stated concerning consecrated property:

“And he shall give the money, and it shall be his.”

It follows that as long as he has not paid the money to the consecrated property, he has not yet acquired the object. And now, after he pulled it and came to pay the consecrated property and thereby redeem it, it is already worth two hundred; therefore he must pay for the object according to its value at the time of acquisition, which is the time of payment and not the time of pulling it from consecrated property.

And the beraita continues and says:

b. If he

pulled it while

it was still worth

two hundred, and he did not manage to redeem it until

it became cheaper and

stood at one hundred

, also

he gives

to the consecrated property

two hundred

, according to what it was worth at the time of pulling.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Why does he pay two hundred? Does pulling not acquire in consecrated property? It follows that he did not acquire it until it became cheaper, and if so, he should pay only one hundred, according to what it was worth at the time of acquisition, which is the time of payment!

And the Gemara answers this: because the Sages stated a principle:

“The power of an ordinary person shall not be more stringent

than the power of

consecrated property.”

That is, one who buys an object from an ordinary person and pulls it while it is still worth two hundred, and it becomes cheaper, pays two hundred, because pulling acquires with an ordinary person, and he must pay according to the value of the object at the time of acquisition.

Therefore, it is not fitting that the power of consecrated property should be less than the power of an ordinary person. Consequently, they ordained that one who also buys an object from consecrated property and pulls it while it is still worth two hundred, and it becomes cheaper, is obligated to pay two hundred zuz, even if the object became cheaper before the payment. Thus far the beraita spoke of a person who pulled an object from consecrated property before paying its value. And now the beraita discusses a person who paid the consecrated property for an object before pulling it:

a.

If he redeemed it

from consecrated property [by giving its value to the treasurer]

while

it was still worth

two hundred, and he did not manage to pull it

from the domain of consecrated property

until

it became cheaper and stood

at one hundred, he gives two hundred.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Because consecrated property acquires through money, as it is stated:

“And he shall give the money, and it shall be his.”

And at the time of giving the money the object was worth two hundred. He must pay its value at the time of acquisition.

And the beraita continues and says:

b.

If he redeemed it while

it was still worth

one hundred, and he did not manage to pull it until it stood at two hundred, what he redeemed is redeemed, and he gives

to the consecrated property only

one hundred.

Because consecrated property acquires through acquisition by money, and at the time of giving the money the object was worth only one hundred.

And we raise an objection:

Why?

Why does he not pay the consecrated property two hundred? After all, if he pulled an object from consecrated property when it was worth two hundred, and it became cheaper before he paid its value, he pays two hundred, as at the time of pulling, because of “The power of an ordinary person shall not be more stringent than the power of consecrated property.” And if so,

here too

, also when he paid the consecrated property in exchange for an object worth one hundred, and it became more expensive before the pulling,

let us say

[let it be said]

“The power of an ordinary person shall not be more stringent than the power of consecrated property,”

and let him pay two hundred according to its value at the time of pulling!

And we resolve it: an ordinary person too cannot retract after giving the money, even if he did not pull it; rather, if he retracts from the transaction, his retraction is a retraction.

Is that so

, that is,

an ordinary person

who wishes to retract after giving money

is he not subject to

“May He who exacted payment”

?

Is he not thereby accepting upon himself the curse of “May He who exacted payment” ?! Certainly so!

And since an ordinary person cannot retract after giving money without accepting a curse, therefore even consecrated property, which received one hundred for an object that became more expensive, does not retract from the redemption; therefore, the owners need not add anything.

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains with regard to which mitzvot women are obligated and with regard to which of them women are exempt. Five principles were stated concerning this:

a.

Every

mitzva that is included in

“the mitzvot of the son upon the father,”

and what is included in this will be explained in the Gemara,

men are obligated

in it,

and women are exempt.

b.

And every

mitzva that is included in

“the mitzvot of the father upon the son,”

and this principle too will be explained in the Gemara,

both men and women are obligated

in it.

c.

And every positive mitzva

whose performance is caused by time,

where time causes it to come about, such as eating matza on Passover and the like,

men are obligated, and women are exempt.

d.

And every positive mitzva not caused by time,

such as the mitzva of mezuzah, returning a lost object, and the like,

both men and women are obligated.

e.

And every negative mitzva, whether caused by time or not caused by time,

both men and women are obligated.

Except for

the following mitzvot, for although they are negative mitzvot, nevertheless women are exempt from them:

a.

“Do not round off” —

the mitzva not to round off the side-growth of the head .

b.

And “do not destroy” —

the mitzva not to destroy the side-growth of the beard .

c.

And “do not become impure for the dead” —

the mitzva stated with regard to kohanim, that they should not become impure with the impurity of the dead.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “All the mitzvot of the son upon the father: men are obligated and women are exempt.”

And the Gemara explains what the Mishna intended:

And we raised the matter:

What does “all the mitzvot of the son upon the father” mean?

And seemingly it could have been explained as follows: all the mitzvot that the son is commanded to perform for his father, namely honoring his father and mother and revering them. Men are obligated and women are exempt.

But the Gemara rejects this and says:

If you say

, if it is said that the tanna intended to say this:

all the mitzvot that a son is obligated to perform for his father,

all the mitzvot that the son is obligated to perform for his father, then this is difficult:

But are

women exempt

from these mitzvot?

And it was taught

in a beraita that women are obligated!

For it was taught: It is stated in the Torah concerning the mitzva of revering father and mother [Leviticus 19:3]: “Every man: his father and his mother shall you revere.”

“Man.”

I have only a man

and not a woman.

A woman, from where

do I know that she too is obligated in revering her father and mother?

Your answer: Since the verse speaks to “a man,” it should have said, “A man, his father and his mother shall you revere” [in the singular]. Why does it say “you shall revere” [in the plural]?

Therefore,

when it says “you shall revere”

[in the plural]

there are two here,

a man and a woman. And from here, the woman too is commanded to revere her father and her mother.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

We learned from the words of the beraita that women are commanded in the mitzva of revering father and mother. And if so, it cannot be said that our Mishna intended to say that women are exempt from all the mitzvot that the son is commanded to perform for his father.

The question above returns: What does “all the mitzvot of the son upon the father” mean?

Rav Yehuda said: This is what he is saying,

this is what the tanna intended to say:

all the mitzvot of the son that are imposed upon the father to perform for his son,

which will be explained below,

men are obligated and women are exempt.

We have learned this

—Rav Yehuda’s explanation of our Mishna—in a beraita as well.

And the Gemara cites a beraita explaining what mitzvot are imposed upon the father to perform for his son:

For the Sages taught,

that is, in light of what Rav Yehuda explained in our Mishna, there is support from the wording of the Mishna for what they taught in the following beraita:

And thus we learned in the beraita:

The father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and

if he is a firstborn, he is obligated

to redeem him

[the redemption of the firstborn],

and

he is obligated

to teach him Torah, to marry him to a woman, and to teach him a trade; and some say: also to teach him to swim,

to teach him how to swim, lest he travel on a ship and the ship sink, and if he does not know how to swim, he will be endangered.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Everyone

who

does not teach his son a trade

teaches him banditry

[robbery].

And immediately we are astonished at Rabbi Yehuda’s words: “He teaches him

banditry,”

can this enter your mind!?

Would it enter your mind that he teaches him banditry?! After all, he sits and teaches him nothing!

Rather,

necessarily, this is what Rabbi Yehuda said: anyone who does not teach his son a trade

is as though

he

teaches him banditry.

For since he is not skilled in any trade, it may happen that he will have no livelihood, and hunger will cause him to rob people.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

The Gemara now explains: [a] From where did the beraita learn that the father is charged to perform each of these mitzvot for his son? [b] From where did the Mishna learn that only the father is obligated in this and not the mother?

We learned in the beraita: the father is obligated with regard to his son

to circumcise him,

and it was explained in our Mishna that only the father is obligated in this and not the mother.

From where do we know

that the father is obligated to circumcise his son?

For it is written

[Genesis 21:4]:

“And Abraham circumcised Isaac his son

according to what God had commanded him.” From here, the father is commanded to circumcise his son.

And the Gemara adds and explains that sometimes the obligation to circumcise the son is imposed upon others:

And where his father did not circumcise him, the court is obligated to circumcise him,

if it happened that the father did not circumcise the son, the court is obligated to circumcise him.

For it is written

[Genesis 17:10]:

“Circumcise among you every male.”

And where the court did not circumcise him, he is obligated to circumcise himself.

If it happened that the court did not circumcise him, he is obligated to circumcise himself when he grows up,

for it is written

[there, verse 14]:

“And an uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off;

that soul from among its people.” From here, he himself is obligated to circumcise himself.

And now the Gemara explains from where our Mishna learned that a woman is not obligated to circumcise her son:

She, from where do we know that she is not obligated?

From where do we know that the woman is not commanded in this?

It is stated concerning circumcision [Genesis 21:4]: “And Abraham circumcised Isaac his son,

according to what God commanded ‘him.’”

The word “him” is restrictive, teaching you that only

“him,”

Abraham, the father, did God command to circumcise his son,

and not

“her,”

Sarah, the mother.

And the Gemara returns to discuss what we said above, that the source of the father’s obligation to circumcise his son is learned from what is stated: “And Abraham circumcised Isaac his son, according to what God commanded him”:

We find it immediately,

indeed we find that at that time Abraham was commanded to circumcise his son, but

for generations, from where do we know,

from where do we know that all Israel throughout its generations is obligated in this?

This may be learned from the following beraita:

The tanna of the academy of Rabbi Yishmael

—a tanna who learned in the academy of Rabbi Yishmael—taught:

Every place where it is stated

in the Torah the expression

“command,”

it is nothing other than

the expression of

urging,

teaching that a person should be quick and diligent in the matter. And it applies

immediately

at that time,

and

it also applies

for generations

after him.

And the tanna brings a source for his words: [a] “Command” is an expression of

“urging”

—

as it is written [Deuteronomy 3:28]:

“And command Joshua: ‘Strengthen him and fortify him.’”

Thus, the expression “command” was said in the context of strengthening and fortifying, that is: that he should strengthen himself to hasten in the matter.

And it applies

immediately and for generations

—

as it is written [Numbers 15:23]:

“From the day that the Lord commanded, and onward, throughout your generations.”

From here, every place where an expression of command is stated means from that day onward, for generations.

And since in the matter of circumcision “He commanded” was stated, as above, it is to be learned from this that the mitzva of circumcision applies immediately and for generations.

We learned in a beraita: The father is obligated concerning his son

to redeem him.

[a] The Gemara explains: From where do we know that the father is obligated to redeem his son?

And we ask:

From where do we know this,

from where did we learn this?

And we answer:

as it is written

[Exodus 34:20]:

“Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem.”

The Gemara adds:

And where his father did not redeem him, he is obligated to redeem himself,

if it happened that the father did not redeem his son, then the son himself is obligated to redeem himself when he grows up.

And the source of this law is:

as it is written

[Numbers 18:15]:

“Redeem, you shall redeem

the firstborn of man.” The repetition of the expression teaches that the son too is obligated to redeem himself if his father did not redeem him.

[b] The Gemara explains: From where did our Mishna learn that a woman is not obligated to redeem her son?

And we inquire concerning it:

And she, from where do we know that she was not commanded,

from where do we know that the woman was not commanded in this?

And we answer:

as it is written

“you shall redeem,” without vocalization. And this can be read in two ways: [a]

“you shall be redeemed,”

when the letter peh is vocalized with kamatz, and it means that there is a mitzva for the firstborn to redeem himself . [b]

“you shall redeem,”

when the letter peh is vocalized with sheva. And it means that there is a mitzva for another to redeem him. And since the two matters are learned from one word, they are to be compared with one another, and therefore,

every

one who

is commanded to redeem himself

is commanded to redeem others, and whoever is not commanded to redeem himself is not commanded to redeem others.

And a woman is not commanded to redeem herself, and therefore she is not commanded to redeem others [her son].

And immediately the Gemara asks: We stated simply that a woman is not commanded to redeem herself. But it is still necessary to discuss:

And she, from where do we know that she is not obligated to redeem herself?

From where do we know this very matter, that the woman is not commanded to redeem herself?

And we answer:

as it is written

“you shall redeem,” and this is to be read in two ways: [a]

“you shall redeem”

[others], [b]

“you shall be redeemed”

[yourself], as above, and they are to be compared with one another with regard to an additional matter:

Whoever others are commanded to redeem is commanded to redeem himself.

And whoever others are not commanded to redeem is not commanded to redeem himself.

And a woman—her father is not obligated to redeem her [as will be explained below]—and therefore she too is not obligated to redeem herself when she grows up.

And immediately the Gemara asks:

And from where

is it

clear to us that others are not commanded to redeem her?

The Gemara answers: Because

the verse says

[Exodus, there]:

“Every firstborn, ‘your sons,’ you shall redeem.”

And it means

your sons, but not your daughters.

And since we spoke concerning the father’s obligation to redeem his firstborn son, and the firstborn’s obligation to redeem himself, the Gemara brings a beraita discussing which obligation takes precedence:

The Sages taught:

A person upon whom the two aforementioned obligations fall, namely

he

must

redeem

himself, because his father did not redeem him. And a son was also born to him,

and his son

is incumbent upon him

to redeem.

And he is able to perform only one redemption, which of them takes precedence?

He takes precedence over his son,

and he should redeem himself.

But

Rabbi Judah says: His son takes precedence,

because

this one,

he himself,

his mitzva

was incumbent

upon his father.

And this one,

his son,

the mitzva

of redeeming

his son

is incumbent

upon him.

And ostensibly, it would appear that Rabbi Judah’s intention is to say that the mitzva incumbent upon him to circumcise his son is always more important than the mitzva of redeeming himself, which in its essence was incumbent upon his father.