Kiddushin 19b — the Talmud in English

And when

and when]

he leaves over in her the value of a peruta, the kiddushin takes effect.

If so,

here too it is no different,

also when one betroths a woman with a loan that she owes him and he has collateral in his possession, it is no different from a master who betroths his maidservant, and she is betrothed.

The Gemara now brings a beraita, in which the words of Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Yehuda and the words of the Sages who disagree with him were brought:

The Sages taught: How

is it

the mitzva of designation?

The master

says to her

the maidservant

in the presence of two

two witnesses]:

“Behold, you are betrothed to me,”

or

“Behold, you are engaged to me.”

And even

on the last day of the six years of her servitude

close to sunset

he may say this to her,

and

from then onward the master

conducts toward her the conduct of a married woman

as a completely married woman,

and he does not conduct toward her the conduct of a maidservant,

that is, he is forbidden to make her work as a maidservant.

These are the words of the Sages.

But

Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Yehuda says:

specifically

if there is enough time during the day

for

the maidservant to perform with him the value of a peruta

the result is that she is

betrothed.

And if not, she is

not betrothed.

And if not, she is not betrothed.

And the beraita adds and says: The law of designation serves as

a parable for

learning from it the law of the

one who says to a woman, “Become betrothed to me from now and after thirty days,”

that is, the kiddushin will take effect now, if I desire it after thirty days,

and another came and betrothed her within

those

thirty days,

and when the thirty days were completed the first man desired the kiddushin, then we learn from the mitzva of designation, as a parable —

that

she is

betrothed to the first man,

and the kiddushin of the second man is nothing [as will be explained shortly]. And immediately the Gemara asks:

A parable for whom?

The words of which of the tannaim brought earlier serve as a parable from which this law is to be learned?

If you say,

if it is said that the

parable

was stated

according

to the words of

Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Yehuda,

there is a difficulty:

But

according to Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Yehuda specifically

if there is enough time during the day to perform with him the value of a peruta, she is betrothed, and if not, she is not.

And it is proven from his words that according to him, in designation, the kiddushin does not take effect retroactively through the giving of the original money; rather, at the time of the designation the kiddushin takes effect through remission of the debt that she owes him. And this is not at all comparable to the law brought in the “parable”!

Rav Aha son of Rava said:

The

parable

was stated

according

to the words of

the Sages:

For according to the Sages, even if there is not enough time on that day for the value of a peruta, the master can designate her, although at that time the master is not giving her the value of a peruta.

Necessarily, according to the Sages, the money that the master gave at the time of purchasing her from her father was given to the father on the understanding that if afterward the master wished to designate her, the designation would take effect from now, through the giving of this money.

And from here we learn: just as in the kiddushei ye'ud the betrothal takes effect retroactively, so too when one betroths a woman “from now and after thirty days”—if he wants the betrothal after thirty days, then the betrothal takes effect retroactively; but if another betrothed her within those thirty days, she is not betrothed.

And we raise a difficulty:

It is obvious!

It is self-evident that this matter should be learned from the words of the Sages! And why was it necessary for the tanna to teach us something so very obvious?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind,

perhaps you would have said, were it not for the words of the beraita:

Here,

for at the time of purchasing the maidservant, the master

did not say to him

to the father, “Your daughter shall be designated to me

‘from now.’”

And if so, I could have learned from here that even one who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” and did not say “from now,” the betrothal takes effect retroactively; and if another betrothed her during those thirty days, she is betrothed to the first.

Therefore,

ka mashma lan,

the tanna teaches us that one who purchases a maidservant is as though he says to her father, who sells her to him, “Let your daughter be designated to me from now, if I desire her afterward.”

It appears that we should say that it would have entered our mind to say that even one who betroths a woman after thirty days, without saying “from now,” if another betrothed her within that period, she is betrothed to the first, because the act of betrothal of the first took place before the betrothal of the second. Therefore, it has the power to effect betrothal after thirty days, whereas the second does not have the power to betroth her within that period and uproot the betrothal of the first, which is to take effect after thirty days. [In other words: the actual betrothal does not take effect before thirty days, and if a man has relations with her within that period, he is not liable to death because of the “prohibition of a married woman.” But an act of betrothal has already taken effect upon the woman with regard to after thirty days, and it is impossible to uproot it]. [And in its straightforward sense, it is possible to explain the Gemara as follows: it would have entered our mind to say that one who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” even though he did not say “from now,” intends this, as though he had said so. And ka mashma lan that he must say explicitly “from now.” However, according to the statements of the earlier authorities mentioned above in note 875, the beraita does not bring the exact wording of the one who betroths, and according to this it is difficult to explain it in this manner]. And similarly, specifically when one says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me from now and after thirty days,” then even if another comes and betroths her, she is betrothed to the first.

But if he did not say “from now,” the betrothal does not take effect retroactively, and she is betrothed to the second.

Tanya idach,

we learned another beraita, in which a practical difference arising from the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda is brought regarding an additional matter:

One who sells his daughter

as a maidservant,

and the

father

went and betrothed her

to another

before the master had managed to designate her, then the father

has made sport of the master, and she is betrothed to the second,

and the master cannot designate her—

the words of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that the initial money was not given for betrothal.

And according to his view, when the master designates her, she becomes betrothed to him only from that moment; and since the father had already betrothed her beforehand to another man, the master has no power to betroth her to himself.

And the Sages

disagree and

say: If

the master

desired to designate her—

he designates her.

For the initial money was given for betrothal. And when the master designates her, she is betrothed to him retroactively, from the time of her purchase as a maidservant, before the father betrothed her to another.

And the beraita adds and says: the law that we learned above serves as a

parable

from which to learn another law:

One who

says to a woman: “Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days,”

and did not say “from now,”

and another came and betrothed her within thirty days,

and when the thirty days ended the first desired his betrothal, then—

we should learn from the law brought at the beginning of the beraita

that she is betrothed to the second, [as will be explained shortly].

[as will be explained shortly].

And immediately the Gemara asks:

A parable for whom?—

the words of which of the tannaim brought above serve as the parable from which the aforementioned law is to be learned?

If you say,

if it is said that the parable was stated

according

to the words of

the Rabbis,

if so, it is difficult:

For the Rabbis said,

behold, the Rabbis said that when a father sells his daughter as a maidservant, and afterward her father betroths her to another man,

if he desired

the master

to designate her—

he designates her.

That is, the maidservant is betrothed to the master, who is the first betrothed, whereas in the “parable” we learned from here that she is betrothed to the second!

Rather, Rav Aḥa son of Rava said:

the

parable

was stated

according

to the words of

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda—

For according to Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda, when the father sells his daughter, he knows that the master has the ability to designate her later by means of that sale. Nevertheless, if the father betrothed her to another man before the designation, she is betrothed to that man, since the father did not explicitly say that he was designating her to the master “from now.”

And from here we learn that even one who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” the woman does not become betrothed retroactively from the first moment. Therefore, if another betrothed her within thirty days, she is betrothed to the second.

And we raise a difficulty:

It is obvious!

It is self-evident that this law should be learned from the words of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda! And why was it necessary for the tanna to teach us something so very obvious?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind

that perhaps you would have said, were it not for the words of the beraita, that the aforementioned law cannot be learned from the words of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda, for

here,

at the time the master purchased the maidservant, he

did not say to her

that he was giving the money for her purchase on the condition that she be designated to him

after thirty days,

and he did not mention the matter of designation at all; therefore Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda said that the designation does not take effect retroactively, and if another betrothed her, she is betrothed to the second.

But when one says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” even though he did not say to her “from now,” you would nevertheless have said that if the first desired it at the end of thirty days, she is betrothed to him retroactively from the time the betrothal was performed, and the betrothal of the second is annulled. Therefore,

ka mashma lan,

the tanna teaches us that one who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” is similar to one who designates a maidservant, because since Scripture gave the master the possibility of designating the maidservant by means of this money, therefore, from the outset, at the time he gave it to the father, he intended that if he desired, he would designate the maidservant with that money in place of the labor that she was obligated to perform in return for it; and this is like one who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days.”

And just as if another betrothed the maidservant before the master designated her, she is betrothed to the second, so too, when one says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another betrothed her, she is betrothed to the second.

The Gemara brings another beraita that discusses the matter of designation:

Tanya idach

in another beraita:

One who sells his daughter and stipulated

with the master, to whom he sells her,

on the condition that he not

be able

to designate her,

then

the condition is fulfilled

and the master cannot designate her—

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

although the father stipulated with the master not to designate her, nevertheless

if he desired

the master

to designate her, he designates her, because he stipulated contrary to what is written in the Torah,

for he voluntarily stipulated to alter the law of designation written in the Torah,

“And anyone who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah—his condition is void.”

And we raise a difficulty concerning the words of the beraita: How is it possible to say that according to Rabbi Meir his condition stands?

And

is it

according

to the view of

Rabbi Meir

that one who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah,

his condition stands?!—

But it was taught

and this is what we learned in a beraita: one who marries a woman undertakes “her sustenance, her clothing, and her marital relations.” “Her sustenance”—these are provisions, which he is obligated to provide for her sustenance. “Her clothing”—this means her garments. “Her marital relations”—to have relations with her in the manner of the entire world.

And we learned in a beraita:

one who says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me on the condition that you have no claim against me

that you have no right to demand from me

sustenance, clothing, and marital relations,” she is betrothed,

but

his condition is void.

And he is obligated in sustenance, clothing, and marital relations, because a person cannot stipulate contrary to what is written in the Torah. And anyone who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah—the condition is void and the act stands—

the betrothal is the act, and therefore it stands, while the condition that he stipulated is void, and therefore he is obligated in her sustenance, her clothing, and her marital relations.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

But

Rabbi Yehuda says:

even though he stipulated contrary to what is written in the Torah, nevertheless his condition is not entirely void, because

in a monetary matter,

that is, in provisions and clothing,

his condition stands,

because money can be relinquished, and the woman has the power to relinquish to the husband the monetary rights that the Torah granted her.

But regarding the obligation of “marital relations,” the woman does not have the power to relinquish it, because it involves bodily distress, and one who relinquishes his bodily distress, his relinquishment is not a valid relinquishment, and his fellow is not permitted to cause him distress.

This concludes the words of the beraita.

And we learned from the words of the beraita that, according to Rabbi Meir, one who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void [even if the stipulation concerns a monetary matter]. If so, it is difficult: how can it be that Rabbi Meir says that one who sells his daughter on condition that the master will not be able to designate her for himself, his stipulation stands?

Hezekiah said:

A resolution: Indeed, throughout the entire Torah, one who stipulates contrary to what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void, but

here is different,

for, according to Rabbi Meir, the law of designation is different.

Because

the verse says

[Exodus 21]: “When a man sells his daughter

as a maidservant.”

The word “as a maidservant” is superfluous,

and it was written in the Torah in order to teach that

at times

the father

sells her only for

the purpose that she should be

only a maidservant,

and not for the purpose that the master should be able to designate her as a wife.

That is, if the father stipulated this at the time of her sale, his words stand.

And we raise an objection against the Sages:

And the Rabbis,

who hold that the father cannot stipulate with the master that he not designate her,

this “as a maidservant”

what do they do with it?

What do they expound from the word “as a maidservant”?

And we resolve:

This is needed by them for that which was taught in a beraita,

in their view, the word “as a maidservant” is needed in order to teach the exposition taught in the beraita:

The verse

“as a maidservant” teaches that

the father

may sell her to disqualified men,

to a mamzer and a natin, who are not permitted to designate her, and she is sold to them only for the purpose that she should be a maidservant, and not for the purpose of designation.

For had the verse not said “as a maidservant,” I would have said that a person cannot sell his daughter as a maidservant unless it is possible to fulfill in her all the laws stated concerning a Hebrew maidservant, including the law of designation; therefore, the verse had to say “as a maidservant.”

And the beraita raises an objection to this exposition: Why did the verse need to say “as a maidservant”?

But

even had it not said “as a maidservant,”

it is a matter of logic;

it can be learned by a kal va-chomer that the father can sell his daughter to disqualified men:

The Torah granted the father the right to sell his daughter as a maidservant, and likewise the right to betroth her.

The principal purpose of betrothal is for intercourse, whereas the principal purpose of a sale is for her handiwork and not for intercourse. It is only that the master has the power to designate her for intercourse.

Now, concerning betrothal: when a father betroths his daughter to a mamzer or a natin, despite the fact that she is forbidden to them, nevertheless the betrothal takes effect. From here a kal va-chomer can be learned regarding a sale:

For

if

we have learned that the father

may betroth her to disqualified men,

that is, a father who betroths his daughter to disqualified men, such as a mamzer or a natin, who are forbidden to her by a prohibition of a negative commandment, and for whom there is no punishment of karet, then his betrothal is a betrothal, despite the fact that the principal purpose of betrothal is for intercourse.

If so, is it possible to say that he

may not sell her to disqualified men

because she is forbidden to them through intercourse?! But the principal purpose of the sale is not for designation, but for the sale of her handiwork!

And since it can be learned by a kal va-chomer that the father can sell his daughter to disqualified men, this is difficult: Why did the verse need to say “as a maidservant” in order to teach us this? Surely it can be learned from the fact that the father has the power to betroth her to disqualified men!

The beraita answers this:

What is so regarding betrothing her to disqualified men

that a person betroths his daughter

even

when she is a na'ara

after she has displayed the signs of a na'ara.

If so, is it possible to learn from here that he

may sell her to disqualified men?!

After all, the father’s power is not greater in a sale—

for

after all,

a person does not sell his daughter when she is a na'ara!

If so, it cannot be learned from the fact that the father betroths her to disqualified men that he can also sell her to disqualified men.

And therefore,

the verse says,

the verse needed to say

“as a maidservant”—

it teaches

through this the verse

that he may sell her to disqualified men.

These are the words of the Rabbis.

Rabbi Eliezer

disagrees and

says: If

it is stated according to the words of the Rabbis that the verse came

to teach that he may sell her to disqualified men,

then this is difficult:

It was already stated

[Exodus 21] concerning a Hebrew maidservant:

“If she is bad in the eyes of her master,

who has not designated her.” That is, because the maidservant is bad in the eyes of the master, he therefore did not designate her.

And what is stated in the verse, “bad,” must be interpreted as meaning

that she is bad in her marriage,

because it is forbidden for him to have intercourse with her. Nevertheless, this concerns a maidservant who, despite the fact that it is forbidden for him to have intercourse with her, nonetheless, if he betrothed her, the betrothal takes effect, for it is said later in the verse, “who has not designated her”—that is, it was in his power to designate her, but he did not designate her.

And it is demonstrated from here that the verse is not speaking of relatives who are forbidden to the maidservant by a prohibition of karet, and with whom betrothal does not take effect.

And since the verse is speaking of a maidservant who is forbidden to the master by a prohibition of a negative commandment, from here it follows that the father sells his daughter to disqualified men to whom she is forbidden by a prohibition of a negative commandment.

If so, this is difficult:

What does the verse teach,

for what purpose was it stated,

“as a maidservant”?

We already know that the father sells his daughter to disqualified men, and that she is sold to them only for the purpose of being a maidservant!

Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer expounds “as a maidservant” for a different exposition: