Kiddushin 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

It should not enter your mind

to say that the Hebrew maidservant is acquired with money in which the law of redemption by deduction cannot be fulfilled, since the law of redemption by deduction is stated with regard to a maidservant.

And a proof of this is:

Analogous to designation,

just as we find a similar principle with regard to the mitzva of designation, as follows:

In the passage concerning the Hebrew maidservant [Exodus 21:8], it is stated: “If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master, who designated her for himself, then he shall allow her to be redeemed.”

That is to say, it would have been fitting for the master to designate her for himself and take her as a wife, and the money with which he acquired her is the money of her betrothal, so that she does not require any other betrothal. Rather, he says to her: “Behold, you are designated for me through the right that I have over you.”

But if she is displeasing in the eyes of her master and he does not wish to designate her, she is redeemed from him with money, or she leaves through the other forms of release applicable to a Hebrew maidservant.

And we learned in a beraita: A father may not sell his daughter to relatives to whom she is forbidden by a prohibition of forbidden relations, because it is impossible to fulfill the law of designation with her.

And just as the sale of a Hebrew maidservant cannot take effect in a manner in which the law of designation cannot be fulfilled, so too a sale cannot take effect that is not fit for redemption by deduction—

for

as with designation, although

the master is not obligated to designate her, but

if he wishes

[if he wishes]

he designates her, and if he wishes

[if he wishes]

he does not designate her,

nevertheless,

wherever he cannot designate her—

the sale is not a sale,

wherever designation is impossible, the sale is not a valid sale.

So too,

this should likewise be said with regard to redemption by deduction:

wherever she cannot be redeemed by deduction—

the sale is not a sale.

Wherever it is impossible to fulfill the law of redemption by deduction, the sale is not a valid sale.

And the Gemara cites the continuation of the statement of Reish Lakish:

Reish Lakish proved that a slave and a maidservant are acquired with a dinar and not with a peruta, because it must be possible to fulfill the law of redemption by deduction through them. And from this Beit Shammai derived that the money through which a woman is acquired is a dinar.

But one may ask: The law of redemption by deduction was not stated with regard to a woman; if so, from where do we know that the money of betrothal must likewise be a dinar and not a peruta?

And in order to answer this, Reish Lakish added and said:

And the betrothal of a woman, according to Beit Shammai, they derive

[they learn]

from the Hebrew maidservant,

who is betrothed to the master through designation:

Just as a Hebrew maidservant is not acquired with a peruta,

just as a Hebrew maidservant is not acquired by the master with a peruta,

so too a woman—

with a peruta

alone

is not betrothed.

And we challenge Reish Lakish: Reish Lakish indeed proved that a Hebrew maidservant is not acquired with a peruta, because the money must be of a value through which the law of redemption by deduction can be fulfilled; but from where do we know that the required amount of money is a dinar?

But say half a dinar?

Say that the required amount is half a dinar, since with this value as well the master can deduct the amount from her redemption price, and a peruta will still remain with which the maidservant can redeem herself! And it is further possible that the required amount of money is even less than half a dinar:

But say,

say that its required amount is

two perutot,

since even with this amount the law of redemption by deduction can be fulfilled! And we answer:

Since you have excluded it from a peruta—

establish it as a dinar.

Since it is necessarily the case that acquisition through money, both for a maidservant and for a woman, is not effective with a peruta, despite the fact that a peruta is the minimum monetary value in every context, it follows that the Torah required significant money. Therefore, it is reasonable that acquisition through money is effective only with a dinar, which is significant money. [d] Another reason for the statement of Beit Shammai:

Rava said: This is the reason of Beit Shammai:

This is the reason of Beit Shammai: By Torah law, a woman is betrothed with a peruta, but the Sages instituted that a woman should be betrothed only with a dinar,

so that the daughters of Israel should not be treated as ownerless property,

by virtue of being betrothed with a peruta. Therefore, with regard to one who betroths a woman with less than a dinar, the Sages nullified his betrothal. We learned in the Mishna [above, 2a]:

And Beit Hillel say:

A woman is acquired

with a peruta.

The Gemara discusses whether the value of a peruta is fixed, so that even if the value of a peruta has increased or decreased, the required amount remains the value of the peruta established by the Sages, or whether one follows specifically the value of the peruta current at the time of the betrothal.

Rav Yosef thought to say

that the intention of the Mishna is

a peruta of any value,

according to the value of a peruta in each generation, at the time of the betrothal. It does not matter whether the value of the peruta has risen above the value of the peruta established by the Sages or whether its value has now declined below the peruta established by the Sages; rather, one always follows the value of the peruta current at that time.

Abaye said to him

as a challenge:

But it is taught concerning it,

and we learned concerning that peruta in our Mishna: “And

how much is a peruta?”—

One-eighth of an Italian issar!”

This implies that the value of a peruta with regard to the money of betrothal is a fixed value, determined according to the value of one-eighth of an Italian issar, and not according to the changing value of a peruta in each generation, at the time of the betrothal!

And if you would say

that you might answer:

This applies

to the words of our Mishna

in the generation of Moses

alone, when they assessed it as one-eighth of an Italian issar.

But here, according to what people consider significant,

in our time one follows the value of money that people consider significant, and this depends upon the peruta current in each generation, as it is.

But

it is impossible to say this, for

when he came,

when

Rav Dimi

came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said:

There was an incident involving a woman who was betrothed with a peruta. The matter came before Rabbi Simai, and

Rabbi Simai assessed, in his generation, how much a peruta is—

one-eighth of an Italian issar.

And he found that the peruta with which the woman had been betrothed was not worth that amount, because at that time the value of the perutot had been reduced; therefore, Rabbi Simai nullified the betrothal.

It is evident from here that Rabbi Simai holds that the value of a peruta is permanently fixed, and one does not follow the peruta current in that generation.

And

so too,

when Ravin came,

when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said: Rabbi Dostai, Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Oshaya

had an incident brought before them involving a woman who was betrothed with a peruta. And

they assessed how much a peruta is—

one-sixth of an Italian issar.

And if at that time the peruta was worth less than this, the woman was not betrothed [and below it will be explained why they assessed the peruta as one-sixth of an Italian issar and not one-eighth of one].

And this contradicts the statement of Rav Yosef, who said that one follows the peruta current at that time!

Rav Yosef said to him

—to Abaye:

If so,

if indeed no peruta is worth less than one-eighth of an Italian issar, there is a difficulty:

One who derives benefit unwittingly from consecrated property pays the principal and an additional fifth, and brings a ram worth two shekels as an asham offering. As it is stated [Leviticus 5:15]: “If a person commits a trespass and sins unwittingly against the sacred property of the Lord, he shall bring his guilt offering to the Lord: an unblemished ram from the flock, according to your valuation in silver shekels, according to the sacred shekel, as a guilt offering.”

And they said in the Torat Kohanim there: “Go out and calculate: How many perutot are there in two sela’im? More than two thousand.” From this you can understand how far one must distance himself from transgression. For even one who sins unwittingly must bring such a substantial atonement.

And from here Rav Yosef challenged the position of all those amoraim, whose words prove that the value of a peruta is fixed at one-eighth of an Italian issar:

This is what we learned,

this that we learned in the Torat Kohanim:

Go out and calculate how many perutot

there are

in two sela’im—

more than two thousand,

presents a difficulty according to their opinion:

For

now,

now that you say that a peruta is always one-eighth of an Italian issar, even

two thousand

perutot

are not contained in two sela coins! According to this calculation, you cannot find even two thousand perutot in two sela coins!

to two sela! According to this calculation, you cannot find even two thousand perutot in two sela!

If so, is it possible that “

more than two thousand

perutot”

is what they call them in the Torat Kohanim?!

in Torat Kohanim?!

That certain elder said to them,

to Rav Yosef and Abaye, who were discussing the matter: The words of this beraita can be reconciled even according to those who say that the value of a peruta is always calculated as one-eighth of an Italian issar: 413]. This can be explained according to the version of the texts before us, which reads “he said to them” in the plural. However, it is evident from Rashi that the certain elder said his words only to Abaye. Apparently, his version in the Gemara read, “he said to him”].

I teach it,

I teach the beraita in the Torat Kohanim in a different formulation: How many perutot are there in two sela coins? —

Approximately two thousand.

I do not teach in it “more than two thousand”! Accordingly, although a peruta is one-eighth of an Italian issar, and there are not two thousand perutot in two sela coins, nevertheless the words of the beraita are resolved, because there are approximately two thousand perutot in two sela coins.

But Rav Yosef then asked that certain elder:

Ultimately,

even according to your words there is still a difficulty: If a peruta is one-eighth of an Italian issar, then

there are one thousand five hundred and thirty-six. There are only 1,536

perutot in two sela coins, and not approximately two thousand!

For a sela is four dinars, and a dinar is twenty-four issarin. It follows that there are ninety-six issarin in a sela, [96=244].

There are eight perutot in each issar. It follows that there are 768 perutot in a sela [768=896]. Thus, there are 1,536 perutot in two sela coins [1536=2768].

That certain elder replied:

Since they exceed half,

since the perutot exceed the second half-thousand [for there are 1,536 perutot, i.e., thirty-six perutot more than one thousand five hundred], therefore “

approximately two thousand”

is what he calls it.

The body of the discussion,

the Gemara now presents the main body of the sugya that Abaye cited above in abbreviated form:

When

he came

Rav Dimi

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said: Rabbi Simai calculated the value of a peruta in his generation —

one-eighth of an Italian issar.

And when Ravin came,

he said:

Rabbi Dostai, Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Oshaya calculated the value of a peruta —

one-sixth

of an issar

Italian.

The Gemara now discusses the disagreement between Rav Dimi [in the name of Rabbi Simai] and Ravin [in the name of the other amoraim]:

Abaye said to Rav Dimi: Let us say that you and Ravin

disagree according to the dispute between these tannaim.

Are we to say that you and Ravin disagree in accordance with the dispute in which the following tannaim disagreed?

As it was taught: The peruta of which the Sages spoke —

one-eighth of an Italian issar.

For this is the valuation of the coins:

a.

Six silver ma’ot

are equal to one

dinar.

b.

A ma’a

is

two coins called

pondionin.

c.

A pondion

is two issarin.

d.

An issar

is

two coins called

musmismim.

e.

A masmis

is two konterankin.

f.

A konterank

is two perutot.

It follows,

that a

peruta

is

one-eighth of an Italian issar.

For an issar is two masmismim, a musmism is two konterankin, and a konterank is two perutot.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

From a ma’a onward, there are other coins:

a.

Three hadrasin

are equal

to one ma’a.

b.

Two hantzin

are equal to one hadras.

c.

Two shamnin

are equal to one hantz.

d.

Two perutot

are equal to one shamin.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel also agrees with the words of the first tanna that an issar is one twenty-fourth of a dinar [a dinar equals six ma’ot; a ma’a equals two pondionin; a pondion equals two issarin].

According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s calculation, there are 144 perutot in a dinar.

A dinar equals six ma’ot. A ma’a equals three hadrasin. A hadras equals two hantzin. A hantz equals two shamnin. A shamin equals two perutot. The total is 144.

And since there are twenty-four issarin in a dinar,

it follows that a

that a

peruta

is

one-sixth of an Italian issar [6=144/24].

And Abaye concludes his question:

Let us say.

Are we to say

that the master said this in accordance with the first tanna, while Ravin said it in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

He said to him,

Rav Dimi:

Between my

[the statement that I brought]

and Ravin —

we both spoke

in accordance with the first tanna,

that a peruta is one-eighth of an Italian issar. For both of us followed the anonymous Mishna in our tractate, which is in accordance with his words.

Nevertheless, what Ravin brought—that a peruta is one-sixth of an Italian issar—

is not difficult.

For indeed, the value of the peruta specified by the Torah never changes, but the value of the issarin can change. The value of perutot is always measured according to one-eighth of an issar that is one twenty-fourth of a dinar. It follows that a peruta is always one 192nd of a dinar. Therefore—

This,

what we both taught, that a peruta is one-eighth of an issar, applies at a time

when the issarin are expensive,

when the issarin had the higher value, as follows.

And

if

this,

what Ravin said, applies at a time

when the issarin are cheap,

when the issarin had declined in value.

And Rav Dimi explains his words:

This,

what we both taught, that a peruta is one-eighth of an issar, applies at a time

when the issarin are expensive, when

there are

twenty-four

issarin

in one zuz.

That is, there were twenty-four issarin in one silver dinar, and it follows that a peruta was one-eighth of an issar. For when we multiply the twenty-four issarin by eight perutot, we find that there were 192 perutot in a dinar. [192=824].

And

this,

what Ravin said, that a peruta is one-sixth of an issar, applies at a time

when it is cheap,

that is, when

there are thirty-two issarin in one zuz,

when there were thirty-two issarin in a dinar, and therefore a peruta was one-sixth of an issar. For when we multiply the thirty-two issarin by six perutot, we find that there were 192 perutot in a dinar [192=632]. And we have already stated that there are always 192 perutot in a dinar.

The Gemara now cites a statement of Shmuel concerning the amount of money required for kiddushin:

Shmuel said: If he betrothed her with a date —

even

if

a kor of dates was selling for one dinar,

so that each individual date was worth much less than a peruta, nevertheless the woman is

betrothed

doubtfully, because

we are concerned lest

the date

be worth a peruta in Media,

where dates are not readily available.

And we raise an objection to Shmuel’s words:

But we learned in the Mishna,

for we learned in the Mishna:

Beit Hillel

say: With a peruta or something worth a peruta.

This implies that a woman is betrothed only with an object worth a peruta, and not with one worth less. Yet according to Shmuel, even with an object worth less than a peruta she is betrothed, because perhaps it is worth a peruta in Media; it would follow that there is no fixed minimum amount for kiddushin!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

—our Mishna—is speaking

of definite kiddushin,

for kiddushin is definite only when he betrothed her with an object worth a peruta in its present location.

Whereas

this,

what Shmuel said, that even if he betrothed her with something worth less than a peruta she is betrothed, is

in

the category of

doubtful kiddushin.

There is a difference between definite kiddushin and doubtful kiddushin in a case where another man betrothed her after the first kiddushin:

If the first kiddushin was definite kiddushin, the woman is permitted to the second man, and she does not require a get from him. Since she had already been betrothed to the first man, the kiddushin of another man does not take effect with regard to her.

But if the first kiddushin was doubtful kiddushin, she is prohibited to both men due to the doubt. For if the first kiddushin was in fact valid, she is prohibited to the second man; and if the first kiddushin was not valid, she is betrothed to the second man and prohibited to the first.

However, if only one man betrothed her, whether through definite kiddushin or doubtful kiddushin, she is prohibited from marrying another man without a get from the first.

And our Mishna teaches that the monetary amount is something worth a peruta, in order to indicate what constitutes fully valid kiddushin. When the object is worth a peruta in its present location, there is no doubt at all concerning the kiddushin. View B: [a] Even if it is certainly known that the date is worth a peruta in Media, the woman is not betrothed by Torah law, because the value of money is established according to its place and time. The Sages decreed that she is betrothed by rabbinic law, because they were concerned that a person from Media who happened to come here and see that she was not betrothed might err and conclude that in his own place as well a woman cannot be betrothed with a date. [b] According to this reason, even if he betrothed her with an object that does not survive, she is betrothed by rabbinic law because of the decree. [c] When Shmuel said, “We are concerned lest it be worth a peruta in Media,” he came to teach that even if there is no certainty that the date is worth a peruta in Media, nevertheless the Sages decreed that she is betrothed by rabbinic law. [d] The Gemara’s statement, “Here, with doubtful kiddushin,” is interpreted as follows: These kiddushin are rabbinic kiddushin, and their status is like that of doubtful kiddushin by Torah law: another man may not betroth her without a get, and if the first man wishes to remain married to her, he must betroth her again through fully valid kiddushin. [This is the view of Rabbi Yitzhak and the Tosafot as cited by the Rishonim, and the Rosh and Ritva agreed with it]. The Rishonim disagree concerning the explanation of the first view cited above [the Rambam, as understood by the Rosh and others]. The Rosh and Ritva understood from the Rambam’s words that since the date is worth a peruta in Media and survives the journey, if she takes it there it will be worth a peruta to her, and therefore she is betrothed. The Ran explained that the Rambam agrees that the value of property is established according to its place and time [as the Tosafot wrote, and as in the second view above]. However, the Rambam maintains that since the woman agreed to accept the date, if the witnesses knew that she customarily purchased such a date for a peruta, she is considered to have said, “It is worth a peruta to me.” When an object is worth more in a woman’s eyes than its market value, she can accept it as the payment that it is worth in her eyes, provided that it has the status of “money.” Therefore, if it is worth a peruta in Media, it has the status of money even though it is not worth a peruta here. The woman can thus say, “It is worth a peruta to me, and I accept kiddushin with it.” But if it is not worth a peruta in Media, it does not have the status of “money.” The declaration, “It is worth a peruta to me,” cannot take an object that is not considered “money” and give it the status of “money.” [Based on the Ran here, together with his words above, 4a in the pages of the Ran, s.v. “We read in the Gemara: It was taught”]. In the Avnei Miluim 31:7, it is explained that according to the Ran, Shmuel’s statement applies specifically to a woman who is known to customarily pay a peruta for a date. But this is only according to the Ran himself above; according to the Rambam himself, it is unnecessary for the witnesses to know that she customarily ascribes a higher value to it. See there. The Shulchan Arukh [Even HaEzer 31:3–4] cites both of the above opinions. See there and in the commentaries there. [See also the Tosafot of Rabbi Yehuda the Elder and the Meiri, cited there, who present other approaches to our sugya].

The Gemara now cites an incident that apparently contradicts Shmuel’s words:

A certain man betrothed a woman with a bundle of tow,

an incident involving a man who betrothed a woman with a bundle of fibers.

Rav Shimi bar Hiyya sat

[he sat]

before Rav, and he examined it,

checking the value of the bundle in order to determine:

If it contains something worth a peruta —

yes,

if it contains something worth a peruta, she is betrothed.

If not —

no.

And we are astonished:

And if it does not have

[does not have]

something worth a peruta

in this location, is she

not

betrothed?!

But Shmuel said: We are concerned

that perhaps it is worth a peruta elsewhere. Does Rav disagree with this?!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This

—the incident involving Rav Shimi, who examined the value of the bundle before Rav—was

in

the context of

definite kiddushin.

That is, Rav Shimi determined whether the bundle was worth a peruta, in which case the kiddushin would be definite kiddushin.

Whereas

this,

what Shmuel said, “We are concerned lest it be worth a peruta in Media,” was

in

the context of

doubtful kiddushin.

The Gemara now cites an incident from which it is evident that the ruling is not in accordance with Shmuel’s words:

A certain man betrothed a woman with a blue stone.

An incident involving a man who betrothed a woman with a blue stone, and afterward another man came and betrothed her with a peruta.

Rav Ḥisda sat

[he sat]

and assessed it, to determine whether it contained something worth a peruta: yes —

she is betrothed;

and if not —

no.

If the stone did not contain something worth a peruta, the first man’s kiddushin was not valid, and she is betrothed to the second man.

And we are astonished:

And if it does not contain

now

something worth a peruta,

is she

not

betrothed to the first man, but only to the second?!

But Shmuel said: We are concerned

that perhaps it is worth a peruta elsewhere! Why, then, did Rav Ḥisda permit her to the second man?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥisda

did not hold in accordance with Shmuel.

The Gemara now presents the continuation of the incident that came before Rav Ḥisda:

Ultimately, it was determined that the stone was not worth a peruta, and she had not been betrothed to the first man. Rav Ḥisda therefore ruled that the woman was betrothed to the second man.

His mother said to him,

the mother of the first man who performed the kiddushin said to Rav Ḥisda:

But,

although it is true that the stone is not worth a peruta now,

on that day when he betrothed her, it was worth a peruta!

On the day that my son betrothed the woman, the stone was worth a peruta. If so, she is betrothed to my son and prohibited to the second man!

He said to her,

Rav Hisda:

You have no authority to render her forbidden

to the latter! –

You do not have the power to testify that the betrothal of your son is valid and thereby render her forbidden to the latter. And even if your daughter agrees with your statement, she cannot render herself forbidden to the second man.

And Rav Hisda proves that a woman does not have the power to render herself forbidden to her husband: