Kiddushin 22b (כב:) — the Talmud in English

Had

it been

stated in Deuteronomy [there]: “And you shall take the awl and place

his ear in the door,”

I would have said

that the master would pierce opposite

the slave’s

ear

a hole

in the door, but he would not pierce the ear itself.

Before the Gemara continues by citing the words of the beraita, it interrupts and raises a difficulty concerning this statement of the beraita—

From the statement of the beraita, “I would have said: He pierces opposite his ear,” it follows that it might have occurred to one to think that

the door, but not

only in it would he make a hole, whereas in

his ear

of the slave

he would not

make a hole; therefore it was stated: “in his ear and in the door.”

But this is perplexing!

And

could I really have entertained the thought and said that

the ear would not be pierced?!

But

is it

not written

explicitly in Exodus [there]:

“And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl”?!

Rather,

the statement of the beraita should be explained as follows:

Had it been stated, “And you shall take the awl and place his ear in the door,” I would have said that

he would pierce the ear

from the outside,

outside the door, wherever he wished, in order to fulfill what is stated in Exodus without qualification: “And his master shall pierce his ear,” without stating where he should pierce it.

And

only after piercing his ear

would he place it on the door,

and

then

pierce opposite his ear

on the other side of the

door,

in order to fulfill the verse stated in Deuteronomy: “And you shall place his ear in the door.”

Therefore, the verse in Deuteronomy had to exclude this possibility by saying, “in his ear and in the door,” as the continuation of the beraita explains.

The Gemara now cites the continuation of the beraita:

The verse states [that is why it says]: “And you shall place

in his ear and in the

door.”

That is, he must place the awl in his ear while it is pressed against the door.

How is this done?—

He places his ear in the door,

and pierces onward

in the ear

until he reaches the door.

The beraita now explains why the verse in Exodus states that the piercing is performed at the door or at the doorpost, whereas in Deuteronomy only the door is mentioned.

For had it stated only

“door”

[as the verse says in Deuteronomy], I

would understand

from the verse that the reference is to any door,

whether

it is

removed

from the doorpost of the entrance and lying on the ground,

or whether it has not been removed,

but remains attached to the doorpost of the entrance. Therefore—

The verse states

in Exodus: “And his master shall bring him to the door or to the

doorpost.”

The verse compares the door to the doorpost of the entrance, to teach you:

Just as

the

doorpost

of the entrance is called a “doorpost” only when it is fixed in the entrance, when it is in an

upright

position—but if it is uprooted from the entrance and lying on the ground, it is no longer called a “doorpost,” but is considered merely a piece of wood—

so too the door,

the door of which the verse speaks as the place against which the ear of the pierced slave is to be pierced, is only a door attached to the doorpost of the entrance, standing there in an

upright

position, and not one removed from the doorpost of the entrance and lying on the ground. The Gemara brings another beraita concerning the verse, “And you shall place his ear in the door.”

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai would expound this verse

with an elegant exposition,

like a “precious ornament,”

a bundle of pearls or spices suspended from the neck as an adornment:

What is different about the ear from all the other limbs of the body?

Thus

said the Holy One, blessed be He: The ear that heard

the

voice at Mount Sinai, when I said, “For the Children of Israel are servants to Me,”

[Leviticus 25]—servants to Me alone—

and not

are they to be

servants to servants.

And

nevertheless

this man went and acquired a master for himself—

therefore

he shall be pierced

in his ear.

In this exposition, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai explained why the piercing is performed in the ear. The beraita now expounds why the piercing is performed at the door fixed to the doorpost:

And Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi would expound this verse

with an elegant exposition,

like a precious ornament

[a bundle of pearls or spices suspended from the neck as an adornment]:

What is different about the door and the doorpost from all the vessels in the house?

Thus

said the Holy One, blessed be He: The door and the doorpost, which served as witnesses in Egypt when I passed over the lintel and the two doorposts, and I said, “For the Children of Israel are servants to Me,” and not servants to servants, and I brought them out from slavery to freedom—and this man went and acquired a master for himself—

he shall be pierced before them.

Mishna:

The Mishna before us concerns the modes of acquisition of a Canaanite slave: a.

A Canaanite slave is acquired

with money,

with a document,

and through possession

[the acquisition through possession will be explained in the Gemara].

b.

And he acquires himself

through two modes of acquisition: with money and with a document. The tannaim disputed by whom these acquisitions are effected:

The first opinion:

With money, through others.

If others give the master money on the condition that the slave thereby go free, he acquires himself through this. But the slave himself cannot give money to the master and thereby go free, because any money that comes into the slave’s possession belongs to the master. Even if the money was given to him on the condition that his master have no authority over it, the slave does not acquire the money.

And with a document, through himself.

If the slave himself receives a document of emancipation from the master, he goes free through it.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: With money, through himself.

If the slave receives money from others on the condition that his master have no authority over it, he acquires the money and may give it to the master, thereby going free.

And with a document, through others

[this will be explained in the Gemara].

And when the Sages said that a slave acquires himself with money through himself, this statement is subject to a condition:

provided that the money belongs to others.

That other people gave him the money on the condition that the master have no authority over it; he then acquires it and uses it to acquire himself.

But if the slave found a lost object, or if someone gave him a gift without stipulation, these belong to the master, and the slave never acquired them. Therefore, he cannot use them to go free.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A Canaanite slave is acquired with money, with a document, and through possession.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

From where do we know this,

where did we learn it?

And we answer:

As it is written

concerning a Canaanite slave [Leviticus 25]:

“And you shall bequeath them to your sons after you, to inherit as a permanent possession.” The verse compares

the Canaanite slaves

to an ancestral field:

What—

just as

an ancestral field is acquired through money, a document, and possession —

so too a Canaanite slave is acquired through money, a document, and possession.

Lest you say:

perhaps

we can learn another matter from an ancestral field:

What—

just as

an ancestral field returns to its owners in the Jubilee—

so too a Canaanite slave returns to his owners in the Jubilee.

Therefore,

the verse states

later in that same verse:

“You shall work them forever.”

The verse teaches that a Canaanite slave does not go out in the Jubilee.

The Gemara now cites additional modes of acquisition through which a Canaanite slave is acquired, besides money, a document, and possession, which were taught in our Mishna: A.

The tanna taught:

the tanna taught in a beraita: A Canaanite slave is acquired

also through exchange.

The Gemara explains why the tanna who taught our Mishna did not mention acquisition through exchange:

But as for our tanna,

only

a matter that does not apply to movable property did he teach.

But

a matter that does apply to movable property he did not teach.

The tanna who taught our Mishna taught only modes of acquisition stated with regard to a slave and not with regard to movable property; but modes of acquisition that apply also to movable property, he did not teach in our Mishna.

B.

Shmuel said: A Canaanite slave is acquired through pulling.

And

how

is pulling performed? If the buyer

seized him,

he pulled the slave forcefully

and he came to him, he acquired him.

But if the master

called him [

called the slave]

and he came to him, he did not acquire him,

because the slave came of his own accord, and his movement was not caused by the master.

The Gemara raises an objection: If Shmuel’s statement is correct, and pulling indeed effects acquisition with regard to a Canaanite slave, then it is difficult: Why did the tannaim who taught our Mishna and the beraita not mention acquisition through pulling?

Granted,

indeed,

with regard to our tanna [

who taught our Mishna], it is understandable why pulling was not taught in the Mishna, since

a matter that applies to movable property he did not teach.

The tanna did not teach in our Mishna an acquisition that applies to movable property, for exchange was likewise not taught in our Mishna for this reason, as explained above. Since acquisition through pulling applies to movable property, the tanna therefore did not teach it in our Mishna.

But

with regard to

the other tanna [

the tanna who taught the beraita], there is a difficulty: Since acquisition through exchange was taught in the beraita, it is evident that he does teach modes of acquisition that apply to movable property as well. If so,

let him teach

also

pulling!

Since the tanna did not teach pulling, it appears that pulling does not effect acquisition with regard to a Canaanite slave, contrary to Shmuel’s statement! The Gemara answers: In fact, pulling does effect acquisition with regard to a Canaanite slave. Nevertheless, the tanna did not teach it in the beraita, because

when he teaches, he teaches a matter that applies both to land and to movable property.

That is, besides money, a document, and possession, we taught in the beraita only exchange, because exchange applies both to movable property and to land. Therefore, it was taught incidentally to money, a document, and possession, which apply to land.

But

pulling, which

only

applies to movable property and does not apply to land,

as it applies to movable property but not to land—

he did not teach.

The Gemara discusses Shmuel’s statement:

Shmuel said:

“How

is pulling performed with regard to a slave? If he

seized him and he came to him—

he acquired him.

But if he

called him and he came to him—

he did not acquire him.”

The Gemara asks:

And

if

he called him—

does his coming occur because of his call,

not

and is it not considered pulling?

But does not a beraita prove that even movement resulting from his call is considered pulling? As follows:

A large domesticated animal is acquired through handing over. A small domesticated animal is acquired through pulling. [Mishna below, 25b]

But was it not taught

with regard to this matter:

How

is a large domesticated animal acquired

through handing over?

If the buyer

took hold of its hoof,

its leg,

or of its hair [

for example, the hair on the horse’s head], or

of the saddle on it,

or

of the pack saddle,

the load

on it,

or

of the bit,

the bridle

in its mouth, and

likewise

of the bell [

the bell]

on its neck—

he acquired it

even if the animal did not move from its place.

This is provided that the buyer’s taking hold was done at the seller’s instruction.

And

how

is a small domesticated animal acquired

through pulling?

The buyer

calls to it and it comes, or

the buyer

strikes it with a stick and it runs [

and it runs]

before him —

once it moves one foreleg

and one hind leg,

immediately

he acquires it.

This is the opinion of the first tanna.

Rabbi Asi,

and some say

that this was stated in the name of

Rabbi Aḥa, says:

The animal is not acquired once it has moved one foreleg and one hind leg

until it walks before him

the measure of

its full height,

and only then is it acquired by him.

In any event, it is explained in the beraita that one who acquires an animal through pulling need not pull it forcefully. Rather, even if he calls it and it comes because of his call, this is acquisition through pulling, and he acquires it.

This poses a difficulty to Shmuel’s statement: Why did Shmuel say that when one calls a Canaanite slave and the slave comes to him, he does not acquire him through pulling? Why is pulling with regard to a slave different from pulling with regard to an animal?

They said,

the members of the academy offered an answer:

There is a difference between an animal and a slave:

An animal

has no understanding, and when the buyer calls to it and it comes,

it goes with the intention of its master,

it proceeds at the direction of the one who called it, and this is as though he pulled it with his hands.

But

a slave

has understanding. When the buyer calls to him and he comes, he does not come at the buyer’s direction; rather, the matter depends on his own understanding and choice, and

at his own

direction he proceeds.

Therefore, his movement is not considered pulling by the master who is acquiring him.

Rav Ashi said:

Since the slave is not acquired by the master when the master calls him only because the slave proceeds according to his own will, if so, when the subject is a

minor slave,

under thirteen years and one day, he is

like an animal,

since he has no understanding. Therefore, if the buyer calls him and the minor comes because of the call, the buyer acquires him through pulling.

The Gemara now cites a beraita explaining how acquisition through possession is performed with regard to a Canaanite slave:

The Sages taught:

How

is the slave acquired

through possession?

If

he removed

the slave’s

shoe for the buyer, or carried his belongings [

clothing]

after him to the bathhouse,

or

undressed him, bathed him, anointed him, scratched him, dressed him, or put on his shoes,

or

lifted him,

meaning that the slave lifted the buyer —

All these are forms of service through which the slave serves his master. Once he does so for the master, this is possession, and

the master acquires

the slave.

Rabbi Shimon said: Possession cannot be greater than lifting, for lifting effects acquisition everywhere!

The Gemara now assumes that Rabbi Shimon gives a reason why a slave who lifts his master is acquired by him through this act: The slave’s lifting his master is no less effective than the other forms of work. For acquisition through lifting effects acquisition everywhere, even in the seller’s courtyard.

This is unlike acquisition through pulling and handing over, which do not effect acquisition in the seller’s courtyard.

The Gemara immediately asks:

What is he saying?

How are Rabbi Shimon’s words to be understood? Here the case concerns a slave who lifts his master, whereas lifting that effects acquisition everywhere refers to the buyer lifting the item being acquired!

Rav Ashi said:

The words of the beraita must be explained differently:

The first tanna said that specifically if

he lifted him [

the slave]

for his master—

he acquired him.

But if

his master lifted him for him—

he did not acquire him.

And

said

concerning this

Rabbi Shimon:

According to the first tanna, it follows that acquisition through possession is superior to acquisition through lifting, since possession effects acquisition with regard to a Canaanite slave, whereas lifting does not effect acquisition.

But I maintain that

it

cannot be said that

possession should be greater than lifting!

For

indeed,

lifting effects acquisition everywhere,

and therefore its power is greater; it certainly effects acquisition even with regard to a Canaanite slave, contrary to the opinion of the first tanna.

And we raise an objection against the words of the beraita:

“Now that you have said”,

since we have said that if

“he lifted his master, he acquired him; if so”,

it is difficult: it should follow that

“a Canaanite slavewoman should also be acquired”

by her master

through intercourse,

since she lifts him. Why, then, in truth, is a slavewoman not acquired through intercourse?

And we answer:

“When we say”,

all that we said—that a slave who lifted his master acquired him—we said only when

“this one”,

the master,

“benefits, and this one”,

the slave,

“suffers,”

so that the slave is thereby serving the master, and therefore this lifting is considered an act of kinyan ḥazaka.

But

“here,”

in the case of a slavewoman who lifted her master through intercourse,

“this one benefits, and this one benefits”—

“indeed!”

They both benefit, and through this act the slavewoman is not serving the master any more than she is serving herself; therefore this does not constitute an act of kinyan ḥazaka.

And we object: It is true that through intercourse in the usual manner both of them benefit.

But through intercourse

“not in the usual manner,”

only the master benefits, whereas the slavewoman suffers.

If so, the words of the beraita remain difficult: if indeed a slave who lifted his master acquired him, why is a slavewoman not acquired through intercourse not in the usual manner? After all, she does not benefit from it!

Rav Aḥai bar Adda from Aḥa

said: The objection can be rejected on the basis of two arguments:

a.

“Who can say that both of them do not derive benefit from it?”

Who can tell us that through intercourse not in the usual manner both of them do not benefit? It is possible that the woman also derives benefit from it!

b.

“Furthermore,”

even if it becomes clear that the woman does not derive benefit from it, as the objector claims, we can explain why a slavewoman is not acquired through intercourse not in the usual manner.

This is because with regard to intercourse,

“‘the beds of a woman’ is written” [Leviticus 20:13], in the plural, and the beds of a woman include both intercourse in the usual manner and intercourse not in the usual manner.

And the verse equated

intercourse

in the usual manner with

intercourse

not in the usual manner,

so that their laws are equal.

And since a slavewoman is not acquired through intercourse in the usual manner, for she benefits from it, she is likewise not acquired through intercourse not in the usual manner.

Since we have discussed the acquisition of a Canaanite slave through kinyan ḥazaka, the Gemara cites an incident involving such an act of acquisition, from which a halakhic ruling is derived:

Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nadva,

from the land of Cush,

“was a convert who had no heirs”

[he was].

He fell ill,

he became sick,

“and Mar Zutra came to inquire after him,”

Mar Zutra came to ask about his welfare.

“He saw that the world had become very oppressive for him.”

Mar Zutra saw that Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nadva was in his death throes and approaching death, and he wished to acquire his slave.

Therefore

“he said to his slave,”

to Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nadva’s slave:

“Take off my shoes and bring them home”

—“Remove my shoes from my feet, take them, and bring them to my house.” He said this because he thought that Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nadva would die while the slave was carrying his shoes, and at that moment he would acquire him for himself through an act of kinyan ḥazaka.

Why did Mar Zutra hurry so much instead of waiting until Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nadva died, at which point he would acquire the slave?

Two opinions were stated in explanation of this matter:

a.

“There are those who say”,

some say: That slave

“was an adult,”

he was fully grown, and had Mar Zutra waited until the master died, the slave would have acquired himself immediately upon the master’s death. Therefore Mar Zutra hurried and performed the acquisition of the slave at the very moment of death.

And at the moment of death itself—