Kiddushin 13a — the Talmud in English

For the first clause

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") when she said

to him

“no”—

it is also kiddushin!

This implies that in the first clause, at the time of giving the money, even when the woman said to him, “No,” this is kiddushin?!

Why?

Why?

But she said

explicitly

“No!”

And Rava concludes:

Rather, is it not

necessarily that

“she wanted”

means

that she said

“Yes.” And

“she did not want”

means

that

she remained completely silent.

And according to this, in the final clause, where he said to her, “Be consecrated to me with it” after the giving of the money—if she said “Yes,” she is consecrated, but if she remained silent, she is not consecrated. Whereas in the first clause, where he said it to her at the time of giving the money—even if she remained silent, she is consecrated.

And derive from it: Silence after the giving of the money—

it is nothing.

For the woman’s silence was because she did not care about what he said to her, and not because she agreed to become consecrated.

And from here Rava learned that also concerning the incident above [of a man who consecrated with a mat and four dinars], she is not consecrated, because she did not know that there were four dinars there until after the giving of the money. And her silence after the giving of the money does not indicate that she consented to the kiddushin.

They challenged it,

they found difficulty with Rava’s proof,

in

the

Pum Nahara

beit-midrash, in the name of Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua:

Are they comparable,

and is the silence in the beraita comparable to the silence that we are discussing here?!

For although there is no distinction between them on account of the silence itself, in our matter one can prove from the fact that the woman did not throw away the coin that she consented to the kiddushin. For—

There,

in the beraita, it is speaking of a case where

he gave it to her as a deposit.

At first he gave the money to the woman as a deposit, and she undertook to guard it; therefore she did not throw the money from her hands, because

she thought: If I throw it, and it breaks, I will be liable for it.

If I throw the money, and it breaks, I will be obligated to pay him its value. For I undertook to guard it [and her silence was because she did not care about what he said].

But

here,

in our matter,

he gave it to her as kiddushin.

The man gave the mat to the woman as kiddushin, and not as a deposit. And although she cannot become consecrated with the mat itself, since it is not worth a peruta, when he returned and said to her, “Be consecrated with the money inside it,”

if it is so that she does not want it, let her throw it away!

If indeed she did not wish to become consecrated, it would have been proper for her to throw it away, since she had not undertaken responsibility for guarding it, and she should not have continued holding it if she did not agree to become consecrated with it. And since she did not throw it away, it is proved from this that she indeed consented to become consecrated with it.

And therefore Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua held that one should say that the woman is consecrated.

Rav Ahai challenged

Rav Ahai rejects the distinction of Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua, for—

Is it so that all women—

know monetary law?!

Are all women expert in monetary law, and do they know that an object that came into their possession as kiddushin, if they do not consent to become consecrated with it, they must throw it away, and if it is lost, they are not liable to pay?!

And since not all women are expert in monetary law, one must say:

Here too, she thought:

the woman

if I throw it, and it breaks—

I will become liable for it!

That is, also in our matter, where the woman did not receive the money as a deposit, she did not throw it away because she thought: If I throw it and it breaks, I will become liable for it. And therefore she did not throw it away, but she did not consent to the kiddushin [as Rava said]. (458a')

Rav Aha son of Rav sent

this question

before

before

Ravina: What is the ruling in a case like this?

In a case like this [where he consecrated with a mat containing money], what is proper to rule according to halakha: is it like Rava, who said that she is not consecrated, or like Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua, who was stringent in the matter?

He sent him

Ravina sent a reply:

We have not heard

We have not heard

that which

he said

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua!

He did not tell us his words, nor did anyone else tell us this in his name. And therefore we rule like Rava, that the woman is not consecrated.

But

you, who have heard—

take heed of it!

You, who have heard the words of Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua, it is proper for you to take account of his words, and require the woman to receive a bill of divorce on account of the doubt before she marries another man.

And the Gemara brings another incident concerning kiddushin with money:

There was a certain woman who was selling silk cords.

An incident occurred involving a woman who was selling silk cords.

A certain man came and snatched a cord from her.

A man came and snatched one cord from her.

She said to him: Give it to me—

give it to me!

He said to her: If I give it to you—

will

you become consecrated to me?

If I give it to you, will you become consecrated to me through it?

She took it, and remained silent.

She took from him the cord that he returned to her, and remained silent.

And

concerning this

Rav Nahman said:

Her silence does not indicate that she consented to the kiddushin, because she

can

afterward

say

say:

“Yes,

indeed

I took it, and I took what belonged to me!”

I took the cord from him because the cord was mine, and therefore I took it in silence, and not because I consented to become consecrated.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Nahman

from a beraita:

For it was taught: A woman whom a man

consecrated

with something

taken by robbery

that he robbed from her,

or

likewise if a man consecrated her

through coercion [

where he took an object from her against her will, gave her money for it, and came to consecrate her with that object],

or

likewise if a man consecrated her

through theft

that he stole from her,

or he snatched a coin from her hand

of the woman,

and consecrated her

with it—

she is

consecrated!

And it is proved from this beraita that the woman cannot say: “Yes, I took it, and I took what belonged to me”!

Rav Nahman answered Rava concerning his objection from the beraita:

There—

where they had discussed the match!

The beraita is speaking of a case where, before the man gave the stolen object to the woman, he had spoken with her about a match for the purpose of kiddushin, and she had consented to become consecrated to him.

Therefore, when she remains silent while he gives her the object that he stole from her and says to her that he is consecrating her with it, her silence is to be understood as meaning that she indeed consents to become consecrated to him, and she waives his obligation to return the stolen property; through this, the stolen object becomes his object.

And it follows that at the time he consecrates her, the object is his, and he can now give it to her as kiddushin.

But if he had not arranged the match with her beforehand, after she receives the stolen object in silence she can say: “Yes, I took it, and I took what belonged to me.” And her silence does not indicate that she consented to the kiddushin.

And Rav Nahman proves his words:

And from where do you say that a distinction is made between them,

and from where do you have to say that there is a distinction

between having discussed the match

before he consecrates her with a stolen object

and not having discussed the match?

For above we brought a beraita that says: One who gives a coin to a woman and says to her, “Take this coin as a deposit,” and then returns and says to her, “Be consecrated to me with it,” if he said this at the time of giving the money, she is consecrated. And if he said this after the giving of the money, if she wanted [she said “Yes”—she is consecrated]; if she did not want [she remained silent—she is not consecrated].

For it was taught in the continuation of that same beraita: the one who gives a sela to a woman and

in the continuation of that baraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna: The one who gives a woman a sela and

says

to her beforehand:

Take [

take ]

this sela, which I owe you

as repayment of my debt.

And he returned

afterward

and said to her: “Be betrothed to me with it”—

if he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with it”

at the time of giving the money,

before the woman received it: “

She agreed”—

she is betrothed. “

She did not agree”—

she is not betrothed.

And if

after the giving of

the

money

he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with it”—

even if she

agreed,

she is not betrothed.

And Rav Naḥman explains and proceeds to explain the words of the beraita that we have just brought:

What does “

she agreed” mean,

and what does “

she did not agree” mean,

that we learned concerning repayment of a debt?

If you say,

if it is said that “

she agreed”

means

that she said: Yes [

yes ], and “

she did not agree”

means

that she said: No,

and specifically when she said “No” is she not betrothed,

but

if she

was silent, there is kiddushin,

but if she remained silent, there is kiddushin.

It is impossible to say so, for if so, one should wonder:

And let it teach “

she is betrothed”

without qualification!

It should have taught simply, “At the time of giving the money—she is betrothed,” and it would have been understood on its own that if she explicitly said “No,” she is not betrothed. For even small children know this,

because there—

just as at the beginning of that beraita, concerning one who betroths with a deposited sela, we learned without qualification, “At the time of giving the money, she is betrothed” [and it was explained above that if she explicitly said “No,” she is not betrothed]!

Rather,

necessarily, “

she agreed”

means

that she said: Yes [

yes ], and

“she did not agree”

means

that she was silent,

and so the beraita said: At the time of giving the money—if she explicitly said “Yes,” she is betrothed, and if she was silent, she is not betrothed. But after the giving of the money, even if she explicitly said “Yes,” she is not betrothed, because at first she took the sela for repayment of the debt, and acquired it, and it is hers. Therefore, even if afterward she agreed to become betrothed with it, it is nothing, for the sela already belongs to her, and it turns out that the one who betroths did not give her his own sela for the kiddushin.

And

in any event,

it teaches that

at the time of giving the money, if she was silent,

she is not betrothed.

And the question arises:

What is the reason?

Why is she not betrothed? After all, she was silent!

And necessarily, the reason for the matter is that she

can say: “Yes, I took it, and I took what was mine!”

And this is as I [Rav Naḥman] said above concerning that man who snatched a varsha from the woman and betrothed her with it.

And Rav Naḥman raises an objection to this:

But then this is difficult,

but there is a difficulty from the beraita that we brought above,

that

if

he betrothed her with robbery, with violence, or with theft, or if he snatched a sela from her hand and betrothed her—

she is betrothed.

And she cannot say, “Yes, I took it, and I took what was mine”!

And Rav Naḥman concludes his proof:

Rather, is it not

necessarily

learn from it—

Here, the beraita that says that if the woman was silent she is betrothed, speaks of a case where he

had

arranged a match

before the giving of the money.

Whereas

here, the beraita that says that she is not betrothed, speaks of a case where he

had not

arranged a match.

And in connection with the fact that we learned in our Mishna that a woman is acquired with a peruta and not with less than a peruta, the Gemara brings here several statements of Rav Asi, one of which relies upon the words of our Mishna.

When Rav Asi’s soul departed, the Sages entered to collect his teachings.

When Rav Asi died, the students gathered to collect the halakhot that they had heard from him. And they said: Whoever heard a new teaching from him should say it in the ears of his colleagues, in order to combine them together so that they would not be forgotten.

A.

One of the Sages said [

one of the students ],

and his name was Rabbi Yaakov: So [

so ]

said Rav Asi: Rabbi Mani said: Just as a woman is not acquired with less than the value of a peruta,

as we learned in our Mishna,

so too land is not acquired with less than the value of a peruta.

They said to him,

the Sages challenged him:

But it was taught,

for we learned in a beraita:

Even though a woman is not acquired with less than the value of a peruta, land is acquired with less than the value of a peruta!

He said to them

Rabbi Yaakov to the Sages:

When that was taught—

with exchange.

That beraita is speaking of acquisition through exchange, and so the beraita said: Even though a woman is not acquired with less than the value of a peruta through acquisition by exchange, nevertheless land is acquired with less than the value of a peruta, through acquisition by exchange.

But through acquisition with money, it is impossible to acquire land except with the value of a peruta, just as it is impossible to acquire a woman through monetary acquisition with less than the value of a peruta.

B.

They then returned, sat, and said,

afterward the students of Rav Asi returned and sat and said another teaching that they had heard from him—

This is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Whoever does not know the nature of

the laws of

bills of divorce and kiddushin—

let him have no dealings with them,

to serve as a judge in the matter, for perhaps he will permit the prohibition of a forbidden relationship, and this is a distortion that cannot be repaired —

Rav Asi said

about this

Rav Asi:

so

said Rabbi Yoḥanan: And

judges who issue rulings concerning bills of divorce and kiddushin when they are not expert in the matter are

more harmful [

harmful ]

to the world than

the people of

the generation of the Flood.

As it is stated [

God rebuked the children of Israel through the prophet Hosea [Hosea 4]: “For there is no truth, no kindness, and no knowledge of God in the land. [Rather,]

swearing falsely [

they swear falsely ],

and murder, and steal, and commit adultery; they break through, and blood touches blood.”

And the continuation of the verse proves that they are more harmful to the world than the generation of the Flood, as follows.

And before the Gemara concludes bringing Rav Asi’s words, the Gemara asks:

What does it indicate?

From where do we know that this verse [“committing adultery”] speaks of the prohibition of a married woman?

And we answer:

As Rav Yosef translated: “

‘They break through’—that is,

they beget children from the wives of their fellows.”

They beget children from the wives of their fellows, from the expression “so he multiplied and so he broke through” [Exodus 1]. “

‘And blood touches blood’”—

they add sins upon sins.”

They add one sin upon another.

And the Gemara returns and brings the continuation of Rav Asi’s words:

And it is written

in the continuation of that prophecy: “

Therefore the land shall mourn, and everyone dwelling in it shall languish, together with the beast of the field and the bird of the heavens; and even the fish of the sea shall be gathered up,”

and so forth

and so on.

And it is proved from here that even the fish died because the children of Israel transgressed the prohibition of a married woman and begot children from the wives of their fellows.

Whereas concerning the generation of the Flood, no decree was issued against the fish of the sea.

As it is stated [

Genesis 7] concerning the Flood: “

Of all that was on dry land

[on the land],

died,”

but not the fish of the sea.

Whereas here,

when the children of Israel transgressed the prohibition of a married woman,

even the fish of the sea

died.

And it is proved from here that the children of Israel who transgress the prohibition of a married woman are more harmful to the world than the generation of the Flood.

And we raise an objection to Rav Asi’s words in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

From where do we know that the punishment mentioned in the verse is for the fact that the children of Israel transgressed the prohibition of a married woman?

For several transgressions were stated in the prophecy of Hosea,

and say that it is only when he commits all of them!

That is, perhaps we should say that the punishment comes only once they commit all these transgressions!

And we answer:

That cannot enter your mind!

Do not let it enter your mind to say so!

Because

it is written

in another prophecy that Jeremiah prophesied [Jeremiah 23]: “

For because of the false oath

[the swearing of false oaths]

the land shall mourn.”

And from here it follows that because of the “false oath” alone the land shall mourn.

But “false oath” is one of the transgressions mentioned in the prophecy of Hosea, at whose end it says, “Therefore the land shall mourn.” And we learn from Jeremiah’s words that because of the “false oath” alone the land shall mourn, even without the other transgressions mentioned in Hosea.

And it is proved from here that the prophet Hosea’s intention was to say that for each and every one of these transgressions individually the land shall mourn.

And the prohibition of a married woman [“they break through”] is one of the transgressions mentioned in Hosea. From here it follows that concerning the prohibition of a married woman by itself it is said that the land shall mourn and even the fish of the sea shall die.

And we raise an objection: Indeed, it may be proved from Jeremiah’s prophecy that because of the “false oath” by itself the land mourns, but from where do we know that also concerning the other transgressions mentioned in Hosea, the land mourns because of each one by itself?

And say: “

The ‘false oath’

alone, and

all

the others by themselves!”

Say that the verse separated the transgression of the “false oath” from the other transgressions. And thus the verse said: “The ‘false oath’ is a severe transgression by itself, for which the land shall mourn. Likewise, the transgressions of ‘swearing falsely, and murdering, and stealing, and committing adultery—they break through’ are one group of severe transgressions. Only when they transgress all of them shall the land mourn!”