Kiddushin 27a (כז.) — the Talmud in English

Rabban Gamliel said to the Elders: The tenth

of the produce

that I am destined to measure

[measure] and separate as ma'aser rishon, it is

given to Yehoshua

to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, who was a Levite and was also on the ship

and its place

of the tenth, that is, the ground beneath it

is rented to him.

And Rabbi Yehoshua gave a peruta for the rental of the place, and acquired the produce together with the land, as we learned: “Movable property is acquired together with immovable property through money ” ,

Rabban Gamliel continued and said:

another tenth, which I am destined to measure

for the sake of ma'aser ani,

is given to Akiva ben Yosef,

and this was Rabbi Akiva, who was a charity collector and was with Rabban Gamliel on the ship.

And the tenth is given to him

so that the poor will acquire it.

And its place is rented to him.

And Rabbi Akiva gave a peruta for the rental of the place and acquired with it the produce of the tithe for the poor.

This concludes the words of the Mishna.

And the Gemara attempts to prove from here that movable property acquired together with land must be accumulated upon that land:

Rabban Gamliel said, “And its place is rented to him,” which indicates that he was particular to rent the very place of the tithe, rather than rent him another place, and

shma minah

learn from this

that we require it to be accumulated upon it,

for if it is not necessary for the movable property to be accumulated upon it, why did Rabban Gamliel choose specifically to rent the place of the tenth rather than another place?

And we reject this: One can always say that it is not necessary for the movable property to be accumulated upon it, and nevertheless Rabban Gamliel chose to rent their place

so as not to trouble them,

so as not to trouble Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva to remove their tithes from the place where they were lying. Therefore he rented the place to them, since by doing so they had the right to leave their tithes there for as long as they wished.

Ta shma

a proof that movable property acquired together with land need not be accumulated upon it:

For Rava bar Yitzḥak said that Rav said: There are two deeds,

there are two forms concerning a deed, whose laws differ from one another:

(a) One who says to two people

“Acquire this field for so-and-so and write a deed,”

intends to say: Take possession of the field and acquire it through ḥazaka for the benefit of so-and-so, and write him a deed concerning it merely as proof. Therefore, if after they took possession of the field he wanted to retract,

he retracts with regard to the deed,

he may retract from writing the deed if he says, “I do not wish him to have proof in his possession.”

but he cannot retract with regard to the field,

if he wished to retract from the very giving of the field, he could not retract, since as soon as they took possession of it for the recipient, the recipient acquired it, and it was his.

(b) One who says, “Acquire this field for so-and-so

on the condition

that you write him the deed,”

intends to say: That so-and-so will not acquire the field until you write and give him a deed concerning it.

Therefore, if after they took possession of the field he came to retract,

he retracts both with regard to the deed

and

with regard to the field.

For since he retracts from the deed, his condition concerning the transfer of the field has automatically not been fulfilled, and the field too was not acquired by him.

This concludes the statement of Rava bar Yitzḥak in the name of Rav.

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said

in the name of

Rav Huna: There are three deeds,

there are three forms of transferring a deed, whose laws differ from one another:

Two

are the ones we stated,

two of the forms are those that we already mentioned above [in Rav’s statement].

And

the other,

the additional form, is as follows:

If the

seller

preceded and wrote him

the buyer

the deed

before the buyer had managed to acquire the land through money or ḥazaka.

And it is permitted for witnesses to write for the seller a deed in which it is written, “My field is sold to you,” even before the buyer took possession of the land,

as we learned in that

“One writes a deed for the seller, even though the

buyer is not

with him,”

and he cannot give it to him at that time.

And if the seller preceded the buyer and wrote a deed before the buyer took possession of the land, then,

once the buyer took possession

of

the land together with him, the deed was acquired

also the

deed, wherever it was.

Even though the buyer performed no act of acquisition with regard to the deed itself.

Thus far are Rav Huna’s words. The Gemara proves from Rav Huna’s words that movable property acquired together with land need not be gathered on the land: Rav Huna said that when the buyer took possession of the land, the deed was acquired “wherever it was,” and apparently the deed was acquired by means of agav, like other movable property acquired together with land.

Conclude from it

that with an acquisition of movable property through land,

we do not require

that the movable property be

gathered on it.

But the Gemara attempts to reject the proof:

A deed is different [

different ]

from

other movable property, because

it is the bridle of the land;

the deed serves as a “handle” for the land, similar to a bridle, which is a handle by which one holds an animal. The matter requires analysis: Does the rationale of “the bridle of the land” mean that it is not acquired at all through agav, but rather that the deed is considered subordinate to the land, so that one who performs an acquisition with regard to the land is considered to have performed an acquisition with regard to the deed itself? Or is this a rationale within the law of agav—that ordinarily, for an acquisition through land, the movable property must be gathered on the land in order to associate it with the land, but in the case of a deed, since it is the bridle of the land, it need not be gathered on the land? The words of Netivot HaMishpat [275:1, with regard to the words of the Rashba, Bava Kamma 52] somewhat indicate that the rationale of “the bridle of the land” is not part of the law of agav. Rather, the deed is considered attached to the land and is acquired together with it. This also appears from Rashi’s wording, and along this line we explained the Gemara immediately below. [However, in Ketzot HaḤoshen there, at the end of subsection 1, he explains that the rationale of “the bridle of the land” is a rationale within the law of agav. But Ketzot HaḤoshen is addressing the Gemara’s conclusion below, that acquisition of the deed is by means of agav. In any event, the Rashba wrote that the rationale of “the bridle of the land” is effective even according to the Gemara’s conclusion with regard to a particular matter. See there. It is nevertheless possible that even Ketzot HaḤoshen agrees that at this stage the Gemara understood that “the bridle of the land” is not part of the law of agav].

And we challenge this:

But it is taught with regard to it,

was it not with regard to this acquisition of the deed that Rav Huna said: Once he took possession of the land, the deed was acquired wherever it was, and

this is what we learned: “Property that has no guarantee is acquired together with property that has a guarantee through money, through a deed, and through possession”?

It is evident from Rav Huna’s words that acquisition of the deed is by means of acquisition through land, like other property! How, then, can it be said that the deed is acquired as the bridle of the land?

And since it is evident from Rav Huna’s words that the deed is acquired wherever it is by means of acquisition through land,

conclude from it

that with an acquisition through land,

we do not require the property to be gathered on it!

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from it

that movable property acquired through land need not be gathered on it.

Another question concerning movable property acquired through land:

They raised a dilemma:

The scholars of the academy were uncertain:

Do we require the term “through,”

that the seller must say to the buyer: “Acquire the land, and acquire the movable property agav the land,”

or not

is it necessary for him to use the expression agav?

Come and hear

a proof that it is not necessary to say agav:

For it teaches all these, as we learned all the Mishnayot and statements cited above [concerning the Gemara’s question whether the property must be “gathered,” such as: “a handbreadth by a handbreadth for so-and-so, and with it one hundred sheep”].

But it does not teach

and none of them states that the transferor used the expression

in any of them that the one transferring ownership used the expression

“through”!

And we reject this:

But according to your reasoning,

according to your understanding that the Mishnayot and beraitot quoted the transferor’s exact wording, one should ask:

“Acquire”—is that taught?

Did we really learn that the transferor said to another person, “Acquire a handbreadth by a handbreadth for so-and-so”? Surely there is no doubt that he must say to him that he should acquire the land [and with it one hundred sheep]!

Rather,

you are forced to say that the wording “a handbreadth by a handbreadth for so-and-so” is not literally the transferor’s wording, and Rav abbreviated his language. Certainly, the acquisition is not effective

until he says

the expression

“Acquire.”

And if so,

here too,

with regard to what we learned, “and with it one hundred sheep,” this is not necessarily the transferor’s exact wording, and it is possible to say that the acquisition is not effective

until he says

the expression

“through.”

And if so, the question raised above returns: Is it necessary for him to use the expression agav?

And we conclude:

And the halakha: [a] With regard to the question raised above, whether the movable property must be gathered on the land, it was ruled that

we do not require it to be gathered. [b] And with regard to the question now raised, whether the expression agav is required, it was ruled that

we do not require it to be piled on the land. Regarding the present uncertainty as to whether the expression “together with” is required, the ruling is that

“through” and “acquire”

are required.

The Gemara raises another question concerning acquisition through land:

They raised a dilemma:

The scholars of the academy were uncertain: If a person comes to transfer to another

a field by sale, and movable property by gift, what

is the law in this case? Can the movable property be transferred as a gift through land that is acquired by sale, or is movable property acquired through land only when the manner of acquisition is the same for both?

Come and hear,

a proof from a Mishna that movable property can be acquired as a gift through land acquired by sale:

We learned in tractate Maaser Sheni [5:9]: “Rabban Gamliel said to the Elders:

The tithe that I am destined to measure

and separate as the first tithe

is given to Joshua [

to Rabbi Joshua ben Ḥananya, who was a Levite],

and its place is rented to him.”

That is: Through renting the place, Rabbi Joshua acquired the tithe produce by means of acquisition through land.

Now, the place of the tithe was rented to Rabbi Joshua in exchange for money, whereas the tithe was given to him as a gift. This demonstrates that movable property can be transferred as a gift through land acquired by sale.

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from it

that movable property can be transferred as a gift through land acquired by sale.

The Gemara raises another question concerning acquisition through land:

They raised a dilemma:

One who wishes to transfer

a field to one person and movable property to another,

and says to the buyer of the field: “Acquire the field for yourself, and through it let the movable property be acquired by so-and-so,

what

is the law in this case? Must the movable property and the field be acquired specifically by the same person, or not?

Come and hear

a proof from the Mishna cited above that a field can be transferred to one person and movable property to another through acquisition by land: For Rabban Gamliel said to the Elders:

The tithe that I am destined to measure

as the tithe for the poor

is given to Akiva ben Yosef, so that he may acquire it for the poor, and its place is rented to him.

This implies that the place was rented to Rabbi Akiva himself, and through this he acquired the tithe produce for the poor by means of acquisition through land.

This demonstrates that a field can be transferred to one person and movable property to another through acquisition by land.

And we reject the proof on the basis of two arguments: [a]

A.

What

is the meaning of “its place

is rented

to him”? It does not mean that the place was rented to Rabbi Akiva. Rather,

it is rented to the tithe,

that is, both the place and the tithe were acquired for the poor. Therefore, nothing can be proved from here concerning a field transferred to one person and movable property to another. [b]

B.

Alternatively, if you wish,

you may say that “its place is rented to him” indeed refers to Rabbi Akiva, but nevertheless no proof can be brought from here that a field can be transferred to one person and movable property to another through acquisition by land.

This is because

Rabbi Akiva is different,

Rabbi Akiva differs from an ordinary person,

as

since he was a charity collector, he was therefore like

the hand of the poor;

his hand was considered like the hand of the poor, and this is equivalent to transferring the field and the movable property to the same person.

On the basis of these two arguments, the proof cited above is rejected, and the question remains unresolved: One who wishes to transfer a field to one person and movable property to another through acquisition by land must consider what the law is in this case.

Rava said: They taught

in our Mishna that movable property is acquired through the land when the buyer takes possession of the land,

only

when

the buyer gave

the seller

the money for all of them

for all the property.

But

if he

did not give

the

money for all of them, he acquired only in proportion to the money he gave,

because the seller did not tell the buyer to take possession of the land with the intention of acquiring the movable property, but only in proportion to the money he had paid.

It was taught in support of Rava:

The following baraita that was taught proves Rava’s statement:

It was taught in a baraita:

The power of money is superior to the power of a document

in one respect,

and

is superior

to the power of money in another respect:

in another respect:

The power of money

is superior to that of a document,

as with money one redeems consecrated property and second tithe, whereas this is not the case with a document.

And the power of a document

is superior to that of money,

as a document effects the release

of a Jewish woman,

as a woman is divorced with a bill of divorce,

whereas this is not the case with money.

And the power of both of them is superior to the power of hazaka

in one respect,

while the power of hazaka

is superior

to the power of both of them

in another respect:

The power of both of them is superior, as both acquire a Hebrew slave, whereas this is not the case with hazaka.

And

the power of hazaka

is superior, as the following law is stated with regard to hazaka:

If one sold him ten fields in ten countries,

then, although the fields are distant from one another, nevertheless,

once

the purchaser

took possession of one of them, he acquired them all.

In what circumstances does this statement apply? With regard to hazaka. But with regard to money and a document, if the purchaser gave only the value of one of them, or if the seller wrote him a document only for one of them, he acquired only that field.