Kiddushin 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara now brings several examples of kesef mentioned in the Torah, apparently proving that the Torah’s intention is money, rather than a silver coin:

A] In the passage concerning bailees [Exodus 22:6–8], it is stated: “When a man gives his fellow money or utensils to guard, and it is stolen from the man’s house, the owner of the house shall approach the judges [to swear]. Concerning every matter of transgression, ‘which he says, This is it,’ the case of both of them shall come before the judges.”

What is the meaning of the verse, “which he says, This is it”? The Sages expounded that the verse means that the defendant admits to part of the claim. And so the verse says: “which he says,” the defendant says, “it is”—what you claimed from me [one hundred dinars] is only “this” [fifty dinars].

This proves that one who admits to part of the claim is liable to take an oath. This oath is called the “oath of the judges.”

And we learned concerning this matter [Shevuot 38b]: “The oath of the judges: The claim [of the plaintiff must be for] two silver coins, and the admission [of the defendant must be] worth a peruta.” But for less than these amounts there is no obligation to take an oath. The Gemara raises an objection from this Mishna against Rav Asi, who says that all kesef mentioned in the Torah is Tyrian coinage—

And yet there is a claim,

a person claims against his fellow, and the defendant admits to part of it, and he is therefore liable to take an oath concerning it,

as it is written

in that passage: “

When a man gives his fellow money or utensils to guard.”

And we learned

Shevuot 38b]:

“The oath of the judges: The claim”—

Shevuot 38b]:

The oath of the judges: The claim— two

coins of

silver.

And the admission

to part of the claim—

worth a peruta.

One must ask: From where did the Sages learn that the claim must be for two kesef? Necessarily, one must say that when the verse said “kesef,” its intention was not specifically silver, but money.

Since it did not specify how much money, the matter depends on the judgment of the Sages, because the verse entrusted the matter to them, to establish the measure according to their understanding. The Sages did not deem it appropriate to impose an oath on the defendant for less than two silver coins. (367a)'

According to Rav Asi, who said that all kesef mentioned in the Torah is Tyrian coinage, this is difficult: It is true that a ma'a is the smallest coin in Tyrian coinage, but from where did the tanna derive that the measure of the claim is two silver coins, and not one ma'a? And we answer: It is true that the kesef mentioned in the Torah is Tyrian coinage. But

there,

the reason that the claim is for two kesef and not one is that it is stated: “When a man gives his fellow money or utensils.” Rava expounded in tractate Shevuot [39b]: “Kesef

is analogous to ‘utensils’”—

kesef must be compared to utensils with regard to two matters:

The first:

Just as

utensils

are

two,

so too money

is

two,

two silver coins.

And the second:

Just as

money

is

a significant item,

two kesef—

so too utensils

must be

a significant item,

worth two kesef.

This is contrary to the statement of the one who said in tractate Shevuot [40b]: If one claimed two needles from another and the latter admitted to one of them, he is liable.

The words of the verse teach that this is not so, since the needles are not worth two kesef.

In any event, we have learned from Rava’s statement that kesef must be compared to utensils. Therefore, the claim must be for two kesef, and not one. B] The Gemara brings the law of the redemption of second tithe, from which it apparently follows that kesef mentioned in the Torah means money, and not Tyrian coinage:

The produce of second tithe is eaten in Jerusalem.

One who is outside Jerusalem and does not wish to bring the tithe produce to Jerusalem may redeem it and bring its monetary value to Jerusalem, and purchase produce with it and eat it there. As it is stated [Deuteronomy 14]: “And you shall give the money, bind up the money in your hand, and go to the place that the Lord your God will choose.”

The Gemara proves from here that kesef mentioned in the Torah means money, and not specifically silver. As follows:

And we raise an objection:

And yet, second tithe,

as

as it is written

Deuteronomy 14:

“And you shall bind up the money in your hand,”

from which it follows that second tithe is redeemed

with “

money.”

And

nevertheless,

we learned

Ma'aser Sheni 2:9:

One who exchanges a sela from the coins

[from perutot]

of second tithe —

the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerns how he should do this.

This implies that the person initially had perutot from the redemption of second tithe.

And this is difficult: According to Rav Asi, the kesef mentioned in the Torah with regard to the redemption of second tithe means specifically silver, and not copper perutot. How, then, could a person have copper perutot from the redemption of second tithe?

This proves that kesef mentioned in the Torah means money, and not specifically Tyrian coinage! And we answer: It would have been appropriate for the verse to say

“money,”

but it says

“the money,”

with the addition of the definite article. The verse

includes

even copper perutot for the redemption of second tithe.

And it is proven from there that the money mentioned in the Torah means monetary value and not Tyrian silver. And we raise an objection:

This proves from there that the money mentioned in the Torah means monetary value, and not specifically Tyrian coinage. The Gemara raises an objection:

But what of

the redemption of

consecrated property, as it is written

“and he shall give the money, and it shall be his,”

and Shmuel said: With regard to consecrated property,

even if it is

worth a maneh, if one redeemed it with an item worth a peruta,

it is

redeemed

after the fact, even though he redeemed it for less than its value.

In any event, it is evident from Shmuel’s statement that consecrated property can be redeemed for an item worth a peruta.

And from here it follows that “money” mentioned in the Torah means monetary value and not actual silver! And this is contrary to the statement of Rav Asi, who says that the money mentioned in the Torah is Tyrian silver!

And we answer:

There too,

the verse included even an item worth a peruta, because

“money, money”

is derived

from the passage concerning tithe.

We learn from tithe: Just as the money mentioned with regard to tithe includes even an item worth a peruta, so too the money mentioned with regard to consecrated property means even an item worth a peruta.

However, in the other places where “money” is stated in the Torah, it means Tyrian silver. We derive from Second Tithe only the money of redeeming consecrated property, since it resembles the redemption of Second Tithe, as both are redemption payments.

d] And we raise an objection:

But what of betrothal of a woman, concerning which it is written

with regard to it [Deuteronomy 24]:

“When a man takes a wife and engages in intercourse with her,” and we derive

the meaning of the verse by means of a gzera shava,

“taking,” “taking,” from the field of Ephron,

as it is stated there [Genesis 23]: “I have given the money for the field; take it from me.”

And

nevertheless

we learned

in our Mishna: “With money—Beit Shammai say: With a dinar or an item worth a dinar. And

Beit Hillel say: With a peruta or an item worth

a peruta.” And the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel. It follows that although money is mentioned with regard to betrothal, Tyrian silver is not required; even a copper peruta is included in this definition!

And should we

say

[should we say] that

Rav Asi, who says

that the money mentioned in the Torah is Tyrian silver, holds

in accordance with Beit Shammai,

who say that the money of betrothal is a dinar or an item worth a dinar?!

On the basis of this objection, the Gemara proves that “money” stated in the Torah indeed means monetary value and not Tyrian silver, and therefore includes even a peruta, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Necessarily, Rav Asi too agrees with this.

And

rather, if this was stated,

but if a ruling was indeed stated in the study hall in the name of Rav Asi that the money mentioned in the Torah is Tyrian silver, one must say that

this is what was stated—

this is what was said:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said: Any “fixed amount of money” stated in the Torah,

any place where a fixed amount is mentioned in the Torah with regard to money, such as “fifty pieces of silver,” or “one hundred pieces of silver,” that fixed amount is according to the value of

Tyrian silver.

And

had the fixed amount

of the Sages

been in

provincial currency.

However, wherever “money” is stated without qualification in the Torah—for example, with regard to a claim, tithe, consecrated property, and betrothal—the Torah means monetary value and not Tyrian silver. And we raise an objection: Since we have said that Rav Asi spoke only about fixed money in the Torah, and not about money stated without qualification, this is difficult:

What does he teach us?

What did Rav Asi come to teach us? After all,

we learned

this explicitly in a Mishna in tractate Bekhorot [49b]:

five sela’im for the redemption of the

redemption of the

son; thirty

shekels

for a slave,

fifty

shekels

for

rape and seduction; one hundred

shekels

for one who spreads an evil report —

all in the sacred shekel,

which is 1/25

of a Tyrian maneh.

If so, why did Rav Asi need to teach us something that we learned explicitly in the Mishna?

And we answer: Indeed, what Rav Asi said—that money mentioned in the Torah means Tyrian silver—can be known from the Mishna in Bekhorot.

But the final part of Rav Asi’s statement—

“and that of the Sages”

means

provincial currency”

was necessary for him to state,

it was necessary to teach this because

we did not learn it,

as this law was not taught in any Mishna.

And where do we find a fixed monetary amount established by the Sages?

For example:

we learned [Bava Kamma 90a and elsewhere]:

Bava Kamma 90a and elsewhere:

One who blows into another’s ear

into his ear, the Sages said that he

gives him a sela,

as this is the payment for the humiliation of an average person.

And

Rav Asi comes to teach us that

do not say

[meaning, do not say],

What is meant by a sela?

Four zuz.

A Tyrian sela, which is worth four zuz.

Rather, what is a sela? -

Half a zuz,

half a zuz, which is one-eighth of a Tyrian sela.

For a Tyrian sela is four zuz. And this is a provincial sela.

Because

people are accustomed to calling half a zuz "

istira."

For people are accustomed to calling half a zuz “istira,” that is, a sela.

Up to this point, the Gemara has presented the discussion concerning the statement of Rav Asi, who said: “All money mentioned in the Torah means Tyrian money.”

This discussion was brought incidentally, because Rav Yosef explained the opinion of Beit Shammai—that a woman is betrothed with a dinar—by means of Rav Asi’s statement.

The Gemara now returns to explain the statement of Beit Shammai: Until now, two reasons were given for the statement of Beit Shammai, and now the Gemara presents two additional reasons for it:

3.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The reason for the opinion of Beit Shammai

is

as

the

statement of Hezekiah

below [14b]:

We learned below [14b]: A Hebrew slave acquires himself through a deduction from the money of his redemption. When the slave comes to redeem himself, the master deducts from the purchase money an amount corresponding to the years he has worked, in proportion to the price of his purchase. Through redemption with this money, the slave acquires himself and goes free.

And from where did we learn this? -

Hezekiah said

below [16a]:

For the verse says,

it is stated concerning the Hebrew maidservant [Exodus 21]: “

And he shall facilitate her redemption,”

rather than “and she shall redeem herself.”

The wording “and he shall facilitate her redemption” indicates that the master is to redeem her. But how can it be that the master himself redeems her? Rather,

the verse teaches

that the master assists her in her redemption by

deducting from her redemption price,

and through this she

goes free

[and a Hebrew slave was juxtaposed to a Hebrew maidservant].

And Rish Lakish holds that the purchase money of the slave or maidservant must be of an amount with which it is possible to fulfill the law of “deduction from the money of redemption.”

Therefore Rish Lakish said:

Granted, if you say that he gave her a dinar,

if you say that the monetary acquisition was effected by the master giving her a dinar, it is indeed possible to fulfill the law of deduction from the money of redemption with this, and

this means that he deducts from it until the amount of a peruta.

But

if,

if

you say

that he gave her a peruta, what can he deduct?

How can the master deduct from her redemption price? Anything worth less than a peruta is not considered money, and necessarily, when she comes to redeem herself, she must pay a full peruta, which is money.

It follows from this that a maidservant’s monetary acquisition is not effected with a peruta. And below Rish Lakish says that, according to Beit Shammai, the law of the money of betrothal is derived from the money used to acquire the maidservant. And even before the Gemara brings the conclusion of Rish Lakish’s statement, it immediately raises the question: From where did Rish Lakish learn that a monetary acquisition is effective for a maidservant only if the law of deduction from the money of redemption can be fulfilled through it? a. The opinion of Rabbeinu Tam: The later authorities cited Rabbeinu Tam as holding that the law of deduction from the money of redemption applies specifically to a maidservant acquired with money, and not to a maidservant acquired with a document. [Mishne LaMelekh, citing Tosafot Rid below, 21b, who brought the words of Rabbeinu Tam; and Minḥat Ḥinukh 43.] According to this, Minḥat Ḥinukh [there] explained that specifically monetary acquisition must be suitable for the law of deduction, because the law of deduction was newly established only with regard to money. [Moreover, the monetary acquisition itself is derived from the law of deduction from the money of redemption stated in “and he shall facilitate her redemption,” below, 14b.] But the law of deduction was not stated with regard to a document, and therefore it need not be suitable for this. [The aforementioned later authorities wrote in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that deduction is not stated with regard to a document. However, see Tosafot Rid’s own wording below, 21b, s.v. Ve-koneh, in the name of Rabbeinu Tam, and see Ḥazon Ish.] b. The opinion of Tosafot Rid [below, 21b]: Even a maidservant acquired with a document goes free through a deduction from the money of redemption, and this is so even if her father gave her as a gift and received no money for her. She deducts from her redemption price and pays according to her market value. According to this, a difficulty arises concerning the Gemara’s statement here: How could Rish Lakish say that a maidservant cannot be acquired with a peruta because she cannot deduct from that peruta? After all, a maidservant can even be acquired with a document, and certainly there is no possibility of deducting from the document itself at all! On the basis of this difficulty, Minḥat Ḥinukh [there] innovated several points according to the opinion of Rid: [1] The law of deduction need not be fulfilled from the money itself with which the maidservant was acquired; rather, the deduction can be made even from all the money that the master paid for her. [2] Rid’s opinion accords with that of the Sema [Ḥoshen Mishpat 190:1], that specifically money that is payment for the purchase, or even money that is not payment for the entire purchase but is the beginning of the payment, effects the acquisition. But if the buyer gives the seller a peruta so that he will not retract, and does not give that peruta as part of the purchase price, it does not effect the acquisition. [The Taz disagrees with this there; see Avnei Miluim 29b.] Accordingly, the Gemara’s statement here should be understood as meaning that the master need not receive more than a peruta at the time he acquires the maidservant. Rather, the master must undertake to pay more than a peruta for the purchase, and the money must be the beginning of the payment. But if the maidservant is worth only one peruta, or even if she is worth more but the master pays only one peruta for her, the law of deduction does not apply, because the maidservant does not pay for her redemption more than the father paid. [This is because that money is the purchase price, in accordance with the Sema. In contrast, when she is acquired with a document, they did not establish a purchase price between them at all, and therefore she is redeemed according to her market value.] Similarly, regarding what we learned concerning the betrothal of a woman, “Beit Shammai say: With a dinar,” it is not necessary for the woman to receive the entire dinar at the time of betrothal and be acquired through it. Rather, he must commit himself to paying her a dinar. [This is considered the purchase price, as explained in Avnei Miluim 29b.] He then betroths her with a peruta as the beginning of payment toward that dinar. The opinion of Ḥazon Ish, Kovetz Shiurim, section 88, and Rabbi Shimon Shkop is that even according to Rid, one must give a full dinar at the time of acquiring the maidservant or betrothing the woman. See there for the reasons.

Perhaps this is what the Merciful One said,

perhaps this is what the verse said:

Where he gave her a dinar,

in a case where the master acquired her with a dinar, then

her redemption price shall be reduced

from her redemption price

until a peruta.

But

where he gave her a peruta -

it shall not be reduced at all,

rather, when she comes to redeem herself, she must pay a full peruta!