Kiddushin 27b — the Talmud in English

And the beraita continues and says: What we said concerning chazaka—that if he established possession of one field, he also acquired another field, even a field that is not adjacent to it—

in what case is this statement said?

Only when

he gave him

the

money for all of them.

But if he

did not give him

the money for

all of them, he acquired only to the extent of his money.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

And since we learned in the beraita that one who establishes possession in one field does not acquire another field that is not adjacent to it unless he gave him the money for all of them, it follows from here concerning acquisition through agav, for movable property is like land that is not adjacent to the field, and therefore it is impossible to acquire it through agav of land unless he gave the seller the money for all of it, as Rava said above.

And since the Gemara brought the beraita in order to prove from it in accordance with Rava’s words, it adds that there is a proof from this beraita in accordance with Shmuel’s words, as follows:

And we say: What we learned in the beraita

supports Shmuel.

For Shmuel said: If he sold him ten fields in ten countries, once he established possession

the purchaser

in one of them, he acquired all of them.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said

concerning Shmuel’s words:

Know

that Shmuel’s words are correct,

for

indeed,

if he handed him

one person to another

ten animals

tied together

by

means of

one halter, and he said to him

the seller to the purchaser,

“Acquire

all these animals,”

would he not acquire them!?

And is it possible that he did not acquire them since he did not establish possession in each one of them?! Certainly not! Rather, since they are all tied to one halter, all of them were acquired together, and similarly. With ten fields, since they are all connected to one another by the land between them, if he established possession in one of them, he acquired all of them.

And we reject this:

They said to him:

Are they comparable?

Is it possible to compare this to ten fields?! For

there,

with ten animals,

their bundle is in his hand.

But

here,

with acquisition of a field,

its bundle is not in his hand!

For one who holds ten animals on one halter has all of them tied together by this halter that is in his hand. But this is not so with fields: They are scattered and are not considered tied together. Therefore, it is possible that one who establishes possession in one field acquires only that field.

Some say,

there are those who say that, to the contrary,

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said:

Know that

Shmuel’s words are not correct, and one who establishes possession in one field

does not acquire

thereby another field as well, for

if he handed him ten animals

that were tied

with one halter, and said to him “

animal

this one, acquire it,” would he acquire it?

Would he acquire the other animals tied with it by the halter?! Certainly not!

And if so, similarly, one who establishes possession in one field, while the other fields are not discernible together with it, is like one who says, “Acquire this field,” and therefore he acquired only that one by itself.

And we reject this:

Are they comparable,

is it possible to compare this to Shmuel’s words?! For

there,

one who hands another ten animals tied with one halter—the

bodies are separate,

and when he says to him, “Acquire this one,” he intends to say that he should acquire specifically that one and not the others. But

here,

with one who sells another ten fields,

the foundation of the land is one,

all the fields are connected to the body of the earth, and they are all considered one body, even though they are divided in their locations within the body. Therefore, when the seller tells the purchaser to establish possession in one parcel of land, this is not like saying to him, “Acquire this one”; rather, his intention is to transfer all of them.

We learned in the Mishna:

And they cause

the movable property

the properties

that have security to be sworn concerning them.

This oath is called “rolling of an oath.” That is, since the person is already obligated to swear concerning the movable property, the court rolls upon him an obligation to swear even concerning the land.

And the Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the law of “rolling of an oath”:

Ulla said: From where is rolling of an oath from the Torah?

This matter is learned from what

is said

concerning a sota:

A married woman who certainly had intercourse with another man is forbidden to her husband by the prohibition of “zona.”

But if it is not certain that she committed adultery while married to her husband, because there are no witnesses who saw the intercourse, but the woman is suspected of this, under the conditions that will be explained below, she is forbidden to her husband by the prohibition of “sota.”

A woman is not forbidden by the prohibition of sota except through kinui and seclusion: If the husband warned her [admonished her] before witnesses not to seclude herself with a certain man, and nevertheless she secluded herself with him before witnesses [for the amount of time suitable for committing adultery], she is forbidden to her husband.

The husband who warned his wife, and she secluded herself, may bring her to a koen to examine whether she became impure or not. This is the order of her examination:

The husband brings for her the mincha of a sota, and the koen gives her the bitter waters to drink, and before giving them to her he makes her swear in this formulation: “If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone astray into impurity while married to your husband, be innocent of these bitter, cursing waters.” “And if you have gone astray, may the Lord make you a curse and an oath among your people, when the Lord makes your thigh fall and your belly swell.” And the woman answers, “Amen, amen.” And then, if the woman indeed committed adultery, her belly swells and her thigh falls, and she dies. But if she is pure, she emerges cleared of the suspicion, goes away, and is permitted to her husband. But if the woman does not wish to drink, she does not drink; rather, she is forbidden to him and leaves without a marriage contract. And the Gemara brings the verse concerning a sota, after the koen makes her swear with the oath of the curse [Numbers 5:22]:

“And the woman shall say: Amen, amen.”

And we learned,

and we learned in tractate Sota [18a]:

For what does she say “Amen,” “Amen”

twice? And why is it not sufficient for her to say “Amen” once?

And the Mishna explains the doubling of “Amen” in several ways:

a.

“Amen”

one

for the oath,

concerning what the koen made her swear, that she had not gone astray, and

Amen

second

for the curse,

the curse with which the koen cursed her: that if she had gone astray, the Lord would make her thigh fall and her belly swell.

b.

Amen

one:

if

I became impure

from this man

with whom there are witnesses that I secluded myself. And

Amen

second:

if

I became impure

from another man.

c.

Amen

one:

that I did not go astray while betrothed.

And

a second “Amen”: that I did not go astray while

married.

And

likewise, if the woman was a yevama who married her yavam, she says: Amen, that I did not go astray while I was

a waiting yevama,

and

Amen, that I did not go astray while

taken in marriage [

after I performed yibum with the yavam]. , Thus far are the words of the Mishna in tractate Sota.

And Ulla proves from the fact that she swears, “Amen: I have not gone astray as a betrothed woman and as a married woman,” that here the law of rolling over an oath was newly established:

For

this

amen, concerning the oath by which the kohen makes her swear that I have not gone astray while I was

a betrothed woman

what are the circumstances?

How is what we learned—that the woman swears that she did not go astray as a betrothed woman—to be understood? If you say that this oath is required by the basic law, and that the law of “rolling over an oath” was not newly established here, it is impossible to say so. For according to this, the verse necessarily said that just as the law of the sotah oath was stated with regard to a married woman, so too the law of the sotah oath was stated with regard to a betrothed woman.

And according to this, we will have to say that the husband warned the woman while she was betrothed, and she also secluded herself while she was still betrothed [just as the sotah oath with regard to a married woman applies only when there had been warning and seclusion].

And if so, how can there be an oath of a sotah with regard to a betrothed woman through warning and seclusion?

If you say,

if it is said that the case is one in which

he warned her

, that he warned her and she secluded herself,

while she was betrothed, and

also

he had her drink

[made her drink]

while she was still betrothed,

and the husband makes her swear concerning this, that she did not commit adultery while she was betrothed. This is impossible, for:

And we learned: A betrothed woman and a widow awaiting levirate marriage

, concerning whom the betrothed man or the levir warned them and they secluded themselves,

do not drink

the sotah water; rather, they leave their husbands,

and they do not receive their marriage settlement.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Why do they not drink? Because “And if you have gone astray, while under your husband”

the Merciful One said

. And it implies that the verse speaks specifically of a woman concerning whom I say “under your husband,” that is, a married woman.

And

with regard to a betrothed woman and a widow awaiting levirate marriage

there is not

for I do not say concerning her “under your husband.”

And necessarily, it is impossible to establish the oath of a betrothed woman in a case where he warned her and had her drink while she was still betrothed!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it is possible to establish the “amen” concerning the oath that she did not go astray while she was betrothed in a case where

he warned

[warned]

her

and she secluded herself

while she was betrothed,

and he had her drink

afterward,

when she was married.

This too is impossible, for: In such a case,

can the water examine her!?

Can the water examine her and permit her to her husband if she married him after she had become forbidden to him by the law of a sotah?

After all,

“And the man shall be clear of iniquity,” the Merciful One said,

and this verse teaches that only

when the man is clear of iniquity

then the

water examines his wife.

But if, after she secluded herself and became forbidden to him by the law of a sotah, her husband had intercourse with her in violation, then

the

man is

not clear of iniquity,

in such a case

the water does not examine his wife.

Therefore it is impossible to establish the oath that she did not go astray while she was betrothed as referring to a case where he warned his wife and she secluded herself while she was betrothed, and he came to have her drink when she was married, for he certainly had intercourse with her after he married her, and thereby transgressed a prohibition, and the water would not examine her, since the husband is not clear of iniquity! And on the basis of this difficulty Ulla concludes:

Rather,

necessarily, the law of the sotah oath was not newly established at all with regard to a betrothed woman. And the oath in which she swears, “Amen: I have not gone astray as a betrothed woman and as a married woman,” concerns an oath that comes

through rolling over

, in the case of a husband who warned his wife when she was married, and she secluded herself, and he did not have intercourse with her after the seclusion. And the kohen makes her swear the oath required by the basic law, that she was not penetrated while she was married, and by virtue of this oath he can also roll over onto her an additional oath, that she was not penetrated when she was betrothed. And here the case is one where he did not warn her at all during the betrothal, and her actions during the betrothal are not fit for an oath in their own right at all. Nevertheless, he can make her swear concerning this through rolling over.

And we raise it: Indeed,

we have found

—we have found that the law of rolling over an oath was newly established in

a sotah

, which is a law of

“prohibition.”

But with regard to

monetary matters, from where do we know?

From where do we know that the law of rolling over an oath was newly established also in monetary laws? After all, monetary laws are not learned from laws of prohibitions!

And we answer:

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael

[a tanna taught from the בית מדרש of Rabbi Yishmael]: The matter is learned through

a kal va-chomer: