Kiddushin 24a — the Talmud in English

As it was taught in a baraita: ![](pamud.bmp "

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a woman does not redeem maaser sheni without

adding

a fifth

to the principal.

These are the words of the Sages: At this stage the Gemara understood that this refers to maaser sheni that the husband separated from produce that grew in his fields. And the woman who redeems it is considered like her husband; thus, this is like a person who redeems his own produce of maaser, who must add a fifth.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of

in the name of

Rabbi Meir: A woman redeems her husband’s maaser sheni

of her husband

without a fifth,

since the maaser sheni is not hers.

And one must examine the words of the baraita:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner is this speaking here? To whom do the money and the produce belong?

If you say,

if it is speaking of a woman who comes to redeem the maaser

with the husband’s coins,

and even the

maaser

is maaser sheni

of the husband,

then certainly

she is carrying out the agency of the husband.

For the woman comes by virtue of the husband’s agency, since he wishes to redeem the maaser with his money. And how is it possible that Rabbi Meir exempts her from adding a fifth?

Necessarily, the baraita is not speaking in this manner.

But rather,

should you say that it is speaking

with her coins,

with money belonging to the woman from before the marriage, which she brought to the husband as “nichsei melog,” ,

and

the

maaser

is

hers,

of the husband.

If so, certainly the woman is considered like another person who comes to redeem maaser that is not his. And concerning maaser it is stated: “And if an

man

redeems from his maaser,”

and not “a

woman

from her husband’s maaser.” And how is it possible that the Sages would obligate the woman to add a fifth to the redemption?

Necessarily, our Mishna is not speaking in this manner.

But rather,

since these two approaches in explaining the baraita have been rejected,

is it not, in this manner,

that the baraita spoke—

that another person acquired for her a maneh,

for another person transferred a maneh to her

and said to her:

Acquire the maneh

on the condition that you redeem the maaser with it—

According to the Sages: When the giver said, “Acquire the maneh,” the husband acquired it. And with what he added and said, “on the condition,” he accomplished nothing. It follows that the money belongs to the husband, and the woman redeems the maaser as his agent,

and therefore she must add a fifth.

According to Rabbi Meir: From the outset, the giver transferred the money to the woman only for the purpose that she be able to redeem the maaser with it, as another person would, who does not add a fifth. Therefore the husband does not acquire the money from her, since he cannot redeem his maaser without adding a fifth. , .

And

it is difficult: It follows that

I heard the opposite from them!

We heard from the words of the Sages and Rabbi Meir concerning maaser the opposite of what we learned from their words concerning the emancipation of a slave. For concerning the emancipation of a slave, Rabbi Meir said that a slave has no acquisition without his master, even if the giver said, “on the condition that you go free with it.” And the Sages said that a slave does have an acquisition without his master in this manner. Whereas concerning maaser we learned the opposite!

And the Gemara brings two answers that were said concerning this difficulty:

1.

Abaye said: Reverse it!

Reverse the words of Rabbi Meir and the Sages in the baraita concerning maaser, and they should be taught as follows:

A woman redeems maaser sheni without a fifth.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A woman does not redeem maaser sheni without a fifth.

And this is consistent with their position concerning the emancipation of a slave.

2.

Rava said

another answer:

In truth, do not reverse it.

Do not reverse the positions in the baraita; rather, the baraita must be established as concerning a woman who comes to redeem maaser with the husband’s money—

And here, we are dealing with maaser that came from her father’s house.

Here it is speaking of a case in which the woman’s father died, he had maaser sheni, and the woman inherited it among the other property that she inherited from her father. And Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed concerning the status of this maaser: An inheritance that falls to a woman after her marriage has the status of nichsei melog, in that the woman acquires land with it, and the land is hers, whereas the produce growing on it belongs to the husband.

And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagreed: Does maaser sheni that the woman inherited have the status of the other property that the woman inherits from her father?

And Rabbi Meir follows his position

according to his view,

as he said

below [52b]:

Maaser

sheni is

property

of

the hekdesh [the Most High]!

[of the Most High]

it is!

And the owners eat it from that of the Most High.

Therefore its status differs from that of the rest of the inheritance, because what the Sages enacted concerning a woman’s inheritance—that it should have the status of nichsei melog, and the husband consumes its produce—applies only to property belonging to the woman, which is ordinary property. But not to an inheritance of maaser sheni, which is property of the Most High; therefore the husband does not acquire the maaser sheni.

And when the woman comes to redeem this produce with the husband’s money, it is as though the husband redeems the woman’s produce of maaser with his money, and he does not pay a fifth, because the maaser is not his.

And

if

the Rabbis

would proceed

according to their position

according to their view,

as they say

below [there]: maaser sheni is

the property of an ordinary person!

And the enactment of the Sages applies to it, so it has the status of nichsei melog, with which land is purchased, and the produce growing on it belongs to the husband.

And since the woman redeems the produce of maaser sheni, in which the husband has a right by virtue of nichsei melog, with the husband’s money,

therefore she performs the agency of the husband,

the woman performs the husband’s agency in this redemption, and it is as though the husband himself redeems his maaser with his money, and he must add a fifth.

Until here the Gemara discussed the ways in which a Canaanite slave goes out, which were mentioned in our Mishna [money and a document]. Now the Gemara brings a baraita that adds another way in which he goes out:

The tanna taught: He goes out through a tooth and an eye

if the master knocked out the slave’s tooth or his eye, he goes free. ,

And

it is not specifically a tooth and an eye; rather, the same law applies to all

extremities of the

the

limbs,

such that if he knocked them out

they do not return

to their original state. , .

And now the Gemara clarifies from where the baraita derives that the slave goes free through this: And we raised the following objection:

Granted,

it is indeed correct that release through a

tooth and an eye is written

explicitly in Scripture.

But release through

the extremities of limbs—

from where do we derive it?

And we answer: Since Scripture said “tooth and eye,” we learn from here all the limbs that are

similar to a tooth and an eye

[that resemble a tooth and an eye]:

Just as

as

a tooth and an eye,

which are

visible defects,

in external limbs visible to the eye,

and

when they fall out they

do not return.

So too, all visible defects that do not return—

their status is like that of a tooth and an eye, and if the master knocks them out, the slave goes free.

And we raise an objection: All this would have been correct had only a tooth been stated in the Torah.

And

since an eye was also stated,

say that they should be

say that

tooth and eye

are like

two verses that come as one.

And

we have a rule that

all two verses that come as one—

do not teach

another matter, even if it resembles them.

For if the Torah intended to give merely an example, to teach from it concerning everything resembling it, it would have sufficed to give only one example, in order to learn from it concerning everything resembling it.

And since the verse stated two matters, it necessarily means to teach that these verses are not examples, but rather the law was stated only with regard to them and not with regard to what resembles them.

And according to this, the slave should go free only through the tooth and eye that were stated in the Torah, and not through other things.

And if so, this is difficult: Why did we learn in the beraita that a slave goes free through all major limbs that do not grow back?!

And we answer:

It is necessary.

Here there is a need for both verses, for tooth as well as for eye, and therefore it is possible to learn from them, despite their being “two verses.”

For the rule that the Sages stated, “All two verses that come as one do not teach,” was stated only in a place where, if we were to learn from the verses for other cases, it would be difficult: Why was one verse not sufficient to serve as an example?

But with regard to tooth and eye, since the verse needed to state both tooth and eye, as the Gemara will explain, it is possible to learn from tooth and eye with regard to all the limbs.

For had the Merciful One written

only

tooth,

I would have said

that

even—