Kiddushin 18b (יח:) — the Talmud in English

To say:

once he spread

the master had spread his

garment over her

for the purpose of designating her as a wife, then, if afterward the master divorced her with a bill of divorce,

the father is no longer

permitted to sell her; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Eliezer says: “When he betrays her”—

this is an expression of betrayal.

To say:

once

the father

betrayed her

by selling her as a maidservant, then, if she was emancipated,

the father is no longer

permitted to sell her.

It follows that, according to Rabbi Akiva, the father may not sell his daughter into servitude after designation [which is marriage].

Similarly, he may not sell her into servitude after betrothal.

But he may sell her into servitude after servitude.

According to Rabbi Eliezer, however, the father may not sell his daughter into servitude after servitude.

But he may sell her into servitude after marriage.

Accordingly, it should be explained that the Rabbis, who stated above that a person may not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage, interpreted the verse “when he betrays her” as referring to the spreading of a garment, in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

And Rabbi Shimon [who said that a person may not sell his daughter into servitude either after marriage or after servitude] interpreted the verse “when he betrays her” both as referring to the spreading of a garment, like Rabbi Akiva, and as referring to betrayal, like Rabbi Eliezer.

Therefore, as the halakha, he disagrees with both of them and maintains that a person may not sell his daughter into servitude either after servitude or after marriage.

The Gemara now elaborates on the reasoning of all the tannaim mentioned:

And we raised a question concerning this:

In what do they disagree,

what is the basis of the disagreement among the tannaim over how to interpret “when he betrays her”?

And we answer: The Torah says bevigdo, and we read the letter bet with a ḥiriq vowel, as though it were written bavigdo, with the addition of the letter yod.

Had the tradition of reading the letter bet with a ḥiriq not been accepted, it would have been appropriate to read it with a kamatz vowel, since it was not written bavigdo, with the addition of the letter yod.

There is a difference between the meaning of bevagdo with a kamatz and the meaning of bavigdo with a ḥiriq:

Bevagdo with a kamatz indicates the expression “betrayal” [just as, with regard to the expression “hearing,” it says in Deuteronomy 29: “when he hears the words of this oath.” And veshom'o is vocalized with a kamatz].

Whereas bavigdo with a ḥiriq indicates the expression “garment,” as it says in Genesis 39: “and she grasped him by his garment.” And bevigdo there is vocalized with a ḥiriq.

The tannaim disagreed when the meaning of a word as it is written in the Torah differs from its pronunciation: Do we expound the written form or the pronounced form? As follows:

Rabbi Eliezer holds: The written form is determinative.

The primary significance of the word is determined by the written tradition concerning how it was transmitted to be written.

Since it was written bevagdo and not bivigdo, it is to be expounded as referring to betrayal.

Therefore, a person may not sell his daughter into servitude after he betrayed her, by having already sold her into servitude on a previous occasion.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: The pronunciation is determinative.

The primary significance of the word is determined by the way we pronounce it,

and since we pronounce it bivigdo, it is to be expounded as referring to the spreading of a garment.

Therefore, a person may not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage.

The Rabbis in the earlier beraita likewise maintain in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

And Rabbi Shimon holds: Both the pronunciation and the written form are determinative.

The significance of the word is equal with regard both to its pronunciation and to its written form, and the word bevagdo is to be expounded both as referring to betrayal, according to its written form, and as referring to the spreading of a garment, according to its pronunciation.

Therefore, a person may not sell his daughter into servitude either after marriage or after servitude.

The Gemara presents here a dilemma that was raised in the house of study concerning designation, since it would apparently be possible to resolve it from Rabbi Akiva’s statement above:

He raised a dilemma

[he asked,]

Rabba bar Avuha: “Designation,”

that is, when the master says to his Hebrew maidservant, “Behold, you are designated for me through the money with which I purchased you”—does this

effect marriage,

so that her status is that of a married woman,

or betrothal

alone does it

effect,

so that her status is that of a betrothed woman? And

what is the practical difference,

there is a difference between a betrothed woman and a married woman with regard to three matters:

a.

To inherit her.

When a married woman dies, her husband inherits her, whereas when a betrothed woman dies, her betrothed does not inherit her.

b.

And to become impure for her.

A priest is permitted to become impure for his married wife who dies, but he may not become impure for his betrothed wife who dies.

c.

And to annul her vows.

A married woman’s husband alone annuls her vows. A betrothed woman’s husband, however, may annul her vows only together with her father [when she is a na'ara].

And there is a dilemma concerning designation:

What

does it effect—marriage or betrothal?

The Gemara seeks to prove that designation effects betrothal alone:

Come

[and]

hear

a proof to resolve the dilemma from what we learned in the earlier beraita:

“When he betrays her”—

once he spread

the master had spread his

garment over her

for the purpose of designation, then, if she was divorced from him with a bill of divorce,

he is no longer permitted

the father

to sell her,

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

And one should infer from Rabbi Akiva’s statement:

Only

selling—he may not sell her.

It is specifically with regard to selling that the father is not permitted to sell her again.

But designation—

he designates her!

But with regard to betrothal, the father is permitted to betroth her to another man.

And

one can learn from here that the designation effected by the master effects only betrothal.

For

if you say

that designation

effects marriage,

it is impossible that the father could return and designate her, since

once she is married

his daughter—

her father no longer has authority over her.

Even after she was divorced by her husband, the father could not return and betroth her to another man!

If so, how could the father betroth his daughter after she had been designated and then divorced?

Rather, is it not so? Learn from here,

will you not learn from this that designation

betrothal

alone

effects.

Therefore, even if she was designated and then divorced, the father is permitted to betroth her to another man!

And we reject this:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

It is actually possible that designation effects marriage. And Rabbi Akiva’s statement must be explained differently:

Here,

when Rabbi Akiva said, “Once he spread his garment over her,” he was not referring to designation, in which the master designates his maidservant as a wife. Rather,

he is speaking of ordinary betrothal,

of the betrothal of a minor who was not sold as a maidservant.

And this is what he is saying:

and this is what Rabbi Akiva intended to say:

once her father has delivered her to one who is obligated in “

her food, clothing, and conjugal rights,”

meaning, he betrothed her for the purpose of marriage, and consequently her husband became obligated to provide her clothing—

he can no longer

the father

sell her.

If so, no proof can be brought from here that designation effects betrothal, since Rabbi Akiva was not speaking at all about the designation of the maidservant, but about betrothal.

The Gemara now attempts to prove from another beraita that designation effects betrothal בלבד:

Come

come

and hear

a proof that will resolve the question, from what we learned in a beraita:

The father may not

the father

sell her

his daughter

to

one of the

close relatives

to whom she is forbidden to marry as a forbidden sexual relation. Since it is stated concerning a Hebrew maidservant [Exodus 21]: “whom he did not [to him] designate.”

Therefore, a father may sell his daughter only to a master with whom everything stated in the passage concerning a Hebrew maidservant can be fulfilled. Since betrothal is not effective with regard to close relatives, the father cannot sell his daughter to such relatives, because it is impossible to fulfill the mitzva of designation with them.

These are the words of the first tanna.

In the name of

in the name of

Rabbi Eliezer they said:

the father

may sell her to close relatives,

and it is not necessary that everything stated in the passage concerning a Hebrew maidservant be capable of being fulfilled with regard to her. Rather, the verse merely stated that if the master wishes to take his maidservant as a wife, he may designate her.

The beraita adds:

And they agree,

both Rabbi Eliezer and the first tanna agree on this matter:

that he may sell her

his daughter, even if she is a

widow—to

a High Priest.

Although he is forbidden to designate her, since he is commanded to marry a virgin and not a widow.

And likewise they agree that the father may sell her even if she is

a divorcée or a ḥalutza—to

an ordinary priest.

Although a High Priest is forbidden to marry a widow, and an ordinary priest is forbidden to marry a divorcée or a ḥalutza, the father may nevertheless sell her to them, because designation applies to them, although by doing so he would commit a transgression.

For if they transgressed and betrothed her as a wife, their betrothal would be effective, even though she is forbidden to them, because betrothal is effective with regard to those liable for violating a prohibition.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

In the beit-midrash they raised a question concerning the words of the beraita:

The beraita said: “And they agree that he may sell a widow to a High Priest,” which proves that the case is one in which this minor had already been betrothed once, her husband died, and she became widowed from him.

This requires clarification:

This widow—

what are the circumstances?!

Which widow is this referring to? That is, in what manner was she betrothed to her husband?

If we say that she betrothed herself,

if we say that the case concerns a minor who betrothed herself without her father, and the man to whom she had been betrothed died, this is difficult:

Can this minor be called

“a widow”

?

Can she be called a “widow”? After all, according to Torah law, a minor’s act has no legal significance, and it follows that she was never betrothed at all!

Rather,

perhaps you will resolve the matter by saying that the case is one in which

her father betrothed her?

This too is subject to an objection:

Once her father betrothed her once—

who would sell her?!

Can he subsequently sell her as a maidservant?!

But

we learned above that

a person may not sell his daughter into servitude

to

another

after he has delivered her

for marriage!

And

he answered this

Rav Amram said in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak: Here,

the widow mentioned in the beraita is a widow who had been betrothed to her husband

through betrothal by designation,

as the father sold her as a maidservant, and the master designated her as a wife, and she was widowed from him.

Although a father may not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage, this applies only when the father himself sold her for marriage, in which case he is not permitted to sell her into servitude.

Here, however, the father sold her into servitude and not for marriage, and it was the master who subsequently designated her for marriage. Therefore, if she became widowed from the master, the father may subsequently sell her into servitude, since he himself did not initially sell her for marriage, but only into servitude.

This resolves the words of the beraita.

However, what we said—that if a father sold his daughter as a maidservant and she was designated, he may subsequently sell her into servitude—is not accepted by everyone. Rather, it depends on the dispute between the tannaim below:

The matter of “designation” requires clarification: When the master designates the maidservant and says to her, “You are designated to me,” through what do the betrothal take effect? After all, at that moment he gives her nothing!

This matter is clarified from the words of the following beraita [19b]:

The Sages taught: How is the mitzva of designation fulfilled? He says to her in the presence of two [witnesses]: “You are betrothed to me.”

He may say this even at the end of the six [years of the maidservant’s service], and even immediately before sunset [on the final day]. These are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: Only if there remains sufficient time during the day [of the final day] for her [to be able] to perform with him [labor] worth one peruta is she betrothed. But if not, she is not betrothed.

That is, according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, the master betroths the maidservant by waiving her obligation to work for him, and that waiver has monetary value. It is therefore as though he gave her a peruta.

Therefore, only if she still has an obligation to perform labor worth a peruta is she betrothed through it. But if he comes to betroth her at the end of the final day, and the value of the labor remaining is not worth a peruta, she is not betrothed.

The Sages, however, hold that the master does not betroth the girl by waiving her obligation to work. Rather, when the master paid the father money at the time he acquired her as a maidservant, that money was initially given also for her betrothal. The master betroths her through the money of her acquisition, which also constitutes betrothal money.

We now return to the words of the aforementioned beraita: “And they agree that he may sell a widow to a High Priest.” Rav Amram explained that the case concerns a minor who was betrothed through betrothal by designation, and that the father is permitted to sell her into servitude after she became widowed from the master, since it was not he who sold her for marriage, but the master.

Now, according to the Sages, who hold that at the time the maidservant was acquired, the master paid the father money also for her betrothal, it follows that the father was the one who betrothed her, by accepting the money from the master. If so, he certainly may not sell her into servitude after marriage. This contradicts Rav Amram’s statement.

Therefore, Rav Amram adds and says:

And

the aforementioned beraita was stated

according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, who said: The initial money

that the master paid the father at the time he acquired the maidservant

was not given for betrothal,

but only for the value of her labor.

Accordingly, it follows that the father did not sell her for marriage, but only into servitude. Rather, it was the master who subsequently betrothed her, by waiving her obligation to work, and therefore, once she became widowed from the master, the father was permitted to sell her into servitude.

Thus far, the Gemara has cited the words of the beraita and Rav Amram’s explanation.

And

from these matters, the Gemara proves that designation effects betrothal בלבד and not marriage.

For

if you say

that designation

effects marriage,

then this is difficult:

once

through designation she

has married, her father no longer has authority over her.

After all, once a minor has married, she leaves her father’s authority completely! How, then, could the father sell his daughter as a maidservant after she had been designated?

Rather, necessarily, designation effects only betrothal, and therefore, after she is divorced, her father is permitted to sell her, since she did not leave his authority completely.

The Gemara rejects the proof that designation effects betrothal—

Rather, what do you say?

What do you prove from the words of the beraita, that designation

effects betrothal?

After all, according to your own words, one must raise a question concerning the beraita:

But a person may not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage!

She had already become betrothed through designation! Why, then, may the father sell her as a maidservant after she became widowed?

Rather, what can you say?

What distinction can you draw in order to resolve this?

Her betrothal differs from her father’s betrothal.

There is a difference between betrothal in which the daughter betroths herself, without her father, and betrothal in which her father betroths her.

For it is only with regard to betrothal performed by the father that the Torah introduced the principle that “he may not sell her into servitude after marriage.”

But with regard to betrothal in which she became betrothed of her own accord, the Torah did not introduce the principle that he may not sell her into servitude after marriage.

If so, the proof that designation effects betrothal can be rejected:

For

even if you say

that designation

effects marriage,

there is no difficulty concerning how her father can sell her again, despite the statement: “Once she has married, her father no longer has authority over her.”

After all, one can make a distinction analogous to the one you made:

Her marriage differs from her father’s marriage!

There is a difference between marriage into which the daughter enters of her own accord, without her father, and marriage effected by her father.

For it is specifically with regard to marriage effected by the father that the Torah introduced the law that “once she has married, her father no longer has authority over her.”

But with regard to marriage into which she entered of her own accord, the Torah did not introduce this law.

Therefore, if she is divorced, her father may sell her again as a maidservant!

That is, whether we say that designation effects betrothal or whether we say that designation effects marriage, it is necessarily required to distinguish between betrothal and marriage effected by the father and designation, which is effected not by the father but by her.

It follows that it cannot be proved from this beraita that designation effects betrothal!

However, the same amora who proved from Rav Amram’s statement that designation effects betrothal returns and defends his words:

What is this?

How do you, the one raising the objection, come to reject my words? By claiming that just as one must distinguish between the father’s betrothal and betrothal into which she entered of her own accord, so too one must distinguish between the father’s marriage and marriage into which she entered of her own accord.

But in truth, betrothal and marriage cannot be compared at all:

For

it is understandable

that it is indeed correct to say that

one betrothal differs from another.

That is, the law governing the sale of a girl after betrothal into which she entered of her own accord differs from the law governing her sale after her father’s betrothal.

This is because a daughter who has become betrothed has not yet left her father’s authority with regard to every matter, since she remains under his authority—to inherit from her A father inherits his daughter if she dies, even if she dies after becoming betrothed. But if she marries and dies, he does not inherit her, as explained in the previous note. , to become impure for her A priest may not become impure through contact with the dead except for the seven close relatives mentioned at the beginning of the passage concerning the priests [Leviticus 21], one of whom is his daughter. Tosafot here wrote that once she becomes betrothed, she remains under her father’s authority with regard to inheriting from her and becoming impure for her. Apparently, they mentioned “becoming impure for her” here incidentally. For Scripture makes no distinction between a married daughter and a daughter who is not married. [A distinction is mentioned only with regard to one’s sister. See the verses there and Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De'a 373:4.] Likewise, the wording of Shulḥan Arukh [there] indicates that a priest may become impure for even his married daughter. , and to annul her vows together with her husband to annul her vows together with her husband A father annuls his daughter’s vows, but once she becomes betrothed he cannot annul her vows by himself; rather, he annuls them together with her father-in-law, as explained in the Torah at the beginning of the passage concerning the tribes [Numbers 27] and in Rashi there. — apart from the matter of selling her.

If so, it is reasonable that the reason the father cannot sell her after betrothing her is not that she has left his authority, but rather that it is a novel Torah decree that imposes upon him the restriction not to sell her.

Therefore, it is reasonable to limit this novel Torah law concerning her sale and apply it only after betrothal performed by the father, and not after betrothal entered into by her.