Kiddushin 17b (יז:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer: Had “winepress” not been stated, I would have said that “that which your God has blessed you” includes everything, even things that are not similar to a threshing floor or a winepress.

And therefore “winepress” was stated—

According to this master,

according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, “winepress” comes to exclude money. And according to this master,

according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, “winepress” comes

to exclude mules.

And the Gemara cites another beraita that discusses the verses stated concerning the grant:

The Sages taught:

It is stated concerning the grant [Deuteronomy 15:14]:

“With that which the Lord your God has blessed you,

you shall give him.”

And I

might

understand from the words of the verse that only if

the master’s household was blessed

because of him,

on account of him,

the slave,

is a grant given to him.

But if

the master’s household was not blessed

because of him,

no grant is given to him. The verse states, therefore, it is stated at the beginning of the verse: “You shall surely grant him.”

“You shall surely grant”

The verse doubled the language of the grant, in order to teach you that you shall grant him in any event,

under all circumstances—whether the household was blessed because of him or whether it was not blessed.

And since the verse includes that even if the household was not blessed because of him, a grant is given to him,

if so,

it is difficult:

What does the verse state?

For what purpose is it stated

“that which He has blessed you”?

What does this verse come to teach us?—

Everything is according to

the

blessing

with which the household was blessed—

give it to him

the slave!

If the household was blessed because of the slave, add a great deal to his grant. And if the household was not blessed, do not give less than the amount prescribed by the verse.

These are the words of the first tanna.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya

disagrees, and

says: The words are to be understood as written.

The words of the verse “that which the Lord your God has blessed you” should be explained according to their simple meaning: If

the master’s household was blessed

because of him,

a grant is given to him.

And if

it was not blessed,

the

household was not blessed because of him, no grant is given to him.

And since according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, if the household was not blessed because of him no grant is given to him,

if so,

it is difficult:

What does the verse state,

for what purpose is it stated

“You shall surely grant him”

with doubled wording?

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya answers this:

The Torah spoke

in the

language of human beings.

For this is the way people speak, using doubled wording. Therefore, no exposition may be derived from the repetition.

We learned in our Mishna [above, 14b] what are the forms of acquisition of a Hebrew slave, a Hebrew maidservant, and one whose ear has been pierced. The death of the master was mentioned in our Mishna with regard to the pierced slave, who acquires himself through the death of the master and does not work for the heirs.

Now the Gemara cites a beraita that explains the law of a Hebrew slave and a Hebrew maidservant upon the death of the master:

The Sages taught:

1.

A Hebrew slave

after the death of the master

works for the son,

the master’s son, who inherits his father, until the completion of the six years of his servitude, or until the Jubilee, if the Jubilee occurred within the six years.

And

if the master dies without sons,

he does not work for the daughter,

even though the daughter inherits her father when he has no sons.

2.

A Hebrew maidservant

after the death of the master

does not work for either the son or the daughter

of the master, because the death of the master sets her free.

3.

One whose ear has been pierced, and

likewise a Hebrew slave sold to a gentile does not work for either the son or the daughter,

because the death of the master sets him free.

And the Gemara explains the words of the beraita:

The master said

[the tanna] in the beraita:

1.

A Hebrew slave works for the son, but does not work for the daughter.

And we raise an objection concerning this:

From where are these words derived,

from where did the tanna learn this?

And we answer: From this,

as the Sages taught:

It is stated concerning a Hebrew slave [Deuteronomy 15:12]: “When your brother, a Hebrew man, is sold to you,

and he shall serve you for six years.”

Since it says “and he shall serve you,” and it does not say merely “and he shall serve,” this indicates that the verse comes to say that the slave shall work only

for you

[the purchaser] alone,

and not for an heir,

for the other heirs, with the exception of the son.

And the tanna continues:

Perhaps you will say: From where do you know that

you say

that the intention of the verse is that the slave shall work only

for you, and not

for your heir,

but that he will continue to work for the son?

Or perhaps it is not so,

perhaps your words are not correct,

but

the verse “and he shall serve you” teaches that he shall work only

for you

alone,

and not

work even

for your son,

just as he does not work for the other heirs?

Your answer is:

When

the verse

says

[in Exodus 21] concerning a Hebrew slave,

“For six years he shall serve,”

and does not say “he shall serve you,” this indicates that he will not work only for you, but will also work for someone else who comes in your place. He will work—

This

that the Hebrew slave shall work after the death of the master

for his son,

his,

is stated

in the verse.

And from here you learn that the slave works for the son after the death of the master.

And perhaps you will ask:

What then,

how

do I uphold

the words of the verse

“and he shall serve you for six years,”

which indicate that the slave shall work only “for you,” and not for anyone else?—

Your answer is: This is how you should expound it:

For you

alone he shall work,

and not for an heir,

with the exception of the son.

And perhaps you will ask:

What have you seen that leads you to include

a Hebrew slave working

for the son

from the verse “For six years he shall serve,”

and to exclude

that he shall not work

for the brother

[or the other heirs] from the verse “and he shall serve you for six years”?

For it is possible to say the opposite: From the verse “For six years he shall serve,” we should include that he shall work even for the brother or another heir, whereas from the verse “and he shall serve you” we should learn that he shall work for you, but not for the son!

Your answer is:

I include the son, since

we find that the son is superior to the brother, because the son

stands in place of

[in place of]

his father

with regard to two matters:

[a]

Designation — a person who has a Hebrew maidservant may designate her, acquiring her as a wife through the money with which she was acquired as a maidservant. And just as he may designate her for himself, so too he may designate her for his son, as it is stated [Exodus 21]: “And if he designates her for his son.”

But the master cannot designate the maidservant for his brother.

[b]

And an ancestral field — one who consecrates his ancestral field may redeem it, and must give for its redemption fifty silver shekels to the Temple treasury for a ḥomer of barley seed. And if the one who consecrated it did not redeem it, and the Temple treasurer managed to sell it to another person, the field remains in the purchaser’s possession until the Jubilee year. At the Jubilee it leaves the purchaser’s possession and is divided among the priests, and it does not return to the one who consecrated it. And if the son of the one who consecrated it purchased the field from the Temple treasurer, it returns at the Jubilee into the possession of his father, and it is not divided among the priests.

And from here there is proof that the son stands in place of his father with regard to an ancestral field. That is, if he purchased the field, his status is not that of another person who purchased it from the Temple treasury [in which case it is divided among the priests at the Jubilee]. Rather, when the son purchases it from the Temple treasury, the field returns to his father at the Jubilee. But if the brother or one of the other heirs purchased the field, it is as though a stranger purchased it, and at the Jubilee the field leaves his possession and is divided among the priests.

With regard to a Hebrew slave, one verse includes that the slave works even for someone else, while another verse excludes that the slave works for you and not for another. And since we find that the son stands in place of his father with regard to these two matters [designation and an ancestral field], it follows that also with regard to a Hebrew slave, the son stands in place of his father.

And just as the slave worked for his father, so he works for him. The verse included the son and excluded the brother and the other heirs.

But it is still possible to raise an objection to the words of the tanna:

On the contrary! I would include,

it seems more reasonable to me to include that the slave shall work

for the brother, since

we find that the brother of the deceased

stands in place of his brother for levirate marriage!

If a man dies without sons, the deceased’s brother performs yibbum with his wife. But the son does not perform yibbum with the wife of his deceased father.

And just as with regard to yibbum we find that the brother stands in place of his deceased brother, and not the son, so it would seem that also with regard to a Hebrew slave, the brother stands in place of his brother, and not the son.

And if so, it is difficult: Why did the tanna include that the slave works for the son and exclude that he works for the brother?

The tanna answers this:

Does yibbum apply anywhere except where there is no son!

The brother performs yibbum with the wife of his deceased brother only if the deceased has no son.

Indeed,

if he has

a son, there is no

law of

yibbum

at all, because the son stands in place of his father and removes the need for yibbum.

Therefore, no proof can be brought from the law of yibbum that the brother stands in place of his brother more than the son!

And since the son is superior to the brother with regard to designation and with regard to redeeming an ancestral field, it follows that it is reasonable to include that the son stands in place of his father also with regard to a Hebrew slave.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the concluding words of the beraita:

The tanna raised the difficulty: Why do we not include the brother, who stands in place of his brother for yibbum?

And he answered: The law of yibbum applies only where there is no son. It follows that the brother is not superior to the son with regard to yibbum.

And the Gemara infers from the words of the tanna:

Rather, the reason is only because of this objection,

the reason that the slave works for the son but not for the brother is solely because of the objection that “yibbum applies only where there is no son.”

And it implies:

Were it not so,

without this objection, I would say that since the

brother is superior

to the son with regard to yibbum, also with regard to a Hebrew slave the slave would work for the brother and not for the son.

But this is difficult: Even if we find that the brother is superior to the son with regard to yibbum, the son still has an advantage over the brother, because—

And let this be sufficient for me: Here there are two, whereas there there is one!

Since the son stands in place of his father with regard to two matters, designation and an ancestral field, whereas the brother stands in place of his brother only with regard to one matter, yibbum, the son is superior to the brother. How, then, could it have entered our minds to say that the brother is superior to the son?

And we answer:

With regard to

an ancestral field as well,

we would know the son’s superiority over the brother only

through this objection

that this

is derived for the tanna.

That is, even with regard to the son’s superiority over the brother in the case of an ancestral field, the tanna needed the teaching that the brother is not superior to the son with regard to yibbum, by means of the objection

“Does yibbum apply anywhere except where there is no son?”

For without this objection, the son would not have had an advantage over the brother even with regard to an ancestral field.

Since with regard to an ancestral field the Torah does not explicitly state that the son stands in place of his father; rather, it is stated there [Leviticus 27]:

“And if [the one who consecrated it] does not redeem the field, and if [the treasurer] sells the field to another man, the field shall be, when it leaves [the purchaser’s possession] at the Jubilee, for the priests.”

And the words “to another man” are superfluous.

The Sages expounded that the word “another” comes to say that specifically if the treasurer sold the field to a stranger, it does not return to the owners at the Jubilee. But if he sold it to a relative of the one who consecrated it, it returns to the owners at the Jubilee.

Whereas the word “man” comes to teach that there are relatives whose status is like that of “another”: If the treasurer sold them the field, it is divided among the priests at the Jubilee.

And the Sages explained that the verse teaches that the son is not like “another,” but the brother is like “another.”

And in a beraita in tractate Arakhin [25b] they asked: What have you seen that leads you to include the son to stand in place of his father with regard to an ancestral field, and to exclude the brother? Why should we not say the opposite? The tanna answered: I include the son, since he stands in place of his father with regard to designation, and therefore he stands in place of his father also with regard to an ancestral field.

And they challenged this: On the contrary! Let us include the brother, since he stands in place of his brother with regard to yibbum!

And the tanna answered this: “Does yibbum apply anywhere except where there is no son?” The brother performs yibbum with the wife of his deceased brother only if the deceased has no son. Indeed, if he has a son, there is no law of yibbum.

And with regard to an ancestral field, the tanna could not answer that the son’s power is superior in two matters, designation and a Hebrew slave, whereas the brother’s power is superior with regard to only one matter, yibbum, because with regard to a Hebrew slave the Torah does not explicitly state that he works for the son and not for the brother.

It follows that in the Torah we find explicitly that the son is superior only with regard to designation, and that the brother is superior only with regard to yibbum. But with regard to an ancestral field and a Hebrew slave, the Torah does not state whose power is superior: that of the son or that of the brother.

Therefore, also with regard to a Hebrew slave, the tanna taught this objection: “Does yibbum apply anywhere except where there is no son?”

But were it not for this objection, I would say: Just as the brother is superior to the son with regard to yibbum, so too he is superior with regard to a Hebrew slave. And it would not have been possible to answer that the son is superior to the brother in two matters [designation and an ancestral field], because without this objection I would not know that the son is indeed superior to the brother even with regard to the ancestral field itself.

We learned in the beraita:

A Hebrew maidservant does not work for either the son or the daughter.

And we raise an objection concerning this:

From where are these words derived,

from where did we learn this?

Rabbi Padda said: Since

in the Book of Deuteronomy [15:12–17], in the passage concerning a Hebrew slave, two laws that apply to a Hebrew slave are stated:

A. The mitzva of granting severance gifts.

B. The law of piercing the ear.

And immediately after the law of piercing the ear,

the verse says: “And likewise shall you do for your maidservant.”

The beraita below demonstrates that a Hebrew maidservant does not have her ear pierced.

And if so, it is necessarily impossible to interpret “And likewise shall you do for your maidservant” as teaching that her ear is pierced. Rather, it must be interpreted to mean that

the verse compared

the Hebrew maidservant

to

a

pierced slave:

Just as

as

a pierced slave does not serve either the son or the daughter [as will be explained below] —

so too, the Hebrew maidservant—

does not serve either the son or the daughter.

And we raise an objection to the statement of Rabbi Padda:

And this

is it the case that the verse, “And likewise

shall you do for your maidservant,” came for this purpose?

Did it come to teach us this exposition, that the maidservant does not serve the son?

This verse is needed for the matter taught in the beraita! The verse is necessary to teach us another law stated in the beraita:

And this is what they taught in the beraita: The verse

“And likewise shall you do for your maidservant,”

was stated with regard to

granting severance gifts.

Just as the passage stated above that severance gifts are granted to a pierced slave, so, too, they are granted to a maidservant.

And the tanna continues: Perhaps you will say, from where

do you say

that the verse was stated with regard to

granting severance gifts?

Or is it not so;

perhaps your statement is incorrect,

but

the verse refers

to piercing the ear,

to teach you that just as the slave has his ear pierced, so the maidservant has her ear pierced!

The answer is:

When it [when the verse]

says

concerning piercing [Exodus 21:5]: “

And if the slave shall clearly say: I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go free. And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl,” then the word “the slave”

comes to emphasize that only the slave has his ear pierced, and not the maidservant—

Thus the law of piercing is stated

and does not apply to a maidservant, but only to a slave. Consequently, the verse “And likewise shall you do for your maidservant” cannot be referring to the law of piercing.

If so,

then

how shall I understand

the verse

“And likewise shall you do for your maidservant”?

You must say that the verse speaks

of granting severance gifts

[with regard to the granting of severance gifts].

This concludes the statement of the beraita.

And from here there is a difficulty against Rabbi Padda:

For according to him, the verse “And likewise shall you do for your maidservant” compares the law of the maidservant to that of the pierced slave, teaching that the maidservant does not serve either the son or the daughter. Yet the beraita says that the verse teaches that the law of granting severance gifts applies to a maidservant as well!

We resolve Rabbi Padda’s statement:

Indeed, the verse compared the maidservant to the pierced slave, and this teaches that a maidservant does not serve the son, as Rabbi Padda said. Nevertheless, the tanna also learned from this verse that the law of granting severance gifts applies to a maidservant as well.

Because, if the verse had come only to compare the law of the maidservant to that of the pierced slave,

then the verse should have written

it would have been appropriate for the verse to say, “And likewise

for your maidservant.”

Why does it say “shall you do”?

Why is the word “shall you do” stated?

You learn two things from it.

From here we learn that the verse comes to teach two things:

a. “And likewise for your maidservant”—to compare her to the pierced slave, who serves neither the son nor the daughter.

b. “Shall you do”—to teach that granting severance gifts applies to a maidservant as well.

We learned in a beraita:

The pierced slave and

likewise

one sold to an idolater do not serve either the son or the daughter.

The Gemara cites a source for the statement of the beraita:

The

pierced slave

does not serve either the son or the daughter—

as it is written [Exodus 21]: “

And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall serve him forever.”

The verse says “and he shall serve him,” rather than “and he shall serve,” to teach that the slave serves him [the master] alone,

and not the son or the daughter.

One sold to an idolater—

from where

do we know that he does not serve either the son or the daughter?

Ḥizkiyya said: The verse says

concerning one sold to an idolater [Leviticus 25]: “

And he shall calculate with his purchaser

[the money of his redemption when he comes to go free].”

The verse says “his purchaser,” and not “the purchaser,” to indicate that he must calculate the redemption money only with his purchaser,

and not with the purchaser’s heirs.

For he goes free upon the master’s death without payment and need not redeem himself with money from the heirs.

And since the Gemara cited Ḥizkiyya’s exposition, “And he shall calculate with his purchaser, and not with the purchaser’s heirs,” it also cites Rava’s statement—

Rava said:

a.

By Torah law—

an idolater inherits

the property of

his father.

And the proof for this is:

as it is stated

concerning a Hebrew slave sold to an idolater: “

And he shall calculate with his purchaser.”

The verse says, “with his purchaser”—

and not with the purchaser’s heirs!

By inference

you learn from this

that

an idolater has

heirs.

It follows from the words of the verse that the gentile master has heirs who inherit his property. For if they do not inherit his property at all, why was it necessary for the verse to say that they do not inherit the Hebrew slave from their gentile father?

b.

A convert

who converted inherits

the

father who is an

idolater,

but this law

is not by Torah law,

for a convert who converts is like a newborn child and is not genealogically related to his father,

rather

this law is

by rabbinic ordinance.

Rava proves this from the statement of the Mishna [Demai 6:10]: An object of idol worship is forbidden for benefit. Wine used for libation and an offering to idol worship are likewise forbidden for benefit.

And just as an object of idol worship and wine used for libation are forbidden for benefit, so too their exchanges are forbidden for benefit.

And we learned concerning this matter in tractate Demai [there]:

Two brothers, one of whom was

a convert, and

the other was

an idolater, and they inherited their father

the

idolater,

and the inheritance included an object of idol worship, wine used for libation, and money—

Before the convert and the idolater divided the inheritance between them, the

convert may say to

his

idolater brother: You take the object of idol worship, and I

will take the

money.

Or

you take the wine used for libation, and I

will take the

money.

And the money in the Jew’s possession is permitted for benefit [and is not included among “the exchanges of idol worship,” which are forbidden for benefit; the reason for this will be explained below].

But all this applies only before each of the brothers has taken his portion.

But,

once they came into the possession of

the

convert,

once they had already divided the inheritance between them, and the object of idol worship and the wine used for libation fell to the convert’s share—

it is forbidden

for the convert to exchange them for the money taken by his gentile brother, since through this exchange he benefits from objects forbidden for benefit.

And

now,

if it would enter your mind

that a convert inherits his father

by Torah law,

then one must ask: Why, before they divided the inheritance, may the convert say to the idolater, “You take the object of idol worship and the wine used for libation, and I will take the money”?

For even

when [when]

they have not come into his possession, when he takes—

he is taking the exchange for idol worship!

For when their gentile father died, each brother acquired half of the object of idol worship and the wine used for libation, and half of the money. When the convert takes his share of the inheritance only in money, he is taking the money in place of the object of idol worship taken by his gentile brother, and this is an exchange of idol worship for money!

Rather,

it must be said that a convert inherits his gentile father only

by rabbinic ordinance

alone. The Sages granted the convert rights only to his father’s permitted property, and not to an object of idol worship or wine used for libation.

And why did the Sages institute that a convert inherits his gentile father?

It is a rabbinic decree,

the Sages instituted this enactment because, if the convert would not inherit his father, there was concern

perhaps

the convert

would return to his former ways

and revert to idolatry in order to inherit his father, since a gentile does inherit his father.

It was taught likewise,

even from the words of the following beraita it is evident that Rava is correct: The reason that the convert may say to the gentile, “You take the idolatry, and I will take the money,” is that the convert inherits his gentile father only by rabbinic enactment: For the beraita adds to the words of the Mishna and says:

Concerning that which we learned—that the convert may say to the gentile, “You take the idolatry, and I will take the money,”

when does this statement apply? —

When they inherited

idolatry and money from their gentile father.

But when they became partners,

if the convert and the gentile jointly purchased idolatry and money,

it is prohibited

for the convert to say to the gentile, “You take the idolatry, and I will take the money,” because he thereby derives benefit from idolatry, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit.

And the question arises: What is the difference between inheritance and partnership? Why, in the case of inheritance, may the convert say, “You take the idolatry,” whereas in the case of partnership is it prohibited?

Rather, from here there is proof of Rava’s statement: In the case of inheritance, it is permitted to say this because, by Torah law, a convert does not inherit any of his father’s estate, and the Sages instituted inheritance for him only in a permissible manner. But this reason does not apply in the case of partnership, since the convert’s share belongs to him by Torah law, as he purchased it.

3.

A gentile

whose father converted while he remained a gentile as before, and who wishes to inherit

his

father,

and

likewise, if he himself converted and his father also converted together with him, and he wishes to inherit

his

father,

the convert —

does not

inherit his father,

neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic enactment.

He does not inherit him by Torah law because, once the father converted, his son is no longer considered related to him, for when the father converted, he became like a newborn child, with no lineage.

And if the son converted, there is no concern that he might return to his former ways, since even a gentile does not inherit his convert father. Therefore, the Sages did not institute that a convert inherits his convert father.

And Rava proves this from the words of the beraita:

As we learned:

One who

borrowed money from a convert whose sons converted with him,

and the convert died,

may not repay his sons,

because they do not inherit him.

And if he repaid

his sons —

the Sages do not regard him favorably.

That is, by his actions he did not add satisfaction to the Sages, and they do not hold this deed to his credit, because they did not require him to do so.

And we raise a contradiction between the Mishna and the words of the beraita:

But did we not learn,

as we learned at the end of tractate Sheviit: One who borrowed money from a convert whose sons converted with him may not repay his sons. And if he repaid them —

the Sages regard him favorably!

And we resolve the contradiction:

It is not difficult!

Here,

the beraita in which we learned that the Sages do not regard him favorably is speaking of one

whose conception and birth

were

not in sanctity.

His mother conceived him while she was a gentile, and she also gave birth to him without having converted.