Kiddushin 24a (כד.) — the Talmud in English

As it was taught:

No woman redeems Second Tithe without

adding

a fifth

to the principal.

These are the words of the Sages. At this stage, the Gemara understood that the reference is to Second Tithe that the husband separated from produce that grew in his fields. And the woman who redeems it is considered like her husband; thus, she is like a person redeeming the produce of his own tithe, who must add a fifth.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of [the name of]

Rabbi Meir: A woman may redeem her husband’s Second Tithe

without a fifth,

since the Second Tithe does not belong to her.

And the words of the beraita must be examined:

What are the circumstances?

In what case is this statement speaking? To whom do the money and the produce belong?

If you say

that it is speaking of a woman who comes to redeem the tithe

with the money of her husband,

and the

tithe

is also the Second Tithe

of her husband,

then certainly

she is acting as her husband’s agent.

The woman comes by virtue of her husband’s agency, since she wishes to redeem the tithe with his money. And how could it be that Rabbi Meir exempts her from adding a fifth?

It must therefore be that the beraita is not speaking of this case.

Rather,

will you say that it is speaking

with her own money,

with money that belonged to the woman from before the marriage, which she brought to her husband as nichsei melog—, —and

the

the

tithe

is

hers,

while the produce belongs to her husband?

If so, the woman is certainly considered like another person who comes to redeem Second Tithe that does not belong to him. And concerning tithe it is stated: “And if

a man

redeems from his tithe,”

but not

a woman

from her husband’s tithe.” And how could it be that the Sages would obligate the woman to add a fifth to the redemption?

It must therefore be that our Mishna is not speaking of this case.

Rather,

since these two approaches to explaining the beraita have been rejected,

is it not the case that the beraita spoke of such a situation—

that another person transferred a maneh to her,

that another person transferred a maneh to her

and said to her:

Acquire this maneh

in order that you redeem the tithe with it—

According to the Sages: When the giver said, “Acquire this maneh,” the husband acquired it. And by adding “in order that,” he accomplished nothing. It follows that the money belongs to the husband, and the woman redeems the tithe as his agent,

and therefore she must add a fifth.

According to Rabbi Meir: From the outset, the giver transferred the money to the woman only for the purpose of enabling her to redeem the tithe with it, like another person who does not add a fifth. Therefore, the husband does not acquire the money from her, since he cannot redeem his tithe without adding a fifth. ,

And

this is difficult: It follows that

I hear the opposite from them!

From the words of the Sages and Rabbi Meir concerning tithe, we hear the opposite of what we learned from their words concerning the emancipation of a slave. For concerning the emancipation of a slave, Rabbi Meir said that a slave cannot acquire property without his master, even if the giver said, “on condition that you go free with it.” And the Sages said that in such a case a slave can acquire property without his master. Yet concerning tithe, we learned the opposite!

The Gemara presents two answers that were given to this difficulty:

1.

Abaye said: Reverse it!

Reverse the statements of Rabbi Meir and the Sages in the beraita concerning tithe, and teach them as follows:

A woman may redeem Second Tithe without a fifth.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A woman may not redeem Second Tithe without a fifth.

And this accords with their positions concerning the emancipation of a slave.

2.

Rava said

another answer:

Actually, do not reverse it.

Do not reverse the positions in the beraita. Rather, the beraita should be established as referring to a woman who comes to redeem tithe with her husband’s money—

And here we are dealing with tithe that came from her father’s house.

Here it is speaking of a case in which the woman’s father died, and he had Second Tithe, and the woman inherited it along with the other property that she inherited from her father. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed concerning the status of this tithe: An inheritance that falls to a woman after her marriage has the status of nichsei melog, with which the woman acquires land; the land belongs to her, whereas the produce growing on it belongs to the husband.

Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed whether the Second Tithe that the woman inherited has the same status as the other property that the woman inherited from her father:

And Rabbi Meir follows his own reasoning

[according to his view],

as he said

below [52b]:

Second Tithe

is

property

of

the Most High

[consecrated property]

it is!

And the owners eat it from the property of the Most High.

Therefore, its status differs from that of other inherited property. The enactment of the Sages that an inheritance of a woman has the status of nichsei melog, with the husband consuming its produce, applies only to property that belongs to the woman and is ordinary property. But it does not apply to an inheritance of Second Tithe, which is property of the Most High; therefore, the husband does not acquire the Second Tithe.

And when the woman comes to redeem this produce with the husband’s money, it is as though the husband is redeeming the woman’s tithe produce with his own money, and he does not pay a fifth, because the tithe is not his.

And

if it were

the Sages,

they would proceed

according to their own reasoning

[according to their view],

as they said

below [there]: Second Tithe

is ordinary property!

And the enactment of the Sages applies to it, so that it has the status of nichsei melog: land is acquired with it, and the produce growing on that land belongs to the husband.

And since the woman redeems the Second Tithe produce, in which the husband has rights by virtue of nichsei melog, with the husband’s money,

therefore, she is acting as the husband’s agent,

the woman performs this redemption as the husband’s agent, and it is as though the husband himself redeems his tithe with his own money, in which case he must add a fifth.

Up to this point, the Gemara discussed the means by which a Canaanite slave is emancipated that were mentioned in our Mishna [money and a document]. Now the Gemara cites a beraita that adds another means of emancipation:

It was taught: He goes free through [the loss of] a tooth or an eye

If the master knocked out the slave’s tooth or eye, he goes free. ,

And

this does not refer specifically to a tooth or an eye; rather, the same law applies to all

principal

limbs,

so that if the master knocked them out,

they do not grow back

to their original state. ,

The Gemara now clarifies the source for the beraita’s ruling that the slave goes free through these injuries: And we raised the matter:

Granted,

it is indeed correct that emancipation through

a tooth and an eye is written

explicitly in the verse.

But emancipation through the

principal limbs—

from where do we derive it?

And we answer: Since the verse mentioned a tooth and an eye, we derive from here all the limbs that are

similar to a tooth and an eye

[that resemble a tooth and an eye]:

Just as

a

tooth and an eye,

which are

visible defects,

on external limbs that can be seen,

and

when they are knocked out

they do not grow back,

so too, all visible defects that do not grow back—

their status is like that of a tooth and an eye, and if the master knocks them out, the slave goes free.

And we challenge: All this would be true if the Torah had stated only tooth.

But

since it also stated eye,

let us say they are,

say that

tooth and eye

are like

“two verses that come as one.”

And

we have a principle that

all two verses that come as one—

do not teach

another matter, even if it is similar to them.

For if the Torah intended merely to cite an example, in order to teach from it about everything similar to it, it would have sufficed to cite only one example, from which to derive all similar cases.

And since the verse stated two matters, it necessarily follows that its intent is to teach that these verses are not examples; rather, the law was stated only with regard to them and not with regard to cases similar to them.

Accordingly, the slave should go free only through the loss of the tooth and eye stated in the Torah, and not through other injuries.

And if so, this is difficult: Why did we learn in the beraita that a slave goes free through the loss of all major limbs that do not grow back!?

And we answer:

It is necessary.

Here there is a need for both verses, for tooth as well as eye, and therefore it is possible to derive the law from them, despite their being “two verses.”

For the principle stated by the Sages, “all two verses that come as one do not teach,” was stated only in a case where, if we were to derive laws for other cases from the verses, it would be difficult: Why was one verse not sufficient to serve as an example?

But with regard to tooth and eye, since the verse had to state both tooth and eye, as the Gemara will explain, it is possible to derive the law from tooth and eye for all the limbs.

For had the Merciful One written

only

“tooth,”

I would have thought

that

even