Kiddushin 12b (יב:) — the Talmud in English

Was this not the same as the incident involving

and is this act not similar to the act of

Judith, the wife of

the wife of

Rabbi Ḥiyya?!

For

Judith, the wife of Rabbi Ḥiyya, regularly gave birth to twins, and

there was

[she had]

to her

as a result

the pain of childbirth,

and she did not want to give birth again.

She said to him,

Judith said to Rabbi Ḥiyya, as follows:

“My mother said to me

[my mother]:

‘Your father accepted betrothal on your behalf when you were a minor’—

your father accepted betrothal on your behalf from another man when you were a minor, and it follows that I am betrothed to another man and forbidden to you as a married woman.

He said to her,

Rabbi Ḥiyya

said: “Your mother has no power to forbid you to me

—your mother does not have the authority to be believed and thereby forbid you to me.”

This proves that even if the woman agrees with her mother’s statement, she does not have the power to forbid herself to her husband.

Likewise, in the incident involving Rav Ḥisda, when the daughter agrees with her mother that on the day of the betrothal the stone was indeed worth a peruta, she does not have the power to forbid herself to the second man on that account.

The Sages

were perplexed and

said to Rav Ḥisda: “Why?”

Why do you permit her to the second man?

But there are witnesses in Idit who know that on that day

indeed

it was worth a peruta!

A report has circulated that there are witnesses in a place called Idit, and those witnesses know that the stone was worth a peruta on the day of the betrothal! If so, how can you permit her to the second man, without being concerned that those witnesses might come and it will be established through their testimony that she is forbidden to him as a married woman?

Rav Ḥisda answered them:

“For now, at any rate, they are not here

before us!”

In any event, now that the witnesses are not before us and there is only a report concerning them, we need not be concerned so as to forbid her.

Rav Ḥisda brings proof for his position that a woman should not be forbidden on the basis of a report that there are witnesses who say that she is forbidden: A woman—even an unmarried woman—who was captured by a gentile is forbidden to marry a koen, because perhaps the captor had intercourse with her, thereby disqualifying her with the status of a “zona,” and she is forbidden to marry a koen.

a. The disqualification of “zona” is a general designation for any woman who has intercourse with a man with whom she cannot have a valid betrothal, and it does not specifically refer to a woman who commits adultery while married. Therefore, intercourse with a gentile, who cannot betroth a Jewish woman, disqualifies a Jewish woman with the status of “zona.”

b. A woman who was captured, when there are no witnesses to the matter, but who comes on her own and says, “I was captured, but I am pure” [I was not violated by gentiles], is believed, because “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” Since we know that she was captured only from the woman’s own statement, we must necessarily believe all of her statements, including what she said: “I am pure.” Therefore, she is permitted to marry a koen.

c. There was an incident involving Samuel’s daughters, who were captured, and each one came and said, “I was captured, but I am pure.” Rabbi Ḥanina permitted them to marry a koen. They asked Rabbi Ḥanina: There are witnesses overseas who say that they were captured, and in this case there is no principle of “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” since they are forbidden on the basis of witnesses and not solely on the basis of their own statements! How can you permit them?

Rabbi Ḥanina answered them: Since the witnesses have still not come, there is no need to be concerned about their statements. For should we say, “The witnesses are beside the northern direction, and she should be forbidden”?! Shall we forbid her because a report has circulated that there are witnesses located outside the Land of Israel, in the north?

This proves that a woman should not be forbidden on the basis of a report that there are witnesses who would forbid her.

Rav Ḥisda proves from here that in our case as well, despite the report that there are witnesses in Idit who know that the stone was worth a peruta on the day of the betrothal, the woman should not be forbidden to the second man on that account.

For

was this not

and is this act not similar to the act of

Rabbi Ḥanina?

For Rabbi Ḥanina said:

Should

its witnesses be beside the northern direction,

[north] and have not come to testify,

and she should be forbidden?!

Rather, she remains permitted.

If so, in our case as well, as long as the witnesses have not come before us and testified that the betrothal was worth a peruta, she should not be forbidden to the second man.

In summary: Rav Ḥisda innovated two points:

[a] One who betroths with less than the value of a peruta is not subject to concern regarding his betrothal, and she is permitted to everyone [unlike Samuel’s view].

[b] Even if a report circulated that there are witnesses who saw that the betrothal was worth a peruta at that time, one need not be concerned about their statements as long as they have not come and testified.

Abaye and Rava—

do not accept this ruling of Rav Ḥisda.

They do not agree with Rav Ḥisda, who permitted the woman to the second man. Rather, in their view, since there are witnesses in Idit that the stone was worth a peruta on the day of the betrothal, one is concerned about their testimony, and she is forbidden to the second man.

And although Rabbi Ḥanina permitted Samuel’s daughters, who had been captured, to marry, and was not concerned about the testimony of the witnesses overseas, one cannot prove from there that in our case as well one need not be concerned about the testimony of witnesses who have not come, because a distinction can be made between the cases:

If they were lenient with regard to a captive woman,

not being concerned about the testimony of witnesses who had not come, the reason is that it is uncommon for a woman to be violated by a gentile, since

she makes herself repulsive to her captor,

she is contemptible in his eyes [or she debases herself before him], and it is reasonable that he did not violate her. Therefore, they were not concerned that witnesses might come and testify that the women had been captured, because even if they were indeed captured, we can presume that they were not violated by their captors.

But should we

be lenient in the case of a married woman?!

When there is a report that there are witnesses in Idit that the stone was worth a peruta at the time of the betrothal, we must be concerned that witnesses to this indeed exist, because it is common for the stone to be worth a peruta.

The Gemara relates that the same woman who had been betrothed with a blue stone relied on Rav Ḥisda’s words, who permitted her to marry the second man, and she married him.

There remained from that family,

and sons remained from that family

in Sura, and the Sages withdrew from it,

because they were concerned that she was the first man’s wife, meaning that the second man had had intercourse with a married woman. The sons were mamzerim.

And not because they agreed with Samuel,

the reason that the Sages withdrew from that family was not that they agreed with Samuel, who says that one who betroths with less than the value of a peruta must be concerned that it might be worth a peruta in Media.

Rather,

if we knew that at the time of the betrothal the stone was not worth a peruta in that place, she would be permitted to marry another man. The Sages would not have withdrawn from that family. The reason that the Sages withdrew from that family was

because

there were witnesses in Idit that the stone was worth a peruta at the time of the betrothal. And the Sages

held

[believed]

like Abaye and Rava,

who were concerned about the testimony of the witnesses even though they had not come to testify about it.

The Gemara cites an incident that proves that Rav Yosef held in accordance with Samuel, namely, that one who betroths a woman with less than the value of a peruta must be concerned that it might be worth a peruta in Media:

There was a certain man who betrothed a woman with a myrtle branch in the marketplace,

an incident involving a man who betrothed a woman with a twig [a branch] of a myrtle tree in the marketplace.

Rav Aḥa bar Huna sent

the following question

before

[to]

Rav Yosef: What is the ruling in a case such as this?

What is the law in such a case?

He sent him

Rav Yosef the following response:

a.

He flogged him, in accordance with Rav—

he flogged the man who betrothed the woman in the marketplace, because this is immodest conduct, as can be derived from Rav’s statement below.

b.

And she requires a bill of divorce, in accordance with Samuel—

the woman requires a bill of divorce in order to marry another man, even though the myrtle branch was not worth a peruta, because one is concerned that it might be worth a peruta in Media, as Samuel said. And where did Rav say that one should be flogged for this?

Rav

was

flogging

[administering lashes] for each of the following matters:

[a]

For one who betroths in the marketplace,

because this is immodest conduct.

[b]

And for one who betroths through intercourse.

This too is immodest conduct.

[c]

And for one who betroths

a woman

without prior matchmaking,

without having arranged the match with her beforehand—this too is immodest conduct.

[d]

And for one who nullifies a bill of divorce—

one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, then runs after the messenger and tells him, “The bill of divorce that I gave you is null.” There is concern that people will not know that he nullified the bill of divorce before it reached her, and the messenger will give it to her after it was nullified, and she will marry on the basis of it. Therefore, he deserves to be flogged.

[e]

And for one who issues a declaration of annulment concerning a bill of divorce—

a man whom the court forced to divorce his wife against his will, and who, before divorcing her, gave notice to witnesses, saying to them: “The bill of divorce that I intend to give my wife—know that I am being coerced to give it. Therefore, I declare before you that it is null.”

Through this, he casts aspersions on her children, for when she marries another man and bears him sons, people will say that she is the first man’s wife and that her sons are mamzerim. Therefore, he deserves to be flogged.

[

And for one who causes distress to a messenger of the Sages]] -

one who strikes a messenger of the bet din who came to summon him to court as the emissary of the judges.

[

And for one upon whom a ban was imposed for thirty days]] -

a person whom the bet din placed under a ban, and who did not come to the bet din to have his ban lifted for thirty days.

[

And for a son-in-law who resides in his father-in-law’s house]] -

a son-in-law who lives in his mother-in-law’s house, as generally a mother-in-law loves her son-in-law, and there is concern that he may stumble with her.

The Gemara analyzes the wording that we stated: “And for a son-in-law who resides in his father-in-law’s house.”

The wording indicates that specifically a son-in-law

who resides

[who lives] in his mother-in-law’s house is flogged; but if he does not live there permanently, but rather

passes by,

he is not flogged.

The following difficulty is raised:

But there was a certain son-in-law who passed by the entrance of his mother-in-law’s house, and Rav Sheshet flogged him.

There was, after all, a certain son-in-law who passed by the entrance of his mother-in-law’s house, and Rav Sheshet flogged him, despite the fact that he did not live there permanently!

And we answer: One cannot derive anything from that incident, because

that

son-in-law -

his mother-in-law was suspected because of him.

That man’s mother-in-law was suspected of having an illicit relationship with him [dayma derives from the term “resemblance,” which is the designation of a woman suspected of adultery], and therefore he was flogged for passing by there. But other men who pass through their mother-in-law’s houses are not flogged.

The Gemara now presents another opinion regarding what Rav would flog people for:

The scholars of Nehardea say: Rav did not flog anyone for all of these matters,

he did not flog people for any of them,

but

only

for one who betroths

through intercourse,

and he did so

without having been formally matched [

which is an extreme breach of modesty].

And there are those who say,

and there are those who say that according to the scholars of Nehardea, one who betroths through intercourse is flogged

even

if he did so

after having been formally matched as well, because of

the

breach of modesty.

The Gemara relates another incident concerning betrothal with money:

There was a certain man who betrothed a woman with a mat of myrtle,

an incident involving a man who betrothed a woman with a mat made of myrtle.

Immediately after the betrothal,

they said to him: But it does not contain the value of a peruta,

it does not contain the value of a peruta!

He said to them: Let her be betrothed with the four dinars that it contains.

Let her be betrothed with the four dinars attached to the mat.

She took it.

And she remained silent.

The woman left the mat, together with the four dinars, in her hand, and remained silent; she did not throw them away.

Rava said:

The woman’s silence does not indicate that she consented to be betrothed with the four dinars, because when she received the mat and the money inside it, she did not know that there was money there, and she had not intended to be betrothed with it. And when she learned that there was money there,

it was silence [

this is silence]

after the giving of the money.

And any silence after the giving of the money -

is nothing!

For one can say that the reason the woman remained silent was that she thought to herself that from the outset she had not accepted the money in order to be betrothed with it, and that there was no betrothal here at all. Therefore, she remained silent and said nothing.

Rava cites a source for his statement:

Rava said: From where do I derive this,

from where did I learn this law?

As it is taught:

one who gives a sela to a woman and

says to her: “Take this sela as a deposit,”

take this sela into your possession as a deposit.

And he then said to her: “You are betrothed to me with it.”

Then, if he said to her, “You are betrothed to me with it”

at the time of giving

the

money,

before the woman received it, then she is

betrothed.

But if

after the giving of the money

he said this to her, then, if she

wanted it,

she is

betrothed,

but if she

did not want it,

she is not betrothed.

Rava proceeds to explain the words of the baraita:

What does

“wanted it” mean, and

what does

“did not want it” mean?

If you say,

if you say that

“wanted it”

means

that she said yes [

indeed], and

“did not want it”

means

that she said no,

then one must wonder:

After all, at the beginning of the baraita we learned: “At the time of giving the money, she is betrothed,” and in that case the baraita did not distinguish between whether she wanted it or did not want it.

And according to your explanation, that in the latter clause “did not want it” means that she said to him “No,”

by inference

you learn this,