Kiddushin 18b — the Talmud in English

To say:

once he spread

the master

his garment over her

for the purpose of designating her as a wife, then, if afterward the master divorced her from him with a bill of divorce,

the father is no longer

permitted

to sell her; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Eliezer says: “When he betrays her” —

it is an expression of betrayal.

To say:

once

the father

betrayed her,

by selling her as a maidservant, then, if she was emancipated,

the father is no longer

the father

permitted to sell her.

It follows that, according to Rabbi Akiva, the father does not sell his daughter as a maidservant after designation [which is marital status].

And similarly, he does not sell her as a maidservant after betrothal.

But he sells her as a maidservant after maidservanthood.

Whereas according to Rabbi Eliezer, the father does not sell his daughter as a maidservant after maidservanthood.

But he sells her as a maidservant after marital status.

And according to this, it must be explained that the Rabbis, who said above that a person does not sell his daughter as a maidservant after marital status, expounded the verse “when he betrays her” as an expression of spreading a garment, as Rabbi Akiva says.

And Rabbi Shimon [who said that a person does not sell his daughter as a maidservant both after marital status and after maidservanthood] expounded the verse “when he betrays her” both as an expression of spreading a garment, like Rabbi Akiva, and as an expression of betrayal, like Rabbi Eliezer.

And therefore, as a matter of halakha, he disagrees with both of them and holds that a person does not sell his daughter as a maidservant either after maidservanthood or after marital status.

And the Gemara adds and explains the reasoning of all the tannaim mentioned:

And we inquire about it:

In what do they differ,

upon what does the disagreement in which the tannaim disagreed depend, regarding how to interpret “when he betrays her”?

And we answer: It is written in the Torah “when he betrays,” and we read the letter bet with a hiriq sound, as though it were written “when he clothes,” with the addition of the letter yod.

But had the tradition of reading the letter bet with a hiriq sound not been accepted, it would have been appropriate to read it with a kamatz sound, since “when he clothes” was not written with the addition of the letter yod.

And there is a difference between the meaning of “when he betrays” with a kamatz and the meaning of “when he clothes” with a hiriq:

“When he betrays” with a kamatz means an expression of “betrayal” [just as regarding the expression “hearing” it is said in Deuteronomy 29: “when he hears the words of this oath.” And “when he hears” is vocalized with a kamatz].

Whereas “when he clothes” with a hiriq means an expression of garment, just as it says in Genesis 39: “And she seized him by his garment.” And “by his garment” is vocalized with a hiriq.

And the tannaim disagreed when the meaning of the word as it is written in the Torah differs from the meaning of its reading: whether the written form is expounded according to its writing or according to its reading, as follows:

Rabbi Eliezer held: the written tradition is decisive.

The principal significance of the word [“mother”] is according to the tradition transmitted concerning how it is to be written.

And since “when he betrays” was written and not “when he clothes,” it is to be expounded as an expression of betrayal.

And therefore, a person does not sell his daughter as a maidservant after he betrayed her, by having already sold her as a maidservant the previous time.

And Rabbi Akiva held: the reading is decisive.

The principal significance of the word is according to how we read it,

and since we read “when he clothes,” it is to be expounded as an expression of spreading a garment.

And therefore, a person does not sell his daughter as a maidservant after marital status.

And the Rabbis in the beraita above also hold in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s view.

And Rabbi Shimon held: the reading and the written tradition are decisive.

The significance of the word is equal both according to its reading and according to the tradition of its writing, and the word “when he betrays” is to be expounded both as an expression of betrayal, according to its writing, and as an expression of spreading a garment, according to its reading.

And therefore, a person does not sell his daughter as a maidservant, neither after marital status nor after maidservanthood.

And the Gemara presents here a doubt that they raised in the beit-midrash concerning designation, since apparently it can be resolved from Rabbi Akiva’s words above:

He asked

[he asked]

Rabbah bar Avuha: “Designation,”

that is, when a master says to his Hebrew maidservant, “Behold, you are designated to me with the money with which I acquired you” — does it

effect marriage

and is her status the status of a married woman,

or betrothal

alone

does it effect?

And her status is the status of a betrothed woman. And

the practical difference

is that there is a difference between a betrothed woman and a married woman concerning three matters:

a.

To inherit her.

If a married woman dies, her husband inherits her, whereas if a betrothed woman dies, the betrothed man does not inherit her.

b.

And to become impure for her.

A koen is permitted to become impure for his married wife who died. But he is not permitted to become impure for his betrothed woman who died.

c.

And to annul her vows.

A married woman’s husband annuls her vows by himself. Whereas in the case of a betrothed woman, her husband annuls her vows only together with her father [when she is a maiden].

And one must be uncertain regarding designation,

what

does it effect? Marriage or betrothal?

And the Gemara comes to prove that designation effects betrothal alone:

Come

[come] and

hear

a proof to resolve the doubt, from what we learned in the beraita above:

“When he betrays her” —

once he spread

the master

his garment over her

for the purpose of designation, then, if she was divorced from him with a bill of divorce,

he is no longer permitted

the father

to sell her,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

And one may infer from Rabbi Akiva’s words:

Only

selling is what he does not sell her.

Specifically with regard to a sale, the father is not permitted to return and sell her.

But designation —

he designates her!

But with regard to betrothal, the father is permitted to betroth her to another man.

And

one may learn from here that the designation with which the master designated her effects only betrothal.

For

if you say

that designation

effects marriage,

it is impossible that the father could return and designate her, for

once she has married

his daughter —

her father no longer has authority over her.

And even after she was divorced from her husband, the father cannot return and betroth her to another man!

And if so, how can the father betroth his daughter after she was designated and divorced?

Rather, is it not so? Learn from it,

you must learn from here that designation

betrothal

alone

effects.

And therefore, even if she was designated and then divorced, the father is permitted to betroth her to another man!

And we reject this:

Rab Nahman bar Yitzhak said,

it is indeed possible that designation effects marriage. And Rabbi Akiva’s words must be explained differently:

Here,

when Rabbi Akiva said “once he spread his garment over her,” he is not speaking of designation, through which the master designates his maidservant as a wife. Rather,

it is referring to ordinary betrothal,

it is speaking of the betrothal of a minor who was not sold as a maidservant.

And this is what he is saying,

and this is what Rabbi Akiva intended to say:

once her father handed her over to one who became obligated in "

her food, her clothing, and her marital relations,"

that is, he betrothed her for the purpose of marriage, and through this her husband became obligated to provide her clothing—

he can no longer

the father

sell her.

And if so, one cannot prove from here that yi'ud creates betrothal, for Rabbi Akiva was not speaking at all about the yi'ud of the maidservant, but about kiddushin.

And now the Gemara attempts to prove from another baraita that yi'ud creates betrothal alone:

Come

[come]

and hear

a proof to resolve the question from what we learned in a baraita:

The father may not

the father

sell her

[his daughter]

to

one of the

relatives

whom she is forbidden to marry as a forbidden sexual relation. Since it is stated concerning a Hebrew maidservant [Exodus 21], "whom he did not designate for himself."

Therefore, the father can sell his daughter only to a master with whom everything stated in the passage of the Hebrew maidservant can be fulfilled. And since kiddushin does not take effect with relatives, the father cannot sell his daughter to relatives, since it is impossible to fulfill the mitzva of yi'ud with them.

These are the words of the tanna kamma.

In the name of

in the name of

Rabbi Eliezer they said:

The father

may sell her to relatives,

and it is not necessary that everything stated in the passage of the Hebrew maidservant be capable of being fulfilled with him. Rather, the verse merely said that if the master wishes to take his maidservant as a wife, he has the power to designate her.

And the baraita adds:

And they agree,

both Rabbi Eliezer and the tanna kamma agree with one another on this matter:

that he may sell her

his daughter, even if she is a

widow—

to a High Priest.

Even though he is forbidden to designate her, since he is commanded to marry a virgin woman, and not a widow.

And likewise they agree that the father may sell her even if she is a

divorcee and a ḥalutza—

to an ordinary priest.

And even though a High Priest is forbidden to marry a widow, and an ordinary priest is forbidden to marry a divorcee and a ḥalutza, nevertheless the father may sell her to them, since yi'ud is applicable with them, although he will perform it in transgression.

For if they transgress and betroth her as a wife, their kiddushin is kiddushin, even though she is forbidden to them, because kiddushin takes effect with those subject to prohibitions of the negative commandments.

Thus far are the words of the baraita.

And they asked in the beit-midrash about the words of the baraita:

The baraita said, "And they agree that he may sell a widow to a High Priest," and it is evident that it is speaking here of a minor girl who had already been betrothed once, whose husband died, and who became widowed from him.

And it is necessary to examine:

This widow—

what are the circumstances?!

Which widow is being discussed? That is, in what manner was she betrothed to her husband?

If you say that she betrothed herself,

if we say that it is speaking of a minor who betrothed herself without her father, and the man to whom she had become betrothed died, then this is difficult:

And to this minor,

"widow"

does Scripture call her

and is it possible to call her a "widow"?! After all, by Torah law, a minor's act has no legal effect, and it follows that she was not betrothed at all!

But rather,

perhaps you will resolve that it is speaking

of a case where her father betrothed her?

But this too can be challenged:

Since her father had already betrothed her once

who would sell her!?

Could he subsequently sell her as a maidservant?!

But

we learned above that

a person may not sell his daughter into servitude

to

another

after he has handed her over

for marriage!

And

and he resolved this

Rav Amram said in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak: Here,

the widow mentioned in the baraita is a widow who was betrothed to her husband

through the kiddushin of yi'ud,

for the father sold her as a maidservant, and the master designated her as a wife, and she became widowed from him.

And although the father may not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage, this applies only when the father himself sold her for marriage, in which case he is not permitted to sell her into servitude.

But here the father sold her into servitude and not for marriage, and the master was the one who later designated her for marriage. Therefore, if she became widowed from the master, the father has the power to sell her afterward into servitude, since he himself did not initially sell her for marriage, but only into servitude.

And through this the words of the baraita are resolved.

However, what we said—that if the father sold his daughter as a maidservant and she was designated, he is afterward permitted to sell her into servitude—is not agreed upon by everyone; rather, it depends upon the dispute between the tannaim below:

It is necessary to examine concerning "yi'ud": When the master designates the maidservant and says to her, "Behold, you are designated for me"—through what do the kiddushin take effect? After all, at that time he gives her nothing!

And this matter is clarified from the words of the following baraita [19b]:

The Sages taught: How is the mitzva of yi'ud performed? He says to her in the presence of two [witnesses]: "Behold, you are betrothed to me."

And he may say this to her even at the end of six [years of the maidservant's service], and even immediately before sunset [of the final day]. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: [Only] if there remains enough time in the day [the final day] for [the maidservant to be able] to perform with him [work] worth a peruta—she is betrothed. But if not—she is not betrothed.

That is, according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, the master betroths the maidservant by waiving her obligation of service, and that waiver is worth money. It is therefore as though he gave her a peruta.

Therefore, only if an obligation remains upon her to perform work worth a peruta is she betrothed through it. But if he comes to betroth her at the end of the final day, and there does not remain in her work a value of a peruta—she is not betrothed.

But the Sages hold that the master does not betroth the girl through waiving her obligation of service. Rather, when the master paid the father money at the time he acquired her as a maidservant, that money was initially given also for her kiddushin. And the master betroths her through the money of her acquisition, which also constitutes kiddushin money.

And now we return to the words of the preceding baraita: "And they agree that he may sell a widow to a High Priest." Rav Amram explained that it is speaking of a minor who was betrothed through the kiddushin of yi'ud, and that the father is permitted to sell her, after she became widowed from the master, as a maidservant, since it was not he who sold her for marriage, but the master.

Now, according to the Sages, who hold that at the time of the maidservant's acquisition, the master pays the father money also for her kiddushin, it follows that the father is the one who betrothed her, through receiving the money from the master. And if so, certainly he is not permitted to sell her into servitude after marriage. And this is contrary to the words of Rav Amram.

Therefore Rav Amram adds and says:

And

the preceding baraita was stated

according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: The initial money

[which the master paid the father at the time of the maidservant's acquisition],

was not given for kiddushin,

but only for the product of her labor.

According to him, it follows that the father did not sell her for marriage, but only into servitude. Rather, the master was the one who betrothed her afterward, by waiving her obligation of service; therefore, after she became widowed from the master, the father is permitted to sell her into servitude.

Thus far the Gemara has brought the words of the baraita and Rav Amram's explanation.

And

from these matters the Gemara proves that yi'ud creates betrothal and not marriage.

For

if you say that yi'ud

betrothal

creates marriage,

then this is difficult: Is it not that

since

through yi'ud she

has married, her father no longer has authority over her?

For when a minor marries, she leaves her father's domain entirely! And how is it possible for the father to sell his daughter as a maidservant after she was designated?

Rather, necessarily, yi'ud creates betrothal alone; therefore, after she is divorced, her father is permitted to sell her, since she did not leave his domain entirely.

And the Gemara rejects the proof that yi'ud creates betrothal—

But rather, what is it?

What do you prove from the words of the baraita, that yi'ud

creates betrothal?

After all, even according to your words, one must ask about the baraita:

But a person may not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage!

After all, here she has already become betrothed through yi'ud! And why can the father sell her as a maidservant after she became widowed?

Rather, what do you have to say,

what can you say to distinguish between them, in order to resolve this—

that her betrothal differs from her father's betrothal.

There is a difference between betrothal in which the daughter betroths herself, without the father, and betrothal in which the father betroths her.

For only concerning betrothal in which the father betrothed her did the Torah introduce the rule that "he may not sell her into servitude after marriage."

But concerning betrothal in which she became betrothed on her own initiative, the Torah did not introduce the rule that he may not sell her into servitude after marriage.

And if so, the proof you brought that yi'ud creates betrothal must be rejected:

For

even if you say

[say] that yi'ud

creates marriage,

there is no difficulty as to how her father can sell her again, for "since she has married, her father no longer has authority over her."

For it can be resolved by means of a distinction similar to the one you make,

that her marriage differs from her father's marriage!

There is a difference between marriage into which the daughter enters on her own, without the father, and marriage through the father.

For only concerning marriage through the father did the Torah introduce the rule that "since she has married, her father no longer has authority over her."

But concerning marriage into which she entered on her own, the Torah did not introduce this law.

Therefore, if she is divorced, her father has the power to sell her again as a maidservant!

That is, whether we say that yi'ud creates betrothal, or whether we say that yi'ud creates marriage, it is necessarily necessary to distinguish between kiddushin and marriage that were performed by the father, and yi'ud, which was performed not by the father, but by her.

And it follows that one cannot prove from this baraita that yi'ud creates betrothal!

But that amora who proved from the words of Rav Amram that yi'ud creates betrothal returns and resolves his words:

What is this,

by what are you, the one raising the objection, coming to reject my words? By claiming that just as one must distinguish between the father's betrothal and betrothal into which she entered on her own, so one must distinguish between the father's marriage and marriage into which she entered on her own.

But in truth, one cannot compare betrothal and marriage at all:

For

it is understandable,

it is indeed correct to say that

betrothal differs from betrothal.

That is, the law of selling her after betrothal into which she entered on her own differs from the law of selling her after her father's betrothal.

This is because a daughter who has become betrothed still does not leave her father's domain concerning all matters, for she continues to be under his authority—to inherit from her, to become impure for her, and to annul her vows together with her husband, ] apart from the matter of selling her.

And if so, it is reasonable that the fact that the father cannot sell her after he betrothed her is not because she left his domain, but is an innovation: the Torah imposed stringency upon him that he may not sell her.

Therefore, it is reasonable to restrict the Torah's innovation concerning selling her, and to establish it only after betrothal performed by the father, and not after betrothal performed by her.