Kiddushin 28b (כח:) — the Talmud in English

And concerning this the tanna said: Any object other than currency, if the purchaser gives it to the seller as an act of acquisition through barter, then

once this one has acquired it

, the seller, has acquired the object, the purchaser acquires its counterpart, and therefore

becomes liable

the purchaser

for

the liability of the

counterpart.

And the tanna comes to teach us that although it is stated, “a shoe,” which is significant as a utensil, nevertheless one does not say that barter can be effected specifically with utensils. Rather, even other movable property, which is not a utensil, can effect an acquisition through barter.

And the Gemara brings support for Rav Yehuda’s statement:

This may also be inferred,

as even from our Mishna it may be inferred that the Mishna was not speaking about currency

as it teaches,

as we learned later in the Mishna

: “How so?

If he exchanged an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox.”

It is explicitly evident from the Mishna that this is not referring to currency, but to barter with other movable property that is not a utensil, such as exchanging an ox for a cow, and the like.

Earlier, at the beginning of the sugya, the Gemara assumed that “everything that can serve as money for another” means currency. And the Gemara raised a difficulty from here against what was ruled in tractate Bava Metzia, that currency cannot serve as an object of barter.

It follows that according to those who say that currency can serve as an object of barter, it would have been possible to explain that “everything that can serve as money for another” means currency.

And we raise an objection to this

: But according to what initially entered our minds,

according to the initial assumption that the Mishna intends to say

that currency can serve as an object of barter,

there is a difficulty

: What is the meaning of “How so?”

How are we to explain the continuation of the Mishna, “How so? If he exchanged an ox for a cow”? Should not the tanna have said, “How so? If he exchanged money for a cow,” since this is referring to barter effected by means of currency?

And we answer: According to what initially entered our minds

this is what he is saying

: This is what the tanna said: [

A] Currency can serve as an object of barter. [

B]

Produce, too, effects [

that is, effects]

barter.

That is, although with regard to barter it is stated, “his shoe,” meaning a utensil, nevertheless even something that is not a utensil also effects barter. [ And the verse mentioned “his shoe” only as an example]. “

How so?

If he exchanged the meat of an ox for a cow, or the meat of a donkey for an ox”—

once this one has acquired

the ox’s meat

, his fellow becomes liable

for the other party

for

the liability of the

counterpart.”

And the Gemara preferred to establish the Mishna’s statement as referring to the meat of an ox rather than to a live ox, because the meat of an ox does not resemble a utensil at all, since it is not fit for any labor. An ox itself, by contrast, somewhat resembles a utensil, since it is used for plowing and the like.

In any event, both according to the initial assumption and according to Rav Yehuda’s answer, the Gemara understood the latter clause [“How so? If he exchanged an ox for a cow,” and so on] according to its plain meaning: that it refers to an acquisition through barter, such as exchanging an ox for a cow, or the meat of an ox for a cow.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this. In tractate Bava Metzia [46b and elsewhere], Rav Sheshet and Rav Naḥman disputed the matter of barter with produce:

According to Rav Sheshet, an acquisition through barter can be effected by means of produce.

But according to Rav Naḥman, an acquisition through barter cannot be effected by means of produce, because with regard to barter it is stated, “his shoe,” and a shoe is considered a utensil. Similarly, other forms of barter are effected only with a utensil.

An ox and a donkey are not utensils. Therefore, according to Rav Naḥman, an acquisition through barter cannot be effected by means of them. All the more so, the meat of an ox or donkey, which is not fit for any labor, is certainly not fit for an acquisition through barter according to Rav Naḥman.

According to what the Gemara has assumed until now, the Mishna establishes that barter can be effected with an ox or with the meat of an ox. If so, there is a difficulty:

That works

, our Mishna is consistent

with the

opinion of

Rav Sheshet, who says: Produce effects barter.

But according to Rav Naḥman, who says that produce does not effect

barter, what can be said?

How are we to explain our Mishna? An ox and a donkey are like produce and not like utensils, so how can barter be effected with them?

And we answer: According to Rav Naḥman, the words of our Mishna must be explained in a new manner:

Our Mishna is not dealing at all with an acquisition through barter, but with an acquisition through money.

This is what he is saying,

this is what the tanna intended to say:

Although an acquisition through “money” is not effective with movable property, nevertheless

there are monies that are [

that are exceptions and acquire]

as

though they were an acquisition through

barter,

with a shoe or with utensils [as will be explained below].

And this is how the language of the Mishna should be explained: “Everything that can serve as money for another,” meaning currency [as the Gemara understood it according to the initial assumption above], sometimes has the following law newly instituted for it: “Once this one has acquired it [when the seller has acquired the money], the other becomes liable for its counterpart”—the purchaser has acquired the object as though this were an acquisition through barter with utensils.

The Mishna explains:

How

is it the case in which an acquisition through money is effective with movable property?

“If he exchanged the ‘money’ for an ox for a cow, or the ‘money’ for a donkey for an ox,”

for example: Reuben purchased an ox from Simeon for one hundred zuz, drew the ox, and became obligated to pay one hundred zuz in exchange for it.

Simeon said to him: I wish to purchase a cow. Perhaps you have a cow to give me in place of the money that you owe me?

Reuben replied: Yes. I have a cow, and it is worth one hundred zuz, or fifty.

Simeon then said to Reuben: The money that you owe me—that is, the price of the ox—is given to you in exchange for the cow.

At that moment, the cow was acquired by Simeon through an acquisition with money, despite the fact that ordinarily an acquisition with money is not effective with movable property.

And we inquire about this:

What is the reason?

Why is the cow acquired through an acquisition with “money”? An acquisition with money is not effective with movable property!

And we answer: The tanna who taught our Mishna

held in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: By Torah law, money acquires

movable property. But the Sages instituted that money does not acquire; rather, meshikha, taking possession, acquires.

And for what reason did they say

that the Sages

said that taking possession acquires

, and not money? Because it may happen that a person pays money to his fellow in order to purchase wheat from him, and before the purchaser manages to take possession of the wheat and bring it into his domain, a fire breaks out in the seller’s house.

According to Torah law, under which the money acquires, the wheat has already been acquired by the purchaser. And the Sages were concerned

lest

the seller not make the effort to save the wheat from the fire, because it does not belong to him. And he

will say to him

, to the purchaser: The wheat already belongs to you and not to me; it follows that

your wheat burned in the upper room,

and I will lose nothing as a result.

Therefore, the Sages said that money does not completely acquire movable property, but either party may retract until taking possession. Consequently, the seller will make the effort to save the wheat from the fire. This concludes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words, the difference between an ordinary acquisition with money and exchanging the “price” of an ox for a cow should be explained as follows: Specifically

with regard to a matter [

a matter

that is common, the Sages

instituted

that money does not acquire. But with regard to

a matter that is uncommon, the Sages did not institute this.

One who seeks to purchase a cow with the price of an ox is included among matters that are uncommon, and the Sages did not institute in this case that money does not acquire. In summary: Rav Naḥman maintains that an acquisition through barter is effective only with utensils, and not with animals or produce. According to him, our Mishna must necessarily be speaking of exchanging the “price” of an ox for a cow. This is an uncommon matter, and the cow is acquired through an acquisition with money, because the Sages instituted that money does not acquire only with regard to a common matter.

We raise an objection: Our statement is based on the statement of Rabbi Yohanan, who said that by Torah law money effects the acquisition of movable property, but the Sages nullified acquisition through money and instituted that pulling effects the acquisition.

However, Reish Lakish disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan. He holds that pulling effects the acquisition by Torah law, but money does not.

And one can raise an objection to the statement of Reish Lakish:

And according to Reish Lakish, who says that pulling is explicitly effective by Torah law,

it is certainly the case that, according to this, there is no difference between an ordinary acquisition through money and exchanging the value of an ox for a cow. For acquisition through money is not effective by Torah law at all, and one cannot distinguish in this matter between a common matter and an uncommon matter. If so, according to Reish Lakish, it is impossible to establish our Mishna as referring to acquisition through money. It must necessarily be referring here to acquisition through barter.

But,

this works well

only

if

we say that Reish Lakish

holds in accordance with Rav Sheshet, who said: Produce

effects barter,

and similarly all movable property is effective for barter. According to this, our Mishna can be interpreted straightforwardly, as referring to one who exchanges an ox for a cow [and it is not referring to the “value” of an ox]. And our Mishna comes to teach that even produce can serve for barter.

Rather,

if we say that Reish Lakish

holds in accordance with Rav Naḥman, who said: Produce does not effect barter,

but only vessels do, then it is necessarily impossible to interpret our Mishna as referring to acquisition through barter at all!

And

if we wish to reconcile our Mishna as referring to acquisition through money and to one who exchanges the “value” of a cow for a donkey, that too is impossible, for according to Reish Lakish

a coin does not effect acquisition

even by Torah law! And if so, this is difficult:

With regard to what can he establish it,

how will Reish Lakish establish our Mishna? For we cannot establish it either as referring to acquisition through barter or as referring to acquisition through money!

And we conclude:

It is necessarily

the case that Reish Lakish

holds in accordance with Rav Sheshet

, that all movable property effects barter, and our Mishna speaks of one who exchanges an ox for a cow. This itself is what the Mishna comes to teach us: that even movable property that is not a vessel is effective for barter, such as one who exchanges an ox for a cow.

Mishna:

The preceding mishnayot dealt with acquisitions through which a person acquires from his fellow; our Mishna deals with acquisitions through which the domain of the Temple treasury acquires.

The wording of our Mishna is elliptical, and the Gemara explains it.

a.

The domain of the Most High

[the property dedicated to the Temple] acquires

through money.

And

if

the private domain

acquires movable property only

through taking possession

, by pulling.

b.

A person’s statement

that he has consecrated money

to the Most High

is considered

like his transfer

of the money

to a private person

[and the Gemara will explain this].

Gemara:

The Sages taught

a beraita explaining our Mishna: a.

How

is the meaning of what we learned,

“The domain of the Most High acquires through money

and the private domain through taking possession”?

The Temple treasurer

of the property dedicated to the Temple

who gave money for

the purchase of a

beast

for a communal offering, then

even

if the

beast

is located

at the other end of the world

and the treasurer cannot pull it,

he acquires

it through acquisition by money.

And

if

a private person

gave money for a beast,

he does not acquire it until he pulls it.

b.

How

is the meaning of what we learned,

“A person’s statement to the Most High is like his transfer to a private person”?

One who says, “This ox

is consecrated for an

burnt offering,”

or

“This house is consecrated,”

then

even

if they are

at the other end of the world

and he cannot pull the ox or take possession of the house, nevertheless the property dedicated to the Temple

acquires

them merely through his statement. ,