Kiddushin 19b (יט:) — the Talmud in English

And if and when ]

and when]

he leaves in her an amount worth a peruta, the betrothal is valid.

If so,

here too it is no different,

the case of one who betroths a woman with a loan that she owes him, when he has collateral in his possession, is no different from the master who betroths his Hebrew maidservant; and she is betrothed. Approach A: The case here is one in which he betroths the woman with the collateral itself. The woman is betrothed because the collateral is acquired by the lender [that is, by the man who betroths her], as explained above in the Gemara on 8b in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak. It follows that the woman received from the man betrothing her new property that was not previously hers. [But it is impossible to betroth her through mere remission of the loan, even when it is secured by collateral.] Accordingly, the case certainly involves the man returning the collateral to her at the time of the betrothal, since the betrothal was effected through the collateral itself. Two explanations were given as to why Rav Naḥman had to derive this from the law of designation. Did Rabbi Yitzḥak not prove above [8b] from the verse that collateral is acquired by the lender? (a) It could have been said that Rabbi Yitzḥak spoke specifically of collateral seized not at the time of the loan [but rather seized by the court at the time of repayment, in order to collect the debt from it]. Collateral seized by the lender at the time of the loan, however, is not acquired by the lender. [See Tosafot above, 8b, and elsewhere.] Therefore Rav Naḥman had to prove from the law of designation that even collateral seized at the time of the loan is acquired by the lender—just as the body of the Hebrew maidservant was taken at the time of the sale, corresponding to the time of the loan. And she is betrothed through it. [Ramban at the end of his remarks; and Rashba and Ritva in the name of some commentators.] (b) It could have been said that although the collateral is acquired by him, the woman is not betrothed because her intention is not to be betrothed with the collateral, but with the loan itself, which he remits to her. [Specifically, if he betroths her with another person’s collateral, she is betrothed, as above on 8b, since there is no remission of a loan there.] Rav Naḥman therefore derived from the law of designation that the maidservant is betrothed through the giving of her body, which is comparable to collateral; we do not say that her intention is to be betrothed through the actual debt that she owes him. [Ramban in his first explanation; and this is also the conclusion of the Ritva.] Approach B: The case here is one in which he betroths the woman through remission of the debt, and not through the collateral itself, and nevertheless the woman is betrothed. It cannot be derived from Rabbi Yitzḥak’s statement above [8b] that she is betrothed except when he betroths her with the body of the collateral. Rav Naḥman adds a novel ruling: even if he betroths her with a “loan” that is secured by collateral, she is betrothed. Two explanations were given for this ruling: (a) When he betroths her with a loan, she is not betrothed because she has already spent the loan money, and there is nothing existing [of the loan] from which she can benefit. With a loan secured by collateral, however, the woman benefits from the collateral being returned to her. When he betroths her with the loan, it is therefore as though he betroths her with the collateral, since she derives benefit from remission of the loan amount—that is, she benefits from the collateral being returned [Rashba; and the Rashba derived this as well from the words of Maimonides]. The Rashba wrote that according to this explanation, he must return the collateral to her, and then she is betrothed. But if he does not return the collateral, no benefit has reached her, and she is not betrothed. (b) When he betroths her with a loan, she is not betrothed because the loan is not present. But when the loan is secured by collateral, it is considered as though it is present. Thus, even if he has not yet returned the collateral to her, she is betrothed through the very remission of the loan. [Semag, positive commandments 48, in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Shemuel. Korban Netanel, section 26, subsection 7, wrote that this is also the view of the Rosh. The rationale may be explained along the lines of the Rashba’s words above: since, through the remission, the lender will have to return the collateral in his possession to her, there is benefit in the remission of the loan even before he returns the collateral, because she has the power to compel him to return it to her in court. Apparently, this may likewise explain the intention of the Rashba in the name of “our teachers, the masters of Tosafot”; see there.]

Our teachers, the masters of the Tosafot, offer a novel interpretation of our sugya: there is no difference between betrothing her with a loan secured by collateral and betrothing her with a loan without collateral. The case here is one in which he betroths the woman through the benefit she derives from remission of the loan, and not through the loan itself. [See the Gemara above, 8b.] Therefore she is betrothed. Rav Naḥman mentioned a loan secured by collateral in order to teach us a novelty: although he has not yet returned the collateral to her, we do not say that she does not rely on his remission and is not betrothed. [The later authorities disagree concerning the view of Tosafot: What did Rav Naḥman derive from the law of designation? The Mahרי"ט maintains that one who betroths a woman through the benefit of remission of a loan has betrothed her by logical inference [without a proof], and Rav Naḥman derived from the law of designation that the woman relies on her intention to be betrothed even if the collateral has not been returned to her. For the designation of the maidservant takes place while she remains in his possession, which is as though the collateral had not returned to her possession. The Penei Yehoshua maintains that Rav Naḥman knew by logical inference that the woman relies on her intention to be betrothed even without collateral. But it could have been said that a person does not betroth a woman through the benefit of remission of a loan, despite the fact that she relies on his intention. Rav Naḥman therefore had to derive from designation the fundamental principle that a person can betroth a woman through the benefit of remission of a loan.] [See also the Maharsha on Tosafot, and the Chavruta volume on Tosafot and our notes there.] The Gemara now cites a beraita in which the words of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and the words of the Sages who disagree with him are presented:

The Sages taught: How

is

the mitzva of designation

performed? The master

says to her,

the maidservant,

in the presence of two two witnesses ]:

two witnesses]:

“Behold, you are betrothed to me,”

or

“Behold, you are engaged to me.”

And even

on the final day of her six years of servitude,

immediately before sunset,

he may say this to her,

and

from that point onward the master

treats her according to the conduct appropriate to a wife

as his full-fledged wife,

and he does not treat her according to the conduct appropriate to a maidservant,

meaning, he is forbidden to make her work as a maidservant. According to the Sages, the initial money was given for the purpose of betrothal. The Gemara below implies that the betrothal took effect retroactively from the time of the sale, on the condition that he ultimately designate her. If so, this is difficult: Why are witnesses required at the time of designation? Designation is merely a condition, and it would seem that witnesses should be required at the time of the sale, which is the actual time of the betrothal, as in every case of one who betroths a woman on condition, where witnesses are required at the time of the betrothal and not at the time the condition is fulfilled! [Gilyonei HaShas, Chazon Ish, and others.] It may be said that at the time of the sale the master need not have the intention of designating her, and the Torah introduced the principle that his subsequent will—at the time of designation—can cause the money that the master gave at the time of the sale to be effective and transform it into betrothal money. It follows that at the time of the sale there is an act of betrothal without the intention of betrothal. At the time of designation, this is the moment when the master consents to the betrothal and transforms the sale into an intentional act of betrothal. Therefore witnesses are required at the time of designation. [Apparently this is the intention of Gilyonei HaShas and the Chazon Ish; see there. See also Penei Yehoshua and others.] Nevertheless, this still requires explanation: In any event, why are witnesses not required also at the time of the sale? It may be answered that this is included in the Torah’s novel ruling: Just as it introduced that intent for betrothal is not required at the time of the sale, so it introduced that witnesses are not required. [Based on the Chazon Ish. Indeed, the Chazon Ish himself is uncertain about this, as explained below. See also the later authorities.] [However, the Chazon Ish is uncertain whether witnesses are in fact required when the master pays the purchase money to the father. Yet from the words of the other later authorities it appears that witnesses are not required at that time.] Seemingly, the products of her labor from the time of designation onward should belong to her father, since according to halakha designation effects only betrothal and not marriage [see above, 18b–19a, and Maimonides, Laws of Slaves 4:19]. Since the maidservant has left the master’s possession, she is like an ordinary minor who has become engaged, whose products of labor belong to her father. Nevertheless, the Rashba wrote [based on the Jerusalem Talmud] that her products of labor still belong to the master, because the master is considered as having said to the woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that the products of your labor belong to me.” [This is unlike the words of the Chazon Ish; see there. See also Shitta Lo Noda LeMi above, 18b, s.v. “What practical difference is there?” and Minḥat Ḥinukh, mitzva 43.]

These are the words of the Sages.

But

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:

only

if there is enough time remaining in the day

for

the time

that the maidservant can

perform work with him worth a peruta,

then she

is betrothed.

But if not, she is not betrothed.

And the beraita adds and says: The law of designation serves as

a parable for

deriving from it the law of the one who

says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me from now, after thirty days,”

meaning, the betrothal takes effect now if I desire it after thirty days,

and another came and betrothed her within

those

thirty days,

and when the thirty days were completed the first man desired the betrothal; then we learn from the mitzva of designation, as a parable—

That

she

is betrothed to the first man,

and the betrothal of the second man has no effect [as will be explained shortly]. And immediately the Gemara asks:

A parable for whom?

The words of which of the tannaim cited above serve as the parable from which this law is derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that it means neither a condition nor a retraction. See below, 60a. Accordingly, it must be said that when the beraita teaches, “A parable for one who says to a woman, ‘You are betrothed to me from now and after thirty days,’” it is not referring to one who says to her precisely in this formulation. Rather, he explicitly says to her, “You are betrothed to me from now if I do not retract until after thirty days.” [Tosafot Rosh, Tosafot Tukh, and Rashba.] Or he says to her, “You are betrothed to me from now on condition that thirty days pass,” in which case his words certainly cannot be interpreted as a retraction. [Mahרי"ט. See Shitta Lo Noda LeMi.]

If you say,

if it is said that the

parable

is stated

according

to the view of

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,

there is a difficulty:

But

according specifically to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,

only if there is enough time remaining in the day to perform work with him worth a peruta is she betrothed; but if not, she is not.

It is evident from his words that, according to him, in designation the betrothal does not take effect retroactively through the initial money; rather, at the time of designation the betrothal takes effect through remission of the debt that she owes him. And this does not at all resemble the law presented in the “parable”!

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said: The

The

parable

was stated

according

to the words of

the Sages: However, some commentators explain that the question of the Gemara here is according to everyone. The Gemara understood that even according to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, who says that the initial money was given for betrothal, this does not mean that when the master designates the maidservant, the betrothal takes effect retroactively from the time of the sale. Rather, at the time of the sale the father is considered to have said to the master, “My daughter is betrothed to you from the time she is designated and thereafter.” The betrothal takes effect only at the time of designation. The Gemara derived this from Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement that there must be enough time remaining to perform work worth a peruta. For if, through designation, the daughter became betrothed retroactively, the following difficulty arises: Why must there be enough time to perform work worth a peruta? Surely the betrothal takes effect now only at the time of the sale, when more than a peruta was given! Rather, it must be that according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, the betrothal takes effect at the time of designation. This is like one who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days through the lien upon you.” Therefore, only if the lien upon her is worth a peruta is she betrothed. [Tosafot Rosh, Ritva, and Shitta Lo Noda LeMi. The Chazon Ish wrote above, on the preceding side, in explaining Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s words, that according to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak the betrothal takes effect from the time of designation onward. Therefore, if there is not enough time remaining in the day for a peruta, she is not betrothed. This is because it is like one who betroths a woman after thirty days and, within those thirty days, takes back the money before the betrothal takes effect; she is certainly not betrothed through it. The Mahרי"ט wrote similarly here; see the following note.] The Ramban, who wrote that the Gemara here is contrary to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, explains Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s words differently, as we explained above, on the preceding side, and in note 859 above. [See also below, note 879.] [The view of the Ritva requires examination. Seemingly, his words here contradict his words above, on the preceding side, where he explained Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s words in accordance with the Ramban.]

For according to the Sages, even if there is not enough time on that day for a peruta, the master can designate her, despite the fact that at that moment the master is not giving her a peruta.

It must therefore be that according to the Sages, the money that the master gave her father at the time of her purchase was given on the understanding that if the master later wished to designate her, the designation would take effect from now, through the giving of this money. It may be answered that if, according to the Sages, the betrothal took effect only at the time of designation, this would be like one who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me with this money after thirty days,” and within that period he returned and took the money from her before the betrothal took effect; she is certainly not betrothed. Similarly, if he betroths the maidservant with the money of her sale and she works for him in exchange for that money until no amount worth a peruta remains, it is as though the money returned to him, and she is not betrothed. [Mahרי"ט.] [The explanation is as follows: If one says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days with a document,” and within that period the document is burned, she is not betrothed. But if one betroths a woman with money “after thirty days” and within that period the money is consumed, she is betrothed. The reason is that she owes him other money in its place, and therefore it is as though the money is present. [Tosafot, Ketubot 82a, s.v. “This is the case when he says.”] Accordingly, in the case of the Hebrew maidservant, if he betroths her at the end of her period of servitude when there is not enough time to perform work worth a peruta, the maidservant does not owe him a peruta. It is therefore not as though the money is present; rather, this is like one who betroths a woman with a document and the document is burned, in which case she is not betrothed.] See Tosafot, s.v. “A parable for whom?”, in their second question on Rashi. See the Chavruta volume and notes 698–699 there.

And from here we learn: Just as in the kiddushei ye'ud—the betrothal takes effect retroactively—so too, when one betroths a woman “from now and after thirty days,” if he wishes to proceed with the betrothal after thirty days, the betrothal takes effect retroactively; but if another betroths her during those thirty days, she is not betrothed.

And we challenge this:

Obviously!

It is self-evident that this should be derived from the statement of the Sages! Why, then, did the tanna need to teach us something so obvious?

And we answer:

Lest you say

that, had the beraita not stated this explicitly, you might have said:

Here,

when the master purchased the maidservant,

he did not say to him

to the father, “Your daughter shall be designated for me

‘from now.’”

And if so, one could have derived from here that even one who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,” but does not say “from now,” the betrothal takes effect retroactively; and if another betrothed her during those thirty days, she would be betrothed to the first man.

Therefore,

it teaches us this:

the tanna teaches us that one who purchases a maidservant is as though he said to her father, who sells her to him: “Your daughter shall be designated for me from now, if I wish to designate her later.”

Similarly, it is specifically when one says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me from now and after thirty days,” that even if another man comes and betroths her, she is betrothed to the first man.

But if he did not say “from now,” the betrothal does not take effect retroactively, and she is betrothed to the second man.

Another beraita was taught:

We learned another beraita, which presents a practical difference between the dispute of the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, with regard to another matter:

If one who sells his daughter

as a maidservant

went

the father

and betrothed her

to another man

before the master had an opportunity to designate her, then the father

has thwarted the master, and she is betrothed to the second man,

and the master cannot designate her—

the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda,

who maintains that the initial money was not given for the purpose of betrothal.

According to him, when the master designates her, she becomes betrothed to him only from that moment onward. Since the father had already betrothed her to another man, the master has no power to betroth her to himself.

And the Rabbis

disagree and

say: If

the master

wishes to designate her—

he designates her.

For the initial money was given for betrothal. Thus, when the master designates her, she is betrothed to him retroactively, from the time he purchased her as a maidservant, before the father betrothed her to another man.

And the beraita adds: The ruling we learned above serves as a

parable

from which to derive another ruling:

One who

says to a woman: “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,”

and does not say “from now,”

and another man comes and betroths her within the thirty days,

and when the thirty days end the first man wishes to proceed with his betrothal, then—

one can learn from the ruling cited at the beginning of the beraita

that she is betrothed to the second man, [

as will be explained shortly].

And immediately the Gemara asks:

A parable for whom?

The statement of which of the tanna’im cited above serves as the parable from which the stated ruling is derived?

If you say

that the parable was stated

according

to the words of

the Rabbis,

then this is difficult:

Did the Rabbis say

that when a father sells his daughter as a maidservant and afterward her father betroths her to another man,

if he wishes

the master

to designate her—

he designates her?

That is, the maidservant is betrothed to the master, who is the first betrother, whereas from the “parable” we learn that she is betrothed to the second man!

Rather, Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said:

The

parable

was stated

according

to the words of

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda—

For according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, when the father sells his daughter, he knows that the master has the option of designating her later by virtue of that sale. Nevertheless, if the father betroths her to another man before the designation, she is betrothed to that man, since the father did not explicitly say that he was designating her for the master “from now.”

And from here we learn that even when one says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,” she does not become betrothed retroactively from the initial moment. Therefore, if another man betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second man.

And we challenge this:

Obviously!

It is self-evident that this ruling should be derived from Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement! Why did the tanna need to teach us something so obvious?

And we answer:

Lest you say

that, had the beraita not stated this, one could not derive the above ruling from Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement, because

here,

when the master purchased the maidservant,

he did not say to her

that he was giving the money for her purchase on the condition that she be designated for him

after thirty days,

and he did not mention the matter of designation at all. Therefore, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said that the designation does not take effect retroactively, and if another man betroths her, she is betrothed to the second man.

But when one says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,” even though he does not say to her “from now,” one might nevertheless have said that if the first man wishes to proceed with the betrothal at the end of the thirty days, she is betrothed to him retroactively from the time the betrothal was performed, and the second man’s betrothal is nullified. Therefore,

it teaches us this:

the tanna teaches us that one who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,” is analogous to one who designates a maidservant. Since the Torah granted the master the option of designating the maidservant by means of this money, it follows that from the outset, when he gave the money to her father, he intended that if he wished, he could designate the maidservant with that money in place of the labor she is obligated to perform in exchange for it. This is therefore like one who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days.”

And just as if another man betroths the maidservant before the master designates her, she is betrothed to the second man, so too, when one says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another man betroths her, she is betrothed to the second man.

The Gemara cites another beraita that discusses designation:

Another beraita was taught

in another beraita:

If one who sells his daughter stipulates

with the master to whom he sells her

on the condition that he not

be able

to designate her,

then

the condition is fulfilled

and the master cannot designate her—

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

Although the father stipulated with the master that he may not designate her, nevertheless,

if

the master

wishes to designate her, he may designate her, because he stipulated against that which is written in the Torah,

as he intentionally stipulated to alter the law of designation written in the Torah,

and “anyone who stipulates against that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.”

And we challenge the statement of the beraita: How can it be said that according to Rabbi Meir his condition stands?

But

does

according

to

Rabbi Meir

one who stipulates against that which is written in the Torah—

have his condition stand?!

But was it not taught

in a beraita as follows: One who marries a woman becomes obligated in “her sustenance, her clothing, and her conjugal rights.” “Her sustenance”—these are the provisions that he is obligated to provide for her. “Her clothing”—this means her garments. “Her conjugal rights”—to have relations with her in the customary manner.

And we learned in a beraita:

One who says to a woman, “You are betrothed to me on the condition that you have no

right to demand from me

sustenance, clothing, or conjugal rights,” she is betrothed,

but

his condition is void.

He is obligated to provide sustenance, clothing, and conjugal rights, because one may not stipulate against that which is written in the Torah. And anyone who stipulates against that which is written in the Torah—the condition is void, but the act remains valid—

the betrothal is the act, and therefore it remains valid; while the condition he stipulated is void, and therefore he remains obligated in her sustenance, clothing, and conjugal rights.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

But

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Although he stipulated against that which is written in the Torah, nevertheless, his condition is not entirely void, because

with regard to a monetary matter,

namely, sustenance and clothing,

his condition stands,

because monetary rights can be waived, and the woman has the power to waive the monetary rights that the Torah granted her.

But with regard to the obligation of conjugal rights, the woman cannot waive it, because it involves bodily distress, and one who waives his own bodily distress has not validly waived it, and the other person is not permitted to cause him distress.

This concludes the words of the beraita.

And we learned from the words of the beraita that, according to Rabbi Meir, one who stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void [even when the stipulation concerns a monetary matter]. If so, it is difficult: How can Rabbi Meir say that, when one who sells his daughter stipulates that the master will not be able to designate her for himself, his stipulation is valid?

Hezekiah said:

The answer is: Indeed, throughout the Torah, one who stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void, but

here it is different,

as the law of designation is different according to Rabbi Meir.

This is because

the verse says

[Exodus 21]: “When a man sells his daughter

as a maidservant.”

The word “as a maidservant” is superfluous,

and it was written in the Torah to teach that

sometimes

the father

sells her only for

the purpose that she be

a maidservant alone,

and not for the purpose that the master be able to designate her as a wife.

That is, if the father stipulated this at the time of her sale, his words are valid.

And we challenge the Sages:

But the Sages,

who hold that the father cannot stipulate with the master that he not designate her,

this phrase “as a maidservant”—

what do they do with it?

What do they expound from the word “as a maidservant”?

And we answer:

This phrase is needed for that which was taught in a beraita.

In their view, the word “as a maidservant” is needed to teach the exposition stated in the beraita:

The verse,

“as a maidservant” teaches that

the father

may sell her to disqualified men,

to a mamzer or a netin, who are not permitted to designate her, and she is sold to them only for the purpose that she be a maidservant, and not for the purpose of designation.

For had the Torah not stated “as a maidservant,” I would have said that a person may sell his daughter as a maidservant only if it is possible to fulfill all the laws stated concerning a Hebrew maidservant, including the law of designation. Therefore, the verse had to state “as a maidservant.”

And the beraita challenges this exposition: Why did the verse need to state “as a maidservant”?

But

even had it not stated “as a maidservant,”

it follows logically:

One can derive by means of a kal va-homer that the father may sell his daughter to disqualified men:

The Torah granted the father the right to sell his daughter as a maidservant, as well as the right to betroth her.

The primary purpose of betrothal is intercourse, whereas the primary purpose of a sale is her labor, and not intercourse. It is only that the master has the ability to designate her for intercourse.

Now, with regard to betrothal, when a father betroths his daughter to a mamzer or a netin, although she is forbidden to them, the betrothal nevertheless takes effect. One can derive from this a kal va-homer with regard to a sale:

For

if

we learned that the father

may betroth her to disqualified men,

that is, when the father betroths his daughter to disqualified men, such as a mamzer or a netin, who are forbidden to her by a prohibition of the Torah, but whose transgression does not carry the punishment of karet, his betrothal takes effect, despite the fact that the primary purpose of betrothal is intercourse,

if so, is it possible to say that

he may not sell her to disqualified men

because she is forbidden to them through intercourse? After all, the primary purpose of the sale is not designation but the sale of her labor!

And since one can derive by a kal va-homer that the father may sell his daughter to disqualified men, there is a difficulty: Why did the verse need to state “as a maidservant” in order to teach us this? After all, it can be derived from the fact that the father has the ability to betroth her to disqualified men!

The beraita answers this:

What is the case with betrothing her to disqualified men

where a person may betroth his daughter

even

when she is a na'ara,

after she has manifested the signs of na'ara status.

If so, is it possible to learn from this that

he may sell her to disqualified men?

After all, the father’s authority is not greater with regard to a sale—

for

after all,

a person may not sell his daughter when she is a na'ara!

If so, one cannot derive from the fact that the father may betroth her to disqualified men that he may also sell her to disqualified men.

Therefore,

the verse states,

the verse needed to state

“as a maidservant”—

teaching

through this that the verse

permits him to sell her to disqualified men.

These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Eliezer

disagrees and

says: If

we accept the words of the Sages, that the verse came

to teach that he may sell her to disqualified men,

then there is a difficulty:

It has already been stated

[Exodus 21] concerning a Hebrew maidservant:

“If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master

who did not designate her.” That is, because the maidservant is displeasing in the eyes of the master, he therefore does not designate her.

And one can interpret what is stated in the verse, “displeasing,” to mean

that she is displeasing in marriage,

because it is forbidden for him to have intercourse with her. Nevertheless, this concerns a maidservant who, despite the fact that it is forbidden for him to have intercourse with her, would still have a valid betrothal were he to betroth her, as it is stated later in the verse, “who did not designate her”—meaning that he had the ability to designate her, but did not designate her.

It is evident from here that the verse is not speaking of relatives who are forbidden to the maidservant by a prohibition carrying karet, and with whom betrothal does not take effect.

And since the verse is speaking about a maidservant who is forbidden to the master by a prohibition of the Torah, it follows that the father sells his daughter to disqualified men to whom she is forbidden by such a prohibition.

If so, there is a difficulty:

What does the verse teach,

for what purpose was it stated,

“as a maidservant”?

After all, we already know that the father sells his daughter to disqualified men, and that she is sold to them only for the purpose of being a maidservant!

Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer expounds “as a maidservant” in a different manner: