Kiddushin 13b (יג:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Is it written

“and they broke through”

with the conjunction vav, “and they broke through”?!

For if the verse intended to say that all these transgressions constitute a single group of transgressions, it should have said “and they broke through,” with the addition of the letter vav, in order to connect it to the other transgressions! Yet in the verse,

“they broke through”

alone

is written!

This indicates that “they broke through” is a transgression for which one is punished independently, even if one did not transgress the other prohibitions.

c.

They then sat again and said,

afterward, the students of Rav Asi sat and related another teaching that they had heard from him.

Concerning

that which we learned

in tractate Kinnim [at the end of chapter 2]:

A woman who gives birth must bring, for her purification, a year-old lamb as an olah offering, and a pigeon or a turtledove as a hatta’t offering.

If she cannot afford this, she brings two turtledoves or two pigeons, one as an olah offering and one as a hatta’t offering.

And we learned concerning this:

The woman,

who gave birth,

who brought her hatta’t offering

and the koen offered it,

and she died,

before she had managed to bring her olah offering—

they shall bring

the

heirs

of

her olah offering.

But if she did not offer her sin-offering, even though she had already designated it, it may not be offered, because a sin-offering whose owner has died must be left to die [Bekhorot 16a and elsewhere]. Since the sin-offering cannot be offered, the elevation-offering also cannot be offered, because wherever the Torah obligates a sin-offering and an elevation-offering, the sin-offering is offered first; and before the sin-offering is offered, the obligation to bring the elevation-offering does not take effect at all. Ramban, Rashba, Ritva. See there. [But see the commentary of the Raavad, Kinnim, end of chapter 2, and the editor’s note to the Ritva, p. 721, citing Tosafot Rabbi Shmuel ben Rabbi Yitzḥak]. And if she brought her elevation-offering, her sin-offering is not brought. [Mishna there.] This is because a sin-offering whose owner has died cannot be offered. Rather, it is placed in an enclosure until it dies. [Rav Ovadya of Bartenura there.] See Tosafot, s.v. “The woman” [printed above on page 13a], and the early authorities.

And

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: And

this ruling

applies

specifically

when she set it aside

for an olah offering

while alive,

when the woman set aside her olah offering while she was still alive.

But

if

she did not set it aside while alive, they shall not

be obligated to bring an olah offering from the property they inherited from her, because the woman’s property did not become encumbered for this purpose.

That is, the tanna who said, “the heirs shall bring her olah offering,” did not mean that the woman’s property is encumbered for this purpose, and that the heirs are compelled to set aside an olah offering. Rather, the tanna teaches us that when the woman who gave birth had herself already set aside the olah offering, since it had already acquired sanctity, the heirs must bring it to be offered, despite the woman’s death.

The amoraim disagreed as to whether “the encumbrance is of Torah origin” or “the encumbrance is not of Torah origin”—

The Sages maintain that a person’s property becomes encumbered to repay his debt even after his death, when his property passes into the possession of the heirs.

And one must examine the root of this encumbrance. Some say: “The encumbrance is of Torah origin.” That is, it is the Torah that encumbered a person’s property for his debts, because a person’s property serves as a “guarantor” that he will repay his debt. Just as a guarantor is obligated to pay the debt if the borrower does not pay, so too the borrower’s property is encumbered for repayment of the debt if the borrower dies without paying.

And some say: “The encumbrance is not of Torah origin.” That is, the Torah did not encumber the borrower’s property to the lender; rather, the borrower himself encumbers his property by writing in the document for the lender, “My property is responsible to you.” The difference between these two opinions concerns an oral loan. According to those who say that the encumbrance is of Torah origin—that it is the Torah that encumbered the borrower’s property—there is no difference between a documented loan and an oral loan; in both cases the property becomes equally encumbered.

But according to those who say that the encumbrance is not of Torah origin, namely, that the person encumbers his property through a document, in the case of an oral loan, where the borrower did not write an encumbrance on his property for the lender, the property did not become encumbered, since he did not write for him, “My property is responsible to you.”

Now let us return to Shmuel’s statement: If a woman who gave birth brought her hatta’t offering and died, the heirs are not obligated to bring her olah offering unless she herself set it aside during her lifetime.

Shmuel’s statement is not in accordance with the opinion of those who say that the encumbrance is of Torah origin. For a woman who gives birth is obligated by Torah law to bring an olah offering, and if we say that the encumbrance is of Torah origin, then even though the woman did not write a document concerning this, her property nevertheless becomes encumbered for it, just as a person’s property serves as security for all his debts [both documented loans and oral loans]. The heirs would then be compelled to bring her olah offering from her property.

Since Shmuel said that if the woman who gave birth did not set aside her olah offering during her lifetime, we do not compel the heirs to bring it—

Apparently,

we learn from here that

Shmuel holds:

Shmuel

the encumbrance

is not of Torah origin! Rather, only when a person encumbers his property in a document does his property become encumbered. But the woman who gave birth did not encumber her property in a document, and therefore her property does not become encumbered for bringing her olah offering, and the heirs cannot be compelled to discharge her obligation to bring it.

! Rather, only when a person places his property under a lien in a document does his property become subject to the debt. But the woman who gave birth did not place her property under a lien in a document, so her property does not become subject to bringing her elevation-offering, and the heirs cannot be compelled to discharge her obligation to bring it.

And

Rav Asi said

concerning this

Rav Asi:

This is what

Rabbi Yohanan said: Even though

the woman who gave birth

did not set aside

her olah offering

during her lifetime,

her property became encumbered, and the heirs are compelled to bring her olah offering from the property they inherited from her.

Apparently,

we learn from here that Rabbi Yohanan

holds

that the encumbrance is of Torah origin,

and therefore the woman’s property is encumbered despite the absence of a document and despite the woman herself not having encumbered her property.

And we raise a difficulty: Why did Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan need to disagree in explaining the Mishna, “The woman who brought her hatta’t offering and died—the heirs shall bring her olah offering”? Their disagreement depends on the question of whether the encumbrance is of Torah origin or not of Torah origin,

and they already disagreed about it once,

as Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan had already disagreed as to whether the encumbrance is of Torah origin or not of Torah origin—

As Rav and Shmuel both said

both of them say]: A person who owes money to another and dies, or who sold his property and has no money with which to repay his debt: if it was

an oral loan, the lender cannot collect

the debt from the borrower’s land,

neither from the heirs

[if the borrower died]

nor from purchasers

[if the borrower sold his property], because the encumbrance is not of Torah origin.

Therefore, only in the case of a documented loan does the property become encumbered, through the borrower himself having encumbered his property. In the case of an oral loan, the property did not become encumbered, and the heirs or purchasers are not obligated to repay the debt from land that previously belonged to the borrower.

And Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish both said

both of them say]:

an oral loan can be collected both from

the heirs and from the purchasers,

because the encumbrance is of Torah origin. That is, it is the Torah that encumbered the borrower’s land; therefore, there is no difference between a documented loan and an oral loan, and the borrower’s property always becomes encumbered for repayment of his debt. Even if he sold it to others or bequeathed it to his sons, the encumbrance does not lapse, and the lender collects his debt from it.

If so, this is difficult: Since we have already learned that Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan disagreed as to whether the encumbrance is of Torah origin or not of Torah origin, why did they need to disagree again concerning a woman who gave birth, as to whether the heirs are compelled to set aside an olah offering from her property? Surely this depends on the question of whether the encumbrance is of Torah origin or not of Torah origin!

And we answer:

It is necessary

to teach us the disagreement between Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan in both places!

For if it were stated only in that case,

because if their disagreement had been stated only with regard to an oral loan, I might have said that specifically

in that case

[in this matter]

Shmuel says

that the lender cannot collect from the heirs or the purchasers

because it is not a debt written in the Torah,

since this debt does not take effect because the Torah imposed an obligation upon him; rather, he obligated himself by borrowing money from another. Therefore, this is not such a severe debt, and the Torah did not encumber his property.

But in this case,

with regard to the obligation of the woman who gave birth, where it was the Torah that imposed upon her the obligation to bring an offering, and it is the command of the King,

I might say

that Shmuel

agrees with Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish

that this obligation is severe, and that an encumbrance takes effect upon the property by virtue of it.

And had it taught us this:

if they had presented the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan to us only with regard to a woman who gave birth, I would have said that specifically

in this case,

with regard to a woman who gave birth,

Rabbi Yoḥanan says

that a lien takes effect upon the property for bringing her burnt-offering, even though this lien was not written in the document, because

a loan

that is

written in the Torah

is considered like a loan written in a document.

Since this obligation—which is called a “loan” in an extended sense—is an obligation stated in the Torah, it is stringent like the law of a loan documented in a written instrument, and therefore a lien takes effect upon the property.

But with regard to this,

a verbal loan that is not written in the Torah,

I might say

that Rabbi Yoḥanan

agrees with Shmuel

that the property does not become encumbered.

Therefore,

it is necessary;

it is necessary to present the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan in both places.

And Rav Pappa determines the halakha between the views of Rav and Shmuel, on the one hand, and those of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, on the other:

Rav Pappa said: The halakha is: With regard to a verbal loan—

he collects from the heirs,

if the borrower dies.

But

if the borrower sold his property,

he does not collect from the purchasers.

Rav Pappa explains the reason for his ruling:

He collects from the heirs—

because

a lien is of Torah origin.

This is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, and therefore even in the case of a verbal loan, one not documented in writing, a lien takes effect upon the property.

But

nevertheless,

he does not collect from the purchasers—

because of the enactment for the benefit of purchasers, as there is concern that the purchasers did not know that the land was encumbered, since

a

verbal loan

has no public notice; no public announcement is made concerning it. If the creditor were to collect the land from them, they would thereby suffer a loss through no fault of their own.

Therefore, the Sages enacted that a creditor may collect his debt from purchasers only in the case of a loan documented in writing, which is publicly known; the purchasers should have ascertained whether the land was encumbered before buying it.

Therefore, the Sages enacted that a lender may collect his debt from purchasers only when the loan is documented in writing and there is public notice of it; the purchasers should have investigated whether the land was subject to a lien before buying it.

We learned in the Mishna [above, 2a]:

“And she acquires herself through a bill of divorce and through the death of the husband.”

The Gemara now discusses from where this was derived:

And we raised a difficulty:

Granted,

it is properly stated that she acquires herself through a

bill of divorce,

for this matter is learned from the verse,

as it is written [Deuteronomy 24]:

“

And he shall write for her a scroll of severance,

and send her from his house.”

But however,

[rather],

the death of the husband—

from where do we know this?

From where do we learn that a woman acquires herself through the death of her husband?

And we answer:

It is a logical inference!

He the husband

[the husband]

forbade her

by virtue of the fact that she was acquired by him.

And

consequently,

he releases her

when he is no longer in the world: she is freed from him, since she had been bound to him, and is no longer bound to him; from that point onward she is permitted to marry another.

And we reject this:

But

with regard to the prohibition of

forbidden sexual relations,

we find forbidden relatives who become prohibited through marriage, such as one’s father’s wife, one’s daughter-in-law, or one’s paternal uncle’s wife; all of these became prohibited to him because they were married to their husbands,

as

the husband

forbade them, and

nevertheless, when he dies, he

does not permit them

through his death. His death does not permit them to marry his relatives; rather, they remain forbidden to his relatives forever!

If so, we find that a husband can cause the prohibition upon his wife to continue even after his death!

Rather,

the fact that a woman acquires herself through the death of her husband must be learned from elsewhere:

As the Merciful One said: A levirate widow who has no children is forbidden

to marry a stranger. As it is stated [Deuteronomy 25]: “For when brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the deceased shall not be married outside to a stranger. [Rather,] her levir shall come to her”—

it follows: This

if

she has

the deceased’s wife

children,

then she is

permitted

to marry a stranger. It is thereby demonstrated that a woman acquires herself through the death of her husband, becoming permitted to marry another man.

And we reject this:

Perhaps,

the death of the husband does not permit her to marry a stranger. Rather, the intention of the verse in the passage of levirate marriage is to state a different distinction between the wife of the deceased who has children and one who has no children. The verse should be understood as follows:

If

she has no children—

the levirate widow is forbidden

the levirate widow

to everyone else to others, as it is stated: “The wife of the deceased shall not be married outside to a stranger,”

[to others], as it is stated: “The wife of the dead shall not be married outside to a stranger,”

but is permitted and permitted

[and permitted]

to the levir,

as it is stated: “Her levir shall come to her.”

But

if the husband dies and

she has children—

she is also forbidden to everyone.

Since the husband’s death does not permit her, and the mitzva of levirate marriage was not stated with regard to her because her deceased husband has children, she remains forbidden to the entire world without exception!

On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts this derivation and presents another derivation:

Rather,

the fact that a woman acquires herself through the death of her husband must be learned from elsewhere:

As the Merciful One said

that

a widow is forbidden to a High Priest

is forbidden—

it follows that

to an ordinary priest

or to an Israelite she is

permitted because she acquired herself through the death of her husband!

[permitted], because she acquired herself through the death of her husband!

For if you say that a widow is forbidden even to an Israelite, why did the verse need to prohibit a widow to a High Priest? Was his status more lenient than that of other Israelites?!

And we reject this:

Perhaps,

perhaps a woman does not acquire herself through the death of her husband, and a widow is forbidden to every Israelite. The reason the verse needed to prohibit a widow to a High Priest is to teach you:

A widow is forbidden

to a High Priest by

the prohibition of

a negative commandment,

as it is stated [Leviticus 21]: “A widow he shall not take.”

But to everyone else

she is not forbidden by a negative commandment, but only

by

“

a positive commandment.” A prohibition derived from a positive commandment is less stringent than a prohibition derived from a negative commandment.

And where is it stated that a widow is forbidden to an Israelite by a positive commandment?

It is stated [Deuteronomy 24]: “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance and send her from his house, and she shall depart and become the wife of another man.” We may infer from here that specifically this woman, whom her husband sent away from his house by means of a bill of divorce, is permitted to marry another. But another woman who was not sent away by a bill of divorce [rather, her husband died] is forbidden to marry another.

And a “negative commandment inferred from a positive commandment” is a positive-commandment prohibition [which is inferred from the implication of a verse phrased as a positive commandment and is not as stringent as a negative commandment, but only as a positive commandment].

It follows from here that a widow is forbidden to an Israelite by a positive-commandment prohibition.

The Gemara answers that it is impossible for a widow to be forbidden to an Israelite by a positive-commandment prohibition:

This “

positive commandment”—

what function could it have!?

How can it be said that a widow has a positive-commandment prohibition against marrying another man, while the negative-commandment and karet prohibitions of a married woman have been removed from her?

But surely one can argue in either direction:

If the husband’s death is effective,

if you say that the husband’s death is effective in removing the marital acquisition between them, and therefore, upon his death, the negative-commandment and karet prohibitions of a married woman are removed from her, then

she should be permitted entirely!

The woman should be completely permitted to marry another, and she should not even be subject to a positive-commandment prohibition, since the marital bond between them has been severed!

If,

if you say that the verse “and send her from his house” teaches us

that the husband’s death is not effective,

that the husband’s death does not remove the marital bond between them, then

let us establish it by its initial status!

She should remain subject to the prohibition that applied to her before her husband’s death—that she is forbidden by a negative commandment and karet.

If so, it is impossible to say that a widow has merely a positive-commandment prohibition against marrying another man.

The question therefore returns: Why did the verse need to prohibit a widow to a High Priest? There is also a negative-commandment prohibition concerning an Israelite!

Rather, it must necessarily be that a married woman acquires herself through the death of her husband. She is permitted to an Israelite and to an ordinary priest, and is forbidden only to a High Priest.

The Gemara rejects this:

And we object:

Why not!?

Why is it impossible to say that a widow is forbidden to an Israelite by a positive-commandment prohibition?

And is it not appropriate to say that the husband's death

has removed her from

the liability of

death and placed her under a positive commandment?

That is, the husband's death removed the woman from the severe prohibition of a married woman during her husband's lifetime, which carries liability for death, and placed her on the lesser level of a prohibition consisting only of a positive commandment?!

But we find something similar elsewhere:

It is analogous to the case of disqualified consecrated animals,

as we find concerning “disqualified consecrated animals,” namely, consecrated animals that developed a blemish and thereby became disqualified for sacrifice:

For initially,

at the outset, before they were redeemed,

they have [

the status of

misuse of consecrated property,

and they are forbidden for shearing and labor.

But when

they redeemed them,

when they redeemed them from their sanctity, then

there is no misuse of consecrated property,

they no longer carry the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property and are permitted as food to everyone. Nevertheless

for shearing and labor—

they remain forbidden [

and the source of the prohibition is explained by Rashi].

It is thus evident that redemption removes only some of the stringencies of consecrated property.

If so, with regard to a married woman as well, one could say similarly that the husband's death removes from the woman only the severity of the prohibition of a negative commandment carrying liability for death, but she nevertheless remains forbidden by a positive-commandment prohibition! [

But a widow is forbidden to a High Priest by a negative commandment!]. On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara brings another source for permitting a woman through her husband's death—

Rather,

the fact that a woman acquires herself through her husband's death must be derived from another source:

As the verse states [

Deuteronomy 20]: “And what man is there who has betrothed a woman [through kiddushin] but has not taken her [through marriage], let him go [from the war] and return home,

lest he die in the war and another man take her.”

It is evident from here that if the husband dies in the war, another man may take his wife. We learn that the woman acquires herself through her husband's death.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, raised an objection against this

as follows:

Say:

say,

who is “

another,”

who is that “other” whom the verse says will take her?

The yavam! [

For the yavam is certainly permitted to the wife of his deceased brother, as brought in the Gemara above], but other men are forbidden to a widow by a positive-commandment prohibition!

Rav Ashi said: There are two answers to this:

A.

First [

the first answer]:

The yavam is not called “another.”

If so, we may learn from the verse, “lest he die in the war and another man take her,” that a widow is entirely permitted to an Israelite and to an ordinary priest.

B.

Furthermore,

we may learn from another verse that a woman acquires herself through her husband's death:

It is stated [Deuteronomy 24] concerning a husband who divorced his wife, after which she went and became betrothed to another man: “

and the latter man despises her and writes her a document of severance

and sends her away from his house,

or the latter man dies,

who took her as a wife [then], her first husband who sent her away may not again take her.”

And

in this verse

death is juxtaposed [

is likened]

death

to divorce,

as both remove the woman's prohibition equally:

Just as divorce—

permits and completes the permitting.

Just as divorce permits the woman completely, so that she is not even subject to a positive-commandment prohibition—

so too death permits her,

it permits her,

and completes the permitting

entirely, so that she is not even subject to a positive-commandment prohibition.

We learned in the Mishna [above 2a]:

And the yevama is acquired through intercourse.

And we raised the question:

Through intercourse—

from where do we know this?

From where do we learn that the yevama is acquired through intercourse?

And we answered: We learn this from

the verse, [

Deuteronomy 25]: !(pamud.bmp "

exact page location") “

Her yavam shall come to her and take her as a wife.”