Kiddushin 23a — the Talmud in English

This

master

interpreted it as referring to death, and this

Mar Zutra

interpreted it as referring to life:

in place of the master, and he acquired the slave immediately, before the slave acquired himself. [b]

b.

And some say [and there are those who say]:

That slave

was a minor,

and nevertheless Mar Zutra had to hurry and occupy himself with acquiring him during the master’s lifetime.

And

this,

not in accordance with Abba Shaul—

For it was taught: A convert who died

without heirs,

and they plundered

—plundered—

Israel

his

property, and there were

among the property

slaves, whether

the slaves were

adults

or

whether

they were

minors, they acquired

for

themselves

upon the death of the master, and became

free men—

the words of the Sages.

Abba Shaul

disagrees and

says:

Slaves

who are adults

indeed

acquire themselves

and become

free men.

But slaves who are

minors

are unable to acquire themselves. And therefore,

whoever takes possession of them—

has acquired them.

And according to Abba Shaul, even if Mar Zutra had waited until the convert died, he would not have lost anything, because since the slave was a minor, he would not have been able to acquire himself. And Mar Zutra did not need to occupy himself with acquiring him immediately; rather, he could have waited until the convert’s death.

And since Mar Zutra hurried and occupied himself with acquiring him during the convert’s lifetime, it is necessarily the case that he holds in accordance with the view of the Sages, that even a minor convert acquires himself after the death of the master. And therefore Mar Zutra hurried to use the slave during his lifetime, so that he would not have time to acquire himself.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he acquires himself with money

through others, and with a document through himself, the words of Rabbi Meir.

And we infer: From Rabbi Meir’s wording it follows that

with money—

only

through others, no;

indeed, he acquires himself.

But

he

does not

have the ability to acquire himself with money

through himself.

That is, if they gave money to the slave on condition that he redeem himself, the slave cannot redeem himself with it. And the reason for this will be explained in the Gemara below.

And from now, there is a question as to in what manner Rabbi Meir spoke:

First possibility: Rabbi Meir spoke of redemption carried out with the slave’s consent. Only then is money through others effective to redeem him. But without the slave’s consent, others are not permitted to redeem him.

Second possibility: Rabbi Meir spoke of redemption carried out without the slave’s consent [for according to his view, other people are permitted to redeem him even without his consent].

And in this manner Rabbi Meir said that the slave is redeemed with a document through himself and not through others. But if the redemption is carried out with the slave’s consent, others too are permitted to redeem him.

And the Gemara has difficulty explaining Rabbi Meir’s words, according to each of these two possibilities:

With what are we dealing:

What is being spoken of?

If you say

that it is as in the second possibility, that we are dealing with redemption carried out

without his consent

of the slave, it is difficult—

For the Gemara has now assumed that in order for others to be able to redeem the slave, they must be his agents. But even if the slave did not make them his agents, they can act by virtue of his agency, since “one may acquire something beneficial for a person in his absence.”

That is, regarding something that is beneficial for a person, it is possible for another person to become his agent even without his presence, and despite the fact that he did not explicitly appoint him as an agent for this matter, since there is no doubt that it is agreeable to him that this person be his agent for something that benefits him.

And according to this it is difficult:

Granted,

behold,

we heard Rabbi Meir say—

we heard Rabbi Meir’s words [in tractate Gittin 11b]

that he said: It is a disadvantage

[a loss]

for the slave

to leave his master’s authority into freedom!

Because when he leaves into freedom, he becomes prohibited to a Canaanite maidservant.

And we learned

and we learned [there]:

One may acquire something beneficial for a person

even

without his presence, but

however,

one may not acquire something disadvantageous for a person except in his presence!

For a person cannot become the agent of another person without his consent with regard to something that is a disadvantage [a bad thing or a loss] for him.

And if so, how is it possible for other people to redeem the slave without his consent? And on the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara establishes Rabbi Meir’s words as referring to redemption carried out with the slave’s consent—

Rather, it is obvious,

that we are dealing with redemption carried out

with his consent

of the slave, and in accordance with the first possibility.

Should you say: Why did the tanna need to teach us that others redeem him with his consent? Is it not self-evident that they can do so?

The answer is:

And this he teaches us,

this is what Rabbi Meir came to teach us: Although the redemption was carried out with the slave’s consent, nevertheless, specifically if it is carried out

through others, no—then it is effective. But if it is carried out

through

himself, it

is

not

effective.

Apparently,

it is demonstrated from here that

a slave has no acquisition without his master

under any circumstances. And even if other people transferred the money to him on condition that the master have no authority over it, the slave does not acquire it. But the Gemara rejects this explanation.

For if we establish Rabbi Meir’s words as referring to redemption carried out with the slave’s consent, from now it is possible to ask:

If so,

if it is said thus,

say the latter clause,

he tells you the end of Rabbi Meir’s words:

With a document—

through himself!

And it follows that specifically

through himself, no—

indeed, he leaves into freedom. But in receiving the document of emancipation

through

other

people

on his behalf, he

does not

leave into freedom.

And if so,

if it is as you say, that Rabbi Meir is speaking of redemption carried out

with his consent, then it is difficult:

of the slave, there is a difficulty:

Through others—

why not!?

Why does the slave not leave into freedom by receiving the document of emancipation through other people on his behalf? After all, we are dealing here with the slave’s consent, and if so, they can become his agents by virtue of “one may acquire something beneficial for a person in his absence”!

And should you say,

perhaps you will say,

what

is Rabbi Meir’s intention when he says, “with a document

through himself”?—

The intention is not specifically through himself, but

also through himself.

And in fact, we are dealing with the slave’s consent, and therefore others too can receive the document on his behalf [and according to this, this wording that we learned, “with money through others,” is also understood, for we are dealing here with the slave’s consent, and they become his agents].

And Rabbi Meir stated “also through himself,” because there is a greater novelty in the slave leaving through himself by means of a document than in his leaving through others by means of a document—

And this he teaches us,

this is what Rabbi Meir came to teach us, lest you say: “The hand of a slave is like the hand of his master,” and if the master places the document of emancipation into the hands of his slave, the document has still not left the master’s domain, and the slave is not emancipated through this.

Rather, you must say:

His document and his hand

of the slave

come at the same time.

That is, when the document [the document of emancipation] reaches the slave’s hand, since at that moment the slave is emancipated, his hand is no longer like the master’s hand. And it is found that the document has left the master’s domain and reached him. Therefore the slave is emancipated.

And to summarize this stage in the Gemara: Rabbi Meir is speaking of an emancipation carried out with the slave’s consent. And this is what Rabbi Meir said: The slave acquires himself with money through others and not through himself. And with a document, through others and also through himself.

But the Gemara rejects this possibility, since—

This is not what was taught!

After all, in the beraita, in which Rabbi Meir’s words were taught more explicitly, it is explained that it is impossible to establish Rabbi Meir’s words as referring to emancipation with the slave’s consent.

For it was taught: With a document—

through himself, and not through others, the words of Rabbi Meir.

And it is explicit in the beraita that according to Rabbi Meir the slave is not emancipated through others by means of a document. And if we say that we are dealing here with emancipation carried out with the slave’s consent, it is difficult: Why can the slave not be emancipated through others? After all, they are his agents for this purpose!

And on the basis of this difficulty, Abaye concludes that we are dealing here with emancipation carried out without the slave’s consent—

Abaye said: In fact,

Rabbi Meir is speaking of emancipation carried out

without his consent

of the slave, and therefore the slave is not emancipated through others by means of a document.

And regarding what we asked: If the emancipation was without the slave’s consent, how is he redeemed with money through others without his consent? After all, according to Rabbi Meir, it is a disadvantage for the slave to leave his master’s authority into freedom!—

And

one can say:

Here it is different,

the law of money differs from the law of a document, for with money the slave acquires himself through others even without his consent,

since he can acquire him against his will!

Since that other person can acquire the slave for himself from his master against the slave’s will, therefore he also

can transfer him to him against his will.

He also has the ability to transfer the slave to himself, so that he will leave into freedom, against the slave’s will.

And we object:

If so,

if we indeed take this reasoning into account [that since the other person can acquire him against his will, he can also redeem him against his will]—

a document as well!

Also with a document others should be able to emancipate him without his consent, since they can acquire him from the master for themselves with a document against his will! And why, concerning emancipation with a document, did Rabbi Meir say, “and with a document, through himself and not through others”?

And we answer: There is a distinction between emancipation with money and emancipation with a document, since the nature and wording of the document of acquiring a slave are not the same nature and wording as those of a document of emancipation.

Rather,

this document is one matter, and that document is another matter.

For the nature and wording of a document of emancipation differ from the nature and wording of a document of acquisition.

In a document of emancipation it is written, “Behold, you are a free man,” whereas in a document of acquisition it is written, “My slave is sold to you.”

Therefore, that other person who comes to emancipate him by means of a document cannot come and do so by virtue of his ability to acquire him with a document, since these documents are not equivalent.

And we raise an objection to the answer:

Here too,

let us state the same distinction with regard to money:

This money is one matter, and that money is another matter!

After all, the money of acquiring a slave differs from the money of redeeming him. For here the money is given for the purpose of acquiring a slave, whereas there the money is given for the purpose of emancipating the slave!

And why do we say that since that other person can acquire him against his will, he can redeem him against his will? And we answer: Although there is a distinction between money given for the purpose of acquisition and money given for the purpose of emancipation, this is not to be taken into account, since

the coin, at any rate, is one and the same!

The same coin is given in both cases, and therefore both are considered one acquisition.

But the matter is different with regard to a document, because the document itself is different in acquisition from release, and therefore this is like two acquisitions.

This concludes Abaye’s explanation.

And now the Gemara explains that Rava also agrees with Abaye that Rabbi Meir spoke of a release performed without the slave’s knowledge, but he gives another reason for distinguishing between money and a document:

Rava said:

with

money

it is not necessary for the redeemer to become the slave’s agent; rather,

his master’s acceptance caused it for him.

By the master’s accepting the money, the slave goes free on his own, and the master does not accept the money as the slave’s agent; rather, he accepts it for his own purposes. Therefore, he does not need to accept the money with the slave’s knowledge, for he is not his agent.

But with

a document, the acceptance of others caused it for him.

Through others’ accepting the document, he goes free, and those others accept the document on behalf of the slave; they must do so as his agents.

And since, according to Rabbi Meir, it is a liability for the slave to go out from under his master’s authority to freedom, they cannot become his agents without his knowledge, for one may not impose a liability upon a person without his knowledge.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the Sages say: With money, by himself

and with a document, through others.

And the Gemara assumed that the intention of the Sages was to say that the slave is released with money specifically by himself and not through others.

And since it was clarified above that Rabbi Meir [who said, “With money, through others”] spoke of a release performed without the slave’s knowledge, the Sages, too, are addressing redemption without the slave’s knowledge.

And we raised a difficulty:

With money, by himself, no

yes, but

through others, not—why?

Why did the Sages say this?

Granted that,

it is indeed true

that

the acquisition of the release is performed

without his knowledge.

Nevertheless, it is appropriate to say that this can be done. For—

Since

it is the case

that we have heard the Sages say,

we heard in tractate Gittin in the name of the Sages that they hold that

it is a benefit

for a slave

to go out from under his master’s authority to freedom.

And we learned

and likewise we learned:

One may confer a benefit upon a person in his absence

without his knowledge,

but one may not impose a liability upon him

except in his presence.

And since it is a benefit for a slave to go free, others can therefore redeem him without his knowledge. Why, then, did the Sages say in our Mishna that the slave is redeemed by himself and not through others?

And if you would say,

perhaps you will say that the words of the Sages should be explained differently:

What

is the intention of the Sages who said, “With money

by himself”?

Even

also

by himself,

and not only through others. And in any event, the slave is redeemed both by himself and through others, since it is a benefit for him.

And

why is there a novelty in the slave’s being redeemed by himself more than through others? Because by our learning that the slave is redeemed by himself,

it teaches us

the tannai taught us

that a slave has an acquisition without his master—

that the slave can acquire money for himself and not for his master, such as when others give him money on the condition that his master have no authority over it; with that money the slave can redeem himself.

[Summary of the answer: The Sages agree that the slave is redeemed through others, and they came to teach that the slave is acquired even by himself, and that he has an acquisition without his master.]

And we reject this:

If so,

if indeed the intention of the Sages is to say “even by himself”—

Come and hear the latter clause,

let us consider the end of the Sages’ words:

For the Sages said at the end of their words:

With a document, through others.

And it implies that their intention is specifically through others,

and not by himself.

And if so, there is a difficulty:

But we have established

as a practical halakha,

that

a slave who received a document of release from his master—

his bill of divorce and his hand come simultaneously—

that the slave acquires his bill of divorce and his hand at one and the same time, and he goes free. And it is a common practice that a slave receives his bill of divorce from his master’s hand. If we explain that the Sages said, “With a document, through others and not by himself,” it follows that we practice in accordance with Rabbi Meir and not in accordance with the words of the Sages.

And how can it be possible to say that we act in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who is a single authority opposed to the Sages, who are the majority?

And if you would say,

perhaps you wish to explain the words of the Sages in another way, and say:

What

is the intention of the Sages who said, “With a document

through others”?

Even through others

without his knowledge, and not only by himself. And there is a novelty in the slave’s going out with a document through others, more than by himself; therefore we learned that the slave goes out through others.

And this teaches us,

the tannai taught us

that it is a benefit for a slave to go out from his master’s authority to freedom,

and therefore others can redeem him even without his knowledge.

That is, the Sages agree that a slave goes out with a document by himself because his bill of divorce and his hand come simultaneously. And they came to teach that even through others the slave is released, because it is a benefit for a slave to go free.

This cannot be answered in this way. For—

Above we said that the Sages hold that with money the slave is released both through others and by himself.

And now we are saying that even with a document the slave is released both by himself and through others.

And

if so,

if indeed our words are correct, that the law of money is identical to the law of a document—

let us combine them and teach them,

it would have been appropriate to combine them and teach them as one matter: And the Sages say,

with money and with a document—

both through others and by himself!

And why did we teach the law of each one separately?

Necessarily, their laws are not identical. Therefore, the Gemara explains a new interpretation:

Rather,

what we learned, “

With money

by himself,” means

both through others and by himself.

And what we learned, “

With a document

through others,” means specifically

through others, and not by himself.

And concerning what we challenged against this: Is it not common practice that a slave himself receives his document of release from his master’s hand? If so, how can it be possible to say that we practice contrary to the words of the Sages?—

It can be said that what we learned, “With a document, through others,” is not a continuation of the Sages’ words. Rather, the one who said this—

it is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

The Sages, however, hold that just as with money the slave is acquired both through others and by himself, so too with a document the slave is acquired both through others and by himself. And we practice in accordance with the opinion of the Sages; therefore, the slave can himself receive the document of release from his master’s hand.

And the Gemara brings a source for the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar:

For it was taught

that thus we learned in a beraita, following the words of Rabbi Meir and the Sages mentioned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Also with a document

specifically

through others, but not through himself.

And therefore it must be explained that what we learned in our Mishna, “and with a document through others”—Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar taught this. But the Sages disagree with this.

And the Gemara summarizes the views of Rabbi Meir, the Sages, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and says:

And there are three disagreements concerning the matter.

Three views were stated concerning our matter, each disagreeing with the other:

a. The view of Rabbi Meir:

With money—through others, even without his knowledge, because the acceptance by his master caused him to become free, and the slave’s knowledge is not needed at all. But through himself, no, because a slave has no acquisition without his master.

With a document—through himself [because according to Rabbi Meir we say: his get and his hand come simultaneously]. But not through others. Because it is a disadvantage for the slave to leave his master for freedom [and it is not the acceptance by his master that causes it for him, but the acceptance by others, and they cannot become his agents without his knowledge, to his disadvantage].

b. The view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar:

Since Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said, “also with a document,” it follows that the law of money and the law of a document are equal, and in both the slave goes free through others, but not through himself.

And his reason is: through others—the slave becomes free even without his knowledge, because it is a benefit for him.

Through himself—the slave does not become free with money, because a slave has no acquisition without his master. And with a document he does not become free because his hand is like his master’s hand.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar does not agree with what we said above, that his get and his hand come simultaneously.

c. The view of the Sages: both with money and with a document—the slave becomes free, both through himself and through others.

And their reason:

Through others—the slave becomes free because it is a benefit for him.

Through himself—with money, the slave becomes free because a slave has an acquisition without his master. And with a document, because his get and his hand come simultaneously. , And the Gemara now explains why Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar does not agree with what we said, “his get and his hand come simultaneously”:

Rabbah said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?

Why does he not agree with what they said, “his get and his hand come simultaneously”—?

His reason:

He learned

he derived the law of the document of the slave’s release by means of a gzera shava,

“lah, lah”

from the get of a woman:

Just as a woman

is not divorced

until he takes out

the

get

from his hand and gives it

to

within her hand.

And her hand is

a domain that is not his,

for the woman’s person is not acquired by her husband.

So too a slave

does not become free

until he takes out

the

get

of release

to the domain that

before the release was already

not his.

And therefore the slave does not become free through his own acceptance, because as long as the slave has not become free, his hand is in the domain of the master.

And the Gemara continues to discuss the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar:

He inquired

[he asked]

Rabbah: