Kiddushin 18a (יח.) — the Talmud in English

And if

the Mishna here, in which we learned that the spirit of the Sages is pleased with him, is speaking of a son

here,

it is speaking of a son whose

conception was not in sanctity,

meaning that while his father was a gentile, his mother became pregnant by him, and his mother converted before he was born,

while his birth

was

in sanctity,

at a time when his mother was a fully Jewish woman. Since his mother was Jewish at the time of the birth, those who see him will err and say that he is a full-fledged Jew, and yet he does not inherit his father, the convert. Therefore, the Sages are pleased that he inherit his father.

Until this point, the Gemara discussed Rava’s words and the beraita cited in connection with his words. At the beginning of his statement, Rava said: “By Torah law, a gentile inherits his father, as it is stated: ‘And he shall reckon with his purchaser’—but not with the heirs of his purchaser; by inference, he has heirs [that is, the gentile has heirs].” The Gemara now states that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin also said [in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan] that by Torah law a gentile inherits his father, but he brought a different source for this ruling:

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: A gentile inherits his father by Torah law. As it is written

[Deuteronomy 2]: “

For I have given Mount Seir as an inheritance to Esau.”

That is, I gave Mount Seir to Esau, for him to bequeath it to his sons. From here you learn that the sons of Esau bequeath Mount Seir to their sons, despite the fact that they are idolaters. The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin’s statement:

But perhaps

the law of the sons of Esau differs from the law of other gentiles, since Esau was the son of Isaac, and it is possible that his law is that of an apostate Jew. Indeed, the law of

an apostate Jew is different,

different from that of a gentile. Perhaps a full-fledged gentile never inherits his father!

And we answer:

Rather,

it is necessary to say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin proved that a gentile inherits his father from another verse later in that passage, as it is stated: “

For I have given Ar as an inheritance to the sons of Lot.”

From here it is demonstrated that the sons of Lot bequeath Ar to their sons, despite the fact that they are not descendants of Abraham but are full-fledged gentiles.

It follows that everyone agrees that a gentile inherits his father by Torah law. The amoraim disagreed only regarding the source of this law:

According to Rava, it is as it is stated: “And he shall reckon with his purchaser,” but not with the heirs of his purchaser; from here it follows that a gentile has heirs.

According to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin, it is as it is stated: “For I have given Ar as an inheritance to the sons of Lot.”

The Gemara explains why each of these two amoraim did not derive the law from the verse cited by the other:

(a)

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin—

a

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin—

for what reason

did he not say in accordance with Rava?

For according to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin, Rava’s proof can be rejected, and the following objection can be raised against his words:

Is it written

explicitly in the verse

“And he shall reckon with his purchaser, but not with the heirs of his purchaser”?

After all, it says only, “And he shall reckon with his purchaser.” If so, it is possible that the verse did not come at all to exclude the heirs of his purchaser! [(]]b

And Rava—

And Rava—

for what reason

did he not say in accordance with Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin?

For according to Rava, Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin’s proof can be rejected, and one can say that although the sons of Lot bequeathed Ar to their sons, other gentiles do not bequeath property to their sons.

Because of Abraham’s honor, it is different!

The sons of Lot differ from other gentiles because of the honor of Abraham, since Lot was his nephew.

We learned in the Mishna [above, 14b]: The Hebrew maidservant has an advantage over him [the Hebrew slave], in that she acquires her freedom through signs of maturity.

The Gemara cites a beraita that seemingly contradicts the statement of our Mishna:

The Sages taught:

There

are rights that were stated

with regard to a Hebrew slave that are not

found

with regard to

a Hebrew

maidservant.

And there

are rights that were stated

with regard to

a Hebrew

maidservant that are not

found

with regard to

a

Hebrew slave.

There

are rights that were stated

with regard to a Hebrew slave: For

if he was sold to a Hebrew slave,

he goes free after six years

[after six years],

and in the Jubilee year, and upon the death of the master,

which is not so with regard to the Hebrew maidservant,

who does not go free through any of these means. [This will be explained below].

And there

are rights stated only

with regard to the maidservant:

a

(a)

For a Hebrew maidservant,

For a Hebrew maidservant

who was sold as a maidservant

goes free through signs of maturity. b

And she may not be sold and sold again,

meaning that if her father sold her once and she was freed, he cannot change his mind and sell her to another person.

c

And she is redeemed against his will,

as will be explained below.

This is not so with regard to a Hebrew slave,

who does not go free through signs of maturity, and who may be sold and sold again by the court because of his theft, and he is not redeemed against his will.

The Gemara discusses the words of the beraita:

The Master said

in the beraita:

There are

rights that were stated

with regard to a Hebrew slave but do not apply

to

a Hebrew maidservant—he goes free after six years, at the Jubilee, and upon the death of the master, whereas this is not so with regard to a Hebrew maidservant.

And we raise a contradiction

to this from the words of our Mishna:

For we learned in the Mishna:

The Hebrew maidservant has an additional

right: in addition to the fact that she acquires her freedom after six years, at the Jubilee, and through reduction of money, she

acquires

her

freedom

also

through signs of puberty.

And it is demonstrated that a Hebrew maidservant acquires her freedom after six years and at the Jubilee.

And from here there is a contradiction to the words of the beraita!

Rav Sheshet said

a resolution: In fact, a Hebrew maidservant goes free after six years, at the Jubilee, and upon the death of the master. And the beraita that said that she does not go free through these means is speaking

of a case where

the master

designated her

for himself as a wife; she is consequently his wife and leaves him only through a bill of divorce.

And we raise a difficulty against Rav Sheshet’s words: If indeed the case is one where he

designated her,

it is obvious! For

she requires a bill of divorce.

It is obvious that she leaves him only through a bill of divorce, like any married woman! Why, then, did the tanna need to teach us this law?

And we answer: There is a novelty here:

Lest you say that the halakha should not be nullified with regard to her.

Perhaps you would say that the laws of a Hebrew maidservant do not become nullified even after he designated her; if she wished, she could leave through one of these forms of release, without a bill of divorce. Therefore,

it teaches us

that the tanna teaches us that she leaves only through a bill of divorce.

And we raise a difficulty against Rav Sheshet’s words: Since the case is one where he designated her,

if so,

the following difficulty should be raised:

For later in the beraita we learned: “And there are [rights stated only] with regard to a Hebrew maidservant—for a Hebrew maidservant goes free through signs.”

And since, according to Rav Sheshet, the beginning of the beraita speaks of a case where he designated her, it follows that the latter clause also speaks of a case where he designated her.

If so, this is difficult:

Why

[does] she

go free through signs?

Since he designated her as a wife, she is his wife and leaves only through a bill of divorce!

And we answer:

This is what he is saying;

this is what the tanna intended to say at the end of the beraita:

“And there is [a right] with regard to a Hebrew maidservant—for if

he did not designate her

as a wife, she

also goes free through signs.”

That is to say: Although the beginning of the beraita speaks of a case where he designated her, in the latter clause the tanna said that there is a right with regard to a Hebrew maidservant that does not apply to a Hebrew slave: if he did not designate her, she goes free through signs.

And the Gemara continues to discuss the words of the beraita:

We learned in the beraita:

And she is not sold and resold,

whereas this is not so with regard to a Hebrew slave.

And we infer from the words of the beraita:

By inference,

you learn from the words of the beraita

that a Hebrew slave is sold and resold.

And we raise a difficulty:

But it was taught

in another beraita, to the contrary:

It is stated [Exodus 22:2] with regard to a thief: “He shall make restitution in full [for the theft. And] if he has nothing, he shall be sold [as a slave] for his theft.”

And the word “for his theft” is superfluous. The beraita derives three matters from it: [a] The verse comes to say that a person is sold as a slave only

“for his theft”—

in order to pay, from the proceeds of his sale, the value of the theft that he stole,

but not for the double payment!

If he has money to pay the value of the theft itself, but does not have enough to pay the double payment imposed upon him, he is not sold as a slave in order to pay it.

[b] Specifically,

“for his theft”

is he sold,

but not for his false testimony!

That is, a false witness who testified that his fellow had stolen, and the witness was discredited, and he is liable to pay “as he conspired to do to his brother”; if he has nothing with which to pay, he is not sold.

[c] “And he shall be sold

for his theft”—

this indicates that he is sold only once.

The verse teaches

that once

a person

is sold

as a slave

one time—

you may no longer sell him

a second time.

And it follows from this beraita that a Hebrew slave is not sold and resold. This contradicts the earlier beraita, in which we learned that specifically a Hebrew maidservant is not sold and resold, whereas this is not so with regard to a Hebrew slave!

Said

he answered,

Rava:

The verse “and he shall be sold for his theft” teaches that he is sold in a sale once for one theft, and not in two sales for one theft. That is to say: One who stole a large sum of money, while his person is not worth the full value of all his theft, is not sold once for half of his theft and a second time for its other half. That is, if he is sold for six years, his labor is worth only half the theft, as in the previous note.

But one who stole twice is sold once for the first theft and a second time for the second theft. With regard to each theft, the phrase “and he shall be sold [only once] for his theft [the particular theft]” applies.

Therefore,

it is not difficult;

the beraitot do not contradict one another, because—

Here,

in the beraita in which we learned that he is not sold and resold, the case is

one theft,

and there we learned that he is not sold twice for that same theft.

Whereas

here,

in the beraita in which we learned that he is sold and resold, the case is

two thefts,

and he is sold once for each theft.

According to Rava, “for his theft” indicates one act of theft. Even if he stole two times the sum of one hundred dinars from the same person, and he was brought to court for the two thefts together and became liable at one time to pay two hundred dinars, nevertheless each hundred dinars is called “his theft.” He is therefore sold once for the first hundred dinars and a second time for the second hundred dinars.

Said

he challenged

Abaye to Rava: But “and he shall be sold

for his theft”—

for his theft”—

it indicates many!

If the thief stood trial in a single proceeding for many thefts that he stole from the same person, they are all called “his theft,” since he became liable at one time to pay the victim for all of them. This is similar to what is stated [Jonah 4:11], “and much cattle,” which refers to many animals; and likewise [Exodus 7:18], “and the fish that is in the river,” which refers to many fish.

Therefore, there is no basis for distinguishing between one theft and two thefts as Rava did.

Rather, Abaye said

a different distinction:

A person who stood trial once for several thefts that he stole from one person: all of them together are included in “his theft.”

But a person who stole from two people is brought to trial twice. Each theft separately is called “for his theft.”

Therefore,

it is not difficult;

the beraitot do not contradict one another, because—

Here,

in the beraita in which we learned that he is not sold and resold, the case is

one where

he stole from

one person. Even if he stole from him twice, nevertheless, if he stood trial for the two thefts together, he is not sold and resold, because all these thefts are included in “his theft,” and he is not sold twice for one theft.

But

Whereas

here,

in the beraita in which we learned that he is sold and resold, the case is

one where

he stole from

two people. Each of them brings him to trial separately, and each theft separately is called “his theft.”

Therefore, he is sold twice, once for each separate theft.

Therefore, he is sold twice, once for each individual theft.

The Gemara now brings another beraita, which discusses the matter of a slave who was sold—whether he is sold again:

The Sages taught:

A thief whose

theft was one thousand

dinars,

and

he himself

was worth five hundred

dinars — he

is sold and sold again.

five hundred, and

A thief whose

theft was five hundred, and

he himself

was worth one thousand—

is not sold at all.

For it is stated in the Torah, “and he shall be sold for his theft,” indicating that he is sold in his entirety, and not half of him.

Since six years of his labor are worth one thousand dinars, and he needs to work only half of them, he is not sold at all.

These are the words of the Rabbis.

Rabbi Eliezer

disagrees and

says:

Only

if his theft was exactly equal to his sale value [the price for which the slave is sold] does he

is he

become sold.

But if not, he is not sold

at all, whether his theft was five hundred and he was worth one thousand, or his theft was one thousand and he was worth five hundred.

Rava said: In this,

this dispute,

Rabbi Eliezer has given the Sages their due,

Rabbi Eliezer has a valid opening and a decisive argument against the Sages.

For one could argue against the words of the Sages:

What is the difference

what is different and distinctive about

the case where he stole five hundred and is worth one thousand, that

everyone agrees that he

is not

he

sold? —

This is because one must infer from the verse, “And he shall be sold for his theft,”

that

he shall be sold in his entirety,

the Merciful One states, and not

shall he be

sold in half

alone.

If so,

so too,

similarly one should infer that

“he shall be sold for his theft”

the Merciful One states,

that he shall be sold for the entirety of the theft,

and not

“he shall be sold for half his theft.”

Therefore, if he stole one thousand and is worth five hundred, he is not sold at all.

The Gemara now returns to discuss the words of the aforementioned beraita:

We learned in the beraita: There is a feature of a Hebrew servant that does not apply to a Hebrew maidservant, and there is a feature of a Hebrew maidservant that does not apply to a Hebrew servant, which does not apply to a Hebrew maidservant. There is a feature of a Hebrew maidservant, as she is a Hebrew maidservant, and so on,

and she may be redeemed against his will

[which is not the case with a Hebrew servant].

The Gemara discusses the meaning of “against his will”: Against whose will?

And we said:

Rava thought to say

Rava thought to explain that the beraita means that the maidservant is redeemed

against the will of the master.

Abaye said

to Rava: If you mean that the words of the beraita, “and she may be redeemed against his will,” are to be understood as meaning that if the master refuses to accept the redemption money, it is given to him against his will, and she is thereby emancipated—there is an objection to your words: Why did we learn, “which is not the case with a Hebrew servant”? After all, in the case of a Hebrew servant as well, the redemption money is given to the master against his will, and he is thereby emancipated!

Rather, necessarily,

what does it mean

what did you intend to say in explaining the words of the beraita? —

That

if we do not have money to redeem the maidservant, then

we write for him a document for her value,

we write the master a promissory note obligating payment of the maidservant’s value and give that document to the master, and the master is obligated to accept the promissory note against his will, as though it were full payment, and emancipate her in exchange for it. This is not the case with a Hebrew servant: The master is not obligated to emancipate the servant by accepting a promissory note for his value, but only by accepting actual money.

And if this is what you intended, your words are perplexing:

Why?

Why is the master obligated to emancipate the maidservant by accepting a promissory note for her value, against his will?

The following analogy is offered for this objection: Is it conceivable that one who

holds a pearl in his hand

would be given a potsherd instead!?

Does one give a potsherd in exchange to a person holding a pearl in his hand?

Similarly here: The master is holding the maidservant herself, who is bound to him, whereas we come and give him merely a promissory note for her value. Relative to his possession of the maidservant herself, this note is worth no more to him than an ordinary potsherd. Surely it is unreasonable to say that the note is considered redemption, like giving the maidservant’s value!

Rather, Abaye said:

This is how the words of the beraita, “and she may be redeemed against his will,” are to be explained:

Against the will of the father!

That is, if the father has property, the court compels him to redeem his daughter,

because of the disgrace of

the

family.

Since the fact that a daughter of this family is sold as a maidservant constitutes a disgrace to the entire family.

The Gemara raises an objection to Abaye’s words: Since, according to Abaye, the father is compelled to redeem his daughter because of the disgrace of the family,

if so,

then, regarding

a Hebrew servant as well,

it would be appropriate that

we compel them

[we compel]

the members of

the

family

to redeem him,

because of the disgrace of

the

family!

Why, then, did we learn that a Hebrew servant is not redeemed against the will of his family members? And we answer: There is no benefit in compelling the family members to redeem the servant, because there is concern that

he will then go and sell himself.

The servant might subsequently go and sell himself again. The Gemara objects: If so,

so too,

in the case of a Hebrew maidservant, there is no benefit in compelling the father to redeem his daughter, since there is concern that

he will then go and sell her,

that he will subsequently go and sell her again as a maidservant! Why, then, is she redeemed against his will?

And we answer:

But it is taught

in this very beraita that a Hebrew maidservant

is not sold and then sold again.

Therefore, there is no concern that the father will sell her again as a maidservant, since he has no ability to do so.

And we inquire:

And who is it!?

Who is the tanna who taught in the beraita that she is not sold and then sold again? And we answer:

It is Rabbi Shimon,

as explained in the following beraita:

As it was taught: A person may sell his daughter for marriage,

a person may betroth his daughter once,

and repeat the act.

If his daughter is widowed or divorced while still betrothed, the father may return and betroth her a second time.

Likewise, a father may sell his daughter

for

the purpose of

servitude, and repeat the sale.

He may return and sell her a second time after she has been emancipated.

Likewise, a person may sell his daughter

for marriage

[he betroths her],

after

he had sold her for

servitude,

and she was emancipated.

But

the father

may not

sell her

for servitude

after

he

had once sold her

for marriage,

and she was widowed or divorced. The reason for this will be explained below.

These are the words of the Sages.

And

Rabbi Shimon says: Just as a person may not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage, so a person may not sell his daughter into servitude

after

he

had once sold her for

servitude,

and she was emancipated.

It follows that what we learned above in the beraita, “she is not sold and then sold again,” is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. But the Sages say that a person may sell his daughter into servitude after servitude.

The Gemara explains the reason for the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon:

And

the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon is explained

by the dispute between these tannaim,

by the interpretation of the verse over which the following tannaim disagreed: It is stated [Exodus 21] concerning a Hebrew maidservant: “He shall not have power to sell her to a foreign people [a stranger],” “when he betrays her.”

The tannaim disagreed about the meaning of the verse, “when he betrays her”:

As it was taught: “When he betrays her” —

the expression refers to betrayal.