Kiddushin 27a — the Talmud in English

Rabban Gamaliel said to the Elders: A tenth [

a tenth of the produce]

that I am destined to measure ![](pamud.bmp "

precise page location") [to measure] and to separate as maaser rishon, behold it is

given to him, to Joshua,

to Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah, who was a Levite, and he too was on the ship.

And its place,

of the tenth, that is, the ground beneath it,

is rented to him.

And Rabbi Joshua gave a peruta for the rental of the place, and acquired the produce along with the land, as we learned: “Movable property, which has no guarantee, is acquired together with property that has a guarantee, through money”. , Rabban Gamaliel continued and said:

And another tenth, which I am destined to measure

for the purpose of maaser ani,

is given

to him, to Akiva ben Yosef,

and he was Rabbi Akiva, who was a collector of charity, and was with Rabban Gamaliel on the ship.

And the tenth is given to him

so that he may acquire it for the poor.

And its place is rented to him.

And Rabbi Akiva gave a peruta for the rental of the place, and acquired with it the produce of the tithe for the poor.

Thus far are the words of the Mishna.

And the Gemara attempts to prove from here that movable property acquired along with land must be gathered upon it:

Rabban Gamaliel said, “And its place is rented to him”; it follows that he was particular to rent the place of the tithe itself, and did not rent him another place, and

infer from this [

learn from this]

that we require it to be gathered upon it,

for if it is not necessary for the movable property to be gathered upon it, why did Rabban Gamaliel choose specifically to rent the place of the tenth and not another place?

And we reject this: It can always be said that it is not necessary for the movable property to be gathered upon it, and nevertheless Rabban Gamaliel chose to rent their place,

so as not to trouble them,

so as not to trouble Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Akiva to remove their tithes from the place where they were lying, and therefore he rented it to them, for through this they had the right to leave their tithes there for as long as they wished.

Come and hear

a proof that movable property acquired together with land need not be gathered upon it:

For Rava bar Yitzhak said that Rav said: There are two documents,

there are two situations concerning a document, whose laws differ from one another: [

A] One who says to two people

“Acquire this field for so-and-so and write a document,”

this is what he intended to say: Take possession of the field, and acquire it through an acquisition of possession for the benefit of so-and-so, and write him a document concerning it merely as evidence. Therefore, if after they took possession of the field he wished to retract,

he retracts concerning the document,

he is entitled to retract concerning the writing of the document, if he said, “I do not wish him to have evidence in his possession.”

but he does not retract concerning the field,

if he wished to retract from the actual giving of the field, he cannot retract, for immediately when they took possession of it for the recipient, he acquired it, and it is his. [

B] One who says, “Acquire this field for so-and-so

on the condition

that you write him the document,”

this is what he intended to say: That so-and-so cannot acquire the field until you write and give him a document concerning it.

Therefore, if after they took possession of the field he came to retract,

he retracts both concerning the document

and

concerning the field.

For since he retracts concerning the document, his condition in transferring the field itself has automatically not been fulfilled, and the field too was not acquired by him.

Thus far are the words of Rava bar Yitzhak in the name of Rav.

And Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin said

in the name of

Rav Huna: There are three documents,

there are three situations in the transfer of a document, whose laws differ from one another:

Two—

that which we said.

Two of the situations are those that we already mentioned above [in Rav’s words].

And

the other,

the additional situation:

If the

seller

preceded and wrote him

for the purchaser

the document

before the purchaser managed to acquire the land through money or possession.

And the witnesses are permitted to write for the seller a document in which it is written, “My field is sold to you,” even before the purchaser took possession of the land,

as in that which we learned

“They write a document for the seller, even though there is no

purchaser

with him,”

and he cannot give it to him at that time.

And if the seller preceded and wrote a deed before the buyer took possession of the land, then

once

the buyer

took possession together with it of the land, the deed was acquired

also the

deed, wherever it may be.

Although the buyer performed no act of acquisition with the deed itself.

Thus far are the words of Rav Huna. And the Gemara proves from the words of Rav Huna that movable property acquired together with land need not be gathered upon it: Rav Huna said that when the buyer took possession of the land, the deed was acquired “wherever it may be,” and simply understood, the deed was acquired by means of kinyan agav, like other movable property acquired together with land. And

infer from this

that with kinyan agav of land

we do not require

that the movable property be

gathered upon it.

But the Gemara attempts to reject the proof:

a deed is different [from other movable property,]

from other movable property, because

a deed

from other movable property, because

it is the bridle of the land,

the deed is like a “handle” for the land, and it is like the land itself. Therefore, when he takes possession of the land, it is as though he takes possession of the deed itself, wherever it may be. But with other movable property, which has no connection whatsoever to the land, it is possible that it cannot be acquired by means of the land unless it is gathered upon it.

And we challenge this:

but concerning this it is taught,

for concerning this acquisition of the deed Rav Huna said: once he took possession of the land, the deed was acquired wherever it may be, and

this is what we learned: “movable property is acquired together with immovable property by money, by a deed, and by possession.”

And it is proven from Rav Huna’s words that acquisition of the deed is by means of kinyan agav, like other property! And how is it possible to say that the deed is acquired by means of the bridle of the land?

And since it is proven from Rav Huna’s words that the deed is acquired wherever it may be by means of kinyan agav, then

infer from this

that with kinyan agav

we do not require the movable property to be gathered!

And we conclude: indeed,

infer from this

that movable property acquired by means of the land need not be gathered upon it.

Another problem concerning movable property acquired by means of land:

they raised a question before them:

the members of the academy were uncertain:

do we require [the expression] agav,

that the seller must say to the buyer: “Acquire the land, and acquire the movable property ‘by means of’ the land”?

or not

is it necessary for him to say the expression “agav”?

come and hear

come and hear proof that it is not necessary to say “agav”:

for all these are taught,

for we learned all the Mishnayot and statements brought above [concerning the Gemara’s question whether “gathered” is required, such as: a handbreadth by a handbreadth for so-and-so, and with it one hundred sheep].

but it is not taught

and none of them stated that the transferor said the expression

“agav”!

And we reject this:

but according to your reasoning,

according to your understanding, that the Mishnayot and beraitot brought the transferor’s actual wording, one must ask:

“Acquire”—is this taught1?

And did we learn that the transferor said to another: “Acquire a handbreadth by a handbreadth for so-and-so”?! Certainly there is no doubt that he must say to him that he should acquire the land [and with it one hundred sheep]!

rather,

you are compelled to say that the expression “a handbreadth by a handbreadth for so-and-so” is not literally the transferor’s wording, and Rav abbreviated his wording, and certainly the acquisition is not effective

until he says

with the expression

“Acquire” .

And if so,

here too,

also in what we learned, “and with it one hundred sheep,” this is not literally the transferor’s wording, and it is possible to say that the acquisition is not effective

until he says

the expression

“agav.”

And if so, the question that we asked above returns: is it necessary for him to say the expression “agav”?

And we conclude:

and the halakha is: [a] Regarding what we were uncertain about above, whether the movable property must be gathered upon the land, it was ruled that

Regarding the earlier uncertainty as to whether the movable property must be piled on the land, the ruling is that

gathered is not required. [b] And regarding what we are now uncertain about, whether the expression “agav” is required, it was ruled that

“together with” and “acquire”

“agav” and “acquire”

are required.

And the Gemara raises another question concerning kinyan agav:

they raised a question before them:

the members of the academy were uncertain: a person who comes to transfer to his fellow

land by sale, and movable property by gift—what

is the law in this matter? Is it possible to transfer the movable property as a gift by means of the land acquired by sale, or is movable property acquired by means of land only when their acquisitions are identical?

come and hear

come and hear proof from a Mishna that it is possible to transfer movable property as a gift by means of land acquired by sale:

We learned in tractate Maaser Sheni [5:9]: “Rabban Gamliel said to the elders:

the tithe that I am destined to measure

to separate as the first tithe

is given to Joshua [Rabbi Joshua son of Hananiah, who was a Levite],

[Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hanania, who was a Levite],

and its place is rented to him.”

That is, through the rental of the place, Rabbi Joshua acquired the produce of the tithe by kinyan agav.

Now, the place of the tithe was rented to Rabbi Joshua for money, whereas the tithe was given to him as a gift. From here [it follows] that it is possible to transfer movable property as a gift by means of land acquired by sale.

And we conclude: indeed,

infer from this

that it is possible to transfer movable property as a gift by means of land acquired by sale.

And the Gemara raises another question concerning kinyan agav:

they raised a question before them:

one who wishes to transfer

land to one person and movable property to another,

and said to the purchaser of the land: “Acquire the land for yourself, and by means of it let the movable property be acquired by so-and-so,”

what

is the law in this matter? Is it necessary that the movable property and the land be acquired specifically by the same person, or not?

come and hear

proof from the aforementioned Mishna that it is possible to transfer land to one person and movable property to another by kinyan agav: for Rabban Gamliel said to the elders:

the tithe that I am destined to measure

for the tithe of the poor

is given to Akiva son of Joseph, so that he may acquire it for the poor, and its place is rented to him.

And it implies that the place was rented to Rabbi Akiva himself, and through this he acquired the produce of the tithe for the poor by kinyan agav.

And from here [it follows] that it is possible to transfer land to one person and movable property to another by kinyan agav.

And we reject the proof on the basis of two arguments:

a

what

is the meaning of “its place

is rented

to him”? It does not mean that the place was rented to Rabbi Akiva, but rather

is rented to the tithe,

that is, both the place and the tithe were acquired for the poor. And nothing can be proven from here concerning land for one person and movable property for another.

b

and if you wish, say

and if you wish, it is possible to say that “its place is rented to him” indeed refers to Rabbi Akiva, and nevertheless nothing can be proven from here that it is possible to transfer land to one person and movable property to another by kinyan agav.

Because

Rabbi Akiva is different,

Rabbi Akiva differs from another person,

for

since he was a collector of charity, therefore he was like

the hand of the poor,

his hand was like the hand of the poor, and this is like transferring the land and the movable property to the same person.

On the basis of these two arguments, the proof above was rejected, and the question remains in its place: one who wishes to transfer land to one person and movable property to another by kinyan agav must remain uncertain what the law is in this matter.

Rava said: They taught

in our Mishna that movable property is acquired by means of the land when he took possession of the land,

only

when

he gave

the buyer

the money for all of them

to the seller.

But

if

he did not give

the

money for all of them, he acquired only in proportion to his money,

because the seller did not tell the buyer to take possession of the land with the intention of acquiring the movable property, but only in proportion to his money.

It was taught in accordance with Rava,

as is proven from what they taught in the following beraita, in accordance with Rava’s words:

They taught in a beraita:

The strength of money is superior to the strength of a document

in one matter,

and

the strength of a document

is superior to the strength of money

in another matter:

The strength of money

is superior to the strength of a document,

for with money one redeems consecrated property and second tithe, which is not so with a document.

And the strength of a document

is superior to the strength of money,

for a document releases

a daughter of Israel,

for a woman is divorced with a get,

which is not so with money.

And the strength of both of them is superior to the strength of possession

in one matter,

and the strength of possession

is superior

to the strength of both of them

in another matter:

The strength of both of them is superior, for both of them acquire a Hebrew slave, which is not so with possession.

And

the strength of possession is superior, for possession

has the following law stated concerning it:

If he sold him ten fields in ten countries,

then, despite the fact that the fields are distant from one another, nevertheless

since

the purchaser

took possession of one of them, he acquired all of them.

In what case is this statement said? With possession. But with money and with a document, if the purchaser gave only the price of one of them, or if he wrote him a document only concerning one of them, he acquired only that field.