Kiddushin 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

For the first clause

when she says

to him

“No”—

the betrothal is also valid!

This implies that in the first clause, at the time the money is given, even when the woman says to him, “No,” the betrothal is valid?!

Why?

Why is this so?

But she said

explicitly

“No!”

And Rava concludes:

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that

“she wanted”

means

that she said

“Yes.”

And

“she did not want”

means

that she remained completely silent.

Accordingly, in the latter clause, where he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with it” after the money had been given: If she said, “Yes,” she is betrothed, but if she remained silent, she is not betrothed. Whereas in the first clause, where he said this to her at the time the money was given, even if she remained silent, she is betrothed.

And infer from this: Silence after the money has been given—

is nothing.

The woman’s silence is because she is unconcerned with what he said to her, and not because she agreed to be betrothed.

And from here Rava learned that also in the incident discussed above [concerning a man who betrothed a woman with a mat and four dinars inside it], she is not betrothed, because she did not know that there were four dinars inside it until after the money had been given. Her silence after the money had been given does not indicate that she consented to the betrothal.

They raised an objection against it,

that is, they found it difficult to accept Rava’s proof,

in

the

Pum Nahara

study hall, in the name of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

Are the cases comparable?

Can the silence in the baraita be compared to the silence that we are discussing here?!

Although there is no distinction between them with regard to the silence itself, in our case one can prove from the fact that the woman did not throw away the coin that she consented to the betrothal. For—

There

in the baraita, it is speaking of a case where

he gave them to her as a deposit.

Initially, he gave the money to the woman as a deposit, and she undertook to safeguard it. Therefore, she did not immediately throw the money from her hands, because

she reasoned: If I throw it away and it breaks, I will be liable for it.

If I throw the money away and it breaks, I will have to pay him its value, since I undertook to safeguard it. [And her silence was because she was unconcerned with what he said

But

here,

in our case,

he gave them to her as betrothal money.

The man gave the mat to the woman for the purpose of betrothal, and not as a deposit. Although she cannot be betrothed with the mat itself, since it is not worth a peruta, when he then said to her, “Be betrothed to me with the money inside it,”

if it is indeed the case that she does not want this, she should throw it away!

If she truly did not wish to be betrothed, it would have been proper for her to throw the money away, since she had not undertaken to safeguard it, and she should not have continued to hold it if she did not consent to be betrothed with it. Since she did not throw it away, this proves that she indeed consented to be betrothed with it.

And therefore Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, reasoned that one must say that the woman is betrothed.

Rav Aḥai challenges this,

Rav Aḥai rejects Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua’s, distinction, for—

Are all women—

versed in monetary law?!

Are all women knowledgeable about monetary law, and do they know that when an object comes into their possession as betrothal money, if they do not consent to be betrothed with it they must throw it away, and that if it is lost they are not liable to pay for it?!

Since not all women are knowledgeable about monetary law, one may say:

Here too, she reasoned:

the woman

If I throw it away and it breaks—

I will be liable for it!

That is, even in our case, where the woman did not receive the money as a deposit, she did not throw it away because she thought: If I throw it away and it breaks, I will be liable for it. Therefore, she did not throw it away, but she did not consent to the betrothal [as Rava said]. (458a

Rav Aḥa bar Rav sent

this question

before

before

Ravina: What is the ruling in a case of this kind?

In a case such as this [where he betrothed her with a mat containing money], what should be the practical ruling: Do we follow Rava, who said that she is not betrothed, or Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, who was stringent in the matter?

He sent him

Ravina sent a reply:

We have not heard

We have not heard

that which

was said by

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua!

He did not tell us his statement, nor did anyone else tell us this in his name. Therefore, we rule in accordance with Rava, that the woman is not betrothed.

But

you, who have heard it,

should take it into consideration!

You, who have heard the words of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, should take his words into consideration, and require the woman to receive a get due to the doubt before she marries someone else.

And the Gemara brings another incident concerning betrothal with money:

There was a certain woman who was selling silk cords.

There was an incident involving a woman who was selling silk cords.

A certain man came and snatched a silk cord from her.

A man came and snatched one cord from her.

She said to him: Give it to me.

Give it to me!

He said to her: If I give it to you,

will you

be betrothed to me?

If I give it to you, will you be betrothed to me with it?

She took it and remained silent.

She took the cord that he returned to her and remained silent.

And

concerning this

Rav Naḥman said:

Her silence does not indicate that she consented to the betrothal, because she

can

later

say:

say:

“No,

indeed,

I took it, but I took what belongs to me!”

I took the cord from him because the cord is mine, and therefore I took it silently, not because I consented to be betrothed.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman

from a baraita:

As it is taught in a baraita: A woman whom a man

betrothed

with an object

obtained by robbery

that he had robbed from her,

or

a man betrothed her

with an object obtained by coercion [

that he took from her against her will, gave her money for it, and then sought to betroth her with that object],

or

a man betrothed her

with a stolen object

that he had stolen from her,

Or he snatched a sela from her hand

of the woman,

and betrothed her

with it—

she is

betrothed!

This proves from the baraita that the woman cannot say, “No, I took it, but I took what belongs to me”!

Rav Naḥman answered Rava’s challenge from the baraita:

There—

it is a case where they had discussed a match!

The baraita is speaking of a case where, before the husband gave the stolen object to the woman, he had discussed with her the matter of a match for the purpose of betrothal, and she had consented to be betrothed to him.

Therefore, when she remains silent while he gives her the object that he stole from her and tells her that he is betrothing her with it, her silence is interpreted as indicating that she indeed consents to be betrothed to him, and that she waives his obligation to return the stolen object; thereby, the stolen object becomes his.

It follows that at the moment he betroths her, the object belongs to him, and he can now give it to her as betrothal money.

But if he had not discussed a match with her beforehand, after she silently accepts the stolen object, she can say: “No, I took it, but I took what belongs to me.” Her silence does not indicate that she consented to the betrothal.

And Rav Naḥman proves his statement:

And from where do you say that we distinguish

How do you know that there is indeed a distinction

between one who had discussed a match with her

before betrothing her with a stolen object

and one who had not discussed a match with her?

For earlier we cited a baraita that says: One who gives a sela to a woman and says to her, “Take this sela as a deposit,” and then says to her, “Be betrothed to me with it,” if he says this at the time the money is given, she is betrothed. If he says it after the money has been given, if she wants it [she says, “Yes”], she is betrothed; if she does not want it [she remains silent], she is not betrothed.

As it is taught

in the continuation of that beraita: If one gives a sela to a woman and

says

to her beforehand:

“Take

receive]

this sela, which I owe you

as repayment of my debt,

and then

afterward

says to her: “You are betrothed to me with it”—

if he said to her, “You are betrothed to me with it

at the time the money is given,”

before the woman received it: “

She agreed”—

she is betrothed. “

She did not agree”—

she is not betrothed.

And if

after the money was given

the

money

he said to her, “You are betrothed to me with it”—

even if she “

agreed,” she

is not betrothed.

And Rav Naḥman proceeds to explain the words of the beraita that we have just cited:

What does “

she agreed” mean,

and what does “

she did not agree” mean,

which we stated concerning repayment of a debt?

If you say

that when it says “

she agreed,”

it means

that she said, “Yes”

indeed], and when it says “

she did not agree,”

it means

that she said, “No,”

and specifically when she said “No” is she not betrothed,

but

if she

remained silent, the betrothal is effective,

i.e., if she remained silent, this is a valid betrothal.

This cannot be said, because if so, one should wonder:

And let it teach “

she is betrothed”

without qualification!

It would have been appropriate to teach simply: “At the time the money is given—she is betrothed,” and it would be self-evident that if she explicitly said “No,” she is not betrothed. For even minors know this,

as there

in the beginning of that beraita, concerning one who betroths with a sela that was deposited with him, it is stated without qualification: “At the time the money is given, she is betrothed” [and it was explained above that if she explicitly said “No,” she is not betrothed]!

Rather,

necessarily, “

she agreed”

means

that she said, “Yes”

indeed], and “

she did not agree”

means

that she remained silent,

and this is what the beraita said: At the time the money is given—if she explicitly said “Yes,” she is betrothed, but if she remained silent, she is not betrothed. Whereas after the money is given, even if she explicitly said “Yes,” she is not betrothed, because initially she took the sela as repayment of the debt, acquired it, and it therefore belongs to her. Consequently, even if she subsequently agreed to become betrothed with it, it is of no consequence, since the sela already belonged to her, and it follows that the man who betroths her did not give her his own sela for the betrothal.

And

in any event,

it teaches that

at the time the money is given, if she remained silent, she

is not betrothed.

The question arises:

What is the reason?

Why is she not betrothed? She remained silent, after all!

Necessarily, the reason is that she

can say: “Yes, I took it, but I took what belongs to me!”

And this is what I, Rav Naḥman, said above concerning the man who snatched a varshakha from a woman and betrothed her with it.

Rav Naḥman raises an objection to this:

But then this is difficult,

as it contradicts the beraita that we cited above,

which teaches that

if one

betroths her with stolen property, with property acquired through robbery or coercion, or if he snatched a sela from her hand and betrothed her with it—she

is betrothed.

She cannot say, “Yes, I took it, but I took what belongs to me”!

And Rav Naḥman concludes his proof:

Rather, is it not

necessarily

inferable from here—

This

the beraita that says that if the woman remained silent she is betrothed, is speaking of a case where he

had previously discussed the match with her

before giving the money.

Whereas

this

the beraita that says that she is not betrothed, is speaking of a case where he

had not previously discussed the match with her.

Incidentally, since our Mishna teaches that a woman is acquired with a peruta, and not with less than the value of a peruta, the Gemara cites here several statements of Rav Asi, one of which relies on the words of our Mishna.

When Rav Asi died, the Sages gathered to collect his teachings.

When Rav Asi passed away, the students assembled to gather the halakhot they had heard from him. They said: Whoever had heard a novel teaching from him should recite it in the presence of his colleagues, so that they could combine them and prevent them from being forgotten.

a.

One of the Sages said to them

[one of the students],

and his name was Rabbi Yaakov: “Thus

[so]

said Rav Asi in the name of Rabbi Mani: Just as a woman is not acquired with less than the value of a peruta,

as we learned in our Mishna,

so too, land is not acquired with less than the value of a peruta.

They said to him,

the Sages challenged him:

But it is taught

that we learned in a beraita:

Although a woman is not acquired with less than the value of a peruta, land is acquired with less than the value of a peruta!

He said to them

Rabbi Yaakov to the Sages:

When that was taught—

with an exchange.

That beraita is speaking of acquisition through an exchange, and this is what it said: Although a woman is not acquired with less than the value of a peruta through an acquisition by exchange, nevertheless, land is acquired with less than the value of a peruta through an acquisition by exchange.

But through monetary acquisition, land can be acquired only with the value of a peruta, just as a woman cannot be acquired through monetary acquisition with less than the value of a peruta.

b.

They then sat again and said,

afterward, the students of Rav Asi sat together again and recited another teaching they had heard from him—

This is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Anyone who is not familiar with the details of

the laws of

divorce documents and betrothal—

should have no involvement with them,

to serve as a judge in such matters, lest he permit a forbidden relationship, and this is an error that cannot be rectified.

Rav Asi

said

about this:

Thus

said Rabbi Yoḥanan: And

judges who issue rulings concerning divorce documents and betrothal when they are not proficient in these matters are

more harmful

[cause greater damage]

to the world than

the people of

the generation of the Flood.

As it is stated

[God rebuked the Children of Israel through the prophet Hosea [Hosea 4]: “For there is no truth, no kindness, and no knowledge of God in the land. [Rather,]

swearing falsely

[taking false oaths],

and murder, and theft, and adultery have broken out, and blood touches blood.”

And the continuation of the verse demonstrates that they are more harmful to the world than the generation of the Flood, as follows.

Before the Gemara concludes citing Rav Asi’s words, the Gemara asks:

What is the indication?

From where do we know that this verse [“adultery”] is speaking of the prohibition against a married woman?

And we answer:

As Rav Yosef translated: “

‘Have broken out’”—that is,

they beget children from the wives of their fellows.

They beget children from the wives of their fellows, from the language of “so he multiplied and so he broke out” [Exodus 1]. “

And blood touches blood”—

they add sins upon sins.

They add one sin to another.

And the Gemara returns to cite the continuation of Rav Asi’s words:

And it is written

in the continuation of that prophecy: “

Therefore the land shall mourn, and every inhabitant of it shall languish, together with the beasts of the field and the birds of the heavens; and even the fish of the sea shall be gathered up,”

etc.,

it says.

This demonstrates that even the fish died because the Children of Israel violated the prohibition against a married woman and begot children from the wives of their fellows.

Whereas in the generation of the Flood, no decree was issued against the fish of the sea.

As it is stated

[Genesis 7] concerning the Flood: “

Of all that was on dry land

[on the land],

they died,”

but not the fish of the sea.

Whereas here,

when the Children of Israel violated the prohibition against a married woman,

even the fish of the sea

died.

This demonstrates that the Children of Israel who violate the prohibition against a married woman are more harmful to the world than the generation of the Flood.

And we challenge Rav Asi’s statement in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

From where do we know that the punishment mentioned in the verse is for the fact that the Children of Israel violated the prohibition against a married woman?

Several sins are mentioned in the prophecy of Hosea,

and perhaps it applies only once they commit all of them!

That is, perhaps the punishment comes only once they have committed all these sins!

And we answer:

That cannot enter your mind!

Do not think that this is so!

Because

it is written

in another prophecy, which Jeremiah prophesied [Jeremiah 23]: “

Because of false oaths

[a false oath]

the land shall mourn.”

Thus, the land mourns on account of “false oaths” alone.

“False oaths” is one of the sins mentioned in the prophecy of Hosea, at the end of which it says, “Therefore the land shall mourn.” We therefore learn from Jeremiah’s words that the land mourns on account of “false oaths” alone, even without the other sins mentioned in Hosea.

It follows that the prophet Hosea intended to say that the land mourns on account of each one of these sins individually.

And the prohibition against a married woman [“have broken out”] is one of the sins mentioned in Hosea. It follows that it is stated concerning the prohibition against a married woman alone that the land shall mourn and even the fish of the sea shall die.

We challenge this: It is indeed possible to prove from Jeremiah’s prophecy that the land mourns on account of “false oaths” alone, but from where do we know that, concerning the other sins mentioned in Hosea’s prophecy as well, the land mourns on account of each one individually?

And perhaps “

false oaths”

alone, while

all

the others only together!

Say that the verse distinguished the sin of “false oaths” from the other sins. Thus, the verse says: “False oaths” is a severe sin in its own right, on account of which the land shall mourn. Likewise, the sins of “denial, murder, theft, and adultery have broken out” constitute one severe group of sins. Only when they commit all of them shall the land mourn!