Kiddushin 24b — the Talmud in English

a milk tooth

is considered within the category of “tooth,” despite the fact that it is destined to fall out and be replaced by another tooth.

Therefore

Scripture wrote “

eye,”

to teach you: just as the eye mentioned in the Torah is not destined to be replaced, so a tooth is not a milk tooth, but a permanent tooth, which is not destined to be replaced.

And if Scripture had written only “eye,” I would have said

I would have said this:

What

just as

an eye, which

is a limb that

was created with him

at the time when he was born—

so too every

thing

that was created with him

at the time when he was born, its law is like that of an eye.

But a tooth,

which was not created with the slave at the time of his birth,

no!

And therefore

it is necessary,

the verse had to state “tooth” explicitly, in order to teach us that although it was not born with the slave, through it he goes out to freedom.

And since it is necessary to write both tooth and eye, both of them serve as examples for all limbs that do not grow back, whose law is like the law of tooth and eye.

And we raise another objection:

and say [

say that the verse should be expounded as follows]:

It is stated in the passage of Mishpatim [Exodus 21:26]:

“Now if a man strikes the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall send him free in exchange for his eye.”

“And if he knocks out the tooth of his slave or the tooth of his maidservant, he shall send him free in exchange for his tooth.”

And let us expound the verse as follows: “

If he strikes”—

a generalization.

“

Tooth”

and “

eye”—

a specification.

And wherever a generalization and a specification are stated,

the generalization contains only what is in the specification.

And therefore, only

tooth and eye,

which were stated in the specification,

not [

so].

But

anything else [

other things],

no!

And why did we learn in the beraita that all the principal limbs that do not grow back have the law of tooth and eye?

And we answer: since later in the verse it is stated, “

he shall send him free”—

the verse returned

to

a generalization.

And wherever it is stated,

a generalization, a specification, and a generalization—

you may infer [

learn from it]

only

a matter that is

similar to the specification.

What,

just as

the specification

that is

explicit

in the verse is:

a.

A visible defect [

in tooth and eye].

b.

And

if the limbs are removed, they

do not grow back.

So too all visible defects, and

if these limbs are removed, they

do not grow back—

through them the slave goes out to freedom.

And we object:

if,

perhaps we should expound the “generalization, specification, and generalization” in another way, and say as follows:

what,

just as

the specification

that is

explicit

in the verse is

visible defects, and

through these defects the slave

is incapacitated for his work,

as he cannot see with his eye or chew with his tooth,

and the

limb does not grow back.

So too all

the things learned from the generalization are

visible defects, and do not grow back, and incapacitate him for his work!

And if you wish to say that this is indeed how they expound the “generalization, specification, and generalization,” then your words present a difficulty:

Why then [

why]

is it taught

in the beraita as follows:

If he plucked a hair from his beard

of his slave

and dislocated a bone in it —

the

slave goes out through them to freedom.

And this bone does not serve the slave for any work [and he is not incapacitated for work through its dislocation],

and why did we learn in the beraita that through it he goes out to freedom?

Rather, it is proven from the words of the beraita that we do not exclude from the “generalization, specification, and generalization” defects through which there is no incapacitation for work.

And if so, the earlier difficulty returns: Why do we not exclude them from “generalization, specification, and generalization”? After all, they are not similar to the specification!

And we answer: The language of the verse is not expounded by way of “generalization, specification, and generalization,” as we had thought until now; rather, the entire verse is expounded by way of “amplification, limitation, and amplification.”

“If he strikes” is an amplification, which includes all blows.

“Tooth” and “eye” are a limitation, for only through the removal of a tooth and an eye does the slave go out to freedom.

Whereas

“he shall send him free”

is an amplification,

for in each of the limbs he shall send him to freedom.

And every verse that is expounded by way of “amplification, limitation, and amplification” includes everything, except for one matter that was excluded by the “limitation.”

And we object:

and if,

if “he shall send him free” is

considered an amplification,

and the verse is expounded by way of “amplification, limitation, and amplification,” only one thing may be excluded from the specification: that it must be a visible defect; but it is impossible to exclude from here also the requirement that it be a defect that does not grow back.

And if so,

even

if

he struck him on his hand and it withered,

dried up,

and it will eventually return

and become healthy,

also!

In this case as well the slave goes out to freedom.

And if it is said thus, a difficulty arises:

Why then [

why]

is it taught

in the beraita as follows:

If he struck him on his hand and it withered, and it will eventually return, the slave does not go out through it to freedom?!

And we answer: Although everywhere that “amplification, limitation, and amplification” is stated only one thing is excluded, here we are necessarily required to exclude two things.

For if we exclude only the requirement that the defects be visible,

if so,

there is a difficulty:

tooth and eye—

what purpose do they serve for it?

What benefit did the verse gain by mentioning both tooth and eye? After all, it would have sufficed to mention tooth alone, in order to exclude the requirement that the defects be visible.

Rather, necessarily we must exclude two things: [

a.] From “tooth” we learn that the defect must be visible. [

b.] From “eye” we learn that the defect must not grow back.

And the Gemara now cites a beraita, which discusses the departure of a Canaanite slave through the principal limbs: How does this departure take place?

The Sages taught: In all of them,

in all the principal limbs,

the slave goes out through them to freedom,

from his labor alone.

And

however, he

requires a writ of release

in order to permit him to marry a free woman.

These are

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Meir says:

the slave

does not require

a writ of release. Rather, immediately when his master knocks out one of his principal limbs, the slave’s law is that of a free man, and he is permitted to marry a free woman.

And the beraita cites additional tannaim who disagreed in this dispute:

Rabbi Eliezer says: He requires

a writ of release.

Rabbi Tarfon says: He does not require one.

Rabbi Akiva says: He requires one. “

Those who decide before the Sages”

say:

a.

The words of Rabbi Tarfon appear correct,

that he does not require a writ

for the

removal of

tooth and eye,

because

the Torah granted the slave

explicitly that through them he goes out to freedom.

b.

And

the

words of Rabbi Akiva appear correct,

who said that he requires a writ,

with regard to the other limbs, since

the slave’s departure through them

is a fine imposed by the Sages,

and is not from the Torah by law. Therefore, he may not be permitted by Torah law to marry a free woman without a writ of release.

But the Gemara rejects the version of the beraita as it was presented here, that departure through the other limbs is a fine imposed by the Sages:

And we ask: Is departure through the other limbs

a fine

of the Sages

?!

After all,

we are expounding verses!

After all, above we derived this from the verses [by amplification, limitation, and amplification]!

Rather,

necessarily the version in the beraita must be changed, and it should be said as follows: “

And the words of Rabbi Akiva appear correct with regard to the other limbs,

since it is a derivation of the Sages.”

That is, since the Torah explicitly stated only departure through tooth and eye, and not through the other limbs, therefore with regard to the other limbs he requires a writ of release.

And after the Gemara corrected the wording of the beraita, it explains the reasons of the tannaim mentioned in it:

And we inquire concerning it:

What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon for

saying that for all the principal limbs one requires a deed of emancipation?

And we answer: Rabbi Shimon

derives

the law of

“sending”

that is stated here [“he shall send him free”] from the law of

“sending”

that was mentioned elsewhere,

from

the divorce of a

woman [“and he shall send her from his house” ]—

“and he shall send her away from his house” —

just as

the sending mentioned regarding a

woman

is

with a document,

a bill of divorce,

so too

the “sending” mentioned regarding a

slave also

is done

with a document,

with a deed of emancipation.

And since we have explained Rabbi Shimon’s reason, it is necessary to explain why Rabbi Meir disagrees with him, for we have found an expression of “sending” that is performed with a document; and why should we not interpret “he shall send him free” as referring to a document?

And we explain Rabbi Meir’s reason:

And Rabbi Meir

holds:

if the verse had written,

if Scripture had said the word

“free”

at the end,

that is, “he shall send him free,” then I too would say

as you say,

that the sending is performed with a document.

But

now,

at present,

since it wrote

“he shall send him free” -

the verse revealed by this that the slave

was free from the outset.

For as soon as the master knocked out his tooth, the slave became free, even without sending with a document. And now the Gemara brings several beraitot discussing departure through a tooth, an eye, and the principal limbs:

The Sages taught:

If he struck

the master

his eye and blinded it,

or he struck him

on his ear and deafened it—

the

slave goes out through them to freedom.

But if he did not strike him directly on his eye or ear, but merely struck

opposite his eye,

against a wall, and the slave was frightened because of the sound,

and

because of the fright became blind

and does not see.

Or he struck

opposite his ear,

against a wall, and the slave became deaf

and does not hear—

the

slave

does not go out through them to freedom.

And the reason for the distinction between one who strikes the slave directly on his eye or ear and one who strikes him opposite his eye or ear will be clarified through the following discussion:

Said

asked

Rav Shaman of Rav Ashi:

Rav Shaman assumed that the reason that if he struck him opposite his eye or ear the slave does not go out to freedom is that he did not injure him by an act with his hands, but only through a sound, which has no substance. Therefore he wondered—

Does this beraita come

to say

[to say]

that

one who injures his fellow through

a sound, it is nothing,

that this is not considered an act of injury, and he is exempt for it?

But it should be proven from two statements of the Sages that one who injures through a sound is liable! [

a]

For Rami bar Yehezkel taught

a beraita:

A rooster that extended

its

head into the air

[the space]

of a glass vessel, and sounded in it,

producing a sound in it,

and broke it

through the sound,

pays full damages.

This is the view of Sumakhos.

And the Sages hold that he pays half-damages. For a rooster that caused damage with its sound is like one who throws a pebble at a vessel and breaks it. And a rooster or an animal that caused damage by throwing pebbles at a vessel pays half-damages. [

b]

And

likewise,

Rav Yosef said, they said in the academy of Rav

[thus said Rav’s students]:

A horse that snorted,

that produced its sound [called snorting],

and a donkey that brayed, and they broke vessels that were inside the house

with their sounds, this is as though they had thrown pebbles at the vessels and broken them, and therefore

they pay half-damages,

in accordance with the view of the Sages who disagree with Sumakhos.

And from these two statements it is proven that one who causes damage through a sound is like one who causes damage through a pebble or an arrow, which have substance.

And surely it is obvious that if a master strikes his slave with an arrow or a pebble and knocks out his tooth, the slave thereby goes out to freedom.

If so, it is difficult: why did we learn that one who strikes his slave opposite his eye or ear and injures him through a sound is exempt from sending him free?

He said

he answered

him,

Rav Ashi answered Rav Shaman: Indeed, it is correct that there is no distinction between a sound and a pebble or an arrow. But all this applies with regard to liability for damage to vessels. However, one who frightens his slave with his sound, and he becomes deaf or blind, does not thereby go out to freedom.

And the reason is because

a person is different, for since he possesses understanding—

he frightens himself!

The law of a person differs from the law of a vessel. Since a person possesses understanding, and it is in his power not to be frightened by the noise, therefore, a person who is injured through the fright of the noise is frightened on his own initiative, as he directs his attention to the fear of the sound that suddenly comes, and the person who injures him through the sound is not considered one who caused the injury.

And Rav Ashi proves his words from a beraita:

As it was taught: One who frightens his fellow—

is exempt under human law and liable under the law of Heaven.

How

is he “one who frightens”?

For example,

he sounded in his ear,

without touching him,

and deafened him.

And therefore he is

exempt.

But if he

held him, sounded in his ear, and deafened him—

he is liable! , .

And the Gemara brings another beraita concerning departure through tooth and eye:

The Sages taught:

If he struck him on his eye and it became dim,

meaning that his sight weakened but he did not become completely blind; or if he struck him

on his tooth and it became loose

[it wavered], then—

if

the

slave can use them

as they are

now

[with his weakened sight and his wavering tooth]—

the

slave

does not go out through them to freedom.

But if not—

the

slave goes out through them to freedom , .

Another beraita was taught,

we learned another beraita similar to the preceding beraita:

It happened that his eye was

the slave’s

dim

[weak],

and he blinded it

the master completely. Or his

tooth was loose, and he knocked it out

the master—

if

the slave was

already able to use them,

beforehand—

the slave goes out through them to freedom.

But if not—

a slave does not go out through them to freedom,

because already beforehand he was considered lacking a tooth or an eye.

And from these two beraitot we learned a shared principle: it is not necessary that the master strike truly healthy teeth or eyes and blind or knock them out completely; rather, less than this is sufficient, for example: [

a] He struck healthy teeth and eyes and weakened them, and now the slave cannot use them [the first beraita]. [

b] He struck an eye that was dim but could be used, and completely blinded it, or knocked out a loose tooth [the second beraita].

And they are necessary,

it is necessary to teach both beraitot, and it is not sufficient to teach one beraita and learn from it the law written in the other beraita! , .

For if he had taught us

only

this

beraita,

the first,

if the tannai had taught us only the first beraita, that the slave goes out even if the master struck healthy tooth and eye and weakened them, I would say that the slave goes out to freedom specifically in that case,

because from the outset

his

sight was healthy, and now

it became

weak sight.

For initially the slave had completely healthy sight, and the master weakened his sight until the slave could not use it.

But here,

in the case discussed in the second beraita,

where from the outset as well his sight was weak,

even before the master struck him the slave’s sight was weak,

I might say

[I would say] that through the master’s blinding it completely

he does not

go out to freedom, since even before the blow his eye was not healthy.

Therefore the tannai needed to teach the second beraita as well.

And if he had taught us this,

if the tannai had taught us only the second beraita, in which he struck a weak eye and blinded it completely, I would say that the reason the slave goes out to freedom through this is

because it is completely blind,

for through the master’s blow the slave’s eye became completely blind, and therefore he goes out to freedom.

But there,

in the first beraita, which speaks of a case such as

where it is not completely blind, I might say

[I would say] that

the

slave does not go out to freedom, since his eye did not become completely blind.

Therefore

they are necessary,

it is necessary to teach both beraitot.

And the Gemara brings another beraita concerning departure through tooth and eye:

The Sages taught:

It happened that his master was

the slave’s

a physician, and he said to him

the slave

to apply medicine to his eye,

with a medicinal drug,

and

while the master was occupied with this, he

blinded it

accidentally.

And similarly, if the slave said to his master

to scrape his tooth,

to clean his tooth and scrape the flesh surrounding the place where it was set,

and he knocked it out

the master accidentally.

That slave

outwitted the master, and went out

thereby

to freedom.

These are the words of the Sages.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Since it was said concerning striking the eye,

“and destroys it,”

it is to be learned from this that the slave does not go out to freedom

until

the master

intends to destroy it.

That the master intends to injure and destroy the slave’s eye. But here, where the master intended to heal the slave, he does not go out to freedom.

And we raise an objection:

and

according to

the Sages,

there is a difficulty:

this

verse,

“and destroys it”—

what do they do with it?

What do the Sages do with the word “and destroys it”? What does it come to teach us?

And we answer:

they require it:

according to the Rabbis, they require the word “and she destroyed it” in order

to

make this law known—

as it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: If

the master

stretched his hand into the womb of his maidservant

the master

and blinded

the eye of the

fetus that

was

in her womb—

the master is exempt

from freeing the fetus, and when it is born, it belongs to the master.

What is the reason?

What is the reason for the matter? Because

the verse says “

and she destroyed it”—

until he intends to destroy it!

Here, the master did not intend to destroy the eye of the fetus, but rather to deliver it.

And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel above, indeed hold that if the master was a physician and intended to apply eye-paint to the eye of the slave, and inadvertently blinded it, the slave goes free; but all this applies to a master who intended to touch the eye of his slave.

But when the master inserted his hand into the womb of his maidservant, he did not intend to touch the eye of the fetus at all. Therefore, even the Rabbis agree in this case that the master is exempt, and this law is derived from “and she destroyed it.” And since we have explained that the Rabbis interpret “and she destroyed it” as excluding a master who stretched his hand into the womb of his maidservant and blinded the fetus in her womb, then there is a question concerning the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: How does he derive from “and she destroyed it” the exclusion of a physician who intended to apply eye-paint to the eye of the slave? Is it not possible to say that the verse excluded only a master who stretched his hand into the womb of his maidservant, who did not intend to touch the eye of the slave at all?

And the Gemara explains:

And the other one,

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

from “

and he destroyed” and “

and she destroyed it”

it is derived.

He expounds an additional exposition.

Since the verse could have said “and he destroyed,” but the verse said “and she destroyed it,” with the addition of the letter heh, two expositions are to be derived from it:

A. “And he destroyed”—to exclude a master who did not intend to destroy at all, and even did not intend to touch the eye of the slave.

B. “And she destroyed it” implies that the verse is speaking of a master who is occupied with the eye, and nevertheless he must intend to destroy it. But if he intends to heal it, he is exempt.

And the other one,

and the Rabbis who disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

he does not expound “destroyed” and “she destroyed it.”

According to them, the addition of the letter heh is not significant, so as to derive any exposition from it.

And now the Gemara brings additional laws concerning the going free on account of a tooth or an eye:

Rav Sheshet said: If his eye was

that of the slave

covered over, and he removed it [and the master extracted it],

and although the slave could not use his eye, nevertheless,

the slave goes free on account of them.

And what is the reason?

What is the reason for the matter? Because from this point onward the slave

is lacking a limb.

And the tanna teaches likewise,

the tanna in the following beraita supports us concerning this law:

For thus we learned in a beraita: The laws of

being unblemished and being male [that the offering must be unblemished, without a defect, and male rather than female] were stated

[meaning that the offering must be unblemished and not female]

with regard to an animal

alone.

But

however,

the laws of

the laws of

being unblemished and being male

apply

to birds

at all.

And the tanna continues and says:

Could it be

even if

its wing became dry [one of its wings]

, or

its leg was cut off, or

or

its eye was extracted,

it is fit as an offering—

The verse says,

therefore it is stated [Leviticus 1:14]: “And if

from the birds

is his offering.”

The word “from” teaches that only part of the bird is fit to be offered,

and not the entire bird.

And from here it follows that one lacking a limb is disqualified!

And it can be learned from this beraita that although the eye was covered over from the outset, nevertheless, if it was completely extracted, he caused a defect. , And the Gemara brings another law concerning the going free on account of a tooth or an eye: