Kiddushin 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

According to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

who holds that the slave himself cannot receive his bill of manumission from his master, the following question arises:

what if he were to have

another person

appointed as an agent

on his behalf

to receive

the

bill of manumission from his master? ,

The two sides of the uncertainty are:

since

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

derived

the gezera shava

“le le”

from a woman—

if so, it is appropriate to say that in this regard as well, his law is

like that of a woman.

And just as a woman can appoint an agent to receive her bill of divorce from her husband, so too, a slave can do so.

Or perhaps

[perhaps] a distinction must be made between a woman and a slave in this regard:

A woman,

since

she herself can receive her bill of divorce,

can also appoint an agent.

A woman, who herself can receive her bill of divorce in her hand, has the power to appoint an agent in her place.

But

a slave, who himself cannot receive his bill of manumission,

also cannot appoint an agent.

Since the slave cannot receive his bill of manumission himself, he does not have the power to appoint an agent for an act that he himself cannot perform.

[Although Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar explicitly said that a slave acquires himself through others, it is possible that this refers to a case in which the others act not as the slave’s agents. But if the slave told another person to receive his bill of manumission, it is possible that he does not become free, because the master intends to give the document to that person as an agent. And a slave cannot appoint an agent to receive it.]

After he raised the question, he then resolved it.

After Rabba asked this question [whether a slave can appoint an agent to receive a bill of manumission according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar], he himself then resolved his uncertainty:

Since Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

derived

the gezera shava

“le le”

from a woman,

as above, the law of the slave is

like

the law of a

woman.

And just as a woman appoints an agent to receive her bill of divorce from her husband, so too, a slave can appoint an agent to receive his bill of manumission.

And we challenge Rabba’s conclusion:

But if so,

if Rabba’s conclusion is correct, the following statement of

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua,

concerning the service of the kohanim in the sacrificial offerings is difficult:

The Gemara in tractate Nedarim [35b] raises the question regarding a person who took a vow prohibiting himself from deriving benefit from a kohen: Is that kohen permitted to sacrifice his offerings?

The two sides of the uncertainty are:

On the one hand, the kohen is the owner’s agent to sacrifice his offering. Therefore, if this kohen sacrifices his offerings, it emerges that the owner benefits from the kohen fulfilling his agency. Consequently, the kohen may not sacrifice his offerings.

On the other hand, one can say that the kohen is not the owner’s agent at all; rather, he is considered an agent of the Almighty to offer the sacrifice before Him. Since the kohen is not sacrificing as the owner’s agent, he is permitted to sacrifice the offerings of one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit, because he is not considered to be providing benefit to the owner. And concerning this, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

These kohanim—

are agents of the Merciful One!

These kohanim are agents of the Almighty in the sacrificial service, and not agents of the owners.

And Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, explains from where he derived his statement:

For if it enters your mind that they are our agents,

if it should enter your mind to say that the kohanim are our [the owners’] agents, a difficulty would arise:

Is there anything that we cannot perform, but they can perform?!

Can there be something that we ourselves cannot perform, but our agents can perform for us?! Certainly not! An agent cannot have greater ability than the one who appoints him.

Since we Israelites cannot sacrifice our offerings ourselves, how could we appoint an agent for an act that we ourselves cannot perform? Rather, necessarily, the kohanim are not our agents, but agents of the Almighty.

This concludes the statement of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

And the Gemara attempts to prove that his words contradict Rabba’s conclusion, who said [according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar] that a slave cannot receive his own bill of manumission from his master, and yet he can appoint an agent for this purpose:

For if Rabba’s words are correct, it is difficult: How could Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, say that there is nothing that we cannot perform but our agents can perform?

Is that not so?!

Is there truly no such thing?!

But the slave, who himself

himself

cannot receive his bill of manumission, but

if he appoints

an agent, he can!

Is it not the case that a slave cannot receive his bill of manumission himself [according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar], and yet he can appoint an agent to receive it on his behalf?!

Rather, necessarily, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, disagrees with Rabba’s statement!

And we reject this:

That is not so!

There is no contradiction between the statement of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and Rabba’s statement.

For Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, was speaking about the sacrificial service, and

Israelites have no connection whatsoever to the sacrificial service.

Israelites cannot perform the sacrificial service themselves in any manner. Therefore, it is impossible for them to appoint agents for an act to which they have no connection at all.

Rabba, by contrast, was speaking about a slave who appoints an agent to receive his bill of manumission. Although a slave cannot receive his own bill of manumission himself, this is not because he has no connection to the receipt of a bill of manumission. Rather, it is because his hand is regarded as his master’s hand, and the bill does not leave his master’s domain and enter his own domain.

But all this applies only to receiving a bill of manumission from his own master. A slave can receive a bill of manumission on behalf of another slave who is not the slave of his master, but of another person, because when the bill reaches his hand, the other slave thereby leaves the authority of his master. It follows that

a slave is connected to bills of divorce and manumission.

Since a slave is connected to bills of divorce and manumission, he therefore has the power to appoint an agent to receive his bill from his own master [for although he himself cannot receive his bill, this is not because he has no connection to bills of divorce and manumission, but because his hand is regarded as the master’s domain].

And the Gemara cites a source from a beraita that a slave can receive the bill of manumission of his fellow slave from his fellow’s master:

As it is taught in a beraita: The matter appears to be that the slave receives

the

bill of manumission of his fellow,

another slave,

from his fellow’s master.

But not from his own master!

For if both of them were slaves of one master, in such a case the bill does not leave the master’s possession. We learned in the Mishna: And he acquires himself with money through others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages say: With money through himself.

Provided that the money belongs to others,

who gave it to him as a gift.

The Gemara now discusses the root of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerning money:

And we consider the matter:

Shall we say that they disagree about this—

Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree over the following principle—

Rabbi Meir holds: A slave has no property independent of his master,

and if others give him a gift, his master acquires it.

And,

similarly,

a woman has no property independent of her husband.

Since a slave has no property independent of his master, even if the money belonged to others, the master acquired it, and the slave does not have the power to redeem himself with that money.

And the Sages hold,

if others gave money as a gift to a slave, then

a slave does have property independent of his master,

since the master can acquire the money only with the consent of the giver, to whom the money belongs. The giver intended that the slave, and not the master, acquire it. Therefore, the money belongs to the slave, and he has the power to redeem himself with it.

And,

similarly,

a woman does have property independent of her husband.

And we reject this:

Rabba said that Rav Sheshet said:

That is not what they dispute.

Rather,

everyone agrees

that when a slave receives a gift from another person without any qualification,

a slave has no property independent of his master.

And

likewise,

a woman has no property independent of her husband.

And here, with what are we dealing?,

what is our Mishna discussing? —

That he gave it to him,

meaning, that he gave it to him,

afterward, and said to him,

to the slave: “Acquire the maneh,”

on condition that your master has no authority over it!

And it is in this regard that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree:

Rabbi Meir holds that when

when

he said to him,

the donor said to the slave,

“Acquire

the maneh,” he immediately

the slave acquires it and his master acquires it.

By virtue of the slave’s acquisition of the maneh, his master acquired it for himself.

And when,

when the donor continued and

said to him

to the slave:

“On condition

that your master has no authority over it” —

he has said nothing at all to him!

His statement accomplishes nothing. [See note ].

And the Rabbis hold: Since he said to him

at the end,

“on condition

that your master has no authority over it,” we say that, from the outset, at the time of the gift, the donor’s intention was not to grant it to the slave except on condition that his master have no authority over it.

Therefore

his condition benefited him,

his condition was effective for him, and the master does not acquire that money. Therefore, the slave can use it to redeem himself.

These are Rav Sheshet’s words.

However, Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Rav Sheshet’s words and explains the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis differently:

And Rabbi Elazar said:

If the donor said to the slave, “Acquire the maneh on condition that your master has no authority over it” —

in every

such

case everyone agrees

that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis did not disagree in this situation, and all agree

that the slave acquires it and his master acquires it.

This is because there is no possibility for the slave to acquire the money entirely for himself, without his master acquiring it through him.

And here, with what are we dealing?

What is our Mishna discussing? It is

for example, that someone gave him

a

different maneh

to the slave,

and said to him:

Acquire this maneh

on condition that you use it to go free.

And it is in this regard that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree:

Rabbi Meir holds that when

when

he said to him,

“Acquire

the maneh,”

he acquires

the

slave

the maneh completely,

and

his

master acquires it from him.

And when

he continued and

said to him: “

On condition

that you use it to go free” —

he has said nothing at all to him.

And the Rabbis hold: Even with regard to himself, he is not granting it

to him.

Even to the slave himself, the donor did not grant it to him completely,

for he did not say to him

that he was granting it to him

except on condition that you use it to go free.

It follows that the slave acquired the maneh only for the purpose of being able to redeem himself with it and go free. It is therefore impossible for the master to acquire a greater right in the maneh than the slave acquires in it. Consequently, the slave can go free with this maneh.

In summary: [a] One who gives a gift to a slave without qualification—his master acquires it.

[b] One who gives a gift to a slave on condition that his master has no authority over it—in Rav Sheshet’s view, Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in this matter. In Rabbi Elazar’s view, everyone agrees that the master acquires it.

[c] One who gives a gift to a slave on condition that the slave go free with it—in Rabbi Elazar’s view, Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in this matter.

[d] The law concerning a woman is like the law concerning a slave.

Where the slave’s master acquires, the woman’s husband acquires; and where the master does not acquire, the husband does not acquire either.

The Gemara now raises a contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis in our Mishna concerning a slave and their statements in the following beraita concerning a woman:

And he raises a contradiction,

and he raises a contradiction between his statements,

of Rabbi Meir,

in our Mishna,

with Rabbi Meir,

in the following beraita,

And

indeed,

Rami

raises a contradiction between the statements of

the Rabbis

in our Mishna,

the Rabbis

in the following beraita:

One who redeems second-tithe produce that belongs to him adds a fifth to the redemption value.

Whereas one who redeems another person’s second-tithe produce with his own money does not add a fifth; rather, he redeems it according to its value.

The beraita before us discusses a woman who redeems second-tithe produce that her husband separated: