Kiddushin 24b (כד:) — the Talmud in English

a milk tooth

is considered included in the category of “tooth,” despite the fact that it is destined to fall out and be replaced by another tooth.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote “

eye,”

to teach you: Just as the eye mentioned in the Torah is not destined to be replaced, so too, the tooth does not mean a milk tooth, but rather a permanent tooth that is not destined to be replaced.

And had the Merciful One written only “eye,” I would have said

that one should say as follows:

Just as

an

eye, which

is a limb that

was created with him

at the time of his birth—

so too, every

thing

that was created with him

at the time of his birth has the same status as an eye.

But a tooth,

which was not created with the slave at the time of his birth,

no!

And therefore

it is necessary

for the verse to state “tooth” explicitly, in order to teach us that although it was not created together with the slave, he goes free through its loss.

And since it is necessary to write both “tooth” and “eye,” both of them serve as examples for all limbs that do not regenerate, whose status is like that of a tooth and an eye.

And we raise another objection:

Perhaps

say that the verse should be expounded as follows:

It is stated in the passage of Mishpatim [Exodus 21:26]: “

And if a man strikes the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall send him free in exchange for his eye.” “

And if he knocks out the tooth of his slave or the tooth of his maidservant, he shall send him free in exchange for his tooth.”

And we should expound the verse as follows: “

If he strikes”—

a generalization. “

Tooth”

Tooth”

and “

eye”—

a specification.

And wherever a generalization and a specification are stated,

the generalization includes only what is stated in the specification.

Therefore, only

tooth and eye,

which are stated in the specification,

and not [

anything else].

But

anything else [

other things],

no!

And why did we learn in the beraita that all the principal limbs that do not regenerate have the status of a tooth and an eye?

And we answer: Since later the verse states, “

He shall send him free”—

the verse returned

and

generalized. 1228.

And wherever there is a

generalization, specification, and generalization—

you may derive [

learn from it]

only

something that is

similar to the specification.

Just as

the

specification

that is

explicit

in the verse is:

a.

A visible defect [

in the case of a tooth and an eye].

b.

And

if the limbs are removed, they

do not regenerate.

So too, all visible defects, and

if these limbs are removed, they

do not regenerate;

the slave goes free through them.

And we object:

If

perhaps we should expound the “generalization, specification, and generalization” in another manner, and say as follows:

Just as

the

specification

that is

explicit

in the verse is

visible defects, and

through these defects the slave

is prevented from his labor,

as he cannot see with his eye or chew with his tooth,

and the

limb does not regenerate.

So too, all

the things derived from the generalization are

visible defects, do not regenerate, and prevent him from his labor!

And if you wish to say that this is indeed how we expound the “generalization, specification, and generalization,” then your statement is difficult:

Why [

why]

is it taught

in the beraita as follows:

If he plucked a hair from his beard

of his slave

and dislocated a bone in it —

the

slave goes free through them?

And this bone does not serve the slave for any labor [and he is not prevented from labor through its dislocation],

so why did we learn in the beraita that he goes free through it? 1226.

Rather, it is proven from the words of the beraita that limbs whose loss does not prevent labor are not excluded through the “generalization, specification, and generalization.”

If so, the earlier difficulty returns: Why are they not excluded through “generalization, specification, and generalization”? After all, they are not similar to the specification!

And we answer: The wording of the verse is not expounded by means of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” as we had thought until now. Rather, the entire verse is expounded by means of “amplification, limitation, and amplification.” “

If he strikes” is an amplification, which includes all blows. “

Tooth” and “eye” are a limitation, indicating that the slave goes free only through the loss of a tooth or eye.

Whereas “

he shall send him free”

is an amplification,

indicating that he shall send him to freedom through any one of the limbs.

And every verse expounded by means of “amplification, limitation, and amplification” includes everything, except for one thing excluded by the “limitation.”

And we object:

And if

“he shall send him free” is considered

an amplification,

and the verse is expounded as “amplification, limitation, and amplification,” then only one thing may be excluded through the specification: that the defect must be visible. But it is impossible to exclude from here also the requirement that the defect not regenerate. 915.

If so,

even

if

he struck him on his hand and it withered,

dried up,

and it will eventually regenerate

and heal,

also!

the slave should go free through this injury as well. 1231.]

And if we say this, a difficulty arises:

Why [

why]

is it taught

in the beraita as follows:

If he struck him on his hand and it withered, and it will eventually regenerate, the slave does not go free through it?!

And we answer: Although wherever “amplification, limitation, and amplification” is stated only one thing is excluded, here we must necessarily exclude two things.

For if we exclude only the requirement that the defects be visible,

then

a difficulty can be raised:

Tooth and eye—

what purpose do they serve?

What purpose was served by the verse mentioning both tooth and eye? It would have sufficed to mention only the tooth, in order to indicate that visible defects are required.

Rather, it is necessarily the case that we must exclude two things: [

a.] From “tooth” we learn that the defect must be visible. [

b.] From “eye” we learn that the defect must not regenerate. 1231.

The Gemara now cites a beraita, which discusses the release of a Canaanite slave through the principal limbs: How is this release effected?

The Sages taught: With regard to all of them,

all the principal limbs,

a slave goes free through them,

from his labor alone.

And

however, he

requires a deed of emancipation

in order to permit him to marry a free woman.

These are

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Meir says:

The slave

does not require

a deed of emancipation. Rather, as soon as his master removes one of his principal limbs, the slave has the status of a free man, and he is permitted to marry a free woman.

The beraita cites additional tanna’im who disagree in this dispute:

Rabbi Eliezer says: He requires

a deed of emancipation.

Rabbi Tarfon says: He does not require one.

Rabbi Akiva says: He requires one. “

Those who decide before the Sages”

say:

a.

The words of Rabbi Tarfon appear

correct—that he does not require a deed

for

the removal of a

tooth or eye,

because

the Torah granted the slave

explicitly that he goes free through them.

b.

And

the

words of Rabbi Akiva

appear correct, as he said that a deed is required,

with regard to the other limbs, since

the slave’s release through them

is a penalty imposed by the Sages,

and is not from the Torah. Therefore, by Torah law he may not be permitted to marry a free woman without a deed of emancipation.

But the Gemara rejects the version of the beraita as cited here, according to which release through the other limbs is a penalty imposed by the Sages:

And we ask: Is release through the other limbs

a penalty

imposed by the Sages

?!

After all,

we are expounding verses!

We derived this earlier from the verses [through amplification, limitation, and amplification]!

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the version of the beraita must be amended, and it should read as follows: “

And the words of Rabbi Akiva appear correct with regard to the other limbs,

since it is a derivation of the Sages.”

That is, since the Torah explicitly stated only release through tooth and eye, and not through the other limbs, a deed of emancipation is required for the other limbs.

After the Gemara corrected the wording of the beraita, it explains the reasons of the tanna’im mentioned in it:

And we raise this difficulty:

What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon,

who says that for all the principal limbs, a get shichrur is required?

And we answer: Rabbi Shimon

derives

the law of

“sending away”,

which is stated here—“he shall send him away free”—from the law of

“sending away”

mentioned elsewhere,

from

the divorce of an

woman,

“and he shall send her away from his house” —

just as

the sending away mentioned with regard to a

woman

is

by a document,

a get,

so too

the “sending away” mentioned with regard to

a slave as well

is performed

by a document,

by a get shichrur.

And since we have explained Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, we must explain why Rabbi Meir disagrees with him. After all, we find an instance of the expression “sending away” that is performed by means of a document; why, then, should we not interpret “he shall send him away free” as referring to a document?

And we explain Rabbi Meir’s reasoning:

And Rabbi Meir

holds:

If the verse had written—if the Torah had stated the word

if Scripture had placed the word

“free”

at the end,

that is, “he shall send him away free”—then I too would have said

as you say,

that the sending away is performed by means of a document.

But

now,

now that

it wrote

“he shall send him away free”—

the verse thereby revealed that the slave

was already free from the outset.

For as soon as the master knocked out his tooth, the slave became free, even without sending him away by means of a document. The Gemara now cites several beraitot that discuss emancipation through a tooth, an eye, and the principal limbs:

The Sages taught:

If he struck him

the master

on his eye and blinded it;

or if he struck him

on his ear and deafened it—

the

slave is emancipated through them.

But if he did not strike him directly on his eye or ear, but merely struck

opposite his eye,

against a wall, and the slave was frightened by the sound,

and

as a result of the fright he became blind and

cannot see;

or if he struck

opposite his ear,

against a wall, and the slave became deaf

and cannot hear—

the

the

slave is not emancipated through them.

The reason for the distinction between one who strikes the slave directly on his eye or ear and one who strikes him opposite his eye or ear will become clear from the following discussion:

Rav Shaman

asked

Rav Ashi:

Rav Shaman assumed that the reason that when one strikes opposite the slave’s eye or ear the slave is not emancipated is that he did not harm him through a direct action, but only through sound, which has no substance. He therefore asked:

Does this beraita come

to say [לומר]

[that is, does it say]

that

one who damages another through

sound has done nothing,

so that this is not considered an act of damage and he is exempt for it?

But this can be disproved from two statements of the Sages, which establish that one who damages through sound is liable! [א]

a]

For Rami bar Yehezkel taught

a beraita:

If a rooster extended

its

head into the air [לחלל]

[the hollow space]

a glass vessel and

made a sound inside it,

and broke it

through the sound,

he pays full damages.

This is the opinion of Sumakhos.

And the Sages maintain that he pays half-damages. For a rooster that caused damage through its sound is like one who throws a pebble at a vessel and breaks it. A rooster or an animal that causes damage by throwing pebbles at a vessel pays half-damages. [ב]

b]

And

likewise,

Rav Yosef said; they said in the study hall of Rav [כך אמרו תלמידי רב]:

[this is what Rav’s students said]:

a horse that neighed,

which made its sound [called a neigh],

and a donkey that brayed, and they broke vessels inside the house

with their sounds—is considered as though they threw pebbles at the vessels and broke them, and therefore

they pay half-damages,

in accordance with the opinion of the Sages who disagree with Sumakhos.

From these two statements it is evident that one who damages through sound is like one who damages through a pebble or an arrow, which have tangible substance.

It is obvious that if a master strikes his slave with an arrow or a pebble and knocks out his tooth, the slave is thereby emancipated.

If so, this is difficult: Why did we learn that one who strikes his slave opposite his eye or ear and harms him through sound is exempt from sending him away free?

He

answered

him:

Rav Ashi replied to Rav Shaman: Indeed, there is no distinction between sound and a pebble or arrow. But that applies only with regard to liability for damaging vessels. One who frightens his slave with his sound, causing him to become deaf or blind, does not thereby emancipate him.

And the reason is that

a person is different, since he is possessed of understanding—

he frightens himself!

The law of a person differs from that of a vessel. Since a person is possessed of understanding and has the ability not to be frightened by the noise, a person who is injured through fright caused by noise frightens himself: He directs his attention to the fear of the sudden sound, and the person who harmed him through the sound is not considered to have caused the damage.

Rav Ashi proves his statement from a beraita:

As it was taught: One who frightens another—

is exempt under human law but liable under the laws of Heaven.

How

is he “one who frightens

For example,

he blew into his ear,

without touching him,

and deafened him.

And therefore he is

exempt.

But if he

seized him, blew into his ear, and deafened him—

he is liable! ,

The Gemara cites another beraita concerning emancipation through a tooth or eye:

The Sages taught:

If he struck him on his eye and dimmed it,

meaning that his vision weakened but he did not become completely blind; or if he struck him

on his tooth and loosened it [התנדנדה], then—

[it began to move], then—

if

the

slave can use them

as they are

[with his weakened vision and loose tooth]—

the

the

slave is not emancipated through them.

But if not—

the

slave is emancipated through them. ,

It was taught in another beraita,

we learned another beraita similar to the preceding one:

If his eye was

the slave’s

[weakened],

and the master blinded it

completely. Or if

his tooth was loose, and he knocked it out

the master—

if

the slave was

already able to use them,

beforehand—

the slave is emancipated through them.

But if not—

no slave is emancipated through them,

because he had already been considered toothless or eyeless beforehand.

From these two beraitot we learn a common principle: The master need not strike a truly healthy tooth or eye and completely destroy or knock it out. Something less is sufficient, for example: [א]

A. He struck healthy tooth and eye and weakened them, and now the slave cannot use them [the first beraita]. [ב]

B. He struck a dim eye that could be used and blinded it completely, or knocked out a loose tooth [the second beraita].

And both are necessary,

for it is necessary to teach both beraitot; it would not suffice to teach one beraita and derive from it the law stated in the other! ,

For if he had taught us

only

this

beraita,

the first,

if the tanna had taught us only the first beraita, that the slave is emancipated even when the master strikes healthy tooth and eye and weakens them, I would say that the slave is emancipated specifically in that case,

because originally

there was

healthy vision, and now

it has become

weak vision.

For initially the slave had completely healthy vision, and the master weakened his vision until the slave could no longer use it.

But here,

in the case discussed in the second beraita,

where originally, too, there was weak vision,

for even before the master struck him, the slave’s vision was weak,

I might say [הייתי אומר]

that when the master blinds it completely,

the

slave is not emancipated, since his eye was not healthy even before the blow.

Therefore, the tanna had to teach the second beraita as well.

And if he had taught us this,

if the tanna had taught us only the second beraita, concerning one who struck a weak eye and blinded it completely, I would say that the reason the slave is emancipated in this case is

because it is completely blinded,

for through the master’s blow the slave’s eye became completely blind, and therefore he is emancipated.

But there,

in the first beraita, which deals with a case such as

where it is not completely blinded, I might say [הייתי אומר]

that

the

slave is not emancipated, since his eye did not become entirely blind.

Therefore

both are necessary,

for it is necessary to teach both beraitot.

The Gemara cites another beraita concerning emancipation through a tooth or eye:

The Sages taught:

If the master of the slave was

the slave’s

a physician, and he said to him

the slave

to apply medicine to his eye,

with a medicinal preparation,

and

when the master was engaged in doing so, he

blinded it

accidentally.

Similarly, if the slave said to his master

to extract his tooth,

to clean his tooth and scrape away the flesh surrounding its socket,

and he knocked it out

the master accidentally.

That slave

has outwitted his master, and is thereby

through this

emancipated.

These are the words of the Sages.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Since, concerning striking an eye, it is stated

“and destroys it”,

it follows that the slave is not emancipated

until

the master

intends to destroy it.

The master must intend to damage and destroy the slave’s eye. But here, since the master intended to heal the slave, he is not emancipated.

And we challenge this:

But

according to

the Sages,

there is a difficulty:

this

verse,

“and destroys it”—

what do they do with it? What does the word “and destroys it” come to teach?

What does the word “and destroys it” come to teach?

And we answer:

They need it:

According to the Rabbis, the word “and he destroyed it” is necessary in order

to

teach us this law—

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: If

the master

inserted his hand into the womb of his pregnant maidservant

in order to deliver the fetus,

and blinded

the

fetus’s eye, which

was

in her womb

he is exempt

from freeing the fetus, and when it is born it belongs to the master.

What is the reason?

What is the reason for this ruling? It is because

the verse says: “

and he destroyed it”—

until he intends to destroy it!

Here, the master did not intend to destroy the fetus’s eye, but rather to deliver it.

The Rabbis, who disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel above, indeed maintain that if the master was a physician and intended to apply eye makeup to the slave’s eye, but blinded it inadvertently, the slave goes free. However, this applies only when the master intended to touch his slave’s eye.

But when the master inserted his hand into the womb of his maidservant, he did not intend to touch the fetus’s eye at all. Therefore, even the Rabbis agree in this case that the master is exempt, and this law is derived from “and he destroyed it.” Since we have explained that the Rabbis interpret “and he destroyed it” as excluding a master who inserted his hand into the womb of his maidservant and blinded a fetus that was in her womb, there is consequently a question concerning the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: How does he derive from “and he destroyed it” the exclusion of a physician who intended to apply eye makeup to the slave’s eye? Surely it may be said that the verse excludes only a master who inserted his hand into the womb of his maidservant, as he did not intend to touch the slave’s eye at all!

The Gemara explains:

And the other one,

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, derives it from

“and he destroyed”

“and he destroyed”

“and he destroyed it”

is derived.

He derives an additional exposition.

Since the verse could have said “and he destroyed,” but instead says “and he destroyed it,” adding the letter heh, two expositions are derived from it:

(a) “And he destroyed”—to exclude a master who did not intend to destroy at all, even if he did not intend to touch the slave’s eye.

(b) “And he destroyed it” implies that the verse is speaking of a master who was engaged with the eye, and nevertheless he must intend to destroy it. But if he intends to heal it, he is exempt.

And the other one,

the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

“‘and he destroyed’ and ‘and he destroyed it’—he does not expound them.”

In their view, the addition of the letter heh is not significant, and no exposition is derived from it.

The Gemara now brings additional laws concerning the slave’s going free on account of a tooth or eye:

Rav Sheshet said: If his eye was

the slave’s

covered over, and he gouged it out

[and the master removed it], then although the slave had been unable to use his eye, nevertheless

the slave goes free on their account.

And what is the reason?

What is the reason for this matter? Because from this point onward the slave

is lacking a limb.

And the tanna likewise teaches,

the tanna in the following beraita supports us in this law:

For so we learned in a beraita: The laws of

being unblemished and of being male

[that the offering must be unblemished and male rather than female] were stated with regard to offerings

in animals

alone.

But

nevertheless,

the

laws of

being unblemished and of being male

do not apply

to birds

at all.

And the tanna continues:

One might have thought

even if

its wing had withered

[one of the bird’s wings], or

its leg was severed,

or

its eye was gouged out,

it is fit as an offering—

The verse states, therefore, it is stated [Leviticus 1:14]: “And if

as it is stated [Leviticus 1:14]: “And if

from the bird

is his offering.”

The word “from” teaches that only part of the bird is fit to be offered,

but not the entire bird.

From here it follows that an animal lacking a limb is unfit!

It may be learned from this beraita that although the eye was covered over from the outset, nevertheless, if it is completely gouged out, he has caused a blemish. , The Gemara brings another law concerning the slave’s going free on account of a tooth or eye: