Kiddushin 20a (כ.) — the Talmud in English

The verse teaches

that

he may sell her

to relatives, who have no capacity to effect kiddushin with her, because she is forbidden to them by a prohibition whose punishment is karet.

Were it not for the teaching of the verse, I would have said that since designation is impossible with relatives, her sale to them should likewise not be a valid sale.

And Rabbi Eliezer challenges his words: Why did the verse need to say “to be a maidservant” in order to teach us this?

Is this not a matter of logical inference,

as it can be derived by a kal va-chomer:

For we have already learned from the verse, “If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master,” that the father may sell his daughter to those disqualified from marrying her. This teaching of the verse is itself a novelty, because it would have been reasonable to prohibit the father from selling his daughter to those disqualified, such as a mamzer or Natin, for two reasons: [

a] One who sells his daughter to a mamzer or Natin causes her disgrace. [

b] Since kiddushin takes effect with her, there is concern that the master might designate her and thereby come to the stumbling block of an illicit marriage.

And the verse, “If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master,” teaches that the Torah did not take these considerations into account; rather, it permitted the father to sell his daughter to those disqualified.

If so, a kal va-chomer can be derived from here concerning relatives:

If

the father sells her

to those disqualified,

even though he thereby causes her disgrace or a stumbling block, is it possible to say that he

may not sell her to relatives?!]

With relatives, there is no disgrace, and it is likewise impossible to come to the stumbling block of an illicit marriage, since marriage does not take effect with them at all!

And since it can be derived by a kal va-chomer that the father may sell his daughter to relatives, the following difficulty arises: Why did the verse need to say “to be a maidservant” in order to teach us this? It should be possible to derive it from the fact that the father may sell his daughter to those disqualified!

And Rabbi Eliezer answers that the kal va-chomer can be refuted:

What is distinctive about selling her to those disqualified

is that the reason he may sell her to them is

that if

the disqualified master

wishes to designate

her, he

designates

her, because kiddushin takes effect with her for him. It is therefore possible to fulfill in a sale to those disqualified all the laws stated in the Torah concerning a Hebrew maidservant!

If so, is it possible to derive from this by a kal va-chomer that he

may sell her to relatives, such that

in a sale to them,

if

the master

wishes to designate

his relative, he

does not designate her;

designation does not take effect with her at all, and she does not become betrothed through it. It is therefore impossible to fulfill with her the law of designation stated in the Torah concerning a Hebrew maidservant!

If so, it cannot be derived from the fact that the father sells her to those disqualified that he may also sell her to relatives.

Therefore,

the verse says:

the verse needed to say

“

to be a maidservant” —

the verse

teaches that he may sell her to relatives.

It follows that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree over whether a person may sell his daughter to relatives. According to Rabbi Eliezer, “to be a maidservant” teaches that he may sell her to relatives. According to the Rabbis, “to be a maidservant” teaches that he may sell her to those disqualified with whom kiddushin takes effect. But it does not teach that he may sell her to relatives. Therefore, a person may not sell his daughter to relatives.

This concludes the words of the beraita.

According to this beraita, the Gemara’s earlier difficulty is resolved:

The Sages said above that if one sells his daughter and stipulates with the master that he will not be able to designate her, his stipulation is void. We challenged this above: Rabbi Meir derives from the verse “to be a maidservant” that the father may sell her only as a maidservant and not for designation! What, then, will the Sages derive from the word “to be a maidservant”?

According to the beraita that we have just cited, it is understandable that the Sages will derive from “to be a maidservant” that the father may sell her to those disqualified [as the Rabbis maintain in this beraita], or that he may sell her to relatives [as Rabbi Eliezer maintains].

But according to this, a difficulty arises: Rabbi Meir derives from “to be a maidservant” that the father may stipulate with the master that he is selling her only as a maidservant. If so, from where does he know that the father may not sell her to those disqualified or to relatives?

And the Gemara answers this:

And Rabbi Meir,

the sale

to those disqualified —

he derives it from the same place from which Rabbi Eliezer derives it.

Rabbi Meir learned the law that he may sell her to those disqualified from the same source from which Rabbi Eliezer learned it: namely, from the verse, “If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master,” meaning that she is “displeasing” because of the marriage into which she would enter.

But

with regard to

the sale to

relatives —

he follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that he may not sell her to relatives.

If so, according to Rabbi Meir, the verse “to be a maidservant” does not come to teach that he may sell her to relatives or to those disqualified. For him, it is superfluous, and he interprets it to mean that the father may sell his daughter only as a maidservant, without designation.

The Gemara cites several beraitot concerning the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding the sale of a maidservant to relatives:

One tanna taught

in one beraita: If one wishes to sell his daughter as a maidservant to his relatives,

he may sell her to his father,

but

he may not sell her to his son [the words of the beraita will be explained below].

the explanation of this beraita will be given below].

And another taught

in another beraita:

He may sell her neither to his father nor to his son.

And we raised a question:

Granted,

it is understandable what is taught in the second beraita,

“He may sell her neither to his father nor to his son,”

because this beraita maintains

the opinion of the Rabbis,

who say that it is impossible to sell a daughter as a maidservant to relatives with whom designation cannot take effect at all.

But

the first beraita, which says

“He may sell her to his father, but he may not sell her to his son” —

according to whom

does it follow?

Not according to the Rabbis,

for according to them he may not sell her to relatives with whom he cannot perform designation, and neither his father nor his son can perform designation! If so, why does the beraita say, “He may sell her to his father”?

And not according to Rabbi Eliezer,

for according to him he may sell her to relatives! If so, why does the beraita say, “But he may not sell her to his son”?

If so, the difficulty remains: According to whose opinion does this beraita hold?

And we answer:

Actually,

this beraita follows

the opinion of the Rabbis,

who say that he may not sell her to relatives with whom the law of designation cannot be fulfilled.

And this beraita teaches that

the Rabbis concede where there is an aspect of designation,

that the Rabbis concede that it is not necessary for the purchaser himself to be able to designate the maidservant. Even if his son can designate her, it is considered that there is an “aspect of designation” with her [one manner in which the law of designation can be fulfilled].

Therefore, a person may sell his daughter to his father. Although his father himself cannot designate her, since she is his granddaughter and a person is forbidden to marry his son’s daughter, he can nevertheless designate her for his son, since a person is permitted to marry his brother’s daughter.

But a person may not sell his daughter to his son, because the son himself cannot designate the maidservant, since she is his sister; nor can the son’s son designate her, because she is his father’s sister, and a person is forbidden to marry his father’s sister.

The Sages taught:

It is stated concerning a Hebrew slave [Exodus 21:3]:

“If he enters alone” —

“he shall leave alone.”

The verse teaches that if, at the time of the sale,

the slave enters with his body

into the master’s possession, then

“he shall leave with his body.”

These are the words of the Sages. The Gemara below will explain their intent.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

Indeed, “alone” means with his body, as the Sages explained, but this verse comes to teach us something else:

If he

enters alone — he

leaves alone.

The Gemara below explains the intent of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

First, the Gemara explains the words of the Sages:

What

did the Sages mean when they derived from the verse that if he

“enters with his body, he leaves with his body”?

Rava said:

The verse comes

to say that

if a Hebrew slave’s master blinds his eye or removes one of his limbs , he

does not leave

free

through the loss of limbs, like a Canaanite slave.

And this is what the verse says: “If he enters alone,” if the slave enters his master’s possession with his body intact, then “he shall leave alone,” meaning that in every case he leaves with his body intact.

That is, even if his master deprived him of a limb, we do not say that his law is like that of a Canaanite slave, whose master sends him free and is exempt from paying him the value of the limb he removed. Rather, since he is a Hebrew slave, if his master deprived him of a limb, the master must pay him the value of that limb. But he does not go free.

This is why the verse calls it “he shall leave alone”: The master pays him the value of the limb he deprived him of, and he leaves at the completion of his years of service as though his body were intact.

Abaye said

to Rava: Your statement is difficult —

The law

itself

that you stated, that a Hebrew slave does not go free through the loss of limbs,

is derived from “He shall not leave as the slaves leave”!

This law is derived from what is stated concerning a Hebrew maidservant [Exodus 21:7]: “She shall not leave as the slaves leave.”

The verse teaches that the maidservant does not go free through the loss of limbs, as Canaanite slaves do.

Rava answered him:

If it were from there,

if you were to derive from there [from “She shall not leave as the slaves leave”] that a Hebrew slave does not go free through the loss of limbs, then

I would have thought

that the verse did not come to teach that the maidservant does not go free through the loss of limbs. Rather, this is the meaning of the verse: “

She shall not leave [the maidservant] as the slaves leave”: Slaves go free through the loss of limbs, but they do not receive payment for the value of the limb from the owners. The maidservant, by contrast, goes free through the loss of limbs and also receives the value of the limb from her master.

And similarly, I would have said concerning a Hebrew slave whose master removed one of his limbs, such as his eye, that

he should give him

the master should return to him

the value of her eye,

that is, his eye,

and he should go out,

and he should also go free.

Therefore,

it teaches us,

the verse “If he enters alone, he shall leave alone,” which is superfluous, teaches us that the slave does not go free through the loss of limbs at all.

The Gemara now explains the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov:

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

The verse “If he enters alone” teaches that if he

enters alone,

then

he leaves alone.

And we raised a question:

What

is the meaning of

“he leaves alone”?

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This is what he is saying:

This is what Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov intended to say in explaining the verse:

Only if, when the slave enters his master’s possession, he

has a wife and children,

then

his master gives him a Canaanite maidservant

so that she will bear children from him for the master, even against the slave’s will.

But “if he enters alone,” if, when the slave enters his master’s possession, he

does not have a wife and children,

then likewise “he shall leave alone,” meaning that

his master does not give him a Canaanite maidservant.

We learned in the Mishna [above, 14b] that a Hebrew slave goes free through payment of the depreciated value, and the Gemara cites a beraita concerning this:

The Sages taught:

A slave who

was sold

to his master for six years

for a maneh

[one hundred zuz],

and appreciated in value

[meaning that his labor became more valuable, or that he improved himself and increased in strength],

and reached two hundred zuz,

which is two manehs, and now the slave comes to deduct from his value in order to redeem himself and go free—

there is room to discuss how his value should properly be assessed: according to his present value, or according to the money that the master received for him?

For example, if the slave comes to redeem himself after five years, with one year of his servitude still remaining, then, if his value is calculated according to his present worth, it follows that each year's labor is worth one-third of a maneh. [1/3=2/6].

But if his value is calculated according to the money that the master received for him, it follows that each year's labor is worth one-sixth of a maneh [1/6=1/6].

The question therefore arises: Must the slave pay one-third of a maneh, or need he pay only one-sixth of a maneh?

The tanna says regarding this:

From where

do I know

that they calculate for him

with regard to his redemption

only

according to

one maneh

, the amount that the master received for him?

The verse states,

for this reason it is stated [Leviticus 25] concerning a Hebrew slave who was sold to a gentile [and seeks to leave his master by deducting money]: “

If many years remain, according to them he shall return his redemption

from the money of his purchase.”

That is, he returns his redemption [the money of his release] according to the money of his purchase [the sum for which he was acquired], and not according to what he is worth now.

From here there is proof that each year's labor is assessed at one-sixth of a maneh, and not at one-third of a maneh.

B. The beraita explains another law:

A slave who

was sold

to his master

for two hundred zuz

[for two manehs],

and depreciated in value,

meaning that he deteriorated,

and reached one maneh

alone.

Apparently, one should say that we follow the money of his purchase, as stated above. But the tanna teaches that in this case we follow the slave's value at the time of redemption:

From where do I know that they calculate for him only

according to

one maneh,

according to what he is worth at the time of redemption?

The verse states,

for this reason it is stated [there]: “And if few years remain,”

according to his years

he shall return his redemption.” “

According to his years” means according to the value of the years now, and not according to the money that the master received for them [at the time of the sale].

From here it follows that each year is assessed at one-sixth of a maneh, and not at one-third of a maneh.

Below, the Gemara will explain why the calculation always proceeds to the benefit of the slave and to the detriment of his master.

C. The tanna continues and says:

From the verses cited thus far,

I have no

source

except

for a

slave

who is a Hebrew

sold to a gentile,

but not for one sold to a Jew.

There is room to distinguish between them and say that only in the case of one sold to a gentile do we proceed to the detriment of the master,

since

the Torah stated that he

is redeemed by relatives,

against the master's will, thereby revealing that the Torah considers the master's

hand

to be

lower.

Therefore, even with regard to the redemption payment, consideration is given to the slave's benefit and to the master's detriment.

But

one sold to a Jew,

who is not redeemed by relatives against the master's will, might likewise not have the master's hand lower with regard to redemption. If so,

from where,

do we know that even in the case of one sold to a Jew, the calculation concerning his redemption payment proceeds to the master's detriment?

The verse states “a hired laborer, a hired laborer,” by means of a verbal analogy.

It is stated concerning one sold to a Jew: “As a hired laborer, as a resident, he shall be with you” [Leviticus 25], and it is stated concerning one sold to a gentile [there]: “As a hired laborer, year by year, he shall be with him.”

We derive the law of one sold to a Jew from the law of one sold to a gentile—

Just as, in the case of one sold to a gentile, the master's hand is lower with regard to redemption, so too, in the case of one sold to a Jew, the master's hand is lower with regard to redemption.

This concludes the words of the beraita.

The Gemara cites an incident involving Abaye, who explained the words of the beraita:

One day

Abaye said:

I am

prepared to answer all who question me with depth and sharpness,

like

the

son of Azzai,

who was sharp and expounded

in the marketplaces of Tiberias,

and used to say of himself: “All the Sages of Israel are before me like the peel of garlic” [Bekhorot 58a].

One of the Sages said to him

[a student who heard Abaye's proclamation]

to Abaye:

I have a question concerning the words of the beraita that the Gemara cited above:

For we learned in the first clause: “He was sold for one maneh, appreciated in value, and reached two hundred zuz. From where do we know that they calculate for him only one maneh? As it is stated: ‘From the money of his purchase’”—from here it follows that we follow the money the master received, and not the slave's present value.

And in the latter clause we learned: “He was sold for two hundred zuz, depreciated in value, and reached one maneh. From where do we know that they calculate for him only one maneh? The verse states: ‘According to his years’”—from here it follows that we follow the value of the slave's years, and not the money that the master received for him.

This is difficult: The verses cited in the beraita contradict one another [“from the money of his purchase” indicates that we follow the purchase price, whereas “according to his years” indicates that we follow the slave's present value]. Necessarily, one must say that each verse speaks of a different circumstance. But this requires examination—

Now,

these

verses can be expounded leniently, and they can be expounded stringently.

Since it is possible to interpret the verses in such a way that we always act leniently toward the slave [if he appreciated in value, we follow the time of his sale, and if he deteriorated, we follow the time of his redemption],

and it is also possible to interpret the verses stringently toward the slave [if he appreciated in value, we follow his present worth, and if he deteriorated, we follow the time of the sale], if so—

What have you seen that you interpret them leniently? Let us interpret them

stringently—

what have you seen that leads you to interpret the verses in the manner lenient toward the slave? On the contrary! Let us interpret the verses in the manner stringent toward the slave!

Abaye answered that student:

That cannot enter your mind,

do not entertain the possibility of being stringent toward the slave! For it can be demonstrated that it is appropriate to be lenient toward the slave,

since the Merciful One was lenient with regard to him,

as we find that the Holy One, blessed be He, was lenient with him concerning another matter, as we learned in a beraita:

As it was taught:

It is stated concerning a Hebrew slave [Deuteronomy 15]:

“For it is good for him with you.”

The word “with you” is superfluous, and the Sages expound it:

“With you” in food, and “with you” in drink.

You shall not

the master

eat fine bread

made from sifted flour,

while he

[the slave]

eats coarse bread

made from unsifted flour. [This is the meaning of “with you” in food.]

Similarly, you shall not have

you

the master

drink aged wine, while he

the slave

drinks new wine.

Similarly, you shall not have

you

the master

sleep on soft cushions,

while

he

the slave

sleeps on straw

that is hard.

From here the Sages said,

the Sages:

Anyone who acquires a Hebrew slave

has thereby

acquired a master for himself.

And since the verse was lenient toward the slave with regard to eating and drinking, it is likewise appropriate to be lenient toward him with regard to his redemption, proceeding for his benefit and not for the master's benefit.

The student continued to challenge Abaye: On the contrary

! But say

that I can say: What the verse was lenient about with regard to the slave,

that applies

only

with regard to eating and drinking,

where it is appropriate to be lenient with the slave

so that he will not suffer,

in order not to distress him by having him eat inferior foods to those eaten by his master.

Here,

however,

with regard to redemption,

on the contrary,

let us be stringent with him!

For there is reason to be stringent with him

based

on the words of

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina,

who said that a person sold as a slave is being punished for having traded in produce of the Sabbatical year, as follows.

Therefore, it is appropriate to be stringent with him so that he will be unable to redeem himself.

The Gemara cites Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina's words at length:

As it was taught: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Come and see how severe

the punishment is for the transgression called

“the dust of the Sabbatical year,”

a minor prohibition [like dust] among the prohibitions of the Sabbatical year:

Several prohibitions concerning the Sabbatical year are stated in the language of “you shall not do,” such as [Leviticus 25]: “You shall not sow your field,” and “You shall not prune your vineyard,” and others.

And it is stated [there]: “The Sabbath of the land shall be for you for food.”

The Sages expounded: The produce of the Sabbatical year was given for food, and not for commerce. It is prohibited to conduct commerce with produce of the Sabbatical year.

This prohibition is more lenient than the other prohibitions of the Sabbatical year, because the other prohibitions of the Sabbatical year are stated in the language of “you shall not do,” whereas this prohibition is a prohibition derived from a positive commandment.

Nevertheless, the verse made the punishment for this prohibition extremely severe—

A person

who

trades in produce of the Sabbatical year will ultimately

be punished by

selling his movable property

because he is pressed for money.

This is derived from what is stated concerning the Jubilee year, during which the laws of the land's remission also apply, as they do during the Sabbatical year:

As it is stated

[Leviticus 25]:

“In this Jubilee year you shall return, each man, to his ancestral property.”

And immediately afterward

it is juxtaposed to it

[it is stated adjacent to it]:

“And when you sell a sale to your fellow, or acquire from the hand of your fellow.”

From the juxtaposition of the verses, the text is expounded as follows: “

In this Jubilee year—and when you sell.”

That is, if you engage in commerce with produce of the Sabbatical year, which I prohibited to you in the Jubilee year, then “a sale to your fellow—from the hand of your fellow.”

You will be punished by being forced to sell

an item acquired from hand to hand,

namely, movable property.

And if, even after he has been forced to sell his movable property, he

does not sense

that this is a punishment for his sin and that he ought to repent of the transgression in his possession —

then

ultimately, he sells

his

fields.

This is a more severe punishment than selling movable property, because a person is more attached to his fields than to his movable property.

As it is stated

in juxtaposition to that passage [there]:

“When your brother becomes impoverished, and he sells part of his ancestral property.”

And even after he sells his land, nevertheless

it does not come into his hand,

the thought of repentance does not enter his heart, and he continues to deteriorate,

until he sells

even

his house.

As it is stated

in juxtaposition to that passage [there]:

“When a man sells a dwelling house in a walled city.”

Before the Gemara concludes citing the words of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, it raises an objection concerning his wording:

At the beginning of the beraita we learned: “‘He did not sense it’; ultimately he sells his fields.” But later we learned: “‘It did not come into his hand’ until he sells his house.”

The question is asked:

What is different there,

what is different at the beginning of the beraita,

where

the tanna

said: “If he

does

‘not sense it,’ he ultimately sells his fields,” implying that there are two possibilities: he may sense it and repent, or he may not sense it and fail to repent.

And what is different here,

what is different later in the beraita,

where

the tanna

said: “It did not come into his hand,” implying that it is obvious to the tanna that a person will not have thoughts of repentance enter his heart until he suffers an additional punishment?

And we answer: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, changed his wording in order to teach us

in accordance with

the statement of

Rav Huna:

For Rav Huna said: Once a person commits a transgression and repeats it

a second time—then

it becomes permitted to him

that transgression.

And one must wonder about Rav Huna’s statement: Is it possible that

it becomes permitted to him,

is this conceivable!?

Would it enter your mind to say that the transgression becomes permitted to him?

Rather,

Rav Huna certainly intended to say as follows: “Once a person commits a transgression and repeats it, then it

becomes for him like

something that was

permitted.”

For he repeats it again and again, without realizing that he is committing a transgression.

Therefore, at the beginning of the beraita, after he was punished once by having his movable property sold, the tanna said, “He did not perceive it,” because it is possible that he will perceive it and possible that he will not perceive it, since he committed the transgression only once.

But after he was punished once, then returned and repeated his sin and was punished a second time, the tanna teaches, “It did not come to him,” because it is human nature that one who commits a transgression and repeats it will not entertain thoughts of repentance, since the transgression has become like something permitted to him.

The Gemara returns to the continuation of the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina: After the sinner was punished by having his house sold,

it still did not come to him,

the thought of repentance did not enter his mind,

until he sells his daughter

as a maidservant.

As it is stated [Exodus 21]:

“And if a man sells his daughter as a maidservant.”

And

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, expounds it in this manner,

even though

the sale of

his daughter is not written in this context!

For the sale of his daughter was not written among the passages adjacent to the matter of the Jubilee, since all the verses that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, cited above were stated in Leviticus, in passages adjacent to the passage of the Jubilee [as explained above]; and from the juxtaposition of these passages to the passage of the Jubilee, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, derives that they are punishments for having engaged in commerce with the produce of the Jubilee year or the Sabbatical year.

Whereas the verse that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, cited here, “And if a man sells his daughter as a maidservant,” was stated in Exodus and is not adjacent to the passage of the Jubilee at all—

nevertheless, one may derive indirectly, from the order of the passages adjacent to the passage of the Jubilee, that the sale of one’s daughter as a maidservant also constitutes a punishment for trading in Sabbatical-year produce, although it is not mentioned there explicitly.

For after the passage concerning the sale of his house, the passage concerning a loan with interest is stated adjacent to it.

And from the juxtaposition of the passages one may derive that after the sinner was forced to sell his house, he was forced to borrow money with interest; and certainly by then he had already managed to sell his daughter as a maidservant.

Since he was forced to borrow with interest, this is evidence that the person had already lost all his money.

And it is also clear [“we are certain of it,” Rashi] that he had already sold his daughter as a maidservant before reaching the point at which he needed to borrow money with interest.

The verse hints to us that he had certainly already managed to sell his daughter as a maidservant beforehand, as punishment for his commerce in Sabbatical-year produce. For if he had the option of selling his daughter as a maidservant, he would not have borrowed with interest; rather, he would have sold her and lived on the money from her sale.

And

this teaches us

this point: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, teaches us that if a person reaches a situation in which he has no choice but either to borrow with interest or to sell his daughter, then

a person should sell his daughter rather than borrow with interest.

It is preferable for a person to sell his daughter as a maidservant than to borrow with interest.

What is the reason,

what is the reason for this matter?

His daughter—

her redemption price decreases.

His daughter is not sold except until she reaches the onset of puberty, and if the father comes to redeem her, he calculates, based on the money he received for her sale, how much corresponds to each year during which she was supposed to remain in the master’s possession. He deducts from her redemption price the amount corresponding to the time during which she worked for the master, and he can redeem her for the price of the labor she performed at the time he sold her.

But

if

this,

a loan with interest [even a permitted loan, when the lender is a gentile],

continually increases

it grows and increases all the time.

The Gemara cites the continuation of the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina:

After the sinner sold his daughter as a maidservant,

the thought of repentance still did not come

to him

until he borrowed with interest.

This is based on

what is stated

later in the verse [Leviticus 25]:

“And if your brother becomes poor, and his means fail with you,”

and adjacent to it

it is written:

“You shall not take from him

interest and increase

and so on

”—

And

the thought of repentance still did not come

to him

until he sells himself

as a Hebrew slave to an Israelite master.

As it is stated

adjacent to the passage concerning interest [there]:

“And if your brother becomes poor, and he is sold to you

as a slave.”

And he is not sold to you

the Israelite

alone

but

rather,

ultimately he will even need to sell himself

to a ger

to a convert.

As it is stated

in the adjacent passage [there]: “And he shall be sold

to a ger.”

And not

only

to a righteous convert

is he sold,

but

even

to a resident ger,

who accepted upon himself the observance of the seven Noahide mitzvot, but not the entire Torah.

As it is stated

[there]: “And he shall be sold to a

resident ger.”

The continuation of that same verse states: “And he shall be sold to the resident ger with you, or to the family of the ger.”

And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, explains who is meant by “the family of the ger” and what is meant by “a foreigner”:

“The family of the ger”—

this is a gentile who worships stars

and constellations, who did not accept upon himself the seven Noahide mitzvot.

And the verse states that even to him the person who engages in commerce with Sabbatical-year produce is sold.

And “a foreigner” mentioned in the verse is an expression referring to idolatry.

When it

[the verse]

says, “to a foreigner”—