Kiddushin 17b — the Talmud in English

And we answer: If “winepress” had not been stated, I would say that “with which the Lord your God has blessed you” includes everything, even things that are not similar to a threshing floor and a winepress.

And therefore “winepress” was stated —

For this master,

according to Rabbi Shimon, “winepress” comes

to exclude money.

According to this master,

And for this master,

for Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, “winepress” comes

to exclude mules.

And the Gemara brings another beraita, which discusses the verses stated concerning the granting:

The Sages taught:

The Sages taught:

It was stated concerning the granting [Deuteronomy 15:14]:

“With which the Lord your God

has blessed you, you shall give him.”

And I

might

understand from the words of the verse that only if

the master’s household was blessed

because of him, the master

grants him

because of the slave

[the granting].

is a grant given to him.

But if

the master’s household was not blessed

because of him,

he does not grant him.

The verse teaches, therefore it was stated at the beginning of the verse:

“

You shall surely grant.”

The verse doubled the language of granting, in order to teach you that you shall grant him

in any event,

in every manner—whether the household was blessed because of him, or whether it was not blessed.

And since the verse includes that even if the household was not blessed because of him, one grants him,

if so

it is difficult:

What does the verse teach,

for what purpose was

“with which you have blessed” stated?

What does this verse come to teach us?—

Everything according to

the

blessing

with which the household was blessed—

give him

to the slave!

If the household was blessed because of the slave, add much to his granting. And if the household was not blessed, do not reduce from what the verse states.

These are the words of the first tanna.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah

disagrees, and

says: The words are as they are written.

says: The words are to be understood as written.

The words of the verse “with which the Lord your God has blessed you” should be explained according to their plain meaning: If

the master’s household was blessed

because of him,

he grants him.

And if

it was not blessed,

the

household because of him, he does not grant him.

And since according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, if the household was not blessed because of him, he does not grant him,

if so

it is difficult:

What does the verse teach,

for what purpose was

“You shall surely grant”

stated with doubled wording?

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah answers this:

The Torah spoke

the

language of human beings.

For this is the way of human beings, to speak with doubled wording. Therefore no exposition is to be derived from the doubling of the wording.

We learned in our Mishna [above 14b] what are the acquisitions of a Hebrew slave, a Hebrew maidservant, and one whose ear was pierced. And the death of the master was mentioned in our Mishna concerning a pierced slave, who acquires himself through the death of the master and does not work for the heirs.

And now the Gemara brings a beraita explaining the law of a Hebrew slave and a Hebrew maidservant upon the death of the master:

The Sages taught:

The Sages taught:

a.

A Hebrew slave,

after the death of the master—

works for the son,

the master’s son, who inherits his father, until the completion of his six years of servitude, or until the Jubilee, if the Jubilee occurred within the six years.

And

if the master dies without sons—

he does not work for the daughter,

even though the daughter inherits her father when he has no sons.

b.

A Hebrew maidservant,

after the death of the master—

does not work for either the son or the daughter

of the master, because the death of the master takes her out to freedom.

c.

The pierced one, and

likewise a Hebrew slave

sold to a gentile—

One whose ear has been pierced, and

does not work for either the son or the daughter,

because the death of the master takes him out to freedom.

And the Gemara explains the words of the beraita:

The master said

[the tanna] in the beraita:

a.

A Hebrew slave works for the son, but does not work for the daughter.

And we raise the question:

From where are these words,

from where did the tanna learn this?

And we answer: From this

that the Sages taught:

It was stated concerning a Hebrew slave [Deuteronomy 15:12]: “When your brother, a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman, is sold to you,

and he shall serve you six years.”

Since “and he shall serve you” was stated, and “and he shall serve” was not stated, it implies that the verse comes to say that the slave shall work only

for you

[the purchaser] alone,

and not for an heir,

for the other heirs, except for the son.

And the tanna continues:

Perhaps you will say: From where do you have this, that

you say

in the intention of the verse that the slave shall work only

for you, and not

for your heir,

but he will continue to work for the son?

Or perhaps he does not,

perhaps your words are not correct,

but rather

“and he shall serve you” teaches that he shall work only

for you

alone,

and not

even work for

your son,

just as he will not work for the other heirs?

Your answer is:

When it

when the verse

says

[Exodus 21] concerning a Hebrew slave, “

For six years he shall serve,”

and it does not say “he shall serve you,” it implies that he will not work only for you, but also for someone else who will come in your place—he will work for him—

Behold,

this, that the Hebrew slave will work after the death of the master

for the son

of the master,

is stated

in the verse.

And from here you learn that the slave works for the son after the death of the master.

And perhaps you will ask:

What then,

how

do I establish

the words of the verse

“and he shall serve you six years”,

which implies that the slave shall work only “for you,” and not for any other person?—

Your answer is: Thus you must expound it:

For you

alone shall he work,

and not for an heir,

except for the son.

And perhaps you will ask:

What have you seen to include

a Hebrew slave, that he should work

for the son

from the verse “for six years he shall serve,”

and to exclude,

that he should not work

for the brother

[or for the other heirs], from the verse “and he shall serve you six years”?

But it is possible to say the opposite: From the verse “for six years he shall serve” we shall include that he shall work even for the brother or the other heirs, whereas from the verse “and he shall serve you” we shall learn that he shall work for you, but not for the son!

Your answer is:

I include the son, since

we find that the son is superior to the brother, since the son

stands in place of

[in place of]

his father

with regard to two matters:

[a]

designation —

a person who has a Hebrew maidservant may designate her, to acquire her as a wife through the money with which she was acquired as a maidservant. And just as he can designate her for himself, so he can designate her also for his son, as it is stated [Exodus 21]: “And if he designates her for his son.”

But the master cannot designate the maidservant for his brother.

[b]

And an ancestral field—

one who consecrates his ancestral field, can redeem it, and must give for its redemption fifty silver shekels to the Temple treasury for a place of a kor of barley seed. And if the one who consecrated it did not redeem it, and the treasurer managed to sell it to another person, then the field remains in the purchaser’s possession until the Jubilee year. And at the Jubilee it leaves the possession of the purchaser and is divided among the priests, and it does not return to the one who consecrated it. And if the son of the one who consecrated it bought the field from the treasurer, it returns at the Jubilee into the possession of his father, and it is not divided among the priests.

And from here there is proof that the son stands in place of his father with regard to an ancestral field. That is, if he bought the field, his law is not like the law of another person who bought it from the consecrated property [in which case it is divided at the Jubilee among the priests]; rather, when the son buys it from the consecrated property, the field returns to his father at the Jubilee. But if the brother or one of the other heirs bought the field, it is as one who is a stranger bought it, and at the Jubilee the field leaves his possession and is divided among the priests.

And concerning a Hebrew slave, one verse includes that the slave works even for someone else, and one verse excludes, that the slave works for you and not for another. And since we have found that the son stands in place of his father with regard to these two matters [designation and an ancestral field], therefore it is logical that also concerning a Hebrew slave, the son stands in place of his father.

And just as the slave worked for his father, so he works for him. And the verse included the son and excluded the brother and the other heirs.

But it is still possible to raise a difficulty against the words of the tanna:

On the contrary! I include,

it seems more logical to me to include that the slave shall work

for the brother, since

we find that the brother of the deceased

stands in place of his brother for levirate marriage!

If a man dies without sons, the brother of the deceased performs levirate marriage with his wife. But the son does not perform levirate marriage with the wife of his father who died.

And just as with regard to levirate marriage we find that the brother stands in place of his deceased brother, and not the son, so it is logical that also with regard to a Hebrew slave, the brother stands in place of his brother, and not the son.

And if so, it is difficult: Why did the tanna include that the slave works for the son, and exclude that he works for the brother?

The tanna answers this:

Is there levirate marriage except where there is no son!

For the brother performs levirate marriage with the wife of his deceased brother only if the deceased has no son.

Therefore,

if he has a

son, there is no

law of

levirate marriage

at all, because the son stands in place of his father and removes the need for levirate marriage.

Therefore no proof can be brought from the law of levirate marriage that the brother stands in place of his brother more than the son!

And since the son is superior to the brother with regard to designation and with regard to the redemption of an ancestral field, therefore it is logical to include that the son stands in place of his father also with regard to a Hebrew slave.

Thus far the words of the beraita.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against the end of the beraita:

The tanna raised the difficulty: Why do we not include the brother, who stands in place of his brother for levirate marriage?

And concerning this he answered: There is no law of levirate marriage except where there is no son. It follows that the brother is not superior to the son with regard to levirate marriage.

And the Gemara infers from the words of the tanna:

Rather, the reason is only because there is this refutation,

the reason that the slave works for the son and not for the brother is only because of the refutation that “there is no levirate marriage except where there is no son.”

And it implies:

If not for this,

without this refutation, I would say that since the

brother is superior

to the son with regard to levirate marriage, also with regard to a Hebrew slave, the slave would work for the brother and not for the son.

And this is difficult: Even if we find that the brother is superior to the son with regard to levirate marriage, the son still has an advantage over the brother, because—

And let this follow for me: here there are two, and here there is one!

Since the son stands in place of his father for two matters, designation and an ancestral field, whereas the brother stands in place of his brother only for one law, levirate marriage, the son is superior to the brother. How, then, would it enter our minds to say that the brother is superior to the son?

And we answer: Even with regard to

an ancestral field,

we would not know the son’s superiority over the brother except

from this refutation—

through this objection

it is derived for him

from this,

for the tanna.

is derived for the tanna.

That is, even with regard to the son’s superiority over the brother concerning an ancestral field, the tanna needed the teaching that the brother is not superior to the son in levirate marriage, by means of the refutation

“Is there levirate marriage except where there is no son?”

For without this refutation, the son would not have had superiority over the brother even with regard to an ancestral field.

Since concerning an ancestral field it is not stated explicitly in the Torah that the son stands in place of his father, but it is stated there [Leviticus 27]:

“ And if [the one who consecrated it] does not redeem the field, and if [the treasurer] sells the field to another man, then the field shall be, when it goes out at the Jubilee, for the priests.”

And the words “to another man” are superfluous.

And the Sages expounded that the word “another” comes to say that specifically if the treasurer sells the field to a stranger, it does not return to the owners at the Jubilee. But if he sells it to a relative of the one who consecrated it, it returns to the owners at the Jubilee.

Whereas the word “man” comes to teach that there are relatives whose law is like that of “another,” such that if the treasurer sells the field to them, it is divided among the priests at the Jubilee.

And the Sages explained that the verse teaches that the son is not like “another,” but the brother is like “another.”

And they asked in a beraita in tractate Arakhin [25b]: What have you seen to include the son and exclude the brother? And why should we not say the opposite? And the tanna answered: I include the son, since he stands in place of his father for designation, and therefore he stands in place of his father also with regard to an ancestral field. Rashi. And behold, the Gemara there adds: since he stands in place of his father for designation “and for a Hebrew slave.” Rashi did not copy “a Hebrew slave,” because concerning a Hebrew slave it is not stated explicitly that the son stands in place of his father, as explained in our sugya. Rather, this too is learned from the law of designation.

And they raised a difficulty against this: On the contrary! Let us include the brother, since he stands in place of his brother for levirate marriage!

And the tanna answered this: “Is there levirate marriage except where there is no son?” For the brother performs levirate marriage with the wife of his deceased brother only if the deceased has no son; therefore, if he has a son, there is no law of levirate marriage.

And concerning an ancestral field, the tanna could not answer that the son’s power is superior in two matters, designation and a Hebrew slave, whereas the brother’s power is superior in levirate marriage alone, since concerning a Hebrew slave it is not stated explicitly in the Torah that he works for the son and not for the brother.

It follows that in the Torah we find explicitly that the son is superior only with regard to designation, and the brother is superior only with regard to levirate marriage. But concerning an ancestral field and a Hebrew slave, it is not stated in the Torah whose power is superior: that of the son or that of the brother.

Therefore, also concerning a Hebrew slave, the tanna taught this refutation: “Is there levirate marriage except where there is no son?”

But without this refutation, I would say: Just as the brother is superior to the son with regard to levirate marriage, so he is superior with regard to a Hebrew slave. And it would not be possible to answer that the son is superior to the brother in two matters [designation and an ancestral field], since without this refutation I would not know that the son is indeed superior to the brother even with regard to an ancestral field itself.

We learned in the beraita:

The Hebrew maidservant does not work for either the son or the daughter.

And we raise the question:

From where are these words,

from where did we learn this?

Rabbi Padda said: For

in the Book of Deuteronomy [15:12–17], in the passage concerning a Hebrew slave, two laws that apply to a Hebrew slave were stated:

A. The mitzva of granting gifts.

B. The law of piercing.

And immediately after the law of piercing,

the verse says: “And likewise shall you do to your maidservant.”

And below the beraita proves that the Hebrew maidservant is not pierced.

And if so, it is necessarily impossible to interpret “and likewise shall you do to your maidservant” as saying that she is pierced; rather, it must be interpreted that

the verse likened

the Hebrew maidservant

to the

slave

who is pierced:

Just as

just as

one who is pierced does not serve either the son or the daughter

[as will be explained below] —

So too the Hebrew maidservant—

she does not serve either the son or the daughter.

And we raise an objection to the words of Rabbi Padda:

But this

And does the verse “and likewise

shall you do to your maidservant”—come for this?

And does it come to teach us this exposition, that the maidservant does not serve the son?

It is needed for this, as it was taught!

For this verse is needed to teach us another law brought in the beraita:

And so they taught in a beraita: The verse

“and likewise shall you do to your maidservant,”

was stated concerning

granting gifts.

Just as it was stated earlier in the passage that gifts are granted to a slave who is pierced, so too gifts are granted to the maidservant.

And the tanna continues and says: Perhaps you will say, from where

do you say

that the verse was stated concerning

granting gifts?

Or is it not so,

perhaps your words are not correct,

but

the verse refers

to piercing,

to teach you that just as the slave is pierced, so the maidservant is pierced!

Your answer:

When it

[the verse]

says

concerning piercing [Exodus 21:5]: “

And if the slave shall surely say:

I love my master, my wife, and my children; I shall not go free. And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl,” the word “the slave” comes to emphasize that only the slave is pierced, and not the maidservant—

Behold, the law of piercing is stated

as not applying to the maidservant, but only to the slave. And necessarily the verse “and likewise shall you do to your maidservant” does not speak concerning the law of piercing.

Then,

if so,

how do I establish

the verse

“and likewise shall you do to your maidservant”?

Under compulsion, the verse speaks

of granting gifts

[concerning the granting of gifts].

This concludes the words of the beraita.

And from here there is a difficulty against Rabbi Padda:

For according to his words, the verse “and likewise shall you do to your maidservant” compares the law of the maidservant to the law of one who is pierced, to teach that the maidservant does not serve either the son or the daughter. Whereas the beraita says that the verse teaches that the law of granting gifts applies even to the maidservant!

And we answer Rabbi Padda’s words:

Indeed, the verse compared the maidservant to one who is pierced, and this comes to teach that the maidservant does not serve the son, as Rabbi Padda says. Nevertheless, the tanna also learned from this verse that the law of granting gifts applies even to the maidservant.

Because, if the verse had come only to compare the law of the maidservant to the law of one who is pierced,

then the verse should have written,

it would have been appropriate for the verse to write “and likewise

to your maidservant.”

Why “shall you do”?

Why was “shall you do” stated?

You may infer two things.

From here we learn that the verse comes to make two things known:

a. “And likewise to your maidservant”—to compare her to one who is pierced, who does not serve either the son or the daughter.

b. “Shall you do”—to teach that granting gifts applies even to the maidservant.

We learned in a beraita:

The pierced one and

likewise

one sold to an idolater do not serve either the son or the daughter.

And the Gemara brings a source for the words of the beraita:

The

pierced one

does not serve either the son or the daughter—

as it is written

“And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall serve him forever.”

The verse said “and he shall serve him,” and did not say “and he shall serve,” to teach that the slave shall serve him [the master] alone,

and not the son, and not the daughter.

One sold to an idolater—

from where

is it established

that he does not serve either the son or the daughter?

Hezekiah said: The verse says

concerning one sold to an idolater [Leviticus 25]:

“And he shall reckon with his purchaser”

[the money of his redemption when he comes to go out to freedom].

The verse said “his purchaser,” and did not say “the purchaser,” in order to say that he must reckon the money of redemption with his purchaser alone,

and not with his purchaser’s heirs.

For he goes out to freedom upon the death of the master without payment, and he does not need to redeem himself with money from the heirs.

And since the Gemara brought Hezekiah’s exposition, “and he shall reckon with his purchaser, and not with his purchaser’s heirs,” it also brings the words of Rava—

Rava said:

a.

By Torah law—

an idolater inherits

property

from his father.

And the proof of this is:

as it is stated

concerning a Hebrew slave sold to an idolater:

“And he shall reckon with his purchaser.”

The verse said “with his purchaser”—

“and not with his purchaser’s heirs!”

By implication

you learn from this

that he has

an idolater

heirs.

It follows from the words of the verse that the foreign master has heirs who inherit his property, for if they do not inherit his property at all, why was it necessary for the verse to say that they do not inherit the Hebrew slave from their foreign father?

b.

A convert

who converted inherits

from

his father, the

idolater,

but this law

is not from Torah law,

for a convert who converted is like a newborn child, and he is not considered related to his father,

but

this law is

from the words of the Scribes.

And Rava proves this from the words of the Mishna [Demai 6:10]: Idolatry is prohibited for benefit. And likewise libation wine and the offerings of idolatry are prohibited for benefit.

And just as idolatry and libation wine are prohibited for benefit, so too their exchanges are prohibited for benefit.

And we learned concerning this in tractate Demai [there]:

Two brothers, one of whom was

a convert, and

the other was

an idolater, who inherited their father

the

idolater,

and there were in the inheritance idolatry, libation wine, and money—

then, before the convert and the idolater divided the inheritance between them, the

convert may say to

his

idolater brother: You take idolatry, and I

will take the

money.

Or,

you take libation wine, and I

will take the

money.

And the money in the Israelite’s possession is permitted for benefit [and is not included within “the exchanges of idolatry,” which are prohibited for benefit; the reason for this will be explained below].

But all this applies only before each of the brothers has taken his share.

But,

once they came into the possession of

the

convert,

for they had already divided the inheritance between them, and idolatry and libation wine fell to the convert’s share—

it is forbidden

for the convert to exchange them for money that his gentile brother took, for through this exchange he benefits from things prohibited for benefit.

But

behold,

if it should enter your mind

that a convert inherits from his father

by Torah law,

then there is a difficulty: Why, before they divided the inheritance, may the convert say to the idolater, “You take idolatry and libation wine, and I will take the money”?

For even

when

[when]

they have not come into his possession, when he takes—

it is the exchange of idolatry that he is taking!

For when their gentile father died, each brother acquired half of the idolatry and libation wine, and half of the money. And when the convert takes from the inheritance only his portion in money, he takes it in place of the idolatry that his gentile brother takes, and this is exchanging idolatry for money!

Rather,

it is necessarily necessary to say that a convert does not inherit his gentile father אלא

only by rabbinic law.

And the Sages granted the convert rights only in his father’s permitted property, and not in idolatry and libation wine.

And why did the Sages institute that a convert inherits his gentile father?

It is a decree that the Sages made,

they instituted a regulation because, if the convert would not inherit his father, there is a concern

perhaps

the convert

will return to his former ways

to idolatry in order to inherit his father. For the gentile does inherit his father.

It was also taught so,

even from the words of the following beraita it is proven in accordance with Rava's words: the reason for the matter that the convert may say to the gentile, "You take the idolatry, and I will take the money," is that the convert does not inherit his gentile father except by rabbinic enactment: for the beraita adds to the words of the Mishna and says:

This that we learned, that the convert may say to the gentile, "You take the idolatry, and I will take the money,"

In what circumstances is this statement said? —

When they inherited

idolatry and money from their gentile father.

But when they became partners,

if the convert and the gentile purchased idolatry and money in partnership,

it is forbidden

for the convert to say to the gentile, "You take the idolatry, and I will take the money," because he benefits from idolatry, which is forbidden to benefit from.

And the question is asked: What is the difference between inheritance and partnership? Why, in the case of inheritance, may the convert say, "You take the idolatry," whereas in the case of partnership it is forbidden?

Rather, from here there is proof for Rava's words: in the case of inheritance, it is permitted to say this, because by Torah law the convert does not inherit anything from his father's property, and the Sages instituted inheritance for him only in a permitted manner. But this reason does not apply to partnership, for the convert's share belongs to him by Torah law, because he acquired it.

G.

A gentile

whose father converted, while he himself remained a gentile as at first, and wishes to inherit

his

father,

the convert, and

likewise, if he himself converted and his father also converted with him, and he wishes to inherit

his

father,

the convert —

does not

inherit his father,

neither by the words of Torah nor by the words of the Scribes.

By the words of Torah he does not inherit: because once the father converted, his son is no longer affiliated with him, for when the father converted, he was like a child newly born, without lineage.

And if the son converted, there is no concern that perhaps he will return to his former ways, for even a gentile does not inherit his convert father. Therefore, the Sages did not institute that a convert inherits his convert father.

And Rava proves this from the words of the beraita:

For we learned:

one who

borrowed money from a convert whose sons converted with him,

and the convert died,

should not return it to his sons,

because they do not inherit him.

And if he returned it

to his sons —

the spirit of the Sages is not pleased with him.

That is, by his actions he did not add satisfaction for the Sages; they do not hold this to his credit, because they did not require him to do so.

And we raise a contradiction from the Mishna against the words of the beraita:

But we learned,

for we learned at the end of tractate Sheviit: one who borrowed money from a convert whose sons converted with him should not return it to his sons. And if he returned it —

the spirit of the Sages is pleased with him!

And we answer:

It is not difficult!

Here,

the beraita in which we learned that the spirit of the Sages is not pleased with him is speaking of one

whose conception and birth

were

not in sanctity.

His mother conceived him while she was a gentile, and she also gave birth to him without having converted.