Kiddushin 13b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Is it written “

and they breached,”

with the conjunction vav added?

For if the intention of the verse were to say that all these transgressions are one group of transgressions, it would have been appropriate to say “and they breached,” with the letter vav added, in order to connect it to the other transgressions! But in the verse

“they breached”

alone

is written!

And it implies that “they breached” is a transgression for which one is punished independently, even if one did not transgress the other transgressions.

3.

They sat again and said,

afterward the students of Rav Asi sat and said another teaching that they had heard from him.

Concerning

that which we learned

in tractate Kinnim [end of chapter 2]:

A woman who gave birth must bring, for her purification, a yearling lamb as an olah, and a dove or a turtledove as a sin-offering.

And if her means are insufficient for this, she brings two turtledoves or two doves, one as an olah and one as a sin-offering.

And we learned concerning this:

The woman

who gave birth

who brought her sin-offering

and the priest offered it,

and she died

before she managed to bring her olah—

her heirs shall bring

the

olah

of

the woman.

And

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: And

this law

is

specifically when she

set it aside

as an olah

during her lifetime,

when the woman set aside her olah while she was still alive.

But

if she

did not set it aside during her lifetime, not

are the heirs obligated to bring, from the property that they inherited from her, an olah offering, because the woman’s property did not become liened for this.

That is to say, the tanna who said, “the heirs shall bring her olah,” did not intend to say that the woman’s property is liened for this, and that the heirs are compelled to set aside an olah. Rather, the tanna informs us that when the woman who gave birth herself had already set aside the olah, since it had already become consecrated, the heirs must bring it to be offered, despite the woman’s death.

The amoraim disagreed whether “the lien is from the Torah” or “the lien is not from the Torah”—

The Sages hold that a person’s property becomes liened in order to repay his debt even after his death, when his property passes into the possession of the heirs.

And it is necessary to examine what the root of this lien is. Some say: “the lien is from the Torah.” That is, it is the Torah that liened a person’s property for his debts, because a person’s property is “responsible” for this, that he repay his debt. And just as a guarantor is obligated to pay the debt if the borrower does not pay, so too the borrower’s property is liened for repayment of the debt if the borrower dies and does not pay.

And some say: “the lien is not from the Torah.” That is, the Torah did not lien the borrower’s property to the lender; rather, the borrower himself liens his property by writing to the lender in the document, “My property is responsible to you.” And the difference between these two approaches concerns an oral loan: according to those who say that the lien is from the Torah—that the Torah is what liened the borrower’s property—there is no difference between a documented loan and an oral loan, and the lien takes effect upon the property equally in both.

Whereas according to those who say that the lien is not from the Torah—that the person liens his property in a document—then in an oral loan, in which the borrower did not write a lien upon his property for the lender, the property did not become liened, for he did not write to him, “My property is responsible to you.”

Now let us return to Shmuel’s words, who said: A woman who gave birth, who brought her sin-offering and died, her heirs are not obligated to bring her olah, unless she herself set it aside during her lifetime.

And Shmuel’s words do not accord with the view of those who say that the lien is from the Torah. For a woman who gave birth is obligated by Torah law to bring an olah, and if we say that the lien is from the Torah, then even though the woman who gave birth did not write a document concerning this, nevertheless her property becomes liened for it, just as a person’s property guarantees all his debts [both a documented loan and an oral loan]. And the heirs are compelled to bring her olah from her property.

And since Shmuel said that if the woman who gave birth did not set aside her olah during her lifetime, we do not compel the heirs to bring it—

Thus,

we learn from here that

Shmuel holds:

Shmuel

the lien

is not from the Torah!

Rather, only when a person liened his property in a document is his property liened. But the woman who gave birth, who did not lien her property in a document, does not have her property liened for bringing her olah offering, and it is impossible to compel the heirs to discharge her olah obligation.

And

said

concerning this

Rav Asi:

Thus

said Rabbi Yohanan: Even though

the woman who gave birth

did not set aside

her olah

during her lifetime,

her property became liened, and the heirs are compelled to bring her olah from the property that they inherited from her.

Thus,

we learn from here that Rabbi Yohanan

holds

that the lien is from the Torah,

and therefore the woman’s property is liened, despite the fact that there is no document here and the woman herself did not lien her property.

And we ask: Why did Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan need to disagree in explaining the Mishna, “The woman who brought her sin-offering and died, her heirs shall bring her olah”? Their disagreement depends on the question of whether the lien is from the Torah or is not from the Torah,

and they already disagreed about it once,

Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan already disagreed whether the lien is from the Torah or is not from the Torah—

For Rav and Shmuel both said

both say]: A person who owed money to another and died, or who sold his property and does not have money with which to repay his debt, if it was

an oral loan, the lender cannot collect

from the borrower’s land,

neither from the heirs

[if the borrower died]

nor from the purchasers

[if the borrower sold his property], because the lien is not from the Torah.

And therefore only in a documented loan is the property liened, through the borrower himself having liened his property; but in an oral loan the property did not become liened, and the heirs or purchasers are not obligated to repay the debt from land that previously belonged to the borrower.

And Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish both said [

both say]:

An oral loan can be collected both from

the heirs and from the purchasers,

because the lien is from the Torah. That is, it is the Torah that liened the borrower’s land; therefore there is no difference between a documented loan and an oral loan, and the borrower’s property always becomes liened for repayment of his debt. Even if he sold it to others or bequeathed it to his sons, the lien does not depart from it, and the lender collects his debt from it.

If so, this is difficult: Since we have already learned that Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan disagreed whether the lien is from the Torah or is not from the Torah, why did they need to return and disagree also concerning a woman who gave birth, whether the heirs are compelled to set aside an olah from her property? This depends on the question of whether the lien is from the Torah or is not from the Torah!

And we answer:

It is necessary,

it is necessary to inform us of the disagreement between Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan in both places!

For if it had been stated in that matter,

because if their disagreement had been stated only concerning an oral loan, I would say that specifically

in that [

in this matter]

Shmuel says

that the lender cannot collect from the heirs or from the purchasers,

because it is not a loan written in the Torah,

for this debt does not take effect upon him through the Torah having imposed an obligation upon him; rather, he obligated himself through borrowing money from his fellow, and therefore this is not such a stringent debt, and the Torah did not lien his property.

But in this matter,

concerning the obligation of the woman who gave birth, for the Torah imposed upon her an obligation to bring an offering and it is the commandment of the King,

I would say,

I would say that Shmuel

agrees with Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish

that this obligation is stringent, and that because of it a lien takes effect upon the property.

And if he had taught us this,

if they had made known to us the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan only concerning the woman who gave birth, I would say that specifically

in this,

in the case of the woman who gave birth,

Rabbi Yohanan says

that a lien takes effect upon the property for bringing her burnt-offering, even though this lien was not written in a document, because

that a debt

that is

written in the Torah -

is considered like one written in a document.

Since this obligation [which is called “a debt” by borrowed terminology] is an obligation stated in the Torah, it is stringent like the law of a debt recorded in a document, and therefore a lien takes effect upon the property in its case.

But concerning this,

in the case of an oral debt that is not written in the Torah,

I would say,

I would say that Rabbi Yohanan

agrees with Shmuel

that the property does not become subject to a lien.

Therefore

it is necessary,

it is necessary to make known to us the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan in both places.

And Rav Pappa determines the halakha between the words of Rav and Shmuel and the words of Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish:

Rav Pappa said: The halakha is: an oral debt -

is collected from the heirs,

if the borrower died.

But

if the borrower sold his property -

it is not collected from the purchasers.

And Rav Pappa explains the reason for his words:

It is collected from the heirs -

because

a lien is from the Torah,

as is the view of Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish; therefore, even in the case of an oral debt, not recorded in a document, a lien takes effect upon the property.

And

nevertheless

it is not collected from the purchasers -

because of the enactment for the benefit of purchasers, for there is concern that perhaps the purchasers did not know that the land was subject to a lien, since

that

an oral debt

has no public knowledge,

no report about it goes out, and if the creditor were to collect the land from them, it would turn out that they suffered a loss through no fault of their own.

And therefore the Sages enacted that the creditor does not collect his debt from the purchasers except in the case of a debt recorded in a document, about which there is public knowledge, and it would have been proper for the purchasers to ascertain whether there was a lien upon the land before buying it.

We learned in the Mishna [above 2a]:

And she acquires herself through a bill of divorce and through the death of the husband.

The Gemara now discusses: from where did we learn this?

And we raised it:

Granted,

she properly acquires herself through a

bill of divorce,

for this matter is learned from the verse,

as it is written [Deuteronomy 24]: “

[Deuteronomy 24]: “

And he shall write for her a document of severance,

and he shall send her from his house.”

But [that is, however]

[rather],

the death of the husband -

from where do we know it?

From where did we learn that the woman acquires herself through the death of the husband?

And we answer:

It is a logical inference!

He [the husband]

[the husband]

prohibited her

by her being acquired to him.

And

automatically,

he releases her,

when he is no longer in the world, she is released from him, for she had been bound to him, and she is no longer bound to him, and from this point onward she is permitted to marry another.

And we reject this:

But

concerning the prohibition of

forbidden relations,

we find that there are forbidden relations who become prohibited through marriage, such as his father’s wife, or his daughter-in-law, or his father’s brother’s wife, all of whom are prohibited to him because they married their husbands,

for

the husband is the one who

prohibited them, and

nevertheless, when he dies -

he does not permit them

through his death. He does not permit them through his death to marry his relatives; rather, they remain forbidden to his relatives forever!

And if so, we find that the husband can cause the continuation of the prohibition concerning his wife even after his death!

Rather,

the fact that the woman acquires herself through the death of the husband must be learned from another place:

For the Merciful One said: a widow awaiting levirate marriage who has no children is prohibited

from marrying a stranger. As it is stated [Deuteronomy 25]: “For brothers will dwell together, and one of them will die, and he has no son; the wife of the dead shall not be outside, to a stranger. [Rather,] the widow awaiting levirate marriage shall be intimate with him” -

It follows: this

if

she has

the wife of the dead

children,

then she is

permitted

to marry a stranger. And it is proven from here that the woman acquires herself through the death of the husband, becoming permitted to marry another person.

And we reject this:

Perhaps,

perhaps the death of the husband does not permit her to a stranger. And the intention of the verse in the section of levirate marriage is to state another distinction between the wife of the dead who has children and one who has no children; and let us say that the verse said as follows:

If

she has no children -

the widow awaiting levirate marriage is prohibited

the widow awaiting levirate marriage

to everyone [to others], as it is stated: “The wife of the dead shall not be outside, to a stranger,”

[to others], as it is stated: “The wife of the dead shall not be married outside to a stranger,”

and she is permitted [and permitted]

[and permitted]

to the levir,

as it is stated, “The widow awaiting levirate marriage shall be intimate with him.”

But

however, if the husband dies and

she has children -

she is likewise prohibited to everyone.

Since the death of the husband does not permit her, and the commandment of levirate marriage was not stated concerning her because her deceased husband has children, she is prohibited to the entire world without exception!

On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts this derivation and brings another derivation:

Rather,

the fact that the woman acquires herself through the death of the husband must be learned from another place:

for the Merciful One said

that

a widow to a High Priest

is prohibited -

it follows,

but to an ordinary priest

or to an Israelite she is

permitted [permitted],

because she acquired herself through the death of her husband!

For if you say that a widow is prohibited even to an Israelite, why did the verse need to prohibit a widow to a High Priest? Was his law more lenient than that of the rest of Israel?!

And we reject this:

Perhaps,

perhaps the woman does not acquire herself through the death of the husband, and a widow is prohibited to every Israelite. And the fact that the verse needed to prohibit a widow to a High Priest is in order to tell you -

A widow is prohibited

to a High Priest with

a prohibition of

“do not”, as it is stated [Leviticus 21]: “A widow—he shall not take.”

, as it is stated [Leviticus 21]: “A widow he shall not take.”

But to everyone

she is not prohibited by a prohibition of “do not,” but only

by “

do.”

And a prohibition derived from “do” is less stringent than a prohibition of “do not.”

And where is it stated that a widow is prohibited to an Israelite by a “do”?

It is stated [Deuteronomy 24]: “And he shall write for her a document of severance and send her from his house, and she shall depart and become another man’s.” And we should infer from here that specifically this woman, whom the husband sent from his house by means of a bill of divorce, is permitted to marry another. But another woman who was not sent away by a bill of divorce [rather, the husband died] is prohibited to marry another.

And a “prohibition of ‘do not’ that comes from the implication of a ‘do’” is a prohibition of “do” [which one infers from the implication of a verse stated in the language of “do”; it is not as stringent as a prohibition of “do not,” but only as a “do”].

And from here, a widow is prohibited to an Israelite by a prohibition of “do.”

And the Gemara answers that it is impossible that a widow is prohibited to an Israelite by a prohibition of “do”:

This “

do” -

what is its function!?

How is it possible to say that a widow has a prohibition of “do” against marrying another, whereas the prohibition of “do not” and karet of a married woman has departed from her?

For one must argue in either case:

If the death of the husband is effective,

if you say that the death of the husband is effective in removing the marital acquisition between them, and therefore through his death the prohibition of “do not” and karet of a married woman departed from her, then

she should be entirely permitted!

The woman should have to be entirely permitted to marry another, and there should not even be a prohibition of “do” upon her, since the marital bond between them has departed!

If,

and if you say that the verse “and he shall send her from his house” reveals to us

that the death of the husband is not effective,

that the death of the husband is not effective in removing the marital bond between them, then

let us establish it with the original matter!

She should be established as being subject to the prohibition that she had before her husband’s death, namely, that she is prohibited by “do not” and karet.

And if so, it is impossible to say that a widow has merely a prohibition of “do” against marrying another person.

And the question returns: why did the verse need to prohibit a widow to a High Priest? After all, there is also a prohibition of “do not” for an Israelite!

Rather, necessarily, a married woman acquires herself through the death of the husband. She is therefore permitted to an Israelite and to an ordinary priest, and she is prohibited only to a High Priest.

And the Gemara rejects this:

And we wonder:

Why not!?

Why is it impossible to say that a widow is prohibited to an Israelite by a prohibition of “do”?

And is it not fitting to say that the husband's death

removed her from

liability for

death, and placed her under a positive-command prohibition?

That is, that the husband's death removed the woman from the severe prohibition of a married woman during her husband's lifetime, which entails liability for death, and placed her at the level of a lighter prohibition, that of a positive command alone?!

Yet we have found something similar elsewhere:

As is the case with disqualified consecrated animals,

just as we have found concerning “disqualified consecrated animals,” which are consecrated animals that developed a blemish and became disqualified for sacrifice:

For initially,

at first, before they redeemed them,

there is in them

the law of

sacrilege,

and they are forbidden for shearing and labor.

But when

they redeemed them,

when they redeemed them from their sanctity, then

there is no sacrilege in them,

they no longer have the prohibition of sacrilege, and they are permitted for eating to every person. Nevertheless,

for shearing and labor—

they are forbidden

[and the source of the prohibition is explained by Rashi].

And it is proved from here that redemption removes only some of the stringencies of consecrated property.

And if so, also concerning a married woman, it is possible to say something similar: that the husband's death removes from the woman only the stringency of the prohibition of a negative command and death, but she nevertheless remains forbidden by a positive-command prohibition!

[Whereas a widow is forbidden to a High Priest by a negative command!] And on the strength of this difficulty, the Gemara brings another source for permitting the woman upon her husband's death—

Rather,

the conclusion that the woman acquires herself through the husband's death is to be learned from another place:

As the verse says

[Deuteronomy 20]: “And what man is there who has betrothed a woman [through kiddushin] but has not taken her [in marriage], let him go [from the war] and return to his house,

lest he die in the war and another man take her.”

And it is proved from here that if the husband dies in the war, another man is permitted to take his wife. And we have learned that the woman acquired herself through the husband's death.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, challenged this

with a difficulty:

Say,

say:

who is the

“other man,”

who is that “other man” of whom the verse said that he should take her?

A yavam!

[For the yavam is certainly permitted to his deceased brother's wife, as brought in the Gemara above], but other people are forbidden to a widow by a positive-command prohibition!

Rav Ashi said: There are two answers to the matter:

1.

First

[a first answer]:

For a yavam is not called “another man.”

And if so, it is to be learned from the verse “lest he die in the war and another man take her” that a widow is entirely permitted to an Israelite and to an ordinary koen.

2.

And furthermore,

it is to be learned that the woman acquires herself through the husband's death from another verse:

It is stated [Deuteronomy 24] concerning a husband who divorced his wife and she went and became betrothed to another: “

And the latter man hated her, and wrote her a bill of divorce

and sent her from his house,

or the latter man died

who took her for himself as a wife; [then] her first husband who sent her away may not again take her.”

And

in this verse

was equated

[was compared]

death

with divorce,

for both of them remove the woman's prohibition equally:

Just as divorce—

permits and completes.

Just as divorce permits the woman entirely, so that she does not have even a positive-command prohibition—

so too death permits,

it permits,

and completes

the permission entirely, so that she does not have even a positive-command prohibition.

We learned in the Mishna [above 2a]:

And the yevama is acquired through intercourse.

And we raised a discussion concerning it:

Through intercourse—

from where do we know it?

From where did we learn that the yevama is acquired through intercourse?

And we answered: We learned this from

the verse says

[Deuteronomy 25]: ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact location of the page") “

Her brother's wife shall come to him, and he shall take her for himself as a wife.”