Kiddushin 19a (יט.) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

but

marriage from marriage,

what am I saying?

Is there indeed a distinction to be made between a marriage arranged by her father and a marriage into which she entered on her own?! After all, marriage removes the daughter entirely from her father’s authority, and there is no distinction between her sale and the other laws governing her; nor is it reasonable to distinguish between a marriage arranged by her father and one into which she entered on her own!

And since we learned that the father may sell her into slavery after she has become widowed, and Rav Amram explained that this refers to after yi'ud, if so, it is proven that yi'ud effects only betrothal. For if we say that yi'ud effects marriage, how could the father sell her? She has already left his authority entirely through the marriage!

And it is therefore proven from here that yi'ud effects betrothal only, and not marriage!

Until this point, the Gemara relied on Rav Amram’s explanation, who explained the beraita as referring to betrothal through yi'ud, and in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, who said: “The initial money was not given for betrothal.”

Thus, it was not the father who betrothed his daughter; rather, the master betroths her directly, by waiving the obligation of her labor.

And Rav Amram’s statement is based on the assumption that, according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, “the initial money was not given for betrothal.”

However, below, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak disputes this assumption and maintains that even Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda agrees that the initial money was given for betrothal [and the reason for this will be explained below].

And therefore the Gemara asks:

And according to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, who says that even according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, the initial money was given for betrothal,

if so, the yi'ud is effected by the father, and the father may not sell his daughter into slavery after he sold her for marriage. It follows that the father cannot sell his daughter into slavery after she became widowed from the yi'ud.

And if so, this is difficult:

How does he establish it?

In what manner will Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak interpret the statement of the beraita that the father may sell his daughter when she is a widow? After all, a person may not sell his daughter into slavery after having sold her for marriage! And we answer: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak

establishes it

—he interprets the statement of the beraita—

in accordance with

the view of

Rabbi Eliezer

[at the beginning of 18b],

who says

only

that he may not sell her into slavery after slavery.

The father is not permitted to sell his daughter into slavery after slavery, but

into slavery after marriage, he may sell her.

The father is permitted to sell her into slavery after having sold her for marriage.

Accordingly, the statement of the beraita must be established as referring to a father who betrothed his daughter—even through ordinary betrothal—and not to yi'ud.

And the Gemara brings another uncertainty concerning yi'ud:

The Torah states concerning yi'ud [Exodus 21]: “And if he designates her for his son.” From here it is derived that the master may designate the Hebrew maidservant for his son.

When the master designates the maidservant for himself, he certainly does so when he is an adult and not when he is a minor, since a minor’s act has no legal effect.

However, when the master designates the maidservant for his son, in this regard

Reish Lakish inquired

[he asked]:

What is the law concerning a man designating a woman for his minor son?

Can the master designate his maidservant for his son when the son is a minor? Since the yi'ud is effected through the awareness of the master, who is an adult, it is possible that the fact that his son is a minor is irrelevant.

The sides of the uncertainty are:

On the one hand, “If he designates her for

his son

,”

the Merciful One said,

and He did not say “for his adult son.” This implies that he may designate her for

any son whatsoever,

and even if he is a minor, he may designate the Hebrew maidservant whom he acquired for him.

Or perhaps

the verse should be interpreted in the opposite manner: “

His son”—

analogous to himself.

The designation for the son must be comparable to the designation for the master himself.

Just as

the master himself,

he

is an adult,

so too

the designation for his son refers to

his son

who is

an adult!

Rabbi Zeira said: Come and hear

a proof to resolve this uncertainty from a beraita:

It is stated concerning the prohibition against a married woman [Leviticus 20]: “And a man who commits adultery with a married woman, who commits adultery with his fellow’s wife—the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death.”

And a beraita taught concerning this verse:

a. “

A man”—

this teaches that only an adult man who commits adultery with a married woman is liable for the death penalty,

excluding a minor. “

Who commits adultery with a married woman”—

there is liability for the death penalty only for adultery with a woman who belongs to “a man,” meaning an adult,

excluding the wife of a minor.

This concludes the statement of the beraita. Rabbi Zeira understood that the verse’s exclusion, “excluding the wife of a minor,” which teaches that one who has intercourse with the wife of a minor is exempt from the death penalty, is because a minor’s act has no legal effect. Thus, when a minor betroths a woman, he has accomplished nothing, and she is not a married woman at all.

Therefore, Rabbi Zeira proves from here that a person may not designate a woman for his minor son, since—

If you say that a person may designate

a woman for his minor son,

then we find marital status

[of a married woman]

for a minor,

for example, when his father designated the maidservant for him. Why, then, did the verse exempt one who has intercourse with the wife of a minor from the death penalty on the grounds that a minor has no marital status?

The Gemara rejects Rabbi Zeira’s proof:

On the contrary! Your words invite a question:

But rather, what

are you, Rabbi Zeira, saying—that he

does not designate

a woman for his minor son?

If so, this is difficult:

Why does the verse exclude him?

Why did the verse have to exclude one who has intercourse with the wife of a minor? After all, there is no such thing as “the wife of a minor” at all!

On the basis of this question, the Gemara proves from the words of the beraita that a person may designate a woman for his minor son:

Resolve it from this,

one can prove from the words of the beraita

that he designates

a woman for his minor son. Therefore, the verse had to exclude one who has intercourse with the wife of a minor from the death penalty, for if you say that he may not designate her, there is no such thing as the wife of a minor at all!

And we reject this:

Rav Ashi said: Here,

the verse that excludes one who has intercourse with the wife of a minor is not speaking of a person who designated a woman for his minor son. Rather—

We are dealing with a nine-year-old boy and one day who is a yavam and has intercourse with his yevama.

It is speaking of a woman whom a minor yavam took in levirate marriage. Since, by Torah law, she is bound to him for intercourse in order to perform levirate marriage, he acquires her through intercourse, and she is his wife by Torah law; if she dies, he inherits her as his wife.

However, he acquires her only if the yavam was nine years old and one day. Since the levirate marriage is effected through intercourse, a minor cannot perform levirate marriage until he reaches the age of nine years and one day, from which age onward his intercourse is defined as intercourse. But the intercourse of a minor below the age of nine years is not defined as intercourse, and therefore he does not acquire her.

Lest you say,

were it not for the statement of the verse, you might have said:

Since by Torah law she is fit for him

[for levirate marriage],

and

once he reaches the age of nine years and one day

his intercourse is intercourse,

therefore anyone

who has intercourse with her

after the minor yavam has performed levirate marriage with her

becomes liable

to death

for

the prohibition of

a married woman.

Therefore,

the verse teaches us

that although the yevama is bound to the intercourse and levirate marriage of the minor, and the minor yavam has intercourse with her, nevertheless, a stranger who has intercourse with this woman is exempt from the death penalty.

Accordingly, the Gemara’s proof that a person may designate a woman for his minor son is rejected.

And if so, the question arises:

What was concluded concerning it?

What is to be done with the uncertainty that we raised [whether a person may designate a woman for his minor son]?

Come and hear,

and hear a proof to resolve the uncertainty:

as Rabbi Aibu said that Rabbi Yannai said:

a.

There is no designation

by which a person designates a woman for his son

except for an adult.

b.

There is no designation except with the awareness of

the son.

And from Rabbi Yannai’s statement, “There is no designation except for an adult,” it can be learned that a person may not designate a woman for his minor son.

And we raise an objection:

Two?!

The two statements that Rabbi Yannai said are in fact one and the same matter. For since designation is only with the son’s knowledge, it is self-evident that designation applies only to an adult son, who has understanding, whereas the knowledge of a minor is not considered “his knowledge”! Why, then, did Rabbi Yannai need to state both points

? And we answer with two explanations:

a. Rabbi Yannai did not intend to teach us two separate laws, but only one law: that designation applies only to an adult, and

for what reason

did

Rabbi Yannai say this?

That is to say:

What

is the

reason

for

designation applying only to an adult? —

Because designation is only with knowledge

of the son, and a minor has no understanding.

b.

Alternatively, if you wish, say

another explanation:

What is the meaning of Rabbi Yannai’s statement, “Designation is only

with knowledge

?” —

It does not refer to the son’s knowledge, as we had thought above. Rather,

with her knowledge

means with the maidservant’s knowledge: The maidservant must know that the master is designating her for kiddushin. And the Gemara proves from a beraita that designation requires the woman’s knowledge:

For

Abaye, son of Rabbi Avahu, taught:

It is stated [Exodus 21]: “If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master,

who has not designated her” —

the verse teaches

that Scripture calls the kiddushin of the maidservant “designation,”

indicating that he must designate her,

to inform her that he is betrothing her as his wife.

He,

Abaye, son of Rabbi Avahu,

taught it to her,

reciting this beraita in this form,

and he explained it to her

on his own initiative:

This beraita speaks specifically about

kiddushin through designation.

But when a minor is betrothed through her father, the husband need not inform her at the time of the kiddushin that he is betrothing her.

But the question arises: Why should we not derive from kiddushin through designation a general rule for all kiddushin, namely, that there too the minor’s knowledge is required? And in order to answer this question, Abaye, son of Rabbi Avahu, continues and says:

And

the beraita was stated

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, who said

[below]:

The initial money —

was not given for kiddushin!

When the master gave the father the money paid for purchasing her, that money was not given in payment for the designation that the master might subsequently perform.

Rather, if the master wishes to betroth her after acquiring her, the Torah gives him the option of releasing her from the labor that she is still obligated to perform for him and designating her as his wife by waiving her labor obligation [provided that the value of that labor is at least a peruta].

Since, at the time the master gave the initial money to the father, she was not betrothed with that money, the father did not originally intend to betroth her with it. Therefore, if the master does not inform the maidservant herself that she is to accept his kiddushin, there is no kiddushin. ,

All this applies according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda. But the Rabbis disagree and hold that “the initial money was given for kiddushin.” Thus, when the father sells his daughter as a maidservant, he consents to receiving the money from the master also on account of the kiddushin, and this is like ordinary kiddushin performed with the father’s knowledge. Therefore, according to the Rabbis, there is no distinction between kiddushin through designation and ordinary kiddushin.

And since, in ordinary kiddushin performed with the father’s knowledge, we have never heard anywhere that her knowledge is required, it necessarily follows that according to the Rabbis her knowledge is not required in kiddushin through designation either.

But Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak disagrees with the statement of Abaye, son of Rabbi Avahu:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Even

if

you say

[say] that the initial money

was given for kiddushin,

according to the Rabbis, nevertheless, a distinction must be made between kiddushin through designation and ordinary kiddushin:

Here it is different,

for the law of designation differs from other kiddushin because Scripture changed the name of the maidservant’s kiddushin from that of other kiddushin —

as the Merciful One said

concerning the maidservant’s kiddushin:

“He shall designate her.”

Scripture changed its wording from that used for other kiddushin so that we would expound “he shall designate her” as related to the word meaning knowledge.

Therefore, the kiddushin of a maidservant differs from other kiddushin of a minor, and it must be performed with the maidservant’s knowledge. Abaye, son of Rabbi Avahu, assumed that according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda the initial money was not given for kiddushin.

And the Gemara discusses where he learned that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda indeed holds this way:

And we inquire:

What

did

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda

say, from which Abaye, son of Rabbi Avahu, learned that the initial money was not given for kiddushin?

And we answer:

As it was taught:

It is stated in the Torah [Exodus 21] concerning designation: “

He shall designate her, and he shall redeem her.”

Scripture juxtaposed

“he shall designate her” [designation] with “he shall redeem her” [the law of redeeming the maidservant], in order to teach that if the master comes to designate the maidservant on the final day, at the end of her six years of service,

there must be sufficient time during the day

for him to fulfill the law of

redemption

with a peruta.

And the beraita continues its explanation:

From here,

on the basis of this derivation,

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda said:

Only

if there is sufficient time during the day

for

the time needed

for the maidservant to be able

to perform with him

labor worth

a peruta,

then she is

betrothed

through the designation, when he says to her, “You are hereby betrothed to me,” and betroths her by waiving her labor obligation worth a peruta.

But if not,

that is, if no time remains on that day sufficient for labor worth a peruta,

she is not betrothed.

For we learned from “he shall designate her, and he shall redeem her” that the law of designation applies only where the law of redemption applies.

Apparently,

it is evident from here that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda

holds that the initial money

that the father received from the master

was not given for kiddushin.

Therefore, according to him, the master must give the maidservant a peruta at the time he designates her as his wife, by waiving her labor obligation valued at a peruta.

And one cannot say that the initial money was given for kiddushin.

For if this were so, there would be no need for sufficient time during the day to perform labor worth a peruta. Since the master says within the six years, “Designate yourself to me,” she would be designated retroactively, through the money that the master gave the father at the time he purchased her, because the father accepted that money on the condition that she be designated through it.

But Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak disagrees with Abaye, son of Rabbi Avahu, and holds that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda’s words do not prove that the initial money was not given for kiddushin:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Even if you say

[say] that the initial money

was given for kiddushin,

the words of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda can nevertheless be upheld: He holds that there must be sufficient time during the day to perform labor worth a peruta.

For the reason that there must be time on that very day to perform labor worth a peruta is not that he betroths her with that peruta, as we had assumed until now, but rather —

Here it is different,

for the law of designation is different because a decree of Scripture was stated concerning it:

“As the Merciful One said: ‘And he shall redeem her.’”

From this it follows that there must be sufficient time during the day for redemption.

And just as the master cannot designate the maidservant after the six years have ended, so too, earlier, he cannot designate her at a time when no labor obligation worth a peruta remains upon her. It is as though the six years had already ended and she had left his authority.

Rav Naḥman agrees with Abaye, son of Rabbi Avahu, that according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda the initial money was not given for kiddushin, and he derives two laws from this:

a.

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman: A person may say to his daughter

when she is

a minor: “Go and accept your kiddushin

yourself from any man whom you desire to marry.”

And this matter is learned

from

the words of

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda:

And is it

not

so that

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda said: “The initial money was not given for kiddushin”!

It follows that the father himself did not betroth his daughter to the master.

And

nevertheless

when

[when] the master

leaves her

in the maidservant

the value of a peruta

, as he waives her obligation to perform that labor for him,

the kiddushin is valid.

And what is the reason for this matter? Necessarily, it is because at the time the father knows that the master can designate her for himself at a later time; therefore, it is as though he agreed that the daughter should receive her own kiddushin.

And if so,

here too it is no different.

One who says to his minor daughter, “Go and receive your kiddushin,” is no different from one who sells his daughter as a maidservant, for he too agreed that the daughter should receive her own kiddushin; therefore, she is betrothed.

2.

And Rava said that Rav Naḥman said:

One who betroths a woman with a loan that she borrowed from him—that is, he waives that loan for her and betroths her with it—she is not betrothed.

Nevertheless,

one who betroths

the woman

with a loan that

she owes him

and she has collateral securing it,

she is

betrothed.

And this matter is learned

from

the words of

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda:

And is it

not

so that

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda said:

“The initial money was not given for kiddushin”!

It follows that the master did not betroth the woman with the money that he gave the father, but rather by waiving her obligation to perform the labor that she owes him—and

this,

that obligation under which she owes him her labor, is in general

a loan

, for there is no actual money here, but merely a debt: she owes him her labor or the money constituting the redemption of her labor.

And she herself

, the maidservant herself,

is collateral

for repayment of the debt, for she is held under his authority and he is entitled to compel her to work for him.