Kiddushin 22a — the Talmud in English

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It is preferable that Israel eat the flesh ![](pamud.bmp "

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of animals destined to die,

sick animals close to death, and that they eat them when they are

slaughtered,

and even though “animals destined to die” are repulsive to eat, and as they said in tractate Hullin [37b]], nevertheless it is preferable that they eat them when they are slaughtered,

and not eat the flesh of animals destined to die

after they die and become

“carcasses”

complete.

And similarly: it is preferable that they marry a beautiful captive permissibly rather than marry her under prohibition.

“And you desire her” -

it follows that Scripture made the matter dependent upon his desire. And if he desires her, she is permitted to him

even though she is not beautiful.

“In her” -

Scripture excludes, teaching that the permission concerning the beautiful captive applies specifically to “her,” that is, to one woman.

And not to her and her companion.

for it is forbidden to take two “beautiful captive” women

.

“And you take” -

“Taking” you have with regard to her.

The kiddushin take effect with regard to her.

And the novelty is: even though the beautiful captive converts against her will, and this is not a complete conversion, nevertheless we do not say that she is like a complete gentile woman, with regard to whom kiddushin do not take effect.

“For yourself as a wife” -

that he should not take two women, one for himself and one for his father.

Or

one for himself and one for his son.

That is, that he should not have intercourse with one woman and leave the second for his father or his son. [See note ]

“And you shall bring her

into your house

]” - teaches

Scripture

that he should not pressure her

to have intercourse with her

in the war,

rather, he must first bring her to his house, and only afterward is he permitted to have intercourse with her.

Until here the Gemara discussed the matter of the beautiful captive, and this matter was brought in our sugya incidentally [since they discussed whether a priestly slave is pierced, a similar discussion was brought concerning whether a koen is permitted to have a beautiful captive

. And now the Gemara returns to discuss the matter of the pierced slave, whose law was mentioned in our Mishna.

It is stated concerning a Hebrew slave [Exodus 21:5–6]: “And if the slave shall clearly say: I love my master, my wife, and my children—I shall not go free! Then his master shall pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall serve him forever

]. And in the beraita they derived several laws from the words of this verse:

The Sages taught:

“If he shall clearly say” -

the repetition of the language teaches that the slave is not pierced

until he says

once that he does not wish to go free,

and repeats it -

and says this again a second time.

And the beraita explains when the slave must make these two statements:

If the slave

said

twice

at the beginning of six

years of his servitude that he does not wish to go free at the end of six years,

and did not say

this at all

at the end of six

the years, then he

is not pierced.

For it is stated [

there ] :

“I shall not go free,”

and it follows that he must say this

at the time of going free,

when he is about to go free.

And if he

said

twice

at the end of six

that he wishes to go free,

and did not say

this

at the beginning of six

even once, then too he

is not pierced.

For it is stated: “If the slave shall clearly say.”

The word “the slave” teaches that the slave is not pierced

until he says

this

while he is a slave,

at the beginning of six, and not at the end of six years [and below the Gemara wonders: Is he not a slave at the end of six]]?!

These are the words of the beraita until here.

And the Gemara raises two questions concerning the words of the beraita:

.

The Master said in the beraita: if the slave

in the beraita: If the servant

said at the beginning of six, but did not say at the end of six, he is not pierced.

For it is stated, “I shall not go free.”

And the Gemara assumed that the plain meaning of what was stated, “at the beginning of six,” is on the first day of his six years of servitude -

And therefore the Gemara asked:

why specifically,

why did the tanna need to derive this

from “I shall not go free”?

Let him derive it

for he can prove this from the wording of the slave’s own statement, that his statement was not at the beginning of six.

It is necessary

For

we require [

it is necessary ] that the slave say:

“I love my master, my wife

the maidservant,

and my children

who were born to me from the maidservant, and therefore I shall not go free.”

But at the beginning of the six years it is impossible that children were born to him from the master’s Canaanite maidservant, since the master gives him the maidservant only after he becomes a slave!

.

Furthermore,

we also learned further in the beraita:

if he said at the end of six, but did not say at the beginning of six, he is not pierced, for it is stated

“If he shall clearly say

the slave.”

And the Gemara assumed that, according to the plain meaning, “the end of six” is the last day of his six years of servitude -

and it is difficult:

is it so [

is it the case that ] at

the end of six he is not a slave?!

But surely throughout that entire day he is still a slave!

And in order to resolve these two questions, Rava explains the words of the beraita in a new manner:

Rava said: “At the beginning of six” means

—

at the beginning of the final pruta.

That is, certainly the slave’s statement is made after the master has given him a Canaanite maidservant and children have been born to him from her.

“And the beginning of six” is the entire period of time remaining for the slave to work for his master, provided that there remains at least a period of work worth one pruta at the least.

And if he wishes to say this close to the completion of his service, when he is about to begin the work of the final pruta imposed upon him, he must say this “at the beginning of the final pruta,” that is, before this period begins, while there is still a pruta’s worth in his work, because it is stated, “the slave

” For if the period of the final pruta has begun, so that a complete pruta’s worth of servitude is no longer imposed upon him, he is not then called a “slave” [although he must complete the work until the end of the pruta], and he cannot say this and be pierced.

And “at the end of six,” which the beraita stated concerning the fact that he is not pierced, means

at the end of the final pruta.

That is: after the slave has already entered the period in which less than a pruta’s worth of work remains, at the end of his six years of servitude. The Gemara brings another beraita containing laws concerning the law of piercing:

The Sages taught:

a. If

he has

the slave

a wife,

a Canaanite maidservant whom his master gave him,

and

there were born to him from her

children,

and

if

his master has no wife and children,

then the slave

is not pierced. Now Rambam [there] wrote in these words: “‘And if he shall clearly say’—until he says it and repeats it. ‘The slave’—until he says it while he is a slave. But if he said it after six, he is not pierced until he says it and repeats it at the end of six, at the beginning of the final pruta. How so? For example, if enough of the day remains to equal a pruta from his sale price, or slightly more. But if less than a pruta remains, this is like one who says it after six.” It follows plainly from his words that the slave makes both statements together at the beginning of six, but this is not implied by the words of the Gemara. And Mishneh LaMelekh wrote there: Rambam was troubled by the above question: since “the slave” and “I shall not go” are stated, it follows that two statements are required; why, then, does the tanna derive this from the repetition “shall clearly say”? Therefore Rambam explains the Gemara differently: “The slave” teaches that the beginning of the statement must be at the beginning of six [that is, while a pruta’s worth of servitude remains upon the slave]; “I shall not go” teaches that the end of the statement must be at the end of six, close to his going free. According to this, it cannot be proved from “the slave” and “I shall not go” that two statements are required, but only that the beginning of the statement is at the beginning of six and its end is at the end of six. Therefore the tanna needed to derive from “shall clearly say” that two statements are required, meaning that he must say and repeat two statements one after the other. The beginning of these two statements is at the beginning of six [as it is stated: “the slave”], and the end of these two statements is at the end of six [as it is stated: “I shall not go”]. Therefore Rambam wrote that he must begin these two statements at a time when enough of the day remains to equal a pruta or slightly more; through this, the completion of the two statements will be at the end of six, when a pruta’s worth no longer remains. The practical difference between Rashi’s explanation and Rambam’s explanation is this: according to Rashi, the first statement must be entirely made while a pruta’s worth remains, and the second statement must be entirely made after less than a pruta remains. According to Rambam, this is not necessary. It is sufficient that part of the first statement be at the beginning of six and that the end of the second statement be at the end of six. See another explanation of Rambam’s words in Lehem Mishneh there. And see further answers to the question of Tosafot HaRosh above in Tosafot HaRosh, Maharit, Mishneh LaMelekh there in the name of Mahari ben Lev, Shita lo Noda le-Mi, and Sefer HaMikneh.

Because

it is stated [

Deuteronomy 15:16 ] concerning a pierced slave: “And it shall be, when he says to you [the slave] [the master]: I shall not go out from you

‘because he loves you and your household.’”

From here it follows that the master must have a “household,” meaning that he has a wife and children.

because he loves you and your household.” From here it follows that the master must have a “house,” that he has a wife and children. b. If

his master

of the slave

has a wife and children, and

if

he,

the slave,

has no wife,

because his master did not give him a Canaanite maidservant.

Or his master gave him a Canaanite maidservant,

and

there were not born

children to him

from her; he

is not pierced.

Because

it is stated

concerning a pierced slave [Exodus 21]: “And if the slave shall clearly say

I love my master, my wife

the maidservant

and my children.”

And if he has no wife and children, he cannot say this, and therefore he is not pierced. c. If

he [

the slave ]

loves his master, but his master does not love him -

he

is not pierced.

because it is stated concerning the pierced slave [Deuteronomy there]: “And it shall be, when he says to you, ‘I shall not go out from you

, because it is good for him with you.’

And if his master does not love him, it is not good for him to be with his master.

d. If

his master loves him, but he does not love his master,

he

is not pierced,

because

it is stated [there]:

there]:

“Because he loves you.”

e. If

he

[the slave]

was ill, and his master was not

ill,

he

is not pierced.

Because

it is stated [there]:

there]:

“Because it is good for him

[the slave]

with you.”

And if he is ill, it is not good for him.

f. If

his master is ill and he is not ill—

he is not pierced,

because

it is stated [there]: “Because it is good for him

with you,”

and it implies that both of them should be equal in that same good.

This is the end of the words of the beraita.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

Rav Beivi bar Abaye

asked:

If the slave and his master were

both

ill—

what is [the law]?

Does he get pierced?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

One side:

“With you”—

we require, and here it exists.

That is to say, the reason that if the slave or his master was ill he is not pierced is that the slave and the master must be equal in the same condition; and if one is ill and the other is healthy, they are not both equal, and therefore he is not pierced.

And accordingly, when both of them are ill, “with you,” as stated, is fulfilled, since both of them are in the same condition, and therefore the slave is pierced then.

A second side:

or perhaps

[perhaps] it is not sufficient that the slave and the master be in the same condition, but

“because it is good for him with you”—we require.

“Because it is good for him with you” must be fulfilled in them, that is, that it be good for both of them through both of them being healthy.

And

when both of them are ill,

this does not exist,

for this verse is not fulfilled in them, and the slave is not pierced.

And we conclude:

teyku!

Let this question stand unresolved.

And the Gemara brings another beraita, which derives from the verse “because it is good for him with you,” another law:

The Sages taught:

The verse

“because it is good for him with you,”

teaches that the slave must be equal

with you

[with the master]

in food,

and equal

with you in drink.

That is to say:

You shall not be eating fine bread while he is eating coarse bread.

And likewise,

you shall not be drinking aged wine,

which is superior,

while he is drinking new wine.

And likewise, you shall not

be sleeping on cushions

that are soft,

while he is sleeping on straw,

which is hard.

From here, the Sages said:

The Sages:

Anyone who acquires a Hebrew slave —

he is

like one who acquires a master for himself,

for he must provide for him generously.

And the Gemara brings another beraita, speaking of the slave’s rights:

The Sages taught:

It is stated concerning a Hebrew slave who goes out at the Jubilee [Leviticus 25:41]:

“And he shall go out from you, he and his sons with him.”

[This verse refers to his sons born to him from his Israelite wife. But sons born to him from a Canaanite maidservant whom his master gave him remain under the authority of the master, as it is stated [Exodus 21]: “The woman [the maidservant] and her children shall belong to her master. But he shall go out by himself.”]

And

Rabbi Shimon

said

about this: Why is it stated that his sons go out at the Jubilee?

And

after all,

if

indeed

he

himself

was sold,

but

his sons and daughters—

who

[are they—are they also]

sold

through his sale?! Certainly not! And if so, from where do they go out?

Rather,

from here

we learn

that his master

of the slave

is obligated to provide food for

his wife

and his sons.

And when the slave goes out from the master’s authority, the master is released from giving them food, and it is as though they then go out from the master’s authority.

And

similarly

this

you say concerning another verse:

It is stated concerning a Hebrew slave who goes out after six years from his sale [Exodus 21]:

“If he is the husband of a wife

[an Israelite woman]

and his wife shall go out with him.”

And

Rabbi Shimon

said

about this

: Why is it stated that his wife goes out with him?

And

after all,

if

indeed

he was sold,

but

his wife—who

[is she—was she]

sold?!

Certainly not! And if so, from where does she go out?

Rather,

from here

we learn

that his master

of the slave

is obligated to provide food for his wife,

and when the slave goes out from the master’s authority, the master is released from giving her food, and it is as though she then goes out from his authority.

And it is necessary,

and it is necessary to inform us that the master is obligated to provide food for the slave’s wife, and also to inform us of this concerning his sons; and it is impossible to learn one from the other, as follows:

For if it were taught to us,

if Scripture informed us of the obligation of providing food only concerning

his sons,

I would think that the reason for the obligation to provide food is

because

they are minors, and

they are not capable of working and eating,

they cannot work by themselves and earn for the purpose of their food.

But concerning

his

wife, who is capable of eating and working,

who can work and obtain her food herself,

let us say: She should work and eat,

I would say that she should work and eat food from the wages of her work, and the master is not obligated to provide her needs.

Therefore Scripture needed to inform us that the master is obligated to provide food for the slave’s wife.

And if it had informed us,

if Scripture informed us of the obligation to provide food only concerning

his wife,

I would think that the reason for the obligation to provide food is

that it is not the way

of a woman

to go around begging,

it is not the way of a woman to go around begging at the doors because she is ashamed.

But his sons, whose way it is to go around begging,

whose way it is to go around begging at the doors,

let us say: no,

I would think that Scripture does not obligate the master to feed them.

Therefore

it is necessary.

It is necessary to inform us of the obligation to provide food both concerning his sons and concerning his wife.

And now the Gemara returns to discuss the law of the pierced slave, which was brought in our Mishna:

The mitzva of piercing is mentioned in the Torah twice:

a. In the Book of Exodus, in the section of Mishpatim, it is stated, “And his master shall bring him to the door or to the doorpost, and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl” [21:6].

b. In the Book of Deuteronomy: “And you shall take the awl, and place it in his ear and in the door” [15:17].

And although it is stated in the Book of Exodus [there], “And he shall bring him to the door or to the doorpost,” nevertheless the slave is not pierced at the doorpost but only at the door, as explained in the Book of Deuteronomy [there].

And the reason that the doorpost was mentioned in the Book of Exodus will be clarified from the words of the following beraita.

The beraita before us derives from these two verses how the piercing is performed:

The Sages taught: