Kiddushin 12b — the Talmud in English

Was it not the case that

this act is similar to the act of

Judith, the wife of

his wife,

of Rabbi Hiyya?!

For

Judith, the wife of Rabbi Hiyya, regularly used to give birth to twins, and

there was [and it was]

[and she had]

to her

as a result

the pain of childbirth,

and she did not want to give birth anymore.

She said to him,

Judith said to Rabbi Hiyya, this is what

my mother said to me [A0018] [my mother]:

[my mother]:

Your father accepted betrothal for you when you were a minor—

your father accepted betrothal for you from another man when you were a minor, and it follows that I am betrothed to another man, and forbidden to you because of the prohibition of a married woman.

He said to her,

Rabbi Hiyya:

Your mother does not have the power to forbid you to me—

your mother does not have the power to be believed to forbid you to me by her words.

And it is proven that even if the woman agrees with her mother’s words, she does not have the power to forbid herself to her husband.

And likewise in the incident of Rav Hisda, when the daughter agrees with her mother that on the day of the betrothal the stone was indeed worth a peruta, she does not have the power thereby to forbid herself to the second man.

The Sages said

they wondered

to Rav Hisda: Why?

Why do you permit her to the second man?

But there are witnesses in Idith who know that on that day

indeed

it was worth a peruta!

The report has gone out that there are witnesses in a place called Idith, and those witnesses know that the stone was worth a peruta on the day of the betrothal! If so, how do you permit her to the second man, and do you not fear that perhaps those witnesses will come, and it will be established by witnesses that she is forbidden to him by the prohibition of a married woman?

Rav Hisda answered them:

Now, at any rate, they are not here

before us!

In any event, now, when the witnesses are not before us and there is only a report concerning them, we have no reason to be concerned so as to forbid her.

And Rav Hisda proves from his words that one may not forbid the woman on the basis of a report that there are witnesses saying that she is forbidden: A woman, even an unmarried woman, who was taken captive by a gentile is forbidden to marry a kohen, because perhaps the captor had intercourse with her, and thereby she becomes disqualified with the disqualification of a “harlot,” and is forbidden to marry a kohen.

a. The disqualification of “harlot” is a general designation for every woman who has intercourse with a man with whom she cannot have a valid betrothal, and not specifically for a woman who commits adultery while married. Therefore, intercourse with a gentile, who cannot betroth a daughter of Israel, disqualifies a daughter of Israel with the disqualification of “harlot.”

b. A woman who was taken captive, and there are no witnesses concerning the matter, but she comes on her own and says: “I was taken captive, but I am pure” [that I was not violated by gentiles], is believed, because “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” Since we know that she was taken captive only from the woman’s own words, we necessarily have to believe all her words, including what she said: “I am pure.” Therefore she is permitted to marry a kohen.

c. An incident occurred involving the daughters of Samuel, who were taken captive, and each one came and said, “I was taken captive, but I am pure.” And Rabbi Hanina permitted them to marry a kohen. And they asked Rabbi Hanina: But there are witnesses in the overseas country saying that they were taken captive, and there is here no credibility of “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” for they are forbidden according to witnesses, and not according to their words alone! So how can you permit them?

And Rabbi Hanina answered this: Since the witnesses have still not come now, there is no need to be concerned about their words. For “the witnesses are beside the north [the north], and she should be forbidden”?! Are we to forbid her because a report has gone out that there are witnesses located outside the Land of Israel, in the north?

And it is proven from here that one may not forbid a woman on the basis that a report has gone out that there are witnesses to forbid her.

And Rav Hisda proves from here that even in our matter, despite the fact that a report has gone out that there are witnesses in Idith that the stone was worth a peruta on the day of the betrothal, one may not forbid the woman to the second man for this reason.

For

was it not

that this act is similar to the act

of Rabbi Hanina?

For Rabbi Hanina said:

And is it so that

her witnesses are beside the north [A0066]] [the north] and have not come to testify,

[the north], and have not come to testify,

and she should be forbidden?!

Rather, she is permitted.

And if so, also in our matter, as long as the witnesses have not come before us and testified that the betrothal was worth a peruta, we may not forbid her to the second man.

In summary: Rav Hisda innovated two matters:

a. One who betroths with less than the value of a peruta, we are not concerned about his betrothal, and she is permitted to every person [unlike the words of Shmuel].

b. Even if a report goes out that there are witnesses who saw that the betrothal was worth a peruta at that time, we are not concerned about their words as long as they have not come and testified.

Abaye and Rava—

they do not hold by this [opinion] of Rav Hisda.

They do not hold in accordance with Rav Hisda’s words, that he permitted the woman to the second man. Rather, in their view, since there are witnesses in Idith that the stone was worth a peruta on the day of the betrothal, we are concerned about their words, and she is forbidden to the second man.

And although Rabbi Hanina permitted the daughters of Samuel, who had been taken captive, to marry, and was not concerned about the words of the witnesses in the overseas country, one cannot prove from there that also in our matter we are not concerned about the words of witnesses who have not come, because one can distinguish between the matters:

If they were lenient regarding a captive woman,

not to be concerned about the words of witnesses who had not come, as Rabbi Hanina said, the reason is that it is uncommon for the woman to be violated by gentiles, since

she makes herself repulsive to the captor,

she is contemptible to him [or she debases herself before him], and it is reasonable that he did not have intercourse with her. Therefore they were not concerned that perhaps witnesses would come and testify that they had been taken captive, because even if indeed they had been taken captive, we can presume that they were not violated by the captors.

But should we

be lenient regarding a married woman!?

For when there is a report that there are witnesses in Idith that the stone was worth a peruta at the time of the betrothal, we have to be concerned that perhaps there indeed are witnesses concerning this, because it is common for the stone to be worth a peruta.

And the Gemara relates that the same woman who was betrothed with a blue stone [with the blue stone] relied on the words of Rav Hisda, who permitted her to marry the second man, and she married him.

There remained from that family,

and sons remained from that family

in Sura, and the Sages withdrew from it,

because they were concerned that she was the first man’s wife, and it followed that the second man had intercourse with a married woman. And the sons were mamzerim.

And not because they held like Shmuel,

the reason that the Sages withdrew from that family was not because they held like Shmuel, that one who betroths with less than the value of a peruta is concerned that perhaps it is worth a peruta in Media.

Rather,

if we knew that at the time of the betrothal the stone was not worth a peruta in that place, she would be permitted to marry another man. And the Sages would not have withdrawn from that family. And the reason that the Sages withdrew from that family was

because

there were witnesses in Idith that the stone was worth a peruta at the time of the betrothal. And the Sages

held [A0100]] [held]

thought]

like Abaye and Rava,

that one is concerned about the words of witnesses even though they had not come to testify concerning the matter.

The Gemara brings an incident from which it is proven that Rav Yosef’s view is in accordance with Shmuel: One who betroths a woman with less than the value of a peruta is concerned that perhaps it is worth a peruta in Media:

A certain man betrothed with a sprig of myrtle in the marketplace,

an incident involving a man who betrothed a woman with a twig [a branch] of a myrtle tree in the marketplace.

Rav Aha bar Huna sent

the following question

before [A0110]] [before]

before]

Rav Yosef: What is the law in a case like this?

What is the ruling in a case like this?

He sent him

Rav Yosef a response:

a.

He should be flogged, like Rav—

he flogged that man who betrothed in the marketplace, because there is licentiousness in the matter, as is to be learned from Rav’s words below.

b.

And she requires a bill of divorce, like Shmuel—

and the woman requires a bill of divorce in order to marry another man, even though the myrtle branch is not worth a peruta, because we are concerned that perhaps it is worth a peruta in Media, as Shmuel said. And where did Rav say that one should be flogged for this?

Rav

was

flogging [A0126]] [flogged] each one for the following matters:

flogging] for each of the following acts:

[A0128]]For one who betroths in the marketplace

For one who betroths a woman in the marketplace,

because this is a way of licentiousness.

b.

And for one who betroths through intercourse.

For this too is a way of licentiousness.

c.

And for one who betroths

a woman

without prior arrangement,

without having made an arrangement with her beforehand—for this too is a way of licentiousness.

d.

And for one who nullifies a bill of divorce—

one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and pursues it and says to the agent, “The bill of divorce that I gave you is null.” There is concern that people may not know that he nullified the bill of divorce before it reached her, and the agent will give it to her after he nullified it, and she will marry through it. Therefore it is appropriate to flog him.

e.

And for one who delivers a declaration concerning a bill of divorce—

a man whom the court forced to divorce his wife against his will, and before divorcing her he delivered a declaration to witnesses and said to them: “Regarding the bill of divorce that I wish to give my wife, know that I am compelled to give it. Therefore I say before you that it is null.”

And through this he casts disrepute upon her sons, for when she marries another man and bears sons to him, people will say that she is the first man’s wife, and her sons are mamzerim. Therefore it is appropriate to flog him.

c]

And for one who troubles the agent of the Sages —

one who strikes a court agent who came to summon him to judgment as the agents of the judges’ court’s emissary.

d]

And for one upon whom excommunication rested for thirty days —

a person whom the court excommunicated, and who did not come to the court to have his excommunication released for thirty days.

e]

And for a bridegroom who resides in his father-in-law’s house —

a bridegroom who lives in his mother-in-law’s house, for ordinarily a mother-in-law loves her bridegroom. And there is concern lest he stumble with her.

The Gemara examines closely the wording that we said: “And for a bridegroom who resides in his father-in-law’s house.”

It follows from this wording that specifically a bridegroom

who resides [

who lived] in his mother-in-law’s house is lashed, but if he does not live there permanently, but rather

passes by,

he is not lashed.

And it is difficult:

But there was that one bridegroom who passed by the doorway of his mother-in-law’s house, and Rav Sheshet lashed him.

But there was one bridegroom who passed by the entrance of his mother-in-law’s house, and Rav Sheshet lashed him, despite the fact that he did not live there permanently!

And we answer: It is not possible to derive anything from that incident, because

that

bridegroom —

his mother-in-law had been suspected concerning him.

That man’s mother-in-law was suspected concerning him [“had been suspected” is from the language of “seems,” by which a sota is called], and therefore they lashed him for passing there. But other people who pass by their mother-in-law’s house are not lashed.

And now the Gemara brings another opinion concerning what Rav would lash for:

The Nehardeans say: In all of them Rav would not lash,

he would not lash for any of them,

but

only

for one who betroths

through intercourse,

and he did so also

without an engagement [

for this is extreme licentiousness].

And some say,

and there are those who say that according to the Nehardeans, one who betroths through intercourse is lashed

even

if he did so

with an engagement as well, because of

the

licentiousness involved in this.

And the Gemara brings another incident concerning betrothal with money:

There was a certain man who betrothed with a mat of myrtle,

an incident involving a man who betrothed a woman with a mat of myrtle.

And immediately after the betrothal,

they said to him: But it does not contain the value of a peruta,

for it does not contain the value of a peruta!

He said to them: Let her be betrothed with the four zuz that are in it.

Let her be betrothed with the four zuz tied to the mat.

She took it.

And she was silent.

The woman left the mat with the four zuz in her hand and was silent, and did not throw them away.

Rava said:

The woman’s silence does not indicate that she agreed to become betrothed with the four zuz, because when she received the mat and the money inside it, she did not know that there was money there, and she had not intended to become betrothed with it. And when she learned that there was money there,

it was silence [

this is silence]

after the giving of the money.

And every silence after the giving of the money —

is nothing at all!

For it may be said that the reason the woman was silent was that she thought in her heart that initially she had not received the money in order to become betrothed with it, and there is no betrothal here at all. And therefore she was silent and said nothing.

And Rava brings a source for his words:

Rava said: From where do I say this,

from where did I learn this law?

For it was taught:

One who gives a sela to a woman and

says to her: “Take this sela as a deposit” —

take this sela into your possession as a deposit.

And he then said to her: “Be betrothed to me with it.”

Now, if he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with it

at the time of the giving

of the

money,

before the woman received it, this is

betrothed.

But if

after the giving of the money

he said this to her, then, if she

wanted,

she is

betrothed,

but if she

did not want,

she is not betrothed.

And Rava continues to explain the words of the beraita:

What does

“wanted” mean,

and what does

“did not want” mean?

If you say,

if you say that

“wanted”

means

that she said yes, [

so], and

“did not want”

means

that she said no,

if so, one must wonder:

For at the beginning of the beraita we learned, “At the time of the giving of the money, she is betrothed,” and in this the beraita did not distinguish between whether she wanted or did not want.

And according to your words, that in the latter clause “did not want” means that she said to him “No,”

from this

you infer,