Kiddushin 18a — the Talmud in English

And

if

here,

in the Mishna, in which we learned that the spirit of the Sages is pleased with him, it is speaking of a son

whose conception was not in sanctity,

for while his father was a gentile, his mother became pregnant from him, and his mother converted before he was born,

and his birth

was

in sanctity,

at a time when his mother was a completely Jewish woman. Since his mother was Jewish at the time of the birth, those who see will err and say that he is a completely Jewish person, and nevertheless he does not inherit his father, the convert. Therefore it is pleasing to the Sages that he inherit his father.

Until here the Gemara discussed Rava's words and the words of the beraita cited in his words. At the beginning of his words Rava said: “By Torah law, a gentile inherits his father, as it is stated: ‘And he shall reckon with his purchaser’—but not with the heirs of his purchaser; by inference, he has [that is, the gentile has] heirs.” And the Gemara brings that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin also said [in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan] that a gentile inherits his father by Torah law, but he brought another source for his words:

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: A gentile inherits his father by Torah law. For it is written

[Deuteronomy 2]: “

For I have given Mount Seir to Esau as an inheritance.”

That is to say, I gave Mount Seir to Esau, for him to bequeath it to his sons. And from here you learn that the sons of Esau bequeath Mount Seir to their sons, despite the fact that they are star-worshippers. And we object to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin's words:

But perhaps,

perhaps the law of the sons of Esau is different from the law of other star-worshippers, for Esau was Isaac's son, and it is possible that his law is that of an apostate Jew. For the law of

an apostate Jew is different,

it differs from the law of a gentile. And, in fact, a complete gentile does not inherit his father!

And we reconcile:

Rather,

necessarily, one must say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin proved that a gentile inherits his father from another verse later in that passage, as it is stated: “

For I have given Ar to the sons of Lot as an inheritance.”

And from here it is proven that the sons of Lot bequeath Ar to their sons, despite the fact that they are not of Abraham's seed, and they are complete gentiles.

It follows that according to everyone, a gentile inherits his father by Torah law. Rather, the amoraim disagreed as to what the source of this law is:

According to Rava, because it is stated: “And he shall reckon with his purchaser,” but not with the heirs of his purchaser; from here there are heirs for a gentile.

And according to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin, because it is stated: “For I have given Ar to the sons of Lot as an inheritance.”

And the Gemara explains why each of these two amoraim did not learn from the verse that his colleague brought:

a.

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin—

a

for what reason,

for what reason

did he not say like Rava?

For according to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin, Rava's proof must be rejected, and an objection must be raised against his words:

Is it written,

is it explicitly stated in the verse,

“And he shall reckon with his purchaser, but not with the heirs of his purchaser”?

Yet only “And he shall reckon with his purchaser” is stated. If so, it is possible that the verse did not come at all to exclude the heirs of his purchaser! b.

And Rava—

for what reason,

for what reason

did he not say like Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin?

For according to Rava, Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin's proof must be rejected, and one must say that although the sons of Lot bequeathed Ar to their sons, nevertheless other gentiles do not bequeath to their sons. For

because of Abraham's honor, it is different!

The sons of Lot are different from other gentiles because of Abraham's honor, since Lot was his nephew.

We learned in the Mishna [above, 14b]: “The Hebrew maidservant has an advantage over him [the Hebrew slave], for she acquires herself through signs.”

And the Gemara brings a beraita that apparently contradicts the words of our Mishna:

The Sages taught:

There are

rights that were stated

with regard to the Hebrew slave that are not

with regard to

the

maidservant

Hebrew.

And there are

rights that were stated

with regard to the

maidservant

Hebrew that are not

with regard to

the

slave

Hebrew.

There are

rights that were stated

with regard to the Hebrew slave: that

if he was sold to a slave, then

he goes out in years [after six years],

[after six years],

and in the Jubilee, and upon the death of the master,

which is not so with regard to the Hebrew maidservant,

for she does not go out through any of these forms of release. [And this will be explained below.]

And there are

rights that were stated only

with regard to the Hebrew maidservant:

a

a.

For a Hebrew maidservant,

who was sold as a maidservant,

goes out through signs.

b.

And she is not sold and sold again,

if her father sold her once and she was freed, he cannot change his mind and sell her to another person.

c.

And she is redeemed against his will,

as will be explained below.

Which is not so with regard to the Hebrew slave,

for he does not go out through signs, and he is sold and sold again by the court because of his theft, and he is not redeemed against his will.

The Gemara discusses the words of the beraita:

The master said

in the beraita:

There are

rights that were stated

with regard to a Hebrew male slave that do not exist

for

a Hebrew maidservant—that he goes out after six years, at the Jubilee, and upon the death of the master, whereas this is not so with a Hebrew maidservant.

And we raise a contradiction

to this, a contradiction from the words of our Mishna:

For we learned in the Mishna:

A Hebrew maidservant has an advantage over him, for

in addition to the fact that she acquires herself after six years, at the Jubilee, and through deduction of money, she

acquires

her

herself

also

through signs.

And it is thereby proven that a Hebrew maidservant acquires herself after six years and at the Jubilee.

And from here there is a contradiction to the words of the beraita!

Rav Sheshet said

a resolution: In reality, a Hebrew maidservant goes out after six years, at the Jubilee, and upon the death of the master. And the beraita that said that she does not go out by these means is speaking of

a case in which

the master

designated her

as a wife for himself, and she is his wife, and she goes out from him only through a bill of divorce.

And we raise an objection to the words of Rav Sheshet: If indeed it is speaking of a case in which he

designated her, it is obvious!

For

she requires her bill of divorce!

It is obvious that she goes out from him only through a bill of divorce, like every married woman! And for what purpose did the tannai need to teach us this law?

And we resolve: There is a novelty in the matter:

Lest you say, the halakha should not be nullified from her.

Perhaps you would say that the laws of a Hebrew maidservant should not be nullified from her even after he designated her, and if she wished, she could go out through one of these means of release, without a bill of divorce. Therefore,

it teaches us

that the tannai teaches us that she goes out only through a bill of divorce.

And we raise an objection to the words of Rav Sheshet: Since it is speaking of a case in which he designated her,

if so,

the following difficulty can be raised:

For later in the beraita we learned: “And there are [rights stated only] with regard to a Hebrew maidservant—for a Hebrew maidservant goes out through signs.”

And since, according to the words of Rav Sheshet, the beginning of the beraita spoke of a case in which he designated her, it follows that even the latter clause speaks of one whom he designated.

And if so, it is difficult:

Why

does

she go out through signs?

Since he designated her as a wife, she is his wife, and she goes out only through a bill of divorce!

And we resolve:

This is what he is saying,

this is what the tannai intended to say at the end of the beraita:

And there are rights with regard to a Hebrew maidservant—for if

he did not designate her

as a wife for himself, she

also goes out through signs.

That is to say, indeed, at the beginning of the beraita it is speaking of a case in which he designated her, but in the latter clause the tannai said that there is a right with regard to a Hebrew maidservant that does not exist with regard to a Hebrew male slave: that if he did not designate her, she goes out through signs.

And the Gemara continues to discuss the words of the beraita:

We learned in a beraita:

And she is not sold and sold again,

whereas this is not so with regard to a Hebrew male slave.

And we infer from the words of the beraita:

By implication

you learn from the words of the beraita

that a Hebrew male slave is sold and sold again.

And we raise a difficulty:

But it was taught:

Yet we learned in another beraita the opposite:

It is stated [Exodus 22:2] concerning a thief: “He shall surely pay [for the theft]. And if he has nothing, he shall be sold [as a slave] for his theft.”

And the word “for his theft” is superfluous. The beraita derived three things from it: [a] The verse comes to say that a person is sold as a slave only

“for his theft”

in order to pay, from the money of his sale, the value of the theft that he stole,

but not for its double payment!

For if he has money to pay the value of the theft itself, but he has nothing with which to pay the double payment imposed upon him, he is not sold as a slave in order to pay it.

[b] Only

“for his theft”

is he sold,

but not for his false oath!

That is, a false witness who testified against his fellow that he stole, and the witness was exposed, and he is required to pay “as he plotted to do to his brother”; if he has nothing with which to pay, he is not sold.

[c] “And he shall be sold

for his theft”—

this implies that he is sold only once.

The verse teaches:

Once

a person

is sold

as a slave

once—

you are no longer permitted to sell him

a second time.

And from the words of this beraita it follows that a Hebrew male slave is not sold and sold again. And this contradicts the words of the earlier beraita, in which we learned that specifically a Hebrew maidservant is not sold and sold again, whereas this is not so with regard to a Hebrew male slave!

He said

a resolution,

Rava:

The verse “and he shall be sold for his theft” teaches that he is sold in one sale for one theft, and not in two sales for one theft. One sale means a sale for six years. For a Hebrew male slave whom the court sells goes out after six years, as above, 14b. And this is also proven from Rashi below, s.v. “and not half of him.” That is to say, one who stole a large amount of money, and his body is not worth the value of all his theft, is not sold once for half of his theft and a second time for its other half. That is to say: If he is sold for six years, he is worth only half a theft, as in the preceding note.

But one who stole twice is sold in one sale for the first theft and in a second sale for the second theft. And with regard to each theft, “and he shall be sold [only once] for his theft [the particular one]” is fulfilled.

Therefore,

it is not difficult;

the beraitot do not contradict one another, because—

Here,

in the beraita in which we learned that he is not sold and sold again, it is speaking

of one theft,

and here we learned that he is not sold twice for the same theft.

Whereas

here,

in the beraita in which we learned that he is sold and sold again, it is speaking

of two thefts,

and he is sold once for each and every theft.

And according to Rava, “for his theft” implies one act of theft. Even if he stole two times an amount of one maneh from the same person, and he stood trial for the two thefts together and became obligated at one time to pay two manehs, nevertheless each maneh is called “his theft.” And he is sold once for the one maneh and a second time for the other maneh.

He said

he challenged

Abaye to Rava: But “and he shall be sold

for his theft”—

it implies many!

It implies a great deal!

If the thief stood trial in one proceeding for many thefts that he stole from the same person, all of them are called “his theft,” since he became obligated at one time to pay the victim for all of them. This is similar to what is stated [Jonah 4:11], “and much cattle,” where the reference is to many animals. And likewise [Exodus 7:18], “and the fish that are in the river,” where the reference is to many fish.

Therefore, there is no basis for distinguishing between one theft and two thefts as Rava distinguished.

Rather, Abaye said

a different distinction:

A person who stood trial once for several thefts that he stole from one person—all of them together are included within “his theft.”

Whereas a person who stole from two people is brought to trial twice. And each theft separately is called “for his theft.”

Therefore,

it is not difficult;

the beraitot do not contradict one another, because—

Here,

in the beraita in which we learned that he is not sold and sold again, it is speaking

of

a case in which he stole from

one person,

for even if he stole from him twice, nevertheless, if he stood trial for the two thefts together, he is not sold and sold again, because all these thefts are included within “his theft,” and he is not sold twice for one theft.

Whereas

here,

in the beraita in which we learned that he is sold and sold again, it is speaking

of

a case in which he stole from

two people,

and each one brings him to trial separately, and each theft separately is called “his theft.”

Therefore, he is sold twice, for each theft separately.

The Gemara now brings another beraita, which discusses the matter of a slave who was sold—whether he is sold again:

The Sages taught:

A thief whose

theft was one thousand

zuz,

and

he himself

was worth five hundred

zuz — he is

sold, and sold again.

five hundred, and

A thief whose

theft was five hundred, and

he himself

was worth one thousand—

he is not sold at all.

For it is stated in the Torah, “and he shall be sold for his theft,” implying that all of him is sold and not half of him.

And since labor for six years is worth one thousand zuz, while he needs to work only half of them, he is not sold at all.

These are the words of the Rabbis.

Rabbi Eliezer

disagrees and

says:

Only

if his theft was equal to his sale value

[the sale price of the slave] exactly, is he

sold.

And if not, he is not sold

at all, whether his theft was five hundred and he was worth one thousand, or his theft was one thousand and he was worth five hundred.

Rava said: In this,

in this dispute,

Rabbi Eliezer has given the Rabbis

a basis for argument and a decisive claim against the Rabbis.

For there is room to argue against the words of the Sages:

what is the difference

in what is different and distinctive about

his theft was five hundred and he is worth one thousand, that

everyone agrees that

he is not

he

sold? —

It is because one must infer from the verse, “and he shall be sold for his theft”

that “

he shall be sold in his entirety,”

the Merciful One said, and not

that he shall be

half

only.

And if so,

so too,

in the same way one must infer that “

he shall be sold for his theft”

the Merciful One said,

that he shall be sold for the entire theft,

and not “

he shall be sold for half his theft.”

And therefore, if his theft was one thousand and he is worth five hundred, he is not sold at all.

And now the Gemara returns to discuss the words of the earlier beraita:

We learned in a beraita: There is [a matter] in a Hebrew male slave that is not in a Hebrew female slave. And there is [a matter] in a Hebrew female slave that is not in a Hebrew male slave, which is not in a Hebrew female slave. There is [a matter] in a Hebrew female slave, for she is a Hebrew female slave, and so on,

and she is redeemed against his will [

which is not so with a Hebrew male slave].

And the Gemara discusses: What is the meaning of “against his will”? Against whose will?

And we said:

Rava thought to say,

Rava thought to explain that the intention of the beraita is to say that the maidservant is redeemed

against the will of the master.

Abaye said to him

to Rava: If your intention is to say that the words of the beraita, “and she is redeemed against his will,” are to be explained as meaning that if the master refuses to accept the redemption money, they give it to him against his will, and she thereby becomes free—I have an objection to your words: Why, then, did we learn, “[which is] not so with a Hebrew male slave”? For also in the case of a Hebrew male slave, they give the master the redemption money against his will, and he thereby becomes free!

Rather, necessarily,

what is it,

what did you intend to say in explaining the words of the beraita? —

That

if we do not have money for the redemption of the maidservant, then

we write him a document for her value,

we write the master a document of obligation to pay him the value of the maidservant, and give the master that document, and the master is obligated to accept the document of obligation against his will, as though it were full money, and to free her in exchange for it. This is not so with a Hebrew slave, for the master is not obligated to free the slave through accepting a document of obligation for his value, but only through receiving actual money.

And if this is your intention, there is reason to wonder at your words:

Why?

Why is the master obligated to free the maidservant through accepting a document of obligation for her value, against his will?

And an analogy to this objection: Is it possible that one who

holds a pearl in his hand—

shall we give him a potsherd!?

Does one give a person who holds a pearl in his hand a piece of pottery in exchange for it?

And similarly here: the master is holding the maidservant’s body, which is subjugated to him, while we come and give him merely a document of obligation for her value; relative to his holding the maidservant herself, this document is worth nothing to him except like an ordinary potsherd. Surely it is not reasonable to say that the document is considered redemption, like giving the value of the maidservant!

Rather, Abaye said:

This is how the words of the beraita, “and she is redeemed against his will,” are to be explained

: against the will of the father!

That is, if the father has property, the court compels him to redeem his daughter,

because of the blemish

of the

family.

Since the fact that a daughter of this family is sold as a maidservant constitutes a blemish for the entire family.

And we object to Abaye’s words: Since according to Abaye the father is compelled to redeem his daughter because of the blemish of the family,

if so,

then, concerning

a Hebrew male slave too,

it would be fitting that

we compel them [

compel

the sons of

the

family

to redeem him,

because of the blemish

of the

family!

And why did we learn, in the case of a Hebrew male slave, that he is not redeemed against the will of his family members? And we answer: There is no benefit in compelling the family members to redeem the slave, because there is concern that

he will then go and sell himself.

For afterward the slave will go and sell himself again. And we object: If so,

so too,

also concerning a Hebrew maidservant, there is no benefit in compelling the father to redeem his daughter, for there is concern that

he will then go and sell her,

for afterward he will go and sell her again as a maidservant! Why, then, is she redeemed against his will?

And we answer:

For it is taught

in this very beraita that a Hebrew maidservant

is not sold and resold.

And therefore there is no concern that the father will return and sell her as a maidservant, since he has no ability to do so.

And we examine this:

And who is it!?

Who is the tan­-nay who taught in the beraita that she is not sold and resold? And we answer:

It is Rabbi Shimon,

as explained in the following beraita:

For it was taught: A person may sell his daughter for marriage,

a person may betroth his daughter one time,

and repeat it.

For if his daughter is widowed, or divorced while she is still betrothed, the father may return and betroth her a second time.

And likewise, the father sells his daughter

for

the

purpose of servitude, and repeats it.

For he may return and sell her a second time, after she has become free.

And likewise, a person sells his daughter

for marriage [

betroths her], to

another

after he sold her for

servitude,

and she became free.

But

the father

cannot

sell her

for servitude

to

another

after he sold her once

for marriage, and she was widowed or divorced. The reason for this will be explained below.

These are the words of the Sages.

And

Rabbi Shimon says: Just as a person cannot sell his daughter for servitude after marriage, so a person cannot sell his daughter for servitude

to

another

after he sold her once for

servitude,

and she became free.

It follows that what we learned in the earlier beraita, “she is not sold and resold,” is according to the view of Rabbi Shimon. But the Sages say: A person sells his daughter for servitude after servitude.

And the Gemara explains the reason for the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon:

And

the dispute of the Sages and Rabbi Shimon is explained

in the dispute of these tannaim,

in the exposition of the verse over which the tannaim below disputed: It is stated [Exodus 21] concerning a Hebrew maidservant: “To a foreign people [to a stranger

], [the father] shall not have authority to sell her, when he betrays her.”

And the tannaim disputed what the verse “when he betrays her” means:

For it was taught: “When he betrays her”—

it is an expression of betrayal.