Kiddushin 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira adds and says:

But what can I do, for

although we do not be concerned about a simpon, there is another reason:

the Sages said: A betrothed Israelite woman does not eat teruma

until she enters the bridal canopy, because of Ulla.

For Ulla said above [5a] that, with regard to a betrothed woman who is in her father's house, the Sages were concerned lest they pour her a cup of teruma wine and she give it to her brothers and sisters, who are Israelites and are forbidden to eat teruma.

The Gemara will explain below why it matters what the reason is that the Sages prohibited a betrothed Israelite woman from eating teruma: whether it is because of a simpon, in accordance with the opinion of ben Bag Bag, or because they might pour her a cup, in accordance with the opinion of ben Beteira.

Thus far, Ravina has explained the kal va-chomer of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.

And one may ask concerning ben Bag Bag: According to his opinion, why did they prohibit a betrothed Israelite woman from eating teruma because of a simpon, whereas with regard to a Canaanite maidservant they were not concerned about a simpon? And why does he not accept the kal va-chomer stated by Rabbi ben Beteira?

Ravina answers this question:

And ben Bag Bag

holds that specifically with regard to a betrothed woman, it is possible that the sale might be voided because of a simpon [a defect]. But

with regard to a simpon in slaves—

he does not hold of it!

According to ben Bag Bag, it is not possible for the sale of male and female slaves to be voided because of a defect, since—

If

that simpon is

a visible defect, he sees it!

The master sees it before the purchase, and since he bought the slave [or maidservant] despite everything, it is certainly clear that he bought him on that understanding; this is therefore not a mistaken transaction.

And

if

the sale is voided

because

it becomes clear that he has

hidden defects—

the sale cannot be voided on that account!

For

what difference does it make to him,

what harm is there to the master if the slave has hidden defects? After all,

he needs him for labor.

The master needs the slave only to perform his work, and

he does not care

about hidden defects.

Lest you say that a sale can nevertheless be voided even in the case of a slave—for example, if

it is found

that the slave is

a thief or a koveiustos,

one who abducts people, and the master claims that this was a mistaken transaction and that he would not have agreed to buy the slave had he known this—

the sale is not voided on this account!

For we learned in a beraita in Bava Batra [92b]: If one sells a slave to another and he is found to be a thief or a koveiustos—

Take him

to the buyer!

He belongs to the buyer, and this is not a mistaken transaction, because slaves are generally thieves. One who buys a slave knows that, presumptively, he is a thief.

What will you say,

what will you say? That a sale can still be voided in the case of a slave—for example, if it is found that the slave is

an armed robber,

which is uncommon, so the buyer did not purchase him on that understanding,

or

if it is found that he is

listed for the king,

having been sentenced to death by the king, making this a mistaken transaction—

the sale is not voided on this account!

For

those matters—

have a public report!

Those matters become publicly known, because they are uncommon, and everyone knows that this slave is an armed robber or is listed for the king. Necessarily, the person who bought him as a slave also learned of this before the purchase, and this is not a mistaken transaction. And we challenge this:

Now,

after all,

according to both the one and the other,

a betrothed woman

does not eat

teruma. According to both ben Bag Bag and ben Beteira, by rabbinic decree a betrothed woman does not eat teruma.

And if so,

what is the difference between them,

what is the practical halakhic difference between them?

With regard to what do they disagree as to whether the reason is a simpon or the concern that they might pour her a cup?

And we answer:

There is a difference between them:

there are three circumstances in which they differ, and their mnemonic is:

“Received, handed over, and went.”

a. “Received”—If the betrothed man accepted upon himself that even if he found a defect in her he would still desire the betrothal, there is no concern about a simpon. Therefore, according to ben Bag Bag, she eats teruma even before she enters the bridal canopy.

However, according to ben Beteira, even in this case there is concern that they might pour her a cup in her father’s house and she might give it to her brothers and sisters. Therefore, she does not eat teruma.

b. “Handed over”—If the father handed his daughter over to the husband’s agents so that they could hand her over to the husband and bring her into the bridal canopy, and she is still on the way, there is no concern that they might pour her a cup in her father’s house and that she might give it to her brothers and sisters, since she has already left her father’s house.

According to ben Beteira, she eats teruma, even though she has not yet entered the bridal canopy.

However, according to ben Bag Bag, even in this case there is concern about a simpon, because it is possible that the husband has not yet examined her through his female relatives to determine whether she has a defect. Therefore, she does not eat teruma.

c. “And went”—If the father went, or if the father’s agents went with the husband’s agents, escorting the bride on her way to the bridal canopy at her husband’s house, and she is still on the way.

According to ben Beteira, there is no concern that she might pour a cup for her brothers and sisters, because they are not with her; whereas according to ben Bag Bag, there is still concern about a simpon.

We learned in the Mishna [above 2a]:

With money—

Beit

Shammai say [

the amount of money is ]

one dinar,

or something worth one dinar.

And we inquire:

What is the reasoning of Beit Shammai,

what is the reason for the statement of Beit Shammai?

The Gemara gives four reasons for the statement of Beit Shammai:

a.

Rabbi Zeira said: For a woman is particular about herself, and she does not become betrothed with less than a dinar.

He said—

Abaye challenged

him—

Rabbi Zeira:

But if that is so,

since you say that consideration is given to the woman’s insistence, one should ask:

For example, the daughters of Rabbi Yannai, who are particular about themselves and do not become betrothed with less than three kav of dinars,

important women, such as Rabbi Yannai’s daughters, who customarily insist on their honor and do not agree to become betrothed with less than three kav of gold—would

so too

we say

that if she extended her hand and accepted one zuz from another man, then too the betrothal would not take effect!?

Would you also say in this case that if an important woman extends her hand and accepts a dinar for the purpose of betrothal, the betrothal does not take effect?

He said—

Rabbi Zeira replied

to him—Abaye: If the woman

extended her hand and accepted

and accepted

less than a dinar,

I did not say that.

I did not say that the betrothal would not take effect. Rather, Beit Shammai certainly agrees that if a woman accepted betrothal with less than a dinar, she is betrothed, since once she extended her hand and accepted the betrothal, it is evident that she agrees to become betrothed even with less than a dinar.

Similarly, Rabbi Yannai’s daughters, who extended their hands and accepted betrothal, are betrothed even with less than three kav of dinars.

And when I said—

that in all that I said consideration is given to the woman’s insistence, I meant specifically a case such as

he betrothed her at night

[at night], when the woman does not see with what amount he is betrothing her.

Alternatively, when she appointed an agent,

or when the woman appointed an agent and did not see with her own eyes with what amount he was betrothing her.

It is only in such a case that Beit Shammai said that a woman is particular about herself and does not agree to become betrothed with less than a dinar.

Similarly, an important woman such as one of Rabbi Yannai’s daughters, if she sent an agent or was betrothed at night, does not become betrothed with less than three kav of dinars.

b. The Gemara brings another reason for the statement of Beit Shammai that a woman becomes betrothed with a dinar:

Rav Yosef said:

Beit Shammai hold that even if the woman saw that the man came to betroth her with less than a dinar and agreed to it, her betrothal is not a betrothal.

And

the reasoning of Beit Shammai is

in accordance with Rav Yehuda,

who

said

in the name of

Rav Asi:

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Asi:

Every

“money”

mentioned in the Torah

means

Tyrian silver—

coins of Tyre. When the Torah explicitly mentions the name of a coin, such as a shekel, it means a Tyrian shekel.

If the Torah says “silver” but does not mention a coin denomination, the reference is to the smallest Tyrian coin.

And

silver

of their statements,

the silver mentioned in the words of the Sages, such as a sela or a dinar, is

state currency,

the coins of Jerusalem, which are worth one-eighth of the coins of Tyre.

This concludes the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav Asi.

Accordingly, it is impossible for a woman to be betrothed with a peruta, because the silver of betrothal is derived by means of the gzera shava “taking, taking” from the field of Ephron. And with regard to the field of Ephron, “silver” is stated, meaning Tyrian silver. In Tyre, copper coins were not minted at all but only silver coins, whereas the peruta is a copper coin.

Therefore, Beit Shammai disagrees with Beit Hillel and maintains that a woman cannot be betrothed with a peruta.

Gufa,

the Gemara cites the substance of Rav Yehuda’s statement in the name of Rav Asi, and the discussion that took place in the beit-midrash concerning his words:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav Asi: Every instance of “silver” stated in the Torah

is

Tyrian silver.

Whereas silver

of their statements—

is

state currency.

In every place where “silver” is stated in the Torah, it could be interpreted in either of two ways: [a] the reference is to a silver coin; [b] “silver” means money.

From Rav Asi’s statement that every instance of “silver” stated in the Torah means a Tyrian silver coin, it is evident that when the Torah says “silver,” it does not refer to all money, but to a coin. Therefore, the verse must be interpreted as referring to a Tyrian silver coin. Other items are indeed effective by virtue of the law of an item of equivalent value, which is like money, but they must be worth the equivalent of Tyrian silver.

And we challenge this:

But

is it

a general rule?!

Can it indeed be said that such a rule applies, namely, that the “silver” stated in the Torah means specifically silver, and does not refer to any money at all?!