Kiddushin 14a — the Talmud in English

That is, by his having intercourse with her, she is acquired [bought] by him as a wife!

But if so, it is difficult:

And say that the entire matter is like a woman!

Say that the yevama was compared to a woman entirely, and even money and a document should acquire her, for it is stated concerning a yevama: “And he shall take her to himself as a wife”"! And why did our Mishna say that the yevama is acquired through intercourse alone, and not through money and a document?!

And we answer:

It does not enter your mind.

Do not entertain the thought of saying so—

because

for it was taught: It might have been that money and a document complete her,

acquiring the yevama for the yavam completely,

in the manner that intercourse completes her,

for it is stated concerning her, “as a wife.”

The verse says,

therefore it is stated later in the verse,

“and he performs yibbum with her,”

whose meaning is: he will have intercourse with her.

And why did the verse need to say this? For it was already stated, “her yevama, he shall have intercourse with her”! Rather, the verse comes to say: specifically

intercourse completes her, but money and a document do not complete her.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

And we challenge the beraita: How is it possible to expound from the word “and he performs yibbum with her” that money and a document do not complete her? For in tractate Yevamot [8b] they already expounded from here that the yavam performs yibbum with the yevama even against her will?

And

if so,

this is needed by it,

the word

“and he performs yibbum with her,”

to say

that he performs yibbum with her against her will

! How can we derive two expositions from one word?

And we answer:

If so,

if indeed the verse came to teach us only that intercourse completes her and money and a document do not complete her, then

let the verse say,

it would have been appropriate for it to say, “Her yevama he shall have intercourse with,

and perform yibbum.”

What

why is it stated

“and he performs yibbum with her,”

with the addition of the letter heh?

You learn two things from it.

From here you learn two expositions: [a] “and he performs yibbum”—intercourse completes her, but money and a document do not.

[b] “and he performs yibbum with her,” with the addition of the letter heh—to teach that a yevama is acquired against her will.

We learned in the Mishna [above 2a]: The yevama is acquired through intercourse, and acquires herself

through chalitza.

The mitzva of chalitza is explicit in the Torah [Deuteronomy 25]: “And if the man [the yavam] does not wish to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate, to the elders, and say: My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; my yavam does not wish! And the elders of his city shall call him and speak to him, and he shall stand and say: I do not wish to take her! And his yevama shall approach him before the elders, remove his shoe from upon his foot, spit before him, and answer and say: So shall be done to the man who will not build his brother’s house. And his name shall be called in Israel, The house of the one whose shoe was removed.”

But it is not stated in the Torah that through the chalitza the yevama acquires herself, and that after the chalitza she is permitted to marry any man.

Therefore the Gemara discusses the words of our Mishna:

From where do we know,

from where do we know that the chalitza permits the yevama to marry another? Perhaps the chalitza is merely a mitzva, and it does not permit the yevama to marry another!

And we answer: for it is written there, concerning chalitza:

“And his name shall be called in Israel”

“the house of the one whose shoe was removed.”

The word “in Israel” is superfluous, and the Sages expounded from it:

Once he removed a shoe from her,—

she is permitted to all Israel.

And so the verse said: “In Israel—the house of the one whose shoe was removed.” That is, every Israelite is fit to bring her into his house [for marriage] once she has undergone chalitza.

And we wonder: Is it so that

this

“Israel”—

came for this purpose,

for this exposition?!

But

this

“Israel”

is needed by it,

the verse needs to write this in order to teach another exposition:

for that which was taught,

for the exposition taught in a beraita, which was brought by

Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda:

And so we learned in a beraita: “And his name shall be called

in Israel” \-

the verse teaches that the mitzva of chalitza must be performed

in a court of Israel, and not in a court of converts.

the word “in Israel” is written twice.

If so, it is impossible to learn from here that since he removed a shoe from her, she is permitted to all Israel?

And we answer: concerning the mitzva of chalitza,

two

“in Israel”

are written.

The word “in Israel” was written there twice:

[a] “My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel.”

[b] “And his name shall be called in Israel.”

One “in Israel” teaches that the mitzva of chalitza must be performed in a court of Israel and not of converts. And the second “in Israel” teaches: Once he removed a shoe from her, she is permitted to all Israel.

But it is still difficult, for we do not have two available instances of “in Israel” to teach these two matters—

for

it is still needed by it—

for that which was taught.

The verse still needed to say, “And his name shall be called in Israel,” in order to teach us the exposition brought in the beraita:

For it was taught:

Rabbi Yehuda said: Once we were sitting before Rabbi Tarfon, and a yevama came to undergo chalitza.

And he said to us,

when the yevama removed the shoe of the yavam:

All of you answer and say:

“The one whose shoe was removed,”

“the one whose shoe was removed.”

It is learned from the statement “And his name shall be called: The shoe-removal,” since the verse did not need to say “in Israel.” And why did the verse add and say “in Israel”? To teach us that once he has removed her shoe, she is permitted to all of Israel!

And from here, the verse “And his name shall be called in Israel, the house of the one whose shoe was removed,” comes to teach us that all those sitting there must say “the one whose shoe was removed,” and it is not superfluous so that we may expound from it.

And we answer:

That

the law that all those standing there must say “the one whose shoe was removed,”

is derived from

“and his name shall be called”

it emerges.

It is learned from what is stated, “And his name shall be called ‘the one whose shoe was removed,’” and the verse did not need to say “in Israel.” And why did the verse add and say “in Israel”? To teach us that once he removed a shoe from her, she is permitted to all Israel!

We learned in the Mishna: [The yevama] acquires herself through chalitza,

and through the death of the yavam.

strangulation—

And we inquire about it:

From where do we know,

from where do we know that the yevama acquires herself through the death of the yavam?

And we answer: This matter is learned by

a kal va-chomer

from a married woman, who acquires herself through the death of her husband [as we expounded above, 13b, from verses]—

And just as a married woman, who

is forbidden by a severe prohibition, so that the judgment of a stranger who has intercourse with her is

strangulation—

the death of the husband permits her

from the prohibition of a married woman, and she is permitted to marry another man.

A yevama, who

is forbidden to marry a stranger

by a

prohibition of

a lav

alone, and her prohibition is not as severe as that of a married woman, then

all the more so

should the death of the yavam permit her to marry another man?!

And we reject this:

What

is the reason

for

that

a married woman

is permitted through the death of the husband?

It is because

she has this feature:

she

goes out through a bill of divorce,

for the verse multiplied another mode of departure for her, which does not release the yevama!

Can you say this concerning this one,

concerning the yevama,

who does not go out through a bill of divorce,

and if so, she should not go out even through the death of the yavam!

And we challenge the rejection: Indeed, a yevama does not leave through a bill of divorce. But

this too,

also in the case of a yevama Scripture included an additional way of leaving, which does not exist in the case of a married woman. For the yevama

leaves through halitza,

whereas a married woman does not leave through halitza. It follows that Scripture did not include more ways of leaving for a married woman than for a yevama!

For besides the husband’s death, a married woman has only one way of leaving—through a bill of divorce. And likewise, a yevama, who has only one way of leaving—through halitza. It follows that the two are equal in the number of their ways of leaving!

Rather,

the kal va-chomer should be rejected with another rejection:

Just as

a married woman, who becomes permitted through the husband’s death, because

since

the one who

forbids her

is the one who

permits her,

for the husband is the one who forbade her through his betrothal, and therefore he permits her through his death!

But a yevama was forbidden through the betrothal of her husband who died, and by virtue of her husband’s betrothal she fell before the yavam for yibbum, and not through an act of the yavam himself. If so, how can the death of the yavam permit her?

Rav Ashi said

a resolution:

This too,

also in the case of a yevama, the one who

forbids her

is the one who

permits her

through his death. For had he not had, at the time of the husband’s death, a brother fit for yibbum, the woman would have been permitted to marry another, and the law of yibbum would not have applied to her at all. It follows that the

yavam

is the one who

forbids her

at the time of the husband’s death. Therefore, the

yavam

also

permits her,

the yavam is the one who permits her through his death.

Thus far, the Gemara has explained from where we learn that a yevama acquires herself through halitza and through the death of the yavam.

And since, in the course of the discussion concerning this matter, the Gemara said that a married woman becomes permitted through a bill of divorce and not through halitza, whereas a yevama becomes permitted through halitza and not through a bill of divorce, the Gemara now discusses the basis of these two matters:

A.

And let a married woman leave through halitza, by a kal va-chomer

from a yevama:

And just as a yevama, who does not leave through a bill of divorce,

nevertheless

leaves through halitza.

This one

a married woman, for whom Scripture included another way of leaving,

who leaves through a bill of divorce,

is it

not logically to be concluded that she leaves

also

through halitza?!

And we resolve:

The verse says

in Deuteronomy 24, concerning a bill of divorce: “And he shall write for her

a scroll of severance

and place it in her hand.”

The word “severance” is superfluous, and it comes to teach that only

a scroll,

a scroll of severance,

severs her

from her husband,

and no other thing

such as halitza

severs her.

B.

And let a yevama leave through a bill of divorce, by a kal va-chomer

from a married woman:

And just as a married woman, who does not leave through halitza, leaves through a bill of divorce.

This one

a yevama, for whom Scripture included another way of leaving,

who leaves through halitza,

and is it

not logically

to say

that she leaves through a bill of divorce?!

And we resolve:

The verse says

in Deuteronomy 25, concerning the mitzva of halitza: “

Thus

shall be done to the man who will not build his brother’s house.”

And

every place in which it is said

“thus,”

this is

an impediment.

That is, thus and not otherwise. And from here we learn that a yevama becomes permitted only through halitza, and not through a bill of divorce.

And we raise an objection: Indeed, an expression of impediment was said concerning halitza. But

and

is it the case that

wherever there is an impediment—

we do not expound a kal va-chomer?!

Is it the case that wherever an expression of impediment is stated in the Torah, it is impossible to expound from a kal va-chomer an additional matter?!

But surely one can prove from the mitzva of the two goats on the Day of Atonement that even where an expression of impediment is stated, it is possible to add another matter by means of a kal va-chomer, as follows:

On the Day of Atonement, there is a mitzva to bring two male goats, in addition to the sin-offering goat sacrificed on the outer altar.

The blood of one of them was sprinkled in the Holy of Holies and in the Sanctuary. The other was sent away to Azazel [Leviticus 16].

And it is said concerning this matter [there]: “And Aaron shall place lots upon the two goats, one lot [on which was written] ‘for the Lord,’ and one lot [on which was written] ‘for Azazel.’”

The following beraita discusses the question: If the High Priest did not place lots upon the two goats, but decided on his own and said, “This one is for the Lord, and this one is for Azazel,” do they, after the fact, each become sanctified according to his utterance? Or is it impossible to assign a designation to each goat except through a lot alone?

And the Gemara proves from the words of that beraita that it is possible to derive a kal va-chomer concerning a matter in which an expression of impediment was stated.

And as for the Day of Atonement, concerning which it is written

that there is a mitzva to cast a

lot

over the two goats,

and

it is written concerning the order of the service of the Day of Atonement, “

a statute.”

And every “statute” is an expression of impediment, and nevertheless the beraita wishes to derive by a kal va-chomer that designation by mouth also is effective—

And it was taught

concerning this matter: It is stated [Leviticus 16:9]: “And Aaron shall present the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord

and make it a sin-offering” —

The verse teaches with “and make it” [and not “and make”] that only

the lot

is the one that

makes

the goat a

sin-offering, and

the calling of the

designation

of a sin-offering upon it does not

make

the goat a

sin-offering.

And the beraita continues and explains that Scripture needed to make this matter known because

I

might

have been able

to say otherwise:

But is it not an inference

to learn the opposite, by a kal va-chomer:

And just as in a case where the lot did not sanctify,

with other offerings, when two offerings are consecrated together and it is necessary to distinguish one from the other [for example, the nests of men with flux, women with flux, and women after childbirth, who set aside two birds, one a sin-offering and one a burnt-offering], if one wrote “sin-offering” on one lot and “burnt-offering” on another lot, the lot does not designate them, and one can change their designations —

And even so,

he sanctified

through them

the designation,

for if he called one bird a sin-offering and one bird a burnt-offering, his words take effect.

If so,

in a case where the lot sanctified,

with the sin-offering goat for the Lord, since the lot is what sanctifies it, is it

not logically that it should sanctify

it

through the designation,

by a kal va-chomer from the other offerings?!

The verse therefore states,

for this reason it is said, “

and make it a sin-offering.”

To teach that only

the lot

mentioned in the previous verse

makes

the goat

a sin-offering, and

the calling of the

designation

of a sin-offering

does not make

it

a sin-offering.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

And the Gemara infers from the words of the beraita:

And the reason is that the verse excluded it,

the entire reason that calling the designation does not make the goat a sin-offering is only because Scripture explicitly excluded this. And it follows that

if not for this, we would expound a kal va-chomer,

to say that calling the designation also makes it a sin-offering.

And

even though it is written concerning it “

a statute,”

which is an expression of impediment, nevertheless it would have been possible to learn by a kal va-chomer that the lot is not indispensable [were it not that Scripture explicitly excluded this].

And from here there is a difficulty against the words of the Gemara above concerning the yevama:

Indeed, concerning a yevama it is said “thus,” which is an expression of impediment, but even where an expression of impediment is stated, it is possible to expound a kal va-chomer. If so, the earlier question returns: Why does a yevama not leave through a bill of divorce by a kal va-chomer?

Therefore we resolve with another resolution:

The verse says

in Deuteronomy 24, concerning a bill of divorce: “And he shall write for her [for a married woman] a scroll of severance.” The word “for her” is superfluous, and it comes to emphasize that specifically

for her

is it possible to write a scroll of severance so that she may leave through it,

but not for a yevama.

And from here we learn that a yevama does not leave through a bill of divorce.

And we challenge:

And say,

say that the word

“for her”

was written to teach that he must write the bill of divorce

for her sake [as though it said: “And he shall write for her sake a scroll of severance”]. If so, how can “for her” be expounded to exclude a yevama?

And we resolve:

Two “for her” are written.

Two instances of “for her” are written concerning a bill of divorce.

The word “her” is written twice concerning a bill of divorce:

A. “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance, and she shall depart and become another man’s” [Deuteronomy 24:1–2].

B. “And the last man shall hate her and write for her a scroll of severance.”

Therefore, it is possible to derive two teachings from here:

A. “For her”—for her sake.

B. “For her”—but not for a yevama.

And we challenge: Indeed, “for her” is written twice concerning a bill of divorce,

and

however,

it is still needed

for both of them to teach two other teachings:

A.

One “

for her”—

for her sake.

B.

And the other, “and he shall write

for

her”—

but not for her and her fellow.

A man married to two women cannot write one bill of divorce for both of them in the wording: “I, so-and-so, divorce my two wives, so-and-so and so-and-so.”

And on account of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts what it resolved above—that the word “for her” comes to teach that a yevama is not divorced through a bill of divorce.

Rather,

we resolve with another resolution:

The verse says

in Deuteronomy 25, concerning a yevama [Deuteronomy 25], “

shoe.”

And this word is superfluous there. For it is stated [there]: “And his yevama shall approach him, and she shall remove his shoe.” And afterward it is stated: “And his name shall be called in Israel, The house of the one whose shoe was removed.” Since “and she shall remove his shoe” has already been stated, it is known that the halitza was performed with a shoe. If so, why is “the house of the one whose shoe was removed” stated? It could have said, “the house of the one who was removed.” And it is already known that the halitza was performed with a shoe!

Rather, Scripture comes to emphasize and say:

Shoe, yes

so.

From anything else—

no!

Scripture teaches that a yevama acquires herself only through the removal of the shoe, but not through anything else. That is, not through a bill of divorce.

And we challenge:

And

is it the case that

this “

shoe”

comes for this purpose!?

Does the word “shoe” come to teach us this?!

This is needed for that which was taught in a beraita,

for it is needed to teach the exposition brought in the beraita:

For so they taught in a beraita: It is stated concerning halitza [there]: “And she shall remove

his shoe

from upon his foot.”

I have only

to learn from the wording of the verse that halitza is effective with only

his shoe,

the shoe of the yavam alone.

A shoe belonging to any person

worn on the foot of the yavam—

from where does he derive it?

From where did the tan in tractate Yevamot [101a] learn that it too is valid for halitza?

The verse therefore states,

for this reason it is said, “

shoe”—

shoe,

twice [as above].

And through the repetition of the word “shoe,”

Scripture included

every shoe, even a shoe that does not belong to the yavam, which is valid for halitza.

Perhaps you will ask:

If so,

that a shoe belonging to any person is valid,

what is the purpose of the verse

why is it stated

“his shoe”?

The answer is: “

His shoe”

teaches that he must perform halitza with a shoe

fit for him,

the yavam.

Except for a

shoe that is

large,

to such an extent

that

the yavam

cannot walk in it.

And likewise,

except for a

shoe that is

small

to such an extent that it does not

cover

cover

most of his foot.