Kiddushin 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

This

is the master.

He interpreted it as referring to death, whereas this

is Mar Zutra,

who interpreted it as referring to life:

in place of the master, he acquired the slave immediately, before the slave could acquire himself.

b.

Some say

that slave

was a minor,

and nevertheless Mar Zutra had to hurry and engage in acquiring him during the master’s lifetime.

And

this is

not in accordance with Abba Shaul—

As it was taught: When a convert dies

without heirs,

and they plundered—

the

Jewish

people plundered

his property, and among it were

slaves—

whether

the slaves were

adults

or

whether

they were

minors, they acquired

for

themselves

upon the master’s death, and they became

free men—

the words of the Sages.

Abba Shaul

disagrees and

says:

The

adult

slaves indeed

acquired themselves

and became

free men.

But

minor

slaves are incapable of acquiring themselves. Therefore,

whoever takes possession of them—

has acquired them.

According to Abba Shaul, even if Mar Zutra had waited until the convert died, he would not have lost anything, because since the slave was a minor, he could not have acquired himself. Mar Zutra therefore had no need to involve himself immediately in acquiring him; rather, he could have waited until the convert’s death.

And since Mar Zutra hurried and engaged in acquiring him during the convert’s lifetime, it necessarily follows that he held the view of the Sages, who maintain that even a minor slave acquires himself after the master’s death. Therefore, Mar Zutra hurried to use the slave during his lifetime, so that the slave would not have time to acquire himself.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he acquires himself with money

through others, and with a document through himself; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And we infer: The wording of Rabbi Meir implies that

with money—

only

through others, no,

he does acquire himself.

But

he

does not

acquire himself with money

through himself.

That is, if money was given to the slave so that he could redeem himself, the slave cannot use it to redeem himself. The reason for this will be explained in the Gemara below.

From this point, there is a doubt as to the circumstance in which Rabbi Meir was speaking:

First possibility: Rabbi Meir was speaking of a redemption carried out with the slave’s consent. Only in that case is money given through others effective for redeeming him. But without the slave’s consent, others are not permitted to redeem him.

Second possibility: Rabbi Meir was speaking of a redemption carried out without the slave’s consent [because in his view other people are permitted to redeem him even without his consent].

And in this manner Rabbi Meir said that the slave is redeemed with a document through himself and not through others. But if the redemption is carried out with the slave’s consent, even others are permitted to redeem him.

The Gemara has difficulty explaining Rabbi Meir’s words according to either of these two possibilities:

What are we dealing with?

What is the case?

If you say

that it is in accordance with the second possibility, namely, that it concerns a redemption carried out

without his consent

of the slave, this is difficult—

For the Gemara has now assumed that in order for others to redeem the slave, they must be his agents. However, even if the slave did not appoint them as his agents, they can act by virtue of his agency, since “one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence.”

That is, with regard to something that is beneficial to a person, another person can become his agent even in his absence. Although he did not explicitly appoint him as an agent for this matter, it is certain that he is pleased for this person to act as his agent in a matter that benefits him.

Accordingly, this is difficult:

Since

we have

heard Rabbi Meir say,

we have heard Rabbi Meir’s words [in Gittin 11b]

that: It is a liability

—a loss—

for a slave

to leave his master’s authority and go free!

Because upon becoming free he is prohibited from a Canaanite maidservant.

And we learned

and we learned [there]:

One may acquire a benefit for a person

even

in his absence, but

nevertheless,

one may not acquire a liability for a person except in his presence!

For a person cannot become another person’s agent without his consent in a matter that is a liability [a harmful matter or a loss] for him.

If so, how can it be possible for other people to redeem the slave without his consent? On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara establishes Rabbi Meir’s statement as referring to a redemption carried out with the slave’s consent—

Rather, it is obvious

that the case is a redemption carried out

with his consent

of the slave, in accordance with the first possibility.

Should you say: Why did the tanna need to teach us that others can redeem him with his consent? Is it not self-evident that they can do so?

The answer is:

And this is what he teaches us:

Rabbi Meir comes to teach us that although the redemption was carried out with the slave’s consent, nevertheless, only if it is carried out

through others, no—

then it is effective. But if it is carried out

through himself,

it

is not

effective.

Apparently,

it is demonstrated from here that

a slave has no property independent of his master

under any circumstances. Even if other people transfer money to him on the condition that the master has no authority over it, the slave does not acquire it. But the Gemara rejects this explanation.

For if we establish Rabbi Meir’s statement as referring to a redemption carried out with the slave’s consent, the following difficulty can now be raised:

If so,

if this is what is meant,

say the latter clause;

let me tell you the end of Rabbi Meir’s statement:

With a document—

through himself!

This implies that specifically

through himself, no,

he does go free. But when the deed of emancipation is received

through

other

people

on his behalf, he

does not

go free.

And if

you would say that Rabbi Meir is speaking of a redemption carried out

with his consent, the difficulty is:

of the slave, there is a difficulty:

Through others—

why not!?

Why does the slave not go free when other people receive the deed of emancipation on his behalf? After all, the case concerns the slave’s consent, and therefore they can become his agents under the principle that one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence!

And if you would say,

perhaps you might say:

What

is Rabbi Meir’s intention when he says, “With a document

through himself”?—

He does not mean specifically through himself, but rather

even through himself.

The case is always one of the slave’s consent, and therefore others can also receive the document on his behalf [and according to this, the meaning of what we learned, “with money through others,” is also clear, since the case concerns the slave’s consent and they become his agents].

And Rabbi Meir used the expression “even through himself” because there is a novel element in the fact that the slave goes free through himself with a document, more than in the fact that he goes free through others with a document—

And this is what he teaches us:

Rabbi Meir comes to teach us that one should not say, “A slave’s hand is like his master’s hand,” and if the master places the deed of emancipation in the hands of his slave, the document has still not left the master’s possession, and the slave is not emancipated through it.

Rather, one must say that

his deed and his hand

of the slave

come into existence simultaneously.

That is, when the deed [the deed of emancipation] reaches the slave’s hand, since at that moment the slave becomes free, his hand is no longer like the master’s hand. It follows that the document has passed from the master’s possession to the slave’s possession. Therefore, the slave is emancipated.

To summarize this stage of the Gemara: Rabbi Meir is speaking of an emancipation carried out with the slave’s consent. This is what Rabbi Meir said: A slave acquires himself with money through others but not through himself; and with a document, through others and even through himself.

However, the Gemara rejects this possibility, since—

But this is not what was taught!

For in the beraita, in which Rabbi Meir’s words are taught more explicitly, it is clear that Rabbi Meir’s statement cannot be established as referring to emancipation with the slave’s consent.

As it was taught: With a document—

through himself, and not through others; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

The beraita explicitly states that according to Rabbi Meir the slave is not emancipated through others by means of a document. And if we say that this concerns emancipation carried out with the slave’s consent, the difficulty arises: Why can the slave not be emancipated through others? After all, they are his agents for this purpose!

On the basis of this difficulty, Abaye concludes that this concerns emancipation carried out without the slave’s consent—

Abaye said: Actually,

Rabbi Meir is speaking of emancipation carried out

without his consent

of the slave, and therefore the slave is not emancipated through others by means of a document.

And regarding what we challenged: If the emancipation was without the slave’s consent, how can he be redeemed with money through others without his consent? Is it not the case according to Rabbi Meir that it is a liability for a slave to leave his master’s authority and go free?—

And

one can say:

Here it is different:

The law of money differs from the law of a document. With money, the slave acquires himself through others even without his consent,

since they can acquire him against his will!

Since that other person can acquire the slave for himself from his master against the slave’s will, he can therefore also

transfer him to himself against his will.

He has the power to transfer the slave to himself, so that the slave will go free, against the slave’s will.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if we indeed take this reasoning into account [that since the other person can acquire him against his will, he can also redeem him against his will],

a document as well!

Others should likewise be able to emancipate him without his consent through a document, since they can acquire him from the master for themselves with a document against his will! Why, then, regarding emancipation through a document, did Rabbi Meir say, “And with a document, through himself and not through others”?

And we answer: A distinction must be made between emancipation through money and emancipation through a document, since the nature and wording of the document of acquisition of a slave are not the same as the nature and wording of a deed of emancipation.

Rather,

this document is one matter, and that document is another matter.

For the nature and wording of a deed of emancipation differ from the nature and wording of a deed of acquisition.

The deed of emancipation states, “Behold, you are a free man,” whereas the deed of acquisition states, “My slave is sold to you.”

Therefore, that other person who comes to emancipate him with a document cannot do so by virtue of his ability to acquire him with a document, since these documents are not equivalent.

And we challenge this answer:

Here too,

with regard to money, let us make the same distinction:

This money is one matter, and that money is another matter!

After all, the money used to acquire a slave differs from the money used to redeem him. In one case the money is given for the purpose of acquiring a slave, whereas in the other case the money is given for the purpose of emancipating the slave!

Why, then, do we say that since that other person can acquire him against his will, he can redeem him against his will? And we answer: Although there is a distinction between money given for the purpose of acquisition and money given for the purpose of emancipation, this distinction is not significant, since

the coin, at any rate, is one and the same!

The same currency is given in both cases, and therefore both are considered a single form of acquisition.

But this is different with regard to a document, because the document itself is different in its acquisition from its use in emancipation, and therefore this is like two separate acquisitions.

This concludes Abaye’s answer.

The Gemara now explains that Rava also agrees with Abaye that Rabbi Meir was speaking of an emancipation performed without the slave’s knowledge, but he gives a different reason for distinguishing between money and a document:

Rava said:

with

money

there is no need for the redeemer to become the slave’s agent; rather,

his master’s acceptance caused it for him.

By virtue of the master’s acceptance of the money, the slave becomes free automatically. The master does not accept the money as the slave’s agent; rather, he accepts it for his own purposes. Therefore, he need not accept the money with the slave’s knowledge, since he is not his agent.

But with

a document, the acceptance by others caused it for him.

By virtue of others accepting the document, he becomes free; and those others accept the document on behalf of the slave, so they must do so as his agents.

Since, according to Rabbi Meir, it is a liability for the slave to leave his master’s possession and become free, they cannot become his agents without his knowledge, for one may not incur a liability for a person without his knowledge.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the Sages say: With money, through himself

and with a document, through others.

The Gemara assumed that the Sages’ intention was to say that a slave becomes free through money specifically through himself, and not through others.

And since it was explained above that Rabbi Meir, who said “with money, through others,” was speaking of an emancipation performed without the slave’s knowledge, the Sages, too, are addressing redemption performed without the slave’s knowledge.

And we raised an objection:

With money, through himself, he does not

so, yes; but

through others, not? Why?

Why did the Sages say this?

Even so,

it is indeed true

that

the acquisition effecting the emancipation was performed

without his knowledge.

Nevertheless, it would be appropriate to say that this can be done. For—

After all,

we

have heard the Sages say:

we heard in tractate Gittin in the name of the Sages, who maintain that

it is a benefit

for a slave

to leave his master’s possession and become free.

And we have also learned

and likewise we learned:

One may confer a benefit upon a person in his absence

without his knowledge,

but one may incur a liability for him

only in his presence.

And since it is a benefit for a slave to become free, others should be able to redeem him without his knowledge. Why, then, did the Sages say in our Mishna that a slave is redeemed through himself and not through others?

And if you would say,

perhaps you might say that the words of the Sages should be understood differently:

What

is the intention of the Sages when they said “with money

through himself”?

Even

that is,

through himself

and not only through others. In fact, the slave is redeemed both through himself and through others, since it is a benefit for him.

And

why is there an innovation in saying that the slave is redeemed through himself, more than through others? Because by teaching that the slave is redeemed through himself,

it teaches us

the tanna informs us

that a slave can possess property without his master—

that the slave can acquire money for himself and not for his master, for example, when others give him money on the condition that his master have no authority over it; with that money, the slave can redeem himself. [

Summary of the answer: The Sages agree that a slave is redeemed through others, and they came to teach that he can also be acquired through himself, and that he can possess property without his master.]

And we reject this:

If so,

if the Sages’ intention is indeed to say “even through himself”—

Consider the latter clause,

and let us examine the end of the Sages’ statement:

For the Sages said at the end of their statement:

With a document, through others.

This implies that their intention is to say specifically through others,

and not through himself.

And if so, there is a difficulty:

But we have established

as a practical halakhic rule,

that

when a slave receives a deed of emancipation from his master,

his deed and his hand come simultaneously:

the slave acquires his deed and his hand at one and the same time, and becomes free. Indeed, it is common practice for a slave to receive his deed from his master’s hand. If we explain that the Sages said “with a document, through others,” and not through himself, it follows that we practice in accordance with Rabbi Meir and not in accordance with the Sages.

And how can it be possible to say that we act in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who is an individual opposed to the Sages, who are the majority?

And if you would say,

perhaps you might explain the words of the Sages differently and say:

What

is the intention of the Sages when they said “with a document

through others”?

Even through others

without his knowledge, and not only through himself. There is an innovation in saying that the slave becomes free through others by means of a document, beyond the case of his becoming free through himself; therefore, we learned that the slave becomes free through others.

And this teaches us,

the tanna informs us,

that it is a benefit for a slave to leave his master’s possession and become free,

and therefore others can redeem him even without his knowledge.

That is, the Sages agree that a slave becomes free through himself by means of a document, because his deed and his hand come simultaneously. And they came to teach that he also becomes free through others, because it is a benefit for a slave to become free.

This explanation is impossible. For—

We said above that the Sages hold that with money the slave becomes free both through others and through himself.

And now we are saying that with a document, too, the slave becomes free both through himself and through others.

And

if so,

if our words are indeed correct, that the law of money is identical to the law of a document,

let us combine them and teach them together:

it would have been appropriate to join them and state them as one matter: And the Sages say,

with money and with a document—

both through others and through himself!

Why, then, did we state the law of each of them separately?

Necessarily, their laws are not identical. Therefore, the Gemara gives a new interpretation:

Rather,

what we learned, “

with money

through himself,” means

both through others and through himself.

And what we learned, “

with a document

through others,” means specifically

through others, and not through himself.

And as for the difficulty we raised against this: Is it not common practice for a slave to receive his deed of emancipation himself from his master’s hand? If so, how can it be possible to say that we act contrary to the words of the Sages?—

One can say that what we learned, “with a document, through others,” is not a continuation of the Sages’ statement. Rather, the one who said this statement—

it is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

The Sages, however, maintain that just as with money the slave is acquired both through others and through himself, so too with a document the slave is acquired both through others and through himself. And we act in accordance with the view of the Sages; therefore, the slave can receive the deed of emancipation himself from his master’s hand.

?