Kiddushin 23b — the Talmud in English

, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

who holds that the slave himself cannot receive his writ of manumission from his master, it is necessary to inquire:

what if he causes

the slave another person to be

an agent

on his behalf

to receive

the

writ of manumission from his master? , .

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

since

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

derived [דרש]

a gzera shava

“le-le”

from a woman—

if so, it is fitting to say that also with regard to this matter his law is

like that of a woman.

And just as a woman can appoint an agent for receipt, who will receive her writ from her husband, so too the slave can do this.

Or perhaps [שמא]

it is necessary to distinguish between a woman and a slave in this matter:

A woman,

since

she herself can receive her writ—

she can likewise appoint an agent.

A woman, who herself can receive her writ with her own hand, has the power to appoint an agent in her place.

But

a slave, who himself does not receive his writ—

he likewise cannot appoint an agent.

Since the slave cannot receive his writ himself, he does not have the power to appoint an agent for something that he himself cannot do.

And although Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar explicitly said that a slave acquires himself through others, it is possible that this refers to a case in which the others do this not as the slave’s agents. But if the slave told another person to receive his writ, it is possible that he does not go free, because the master will intend to give him the document in the capacity of an agent. And the slave cannot appoint an agent for receipt.

After he raised the question, he then resolved it.

After Rabba asked this question [whether a slave can appoint an agent for receipt according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar], he himself returned and resolved his uncertainty:

Since Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar

derived [דרש]

a gzera shava

“le-le”

from a woman,

as above, therefore the law of the slave is

like

the law of

a woman.

And just as a woman appoints an agent to receive her writ from her husband, so too the slave can appoint an agent for receipt.

And we raise a difficulty against Rabba’s conclusion:

But if so,

if Rabba’s conclusion is correct, it is necessary to wonder about

that which Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said

concerning the service of the priests with sacrifices:

The Gemara in tractate Nedarim [35b] is uncertain concerning a person who made a vow and prohibited benefit from a priest to himself: is that priest permitted to offer his sacrifices?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

On the one hand, the priest is the owner’s agent to offer his sacrifice. Therefore, if this priest offers his sacrifices, it follows that the owner benefits from the fact that the priest fulfills his agency. Therefore, the priest is forbidden to offer his sacrifices.

But, on the other hand, it is possible to say that the priest is not the owner’s agent at all; rather, he is considered the agent of the Almighty to offer the sacrifice before Him. And since the priest does not offer it as the owner’s agent, he is permitted to offer the sacrifices of one from whom benefit is prohibited by a vow, because he is not considered to be benefiting the owner. And concerning this matter Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

“These priests”—

“are agents of the Merciful One!”

These priests are agents of the Almighty in the service of the sacrifices, and not agents of the owners.

And Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, explains from where he learned his statement:

“For if it enters your mind that they are our agents,”

if it should enter your mind to say that the priests are our [the owners’] agents, then a difficulty arises:

“Is there anything that we cannot do, but they can do?!”

Is there something that we ourselves cannot do, but our agents can do for us?! Obviously not! For an agent cannot be superior to the one who appointed him.

And since we, the Israelites, cannot offer our sacrifices ourselves, how can we appoint an agent for something that we cannot do ourselves? Rather, necessarily, the priests are not our agents, but the agents of the Almighty.

This concludes the words of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

And the Gemara attempts to prove that his words contradict Rabba’s conclusion, who said [according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar] that the slave does not himself receive his writ from his master, and nevertheless he can appoint an agent for this:

For if Rabba’s words are correct, it is necessary to wonder: how did Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, say that there is nothing that we cannot do but our agents can do?

“Is there not?!”

Is it indeed not so?!

“But a slave, who himself

himself

cannot receive his writ, and

if

can appoint an agent!”

Is it not the case that a slave cannot receive his writ himself [according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar], and nevertheless he can appoint an agent to receive it for him!

Rather, necessarily, Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, disagrees with Rabba’s words!

And we reject this:

“It is not so!”

There is no contradiction between the words of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and the words of Rabba.

For Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, spoke concerning the service of the sacrifices, and

“Israelites have no connection at all with the service of the sacrifices.”

Israelites cannot perform the service of the sacrifices themselves in any manner; therefore, it is impossible for them to appoint agents for something with which they have no connection at all.

Whereas Rabba spoke concerning a slave who appoints an agent to receive his writ. And although a slave cannot receive his own writ himself, this is not because he has no connection with receiving a writ, but because his hand is like his master’s hand, and the writ does not leave his master’s domain for his domain.

But all this applies only with regard to receiving a writ of manumission from his own master. However, a slave can receive a writ of manumission for another slave who is not the slave of his master, but of another person, because when the writ reaches his hand, that other slave thereby leaves the domain of his master. And it follows that

“a slave has a connection with writs.”

And since a slave has a connection with writs, he therefore has the power to appoint an agent to receive his writ from his own master [for although he himself cannot receive his writ, this is not because he has no connection with writs, but because his hand is like the master’s domain].

And the Gemara brings a source from a beraita that a slave can receive the writ of his fellow slave from his fellow’s master:

“For it was taught in a beraita: The matter appears to be so, that the slave receives

the

writ of his fellow,

of another slave,

from his fellow’s master.

“But not from his own master!”

For if both of them were slaves of one master, in such a case the writ does not leave the master’s hand. We learned in the Mishna: “And he acquires himself with money through others,” the words of Rabbi Meir. And the Sages say: “With money through himself.”

“Provided that the money belongs to others,”

who gave it to him as a gift.

And the Gemara now discusses what is the root of the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerning money:

And we inquire about it:

“Shall we say that they disagree about this”—

Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed over the following reasoning—

“For Rabbi Meir holds: a slave has no acquisition without his master,”

and if others gave him a gift, his master acquired it.

And

similarly,

“a woman has no acquisition without her husband.”

And since a slave has no acquisition without his master, even if the money belonged to others, the master acquired it, and the slave does not have the power to redeem himself with that money.

“And the Sages hold”,

if others gave money as a gift to the slave, then

“a slave has acquisition without his master,”

since the master cannot acquire the money except with the consent of the giver, for the money belongs to him. And the giver did not resolve in his heart that the master should acquire it, but rather the slave. Therefore, the money belongs to him, and he has the power to redeem himself with that money.

And

similarly,

“a woman has acquisition without her husband.”

And we reject this:

Rabba said in the name of Rav Sheshet:

They did not disagree about this.

Rather,

“everyone agrees”,

everyone agrees concerning a slave who received a gift from another person without qualification, that

“a slave has no acquisition without his master.”

And

likewise,

“a woman has no acquisition without her husband.”

And here, with what are we dealing:

what is being discussed in our Mishna

that he acquired for him

that he granted him

another person a maneh, and said to him

to the slave: acquire the maneh

on the condition that your master have no authority over it!

And concerning this Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree:

Rabbi Meir holds, that

when

he said to him

the giver to the slave “

acquire

the maneh,” immediately

the slave acquires and his master acquires.

Through the slave’s acquiring the maneh, his master acquired it for himself.

And when,

when the giver continued and

said to him

to the slave:

on the condition

that your master have no authority over it —

he has said nothing to him!

His statement accomplishes nothing. [And see the note ].

And the Rabbis hold: since he said to him

at the end “

on the condition

that your master have no authority over it,” we say that from the outset, at the time of the giving, the giver’s intention was not to grant it to the slave except on the condition that his master have no authority over it.

Therefore

his condition benefited him,

his condition benefited him, and the master does not acquire that money. Therefore the slave can redeem himself with it.

These are the words of Rav Sheshet up to here.

But Rabbi Elazar disagrees with the words of Rav Sheshet and explains the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis in another way:

And Rabbi Elazar said:

if the giver said to the slave, “Acquire the maneh on the condition that your master have no authority over it” —

in every such

such

everyone does not disagree,

in this manner Rabbi Meir and the Sages did not disagree, and all agree

that the slave acquires and his master acquires.

Because there is no possibility that the slave should acquire the money entirely for himself, without his master acquiring from him.

And here, with what are we dealing?

what is being discussed in our Mishna — with

a case in which a person acquired for him

a person

another maneh

for the slave,

and said to him:

acquire this maneh

on the condition that you leave [slavery] through it.

And concerning this Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree:

Rabbi Meir holds, that

when

he said to him “

acquire

the maneh,”

the

slave

slave

acquires the maneh completely,

and

from it

his master acquires.

And when

he continued and

said to him: “

on the condition

that you leave [slavery] through it” —

he has said nothing to him.

And the Rabbis hold: to him as well, he is not granting this

to him.

Even to the slave himself, the giver did not grant it to him completely,

for he did not say to him

that he was granting it to him

except on the condition that you leave [slavery] through it.

It follows that the slave acquired the maneh only to the extent that he can redeem himself with it and leave [slavery]. And it is not possible that the master should acquire a right in the maneh greater than that which the slave acquires in it. Therefore, the slave can leave [slavery] through this maneh.

In summary: [a] One who gives a gift to a slave without stipulation — his master acquires it.

[b] One who gives a gift to a slave on the condition that his master have no authority over it — according to Rav Sheshet, Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree concerning this. And according to Rabbi Elazar, all agree that the master acquires it.

[c] One who gives a gift to a slave on the condition that the slave leave [slavery] through it — Rabbi Elazar’s view is that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree concerning this.

[d] The law of a woman is like the law of a slave.

Where the master of the slave acquires, the husband of the woman acquires. And where the master does not acquire, the husband too does not acquire.

And now the Gemara raises a contradiction between the words of Rabbi Meir and the Sages in our Mishna concerning a slave, and their words in the beraita concerning a woman:

And it raises a contradiction,

and one can raise a contradiction between his words

of Rabbi Meir

in our Mishna,

against Rabbi Meir

in the beraita below,

And

likewise,

Rami

raises a contradiction between the words of

the Rabbis

in our Mishna,

and the Rabbis

in the following beraita:

One who redeems Second-Tithe produce that belongs to him adds a fifth to the value of the redemption.

But one who redeems the Second-Tithe produce of his fellow with his own money does not add a fifth; rather, he redeems it according to its value.

The beraita before us discusses a woman who redeems Second-Tithe produce that her husband separated: