Kiddushin 22a (כב.) — the Talmud in English

And by way of analogy:

Thus the verse says:

“It is preferable that Israel eat meat”

of animals destined to die,

sick animals that are close to death, and that they eat them while they are

slaughtered,

even though animals destined to die are repulsive to eat, as they said in tractate Hullin [37b], nevertheless, it is preferable that they eat them while they are slaughtered,

rather than eat meat from animals destined to die

after they die and become

“unslaughtered carcasses”

in the full sense.

Similarly: It is preferable that they take a beautiful captive woman permissibly rather than take her in violation of the prohibition.

d

“And you desire” –

the verse indicates that the matter depends on his desire. If he desires her, she is permitted to him

even though she is not beautiful.

e

“Her” –

the verse excludes, teaching that the permission concerning a beautiful captive woman applies specifically “to her,” that is, to one woman.

But not to her and another woman.

For it is prohibited to take two “beautiful captive women.”

f

“And take” –

“Taking” is effective with regard to her.

The kiddushin takes effect with regard to her.

And the novel point is this: Although a beautiful captive woman converts against her will, and this is not a complete conversion, nevertheless we do not say that she is like a complete gentile woman, with regard to whom kiddushin does not take effect.

g

“For yourself as a wife” –

that he should not take two women, one for himself and one for his father,

or

one for himself and one for his son.

That is, he should not have relations with one woman and leave the second for his father or his son. [See note ]

h

“And you shall bring

her into your house” –

the verse teaches

that

he may not pressure her

to have relations with her

in the midst of war,

but he must first bring her to his house, and only afterward is he permitted to have relations with her.

This concludes the Gemara’s discussion of the matter of the “beautiful captive woman.” This matter was brought in our sugya incidentally [because they were discussing whether a servant of a kohen is pierced, and a similar discussion was brought concerning whether a kohen is permitted to take a beautiful captive woman].

The Gemara now returns to discuss the matter of the pierced servant, whose law was mentioned in our Mishna.

It is stated concerning a Hebrew servant [Exodus 21:5–6]: “But if the servant shall plainly say: I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go free. Then his master shall bring him to the judges, and he shall bring him to the door or to the doorpost, and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl; and he shall serve him forever.”

And in a beraita, several laws were derived from this verse:

The Sages taught:

a

“If he shall plainly say” –

the repetition of the expression teaches that the servant is not pierced

until he says

once that he does not wish to go free,

and repeats it –

and says this again a second time.

The beraita explains when the servant must make these two statements:

If the servant

said

twice

at the beginning of the six

years of his servitude that he does not wish to go free at the end of six years,

but did not say

this at all

at the end of the six

years, then he

is not pierced.

As it is stated

[there]:

“I will not go free,”

which indicates that he must say this

at the time of going free,

when he is about to go free.

And if he

said

twice

at the end of the six

that he wishes to go free,

but did not say

this

at the beginning of the six

even once, then too he

is not pierced.

As it is stated: “If the servant shall plainly say.”

The word “the servant” teaches that the servant is not pierced

until he says

this

while he is a servant,

at the beginning of the six years, and not at the end of the six years [and below the Gemara wonders: Is he not a servant at the end of the six years?!]

This concludes the words of the beraita.

The Gemara raises two difficulties concerning the words of the beraita:

a.

The Master said

in the beraita: If the servant

said at the beginning of the six years, but did not say at the end of the six years, he is not pierced.

As it is stated: “I will not go free.”

The Gemara assumed that the plain meaning of “at the beginning of the six years” is the first day of his six years of servitude—

and therefore the Gemara asked:

Why specifically,

why did the tanna need to derive this

from “I will not go free”?

Let him derive it

from the wording of the servant’s own statement, since his statement was not made at the beginning of the six years.

It is necessary

for

we require

[that the servant say]:

“I love my master, my wife

[the Canaanite maidservant],

and my children

[who were born to me from the maidservant, and therefore] I will not go free.”

But at the beginning of the six years, it is impossible that sons were born to him from the master’s Canaanite maidservant, since the master gives him the maidservant only after he has become a servant!

b.

Furthermore,

we also learned later in the beraita:

If he said at the end of the six years, but did not say at the beginning of the six years, he is not pierced, as it is stated,

“If he shall plainly say,

‘the servant.’”

The Gemara assumed that, according to the plain meaning, “at the end of the six years” means the final day of his six years of servitude—

and this is difficult:

Is it so

[that] at

the end of the six years he is not a servant?!

He is still a servant throughout that entire day!

To resolve these two difficulties, Rava explains the words of the beraita in a new manner:

Rava said: “At the beginning of the six years” means

—

at the beginning of the final peruta.

That is, certainly the servant’s statement is made after the master has given him a Canaanite maidservant and sons have been born to him from her. “

The beginning of the six years” refers to the entire period remaining for the servant to work for his master, provided that at least a period of work worth one peruta remains at a minimum.

And if he wishes to make this statement close to the completion of his service, when he is about to begin the work of the final peruta imposed upon him, he must say it “at the beginning of the final peruta,” that is, before this period begins, while at least a peruta’s worth of work still remains in his servitude, as it is stated: “the servant.”

For once the period of the final peruta has begun, when he is no longer subject to a full peruta’s worth of servitude, he is not then called “a servant” [although he must complete the work until the peruta is completed], and he cannot make this statement and be pierced.

And “at the end of the six years,” which the beraita states is a time when he is not pierced, means

at the end of the final peruta.

That is, after the servant has already entered the period in which less than a peruta’s worth of work remains, at the end of his six years of servitude. The Gemara cites another beraita containing laws concerning the law of piercing:

The Sages taught:

a. If the servant

has

a

wife,

a Canaanite maidservant whom his master gave him,

and

sons were born to him from her,

and

if

his master has no wife and children,

then the servant

is not pierced.

Because

it is stated

[Deuteronomy 15:16] concerning a pierced servant: “And it shall be, if he says to you [the master], ‘I will not go out from you,’

‘because he loves you and your household.’”

From here it follows that the master must have a “household,” meaning that he has a wife and children.

b. If

the master

of the servant

has a wife and children, and

if

he,

the servant,

has no wife,

because his master did not give him a Canaanite maidservant,

Or if his master gave him a Canaanite maidservant

and

no

children were born

to him from her, he

is not pierced.

Because

it is stated

concerning a pierced servant [Exodus 21]: “And if the servant shall plainly say:

‘I love my master, my wife

[the maidservant]

and my children.’”

If he has no wife and children, he cannot say this, and therefore he is not pierced. c. If

he

[the servant]

loves his master, but his master does not love him –

he

is not pierced.

because it is stated concerning the pierced slave [Deuteronomy, there]: “And it shall be, when he says to you, ‘I will not leave you,’

because it is good for him with you.”

And if his master does not love him, it is not good for his master to have him with him.

d. If

his master loves him, but he does not love his master,

he

is not pierced,

because

it is stated [Deuteronomy,

there]:

“Because he loves you.”

e. If

he

[the slave]

is ill, but his master is not

ill,

he

is not pierced.

Because

it is stated [Deuteronomy,

there]:

“Because it is good for him

[the slave]

with you.”

And if he is ill, it is not good for him.

f. If

his master is ill, but he is not ill—

he is not pierced,

because

it is stated [Deuteronomy,

there]: “Because it is good for him

with you,”

and this indicates that both of them must be equal with regard to that same welfare.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye raised

[asked]

the following question:

If the slave and his master

were both ill—

what is

the ruling? Is he pierced?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

One side:

“With you”—

we require this, and here it is present.

That is, the reason that if either the slave or his master was ill, he is not pierced, is that the slave and the master must be equal in the same condition. If one is ill and the other is healthy, they are not equal, and therefore he is not pierced.

Accordingly, when both are ill, the requirement expressed by “with you” is fulfilled, since both are in the same condition; therefore, the slave is pierced in that case.

The other side:

Or perhaps

[maybe] it is not sufficient that the slave and the master be in the same condition; rather,

“Because it is good for him with you”—we require this.

“Because it is good for him with you” must be fulfilled with regard to them; that is, it must be good for both of them, through both of them being healthy.

And

when both are ill,

this is not present;

this verse is not fulfilled with regard to them, and the slave is not pierced.

And we conclude:

The question remains unresolved.

This question shall remain in doubt.

And the Gemara cites another beraita, which derives from the verse “Because it is good for him with you” another law:

The Sages taught:

The verse

“Because it is good for him with you”

teaches that the slave must be equal

with you

[with the master]

with regard to food,

and equal

with you with regard to drink.

That is:

You must not eat fine bread while he eats coarse bread.

Likewise,

you must not drink aged wine,

which is superior,

while he drinks young wine.

Likewise,

you must not sleep on soft mattresses

while

he sleeps on straw,

which is hard.

From here the Sages said:

The Sages:

Whoever acquires a Hebrew slave

is

like one who acquires a master for himself,

for he must provide for him generously.

And the Gemara cites another beraita, which discusses the slave’s rights:

The Sages taught:

It is stated concerning a Hebrew slave who goes free at the Jubilee [Leviticus 25:41]:

“And he shall leave you, he and his sons with him.”

[This verse refers to sons born to him from his Israelite wife. But sons born to him from a Canaanite maidservant whom his master gave him remain under the authority of the master, as it is stated [Exodus 21]: “The woman [the maidservant] and her children shall belong to her master, and he shall go out alone.”]

And

Rabbi Shimon

said

about this:

Why does the verse state that his sons go free at the Jubilee?

But

if

indeed

he

himself

was sold,

but

his sons and daughters—

who

[are they—were they also]

sold

through his sale?! Certainly not! And if so, from where do they go free?

Rather,

from here

we learn

that his master

the slave’s

is obligated to provide sustenance for

his wife

and sons.

And when the slave leaves the master’s authority, the master is released from providing them with sustenance, and it is as though they too then leave the master’s authority.

And

similarly

to this

you say

with regard to another verse:

It is stated concerning a Hebrew slave who goes free after six years from the time of his sale [Exodus 21:3]:

“If he is the husband of a wife

[an Israelite woman],

his wife shall leave with him.”

And

Rabbi Shimon

said

about this:

Why does the verse state that his wife leaves with him?

But

if

indeed

he was sold,

but

his wife—who

[was she—was she]

sold?!

Certainly not! And if so, from where does she go free?

Rather,

from here

we learn

that his master

the slave’s

is obligated to provide sustenance for his wife, and when the slave leaves the master’s authority, the master is released from providing her with sustenance, and it is as though she then leaves his authority.

And it is necessary,

for it is necessary to teach that the master is obligated to provide sustenance for the slave’s wife, and also to teach this with regard to his sons; one cannot derive one from the other, as follows:

For had it been taught,

if the verse had taught the obligation to provide sustenance only with regard to

his sons,

I would have thought that the reason for the obligation to provide sustenance is

because

they are minors, and

are not capable of working and eating,

meaning that they cannot work and earn money themselves for their sustenance.

But

with regard to

his wife, who is capable of eating and working,

meaning that she can work and obtain her sustenance herself,

I would say: Let her work and eat,

I would have said that she should work and obtain her sustenance from her wages, and that the master is not obligated to provide for her needs.

Therefore, the verse had to teach us that the master is obligated to provide sustenance for the slave’s wife.

And had it taught us,

if the verse had taught the obligation to provide sustenance only with regard to

his wife,

I would have thought that the reason for the obligation to provide sustenance is

that it is not the practice

of a woman

to go begging,

as it is not the practice of a woman to go from door to door because she is ashamed.

But his sons, who do go begging,

as it is their practice to go from door to door,

I would say not;

I would have thought that the verse does not obligate the master to sustain them.

Therefore,

it is necessary.

It is necessary to teach the obligation to provide sustenance both with regard to his sons and with regard to his wife.

The Gemara now returns to discuss the law of the pierced slave, which was mentioned in our Mishna:

The mitzva of piercing is mentioned twice in the Torah:

a. In the Book of Exodus, in the portion of Mishpatim, it is stated: “And his master shall bring him to the door or to the doorpost, and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl” [21:6].

b. In the Book of Deuteronomy: “And you shall take the awl and place it through his ear and into the door” [15:17].

And although it is stated in the Book of Exodus [there], “And he shall bring him to the door or to the doorpost,” nevertheless, the slave is not pierced at the doorpost, but only at the door, as explained in the Book of Deuteronomy [there].

The reason that the doorpost is mentioned in the Book of Exodus will be explained from the words of the following beraita.

The beraita before us derives from these two verses how the piercing is performed:

The Sages taught: