Kiddushin 28b — the Talmud in English

Regarding this, the tanna taught: Any object other than currency—if the buyer gives it to the seller as an object of acquisition for an exchange transaction—then

once this person has acquired

the seller has acquired the object, the buyer acquires its exchange, and therefore

becomes liable

the buyer

for

accidental damage to the

exchange.

The tanna teaches us that although the verse says “a shoe,” which is significant as a utensil, nevertheless one does not say that an exchange transaction can be performed only with utensils. Even other movable property that is not a utensil can effect an acquisition through exchange.

The Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—brings support for Rav Yehuda’s statement:

This may also be inferred,

as even from our Mishna one may infer that the Mishna was not speaking about currency:

as it teaches,

as we learned later in the Mishna:

“How so?”

“If he exchanged an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox.”

It is explicitly clear from the Mishna that this is not referring to currency, but to an exchange involving other movable property that is not a utensil—for example, exchanging an ox for a cow, and the like.

Earlier, at the beginning of the discussion, the Gemara assumed that “anything whose value is established as money for another item” means currency. The Gemara challenged this assumption from the ruling in tractate Bava Metzia that currency cannot serve as an exchange.

This implies that according to those who say that currency can serve as an exchange, it would have been possible to explain that “anything whose value is established as money for another item” means currency.

The Gemara raises an objection to this:

But according to what initially entered our minds,

according to the initial understanding that the Mishna means

that currency can serve as an exchange,

there is a difficulty:

What does “How so?” mean?

How are we to explain the continuation of the Mishna, “How so? If he exchanged an ox for a cow”? Should not the tanna have said, “How so? If he exchanged money for a cow,” since this concerns an exchange performed through currency?

The Gemara answers: According to what initially entered our minds,

this is what he is saying:

This is what the tanna meant:

a. Currency can serve as an exchange.

b.

Produce also can effect

an

exchange.

In other words, although in the laws of exchange the verse says “his shoe,” meaning a utensil, nevertheless even something that is not a utensil can also effect an exchange. The verse mentioned “his shoe” only as an example. “

How so?

If he exchanged the meat of an ox for a cow, or the meat of a donkey for an ox”—

once this person has acquired

the ox’s meat,

his fellow becomes liable

to

for

accidental damage to the

exchange.”

The Gemara preferred to establish the Mishna as referring to ox meat rather than to a live ox, because ox meat does not resemble a utensil at all, since it is not fit for any kind of work. An ox itself, by contrast, somewhat resembles a utensil, since it is used for plowing and the like.

In any event, both according to the initial assumption and according to Rav Yehuda’s answer, the Gemara understood the latter clause [“How so? If he exchanged an ox for a cow,” and so on] according to its straightforward meaning: it refers to acquisition through exchange, such as exchanging an ox for a cow or the meat of an ox for a cow.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this: In tractate Bava Metzia [46b and elsewhere], Rav Sheshet and Rav Nahman disagree concerning exchange involving produce:

According to Rav Sheshet, an acquisition through exchange can be effected by means of produce.

According to Rav Nahman, however, an acquisition through exchange cannot be effected by means of produce, because it is stated concerning exchange: “his shoe,” and a shoe is considered a utensil. Similarly, all other exchanges can be effected only with a utensil.

An ox and a donkey are not utensils. Therefore, according to Rav Nahman, an acquisition through exchange cannot be effected with them. All the more so, ox meat or donkey meat, which is not fit for any kind of work, is certainly not fit for an acquisition through exchange according to Rav Nahman.

According to what the Gemara has assumed until now, the Mishna states that an exchange can be effected with an ox or with ox meat. If so, there is a difficulty:

That works well

and our Mishna is understandable

according to

the view of

Rav Sheshet, who says: Produce can effect an exchange.

But according to Rav Nahman, who says that produce cannot effect

an exchange, what can be said?

How are we to explain our Mishna? An ox and a donkey are like produce, not like utensils; so how can an exchange be effected with them?

The Gemara answers: According to Rav Nahman, the words of our Mishna must be explained in a new way:

Our Mishna is not discussing acquisition through exchange at all, but acquisition through money.

This is what he is saying,

this is what the tanna intended to say:

Although acquisition through “money” is not effective for movable property, nevertheless

there are forms of payment that

are exceptions and acquire the item

as though

they were an acquisition through

exchange,

with a shoe or other utensils [as explained below].

And this is how the wording of the Mishna is to be explained: “Anything whose value is established as money for another item”—that is, currency [as the Gemara understood it in its initial assumption above—sometimes the law stated, “Once this person has acquired [when the seller acquired the money], this person becomes liable for its exchange,” meaning that the buyer acquired the object as though this were an acquisition through exchange with utensils].

The Mishna explains:

How

is acquisition through money effective for movable property?

“If he exchanged the ‘payment for’ an ox for a cow, or the ‘payment for’ a donkey for an ox,”

for example: Reuven bought an ox from Shimon for one hundred zuz, drew the ox into his possession, and became obligated to pay one hundred zuz in return for it.

Shimon said to him: I want to buy a cow. Perhaps you have a cow to give me in place of the money you owe me?

Reuven replied: Yes. I have a cow, and it is worth one hundred zuz, or fifty.

Shimon then said to Reuven: The money you owe me—that is, the payment for the ox—is given to you in exchange for the cow.

At that moment, Shimon acquired the cow through acquisition by money, even though ordinarily acquisition by money is not effective for movable property.

The Gemara examines the matter:

What is the reason?

Why is the cow acquired through acquisition by “money”? Acquisition by money is not effective for movable property!

The Gemara answers: The tanna who taught our Mishna

follows the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan, who said: By Torah law, money acquires

movable property. The Sages enacted that money does not acquire; only pulling the item does.

And for what reason did they say

that the Sages

made pulling the item effective,

and not money? Because it could happen that a person pays money to another in order to purchase wheat from him, and before the buyer has time to pull the wheat and bring it into his possession, a fire breaks out in the seller’s house.

According to Torah law, under which the money acquires the item, the wheat already belongs to the buyer. The Sages were concerned

lest

the seller not make the effort to save the wheat from the fire, since it does not belong to him. And he

would say to him

the buyer: The wheat already belongs to you, not to me; therefore

“your wheat burned in the upper room,”

and I will lose nothing as a result.

Therefore, the Sages said that money does not completely acquire movable property, but either party may retract until the item is pulled into the buyer’s possession. Consequently, the seller will make the effort to save the wheat from the fire. This concludes Rabbi Yohanan’s statement. According to Rabbi Yohanan, the distinction between an ordinary acquisition by money and exchanging the “payment for” an ox for a cow must be explained as follows: Only

in a matter

in a matter

that is common did

the Sages

enact that money does not acquire. But

in a matter that is uncommon, the Sages did not enact this.

One who seeks to purchase a cow with the payment for an ox is dealing with an uncommon matter, and the Sages did not enact in such a case that money should not acquire the item. In summary: Rav Nahman maintains that acquisition through exchange is effective only with utensils, and not with animals or produce. According to him, our Mishna must necessarily be discussing the exchange of the “payment for” an ox for a cow. This is an uncommon matter and is acquired through acquisition by money, because the Sages enacted that money does not acquire only in a common matter.

And we raise an objection: Our words are based on the words of Rabbi Yohanan, who said that by Torah law money effects the acquisition of movable property, but the Sages nullified the acquisition through money and instituted that pulling effects acquisition.

But Resh Lakish disagrees with the words of Rabbi Yohanan, and holds that pulling effects acquisition by Torah law, but not money.

And there is a difficulty concerning the words of Resh Lakish:

And according to Resh Lakish, who says that pulling is explicitly [the mode of acquisition] from the Torah,

certainly, according to this, there is no difference between an ordinary acquisition through money and one who exchanges the value of an ox for a cow. For an acquisition through money is not effective by Torah law at all, and it is impossible to distinguish here between a matter that is common and a matter that is uncommon. And if so, according to Resh Lakish, it is impossible to establish our Mishna as referring to an acquisition through money at all. Necessarily, it is referring here to an acquisition through barter.

However,

this works,

only

if

we say that Resh Lakish

holds like Rav Sheshet, who said: produce

functions as barter,

and similarly all movable property is effective for barter; and according to this, our Mishna can be explained according to its plain meaning, that it is referring to one who exchanges an ox for a cow [and it is not referring to the “value” of an ox]. And our Mishna comes to teach that even produce becomes barter.

Rather,

if we say that Resh Lakish

holds like Rav Nahman, who said: produce does not function as barter,

but only vessels, then it is necessarily impossible to explain our Mishna as referring to an acquisition through barter at all!

And

if we wish to reconcile our Mishna as referring to an acquisition through money and to one who exchanges the “value” of a cow for a donkey, this too is not possible, for according to Resh Lakish

currency does not effect acquisition

even by Torah law! And if so, there is a difficulty:

With what does he establish it,

with what will Resh Lakish establish our Mishna? For we cannot establish it either as an acquisition through barter or as an acquisition through money!

And we conclude:

necessarily

it must be said that Resh Lakish

holds like Rav Sheshet,

that all movable property effects barter, and our Mishna speaks of one who exchanges an ox for a cow; and this itself is what the Mishna comes to teach: that even movable property that is not a vessel is effective in barter, such as one who exchanges an ox for a cow.

Mishna:

The preceding mishnayot dealt with acquisitions through which a person acquires from his fellow; our Mishna deals with acquisitions through which the authority of consecrated property acquires.

The wording of our Mishna is obscure, and the Gemara explains it.

a.

The authority of the Most High

[consecrated property] acquires

through money.

And

if

the authority of the ordinary person

acquires movable property specifically

through taking possession,

through pulling.

b.

His statement

of a person who consecrated property

to the Most High,

behold, it is considered

like his handing over

of the property

to an ordinary person

[and the Gemara will explain this].

Gemara:

The Sages taught

a beraita explaining our Mishna: a.

How

is the meaning of what we learned,

“The authority of the Most High through money

and the authority of the ordinary person through taking possession”?

A gizbar

of consecrated property

who gave money for

an

animal

to purchase it for the communal offering, then

even

if the

animal

is found

at the end of the world

and the treasurer cannot pull it,

he acquired

it through the acquisition of money.

And

if

an ordinary person

gave money for an animal,

he does not acquire it until he pulls it.

b.

How

is the meaning of what we learned,

“His statement to the Most High is like his handing over to an ordinary person”?

One who says, “This ox

is consecrated for

an elevation-offering,”

or

“This house is consecrated,”

then

even

if they are

at the end of the world

and he cannot pull the ox or take possession of the house, nevertheless consecrated property

acquires

them merely through his statement. ,