Kiddushin 27b (כז:) — the Talmud in English

And the beraita continues and says: What we said concerning acquisition by possession—that if one established possession of one field, he also acquired another field, even one that is not adjacent to it—

in what case is this said?

Only when

he gave him

the

money for all of them.

But if he

did not give him

the money for

all of them, he acquired only land corresponding to the money he paid.

This concludes the words of the beraita.

And since we learned in the beraita that one who establishes possession of one field does not acquire another field that is not adjacent to it unless he gave him the money for all of them, it follows that the same applies to acquisition through attachment, since movable property is like land that is not adjacent to the field, and therefore it is impossible to acquire movable property through attachment to land unless he gave the seller the money for all of it, in accordance with the statement of Rava above.

And since the Gemara brought the beraita in order to prove Rava’s position from it, it adds that this beraita also provides support for Shmuel’s position, as follows:

And we say: What we learned in the beraita

supports Shmuel.

As Shmuel said: If he sold him ten fields in ten countries, once he established possession

the purchaser

of one of them, he acquired them all.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Ika, said

with regard to Shmuel’s statement:

Know

that Shmuel’s statement is correct,

for

if

a person had handed him

one person to another

ten animals

tied together

by

means of

one halter, and said to him

the seller to the purchaser,

“Acquire

all these animals,”

would he not acquire them?!

A person could not fail to acquire them merely because he did not establish possession of each one individually! Certainly not. Rather, since they are all tied to one halter, they are all acquired together. And similarly, with regard to ten fields, since they are all connected to one another through the land between them, if he established possession of one of them, he acquired them all. This is based on the Ritva’s explanation below of the Gemara’s rejection. Tosafot raised the following difficulty: How can one prove from a person holding the halter of ten animals that the same law applies to ten fields? One who holds the halter of ten animals is considered to be holding all of them [just as one who holds the halter of a single animal has thereby established possession of that animal itself]. Whereas with regard to ten fields, the purchaser establishes possession of only one of them! Because of this difficulty, Tosafot explained that this is not referring to a case in which the purchaser held the halter itself. Rather, although all the animals were attached to a single halter, he held the leg of one of them, or the like. He acquired all of them even though he had not established possession of them at all, because they were connected to one another. Similarly, with regard to ten fields, when he established possession of one of them, he acquired them all because they were connected to one another. However, from the plain meaning of Rashi’s words [s.v. “its bundle is in his hand”] and those of the early authorities, it appears that they explained that this refers to one who holds the halter itself, and not the leg of one of the animals. It appears from the words of Tosafot Rid [below, s.v. “There are those who say”] that we might have thought that he acquires only the animal nearest the end of the halter. Rav Aha said that this is certainly not the law, and from here he proved that similarly, with regard to ten fields, we do not say that he acquires only the field in which he established possession. [Apparently, ten animals tied to one halter means a long rope connecting them all. The delivery is recognizable here only with respect to the animal nearest the end of the rope, and nevertheless he acquires them all, because since they are connected to one another, the delivery applies to all of them. From this Rav Aha proved that similarly, establishing possession of one of ten fields is considered possession of all of them, since they are connected to one another, even though the act of possession is recognizable only with regard to one of them].

And we reject this:

They said to him:

Are the cases comparable?

Can this be compared to ten fields?! After all,

there

with regard to the ten animals,

their bundle is in his hand.

But

here,

with regard to acquisition of a field,

their bundle is not in his hand!

For when one holds the halter of ten animals, all of them are tied together by that halter, which is in his hand. This is not so with regard to fields: They are scattered and are not considered tied together. Therefore, it is possible that one who establishes possession of one field acquired only that field.

There are those who say,

who say the opposite:

Rav Aha, son of Rav Ika, said:

Know that

Shmuel’s statement is not correct, and one who establishes possession of one field

does not acquire

another field through this as well, for

if he had handed him ten animals

that were tied

by one halter, and said to him, “

This animal

you acquire,” would he acquire?

Would he acquire the other animals tied with it by the halter?! Certainly not!

And if so, similarly, one who establishes possession of one field, while the other fields are not recognizable as being with it, is like one who says, “This field you acquire,” and therefore he acquired only that field.

And we reject this:

Are the cases comparable?

Can this be compared to Shmuel’s statement?! After all,

there,

when one hands another person ten animals tied by one halter, the

bodies are separate,

and when he says to him, “You acquire this one,” he intends to say that he should acquire specifically that one and not the others. But

here,

when one sells another person ten fields,

the earth is one solid mass;

all the fields are connected to the body of the earth, and they are all considered one body, even though they are divided according to their locations within that body. Therefore, when the seller tells the purchaser to establish possession of one parcel of land, this is not like saying to him, “You acquire this one”; rather, his intention is to transfer all of them to him.

We learned in the Mishna:

And they cause

the movable property

the assets

that have guaranteed collection to require an oath concerning them.

This oath is called “rolling over an oath.” That is, since the person is already required to take an oath concerning movable property, the court extends the obligation upon him to take an oath concerning land as well.

And the Gemara brings a source from the Torah for the law of “rolling over an oath”:

Ulla said: From where is the law of rolling over an oath derived from the Torah?

This matter is learned from what

is stated

concerning a sota:

A married woman who certainly had intercourse with another man is forbidden to her husband by the prohibition of a “harlot.”

But if it is not certain that she committed adultery while married, because there are no witnesses who saw the intercourse, but the woman is suspected of this under the conditions that will be explained below, she is forbidden to her husband by the prohibition of a sota.

A woman is forbidden as a sota only through “warning” and “seclusion”: If the husband warned her [cautioned her] before witnesses not to seclude herself with a certain man, and nevertheless she secluded herself with him before witnesses [for the amount of time suitable for intercourse], she is forbidden to her husband.

A husband who warned his wife and she secluded herself may bring her to a koen to examine whether or not she became defiled. This is the procedure of her examination:

The husband brings for her the minha of a sota, and the koen gives her the bitter waters to drink, and before giving them to her, he administers an oath to her in the following wording: “If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone astray into defilement while under your husband, be cleared by these bitter, accursed waters.” “And if you have gone astray, the Lord will make you a curse and an oath among your people, when the Lord makes your thigh fall and your belly swell.” And the woman answers, “Amen, amen.” Then, if the woman in fact committed adultery, her belly swells, her thigh falls, and she dies. But if she is pure, she emerges cleared of the suspicion, goes on her way, and is permitted to her husband. But if the woman does not wish to drink, she does not drink; rather, she is forbidden to him and leaves without her marriage contract. And the Gemara brings the verse concerning a sota, after the koen administers the oath of the curse [Numbers 5:22]:

“And the woman shall say: Amen, amen.”

And we learned,

and we learned in tractate Sota [18a]:

Why does she say “Amen, amen”

twice? Why is it not sufficient for her to say amen once?

And the Mishna explains the duplication of “amen” in several ways:

a.

“Amen”

one

for the oath,

for what the koen administered the oath concerning—that she had not gone astray, and

amen

a second

for the curse,

the curse with which the koen cursed her: that if she had gone astray, the Lord would make her thigh fall and her belly swell.

b.

Amen

one:

if

I became defiled

by this man

with whom there are witnesses that I secluded myself. And

amen

a second:

if

I became defiled

by another man.

c.

Amen

one:

that I did not go astray while betrothed.

And

a second amen: that I did not go astray while

married.

And

so too, if the woman was a yevama who married her yavam, she says: Amen, that I did not go astray while I was

awaiting levirate marriage,

and

amen, that I did not go astray while

taken in levirate marriage [

after I performed yibbum with the yavam]. , This concludes the words of the Mishna in tractate Sota.

And Ulla proves from the fact that she swears, “Amen: I have not deviated as a betrothed woman or a married woman,” that the law of rolling a sh שבועה into another שבועה was introduced here:

For

this

“Amen,” concerning the שבועה administered to her by the koen that she did not deviate while she was

betrothed,

what are the circumstances?

What is meant by what we learned, that the woman swears that she did not deviate while betrothed? Perhaps you will say that this שבועה is required by the basic law, and that the law of “rolling a שבועה” was not introduced here. This cannot be said. For according to this, the verse must necessarily be saying that just as the law of the שבועה of a sota was stated with regard to a married woman, so too the law of the שבועה of a sota was stated with regard to a betrothed woman.

Accordingly, we would have to say that the husband had warned the woman while she was betrothed, and that she had also secluded herself while she was still betrothed [just as a sota’s שבועה in the case of a married woman applies only when there had been both warning and seclusion].

If so, one can ask: How could there be a sota’s שבועה in the case of a betrothed woman following warning and seclusion?

If you say,

if we say that the case is one in which

he warned her,

he warned her and she secluded herself

while she was betrothed, and

also

he gives her to drink [

administers the water to her]

while she is still betrothed,

and the husband administers a שבועה to her concerning the fact that she did not commit adultery while betrothed, this is impossible, because:

But we learned: A betrothed woman and a yevama awaiting levirate marriage

whose fiancé or yavam warned them and they secluded themselves

do not drink

the sota water. Rather, they leave their husbands,

and they do not receive their ketuba.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason?

Why do they not drink? Because “if you have gone astray into impurity

under your husband, the Merciful One said.”

This indicates that the verse speaks specifically of a woman to whom the expression “under your husband” applies, namely, a married woman.

And

in the case of a betrothed woman and a yevama awaiting levirate marriage

there is none,

for the expression “under your husband” does not apply to her.

Necessarily, then, it is impossible to establish the שבועה of a betrothed woman as referring to a case in which he warned her and gave her to drink while she was still betrothed!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the “Amen” concerning the שבועה that she did not deviate while betrothed can be established as referring to a case in which

he warned [

warned]

her

and she secluded herself

while she was betrothed,

and he gives her to drink

afterward,

when she is married.

This, too, is impossible, because in such a case,

will the water examine her!?

Can the water examine her and permit her to her husband if she married him after she had become forbidden to him under the law of a sota?

But surely

“And the man shall be free of iniquity,” the Merciful One said,

and this verse teaches that only

when the man is free of iniquity

then the

water examines his wife.

But if, after she secluded herself and became forbidden to him under the law of a sota, her husband had intercourse with her despite the prohibition, then

the

man

is not free of iniquity,

and in such a case

the water does not examine his wife.

Therefore, it is impossible to establish the שבועה concerning her not having deviated while betrothed as referring to a case in which he warned his wife and she secluded herself while betrothed, and he came to give her to drink when she was married, because he certainly had intercourse with her after marrying her, and thereby violated a prohibition; the water would not examine her, since the husband is not free of iniquity! On the basis of this difficulty, Ulla concludes:

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the law of the שבועה of a sota was not introduced at all for a betrothed woman. The statement that she swears “Amen: I have not deviated while betrothed or married” refers to a שבועה that comes

by means of rolling a שבועה into another שבועה,

in the case of a husband who warned his wife when she was married, and she secluded herself, and he did not have intercourse with her after the seclusion. The koen administers the שבועה to her as required by the basic law, that she did not have intercourse while married; by virtue of this שבועה, he can also roll an additional שבועה onto her, that she did not have intercourse while she was betrothed. The case is one in which he did not warn her at all during the betrothal period, and her actions during the betrothal period are not subject to a שבועה in their own right. Nevertheless, he can administer a שבועה to her concerning them by means of rolling a שבועה into another שבועה.

And we raise an objection: Indeed,

we have found

that the law of rolling a שבועה was introduced in the case of a

sota,

which is a law of

prohibitions.

But with regard to

monetary matters, from where do we know it?

From where do we know that the law of rolling a שבועה was introduced in monetary law as well? After all, monetary law is not learned from the laws of prohibitions!

And we answer:

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael

—a tanna who taught in the בית מדרש of Rabbi Yishmael—said: This is learned by means of a

kal va-chomer: