Kiddushin 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

That is, through intercourse with her, she becomes acquired to him as a wife!

But if so, this can be challenged:

And say that the entire matter is like a wife!

Say that the yevama was compared to a wife in every respect, and even money and a document should acquire her, for it is stated concerning the yevama: “And he shall take her as a wife”! And why did our Mishna state that a yevama is acquired only through intercourse, and not through money or a document?!

And we answer:

It should not enter your mind.

Do not think that this is so—

because

it was taught in a beraita: One might have thought that money and a document complete her acquisition,

acquiring the yevama fully for the yavam,

just as intercourse completes her acquisition,

for it is stated concerning her: “as a wife.”

The verse states,

therefore, the continuation of the verse says,

“and he shall perform levirate marriage with her,”

the meaning of which is: he shall have intercourse with her.

And why was it necessary for the verse to say this? After all, it had already said, “her yavam shall have intercourse with her”! Rather, the verse comes to say that specifically

intercourse completes her acquisition, but money and a document do not complete her acquisition.

This concludes the words of the beraita.

And we challenge the beraita: How can it be possible to expound from the word “and he shall perform levirate marriage with her” that money and a document do not complete her acquisition? After all, in tractate Yevamot [8b], this word was already expounded to teach that the yavam performs levirate marriage with the yevama even against her will.

And

if so,

this is needed

the word

“and he shall perform levirate marriage with her,”

to say

that he performs levirate marriage with her against her will,

her! How can two expositions be derived from one word?

And we answer:

If so,

if the verse indeed came only to teach us that intercourse completes her acquisition, but money and a document do not complete her acquisition, then

let the verse say

it should have said: “Her yavam shall have intercourse with her

and he shall perform levirate marriage.”

What

why is it stated

“and he shall perform levirate marriage with her,”

with the additional letter heh?

You can infer two things.

Two expositions can be derived from this: [a] “and he shall perform levirate marriage”—intercourse completes her acquisition, but money and a document do not. [b] “and he shall perform levirate marriage with her,” with the additional letter heh—teaching that a yevama is acquired against her will.

We learned in the Mishna [above, 2a]: A yevama is acquired through intercourse, and she acquires herself

through halitza.

The mitzva of halitza is explicitly stated in the Torah [Deuteronomy 25]: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate, to the elders, and say: My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; my yavam does not wish me! Then the elders of his city shall call him and speak to him, and he shall stand and say: I do not wish to take her! Then his yevama shall approach him before the elders, remove his shoe from upon his foot, spit before him, and answer and say: So shall be done to the man who will not build his brother’s house. And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of the one whose shoe was removed.”

But the Torah does not state that through halitza the yevama acquires herself and becomes permitted, after halitza, to marry anyone.

Therefore, the Gemara discusses the words of our Mishna:

From where do we know,

from where do we know that halitza permits the yevama to marry another man? Perhaps halitza is merely a mitzva, and does not permit the yevama to marry another man!

And we answer: For it is written there, concerning halitza:

“And his name shall be called in Israel,”

“the house of the one whose shoe was removed.”

The word “in Israel” is superfluous, and the Sages expounded it:

Once he has removed the shoe from her,

she is permitted to all of Israel.

And so the verse says: “In Israel—the house of the one whose shoe was removed.” That is, once he has removed her shoe, every member of Israel is fit to take her into his home [for marriage].

And we wonder: Is this word

“Israel”

intended for this purpose,

for this exposition?!

After all,

this word “Israel”

is needed

the verse needs to write it in order to teach another exposition:

as it was taught in a beraita,

for the exposition taught in a beraita brought by

Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda:

And so we learned in a beraita: “And his name shall be called

in Israel”

—the verse teaches that the mitzva of halitza must be performed

in a court of Israel, and not in a court of converts.

in Israel” —

And if so, is it impossible to learn from here that once he has removed her shoe, she is permitted to all of Israel?

And we answer: Regarding the mitzva of halitza,

the word “in Israel” is written twice.

The word “in Israel” appears there twice: [a] “My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother [b] “And his name shall be called in Israel.” One “in Israel” teaches that the mitzva of halitza must be performed in a court of Israel and not in a court of converts. The second “in Israel” teaches: Once he has removed her shoe, she is permitted to all of Israel.

But a difficulty still remains: We do not have two instances of “in Israel” available to teach these two matters—

because

it is still needed

for the exposition

taught in a beraita.

The verse still needed to say “And his name shall be called in Israel” in order to teach us the exposition brought in the beraita:

As it was taught:

Rabbi Yehuda said: Once we were sitting before Rabbi Tarfon, and a yevama came to perform halitza.

And he said to us,

Rabbi Tarfon, when the yevama removed the yavam’s shoe:

“All of you answer and say”:

“The shoe-removal,”

“The shoe-removal.”

It was taught:

This demonstrates that the verse “And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of the one whose shoe was removed” comes to teach us that everyone sitting there must say “The shoe-removal,” and therefore “in Israel” is not superfluous, to be expounded for the other purpose.

And we answer:

That matter,

the law that everyone standing there must say “The shoe-removal,”

is derived from

“And his name shall be called.”

It is learned from the statement “And his name shall be called: The shoe-removal,” since the verse did not need to say “in Israel.” And why did the verse add and say “in Israel”? To teach us that once he has removed her shoe, she is permitted to all of Israel!

This shows that the verse, “And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of the one whose shoe was removed,” comes to teach us that everyone sitting there must say, “The shoe was removed”; therefore, the word is not superfluous and cannot be expounded for the other purpose.

We learned in the Mishna: [The yevama] acquires herself through halitza,

and through the death of the yavam.

the law that everyone standing there must say, “The shoe was removed,”

And we inquire:

From where do we know,

from where do we know that a yevama acquires herself through the death of the yavam?

And we answer: This matter is learned through a kal va-chomer from a married woman, who acquires herself through the death of her husband [as we derived earlier, on 13b, from verses]—

Just as a married woman, who is

subject to a severe prohibition, such that a stranger who has intercourse with her is liable to

strangulation—

the death of the husband permits her

from the prohibition of a married woman, and she is permitted to marry another man;

a yevama, who is

forbidden to marry a stranger

by

a

prohibition of lav

alone, and whose prohibition is not as severe as that of a married woman—then

is it not all the more so

that the death of the yavam should permit her to marry another man?!

And we reject this:

What

is the reason

that

a

married woman

becomes permitted through the death of her husband?

It is because

in her case

she

leaves through a bill of divorce,

as the verse included another form of release for her, one that does not release the yevama!

Can you say the same in this case,

with regard to a yevama,

who does not leave through a bill of divorce,

and if so, she should not leave even through the death of the yavam!

It is because

she has the following feature:

she

can leave through a bill of divorce,

as the verse included another form of release for her, one that does not release the levirate wife!

Can you say the same in this case,

with regard to the levirate wife,

who cannot leave through a bill of divorce,

and if so, she should not become free even through the death of the levir!

And we raise an objection to the rejection: Indeed, a yevama does not leave her bond through a get. But

this too,

the Torah included an additional form of leaving even for a yevama, which does not apply to a married woman. For a yevama

leaves through halitza,

whereas a married woman does not leave through halitza. It follows that the Torah did not include more forms of leaving for a married woman than for a yevama!

For apart from the death of the husband, a married woman has only one additional form of leaving—the get. And likewise, a yevama has only one additional form of leaving—halitza. It follows that the two are equal in the number of their forms of leaving!

Rather,

the kal va-chomer should be rejected for another reason:

Just as

a married woman, who becomes permitted through the death of her husband, does so because

the one who

forbade

her

is the one who

permits her,

for the husband is the one who forbade her through his betrothal, and therefore he permits her through his death!

But a yevama was forbidden through the betrothal of her husband who died, and by virtue of her deceased husband’s betrothal she fell before the yavam for levirate marriage, and not through an act of the yavam himself. If so, how can the death of the yavam permit her?

Rav Ashi said

in answer:

This too,

even in the case of a yevama, the one who

forbade her

is the one who

permits her through his death. For if, at the time of her husband’s death, he had not had a brother fit for levirate marriage, the woman would have been permitted to marry someone else, and the law of levirate marriage would never have applied to her. It follows that the

yavam

is the one who

forbade her

at the time of her husband’s death. Therefore, the

yavam

also

also

permits her;

the yavam is the one who permits her through his death.

Thus far, the Gemara has explained from where we derive that a yevama acquires herself through halitza and through the death of the yavam.

And since, in the course of the discussion on this matter, the Gemara stated that a married woman becomes permitted through a get and not through halitza, whereas a yevama becomes permitted through halitza and not through a get, the Gemara now discusses the basis of these two principles:

A.

And let a married woman leave through halitza, by means of a kal va-chomer

from a yevama:

Just as a yevama, who does not leave through a get,

nevertheless

leaves through halitza.

This one

—a married woman—for whom the Torah included another form of leaving,

so that she leaves through a get,

does it

not follow that she leaves

also

through halitza?!

And we answer:

The verse says

[Deuteronomy 24], concerning a get: “And he shall write for her

a scroll of severance

and place it in her hand.”

The word “severance” is superfluous, and it comes to teach that only

a scroll,

a scroll of severance,

severs her

from her husband,

and no other thing

—such as halitza—

severs her.

B.

And let a yevama leave through a get, by means of a kal va-chomer

from a married woman:

Just as a married woman, who does not leave through halitza, leaves through a get.

This one

—a yevama—for whom the Torah included another form of leaving,

so that she leaves through halitza,

and is it

not certainly

the case

that she leaves through a get?!

And we answer:

The verse says

[Deuteronomy 25], concerning the mitzva of halitza: “Thus

shall it be done

to the man who will not build his brother’s house.”

And

wherever the expression

“thus”

is stated, it is

a requirement.

That is, thus and not otherwise. From here we learned that a yevama becomes permitted only through halitza and not through a get.

And we ask: Indeed, the expression “a requirement” was stated concerning halitza. But

and

is it the case that

wherever there is a requirement—

one does not expound a kal va-chomer?!

Is it the case that wherever the Torah states an expression indicating a requirement, it is impossible to derive an additional matter by means of a kal va-chomer?!

But surely one can prove from the mitzva of the two goats on Yom Kippur that even where an expression indicating a requirement is stated, it is possible to add another matter by means of a kal va-chomer, as follows:

On Yom Kippur, there is a mitzva to bring two male goats, in addition to the sin-offering goat sacrificed on the outer altar.

The blood of one of them was sprinkled in the Holy of Holies and in the Sanctuary. The other was sent to Azazel [Leviticus 16].

And it is stated concerning this matter [there]: “And Aaron shall place lots upon the two goats: one lot [on which was written] ‘For the Lord,’ and one lot [on which was written] ‘For Azazel.’”

The following beraita discusses whether, if the High Priest did not place lots upon the two goats but instead decided on his own and said, “This one is for the Lord, and this one is for Azazel,” each one was consecrated in accordance with his declaration after the fact; or whether it is impossible to designate each goat except through lots alone.

And the Gemara proves from the words of that beraita that it is possible to derive a kal va-chomer concerning a matter in which an expression indicating a requirement was stated.

And as for Yom Kippur, concerning which it is written

that there is a mitzva to cast a

lot

for the two goats,

and

it is written concerning the order of the Yom Kippur service,

“a statute.”

And every “statute” is an expression indicating a requirement, and nevertheless the beraita seeks to derive by means of a kal va-chomer that designation by verbal declaration is also effective—

And it was taught

concerning this matter: It is stated [Leviticus 16:9]: “And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the lot arose ‘For the Lord,’

and make it a sin-offering” —

The verse teaches through the expression “and make it”—and not “and make”—that only

the lot

is what

makes

the goat a

sin-offering, and

calling it by the

designation

of a sin-offering does not

make

the goat a

sin-offering.

And the beraita continues and explains that the verse needed to teach us this because

I

might have

been able

to say otherwise:

Is it not an inference

to derive the opposite by means of a kal va-chomer:

Just as in a case where the lot does not consecrate,

with regard to other offerings, when two offerings are consecrated together and it is necessary to distinguish between them [for example, the nests of zavim, zavot, and women after childbirth, in which two birds are set aside, one a sin-offering and one a burnt-offering], if “sin-offering” is written on one lot and “burnt-offering” on another lot, the lots do not designate them, and one may change their designations —

And nevertheless

the designation

through them

consecrates,

for if he designated one bird as a sin-offering and another bird as a burnt-offering, his words take effect.

If so,

in a case where the lot consecrates,

with regard to the sin-offering goat for the Lord, where the lot is what consecrates it, does it

not certainly follow that the designation

also

consecrates

it, by a kal va-chomer from other offerings?!

The verse states,

therefore it says,

“and make it a sin-offering.”

This teaches that only

the lot

—which was mentioned in the preceding verse—

makes

the goat

a sin-offering, and

calling it by the

designation

of a sin-offering does not

make

it

a sin-offering.

Thus far are the words of the beraita.

And the Gemara infers from the words of the beraita:

And the reason is that the verse excluded it,

meaning that the sole reason calling the goat by the designation does not make it a sin-offering is that the verse explicitly excluded this. It follows that

if not for this, we would expound a kal va-chomer,

to say that calling it by the designation would also make it a sin-offering.

And

even though it is written concerning it

“a statute,”

which is an expression indicating a requirement, it would nevertheless have been possible to derive by means of a kal va-chomer that the lot is not indispensable [were it not that the verse explicitly excluded this].

And from here there is a difficulty with the words of the Gemara above concerning the yevama:

Indeed, “thus,” an expression indicating a requirement, was stated concerning a yevama. But even where an expression indicating a requirement is stated, it is possible to expound a kal va-chomer. If so, the earlier question returns: Why does a yevama not leave through a get by means of a kal va-chomer?

Therefore, we answer with another answer:

The verse says

[Deuteronomy 24], concerning a get: “And he shall write for

her

a scroll of severance” [for a married woman]. The word “for her” is superfluous, and it comes to emphasize that specifically

for her, and not for a yevama,

may one write a scroll of severance so that she leaves through it. From here we learn that a yevama does not leave through a get.

And we ask:

But say,

that the word

“for her”

was written to teach that one must write the get

for her sake

—as though it said: “And he shall write for her sake a scroll of severance.” If so, how can “for her” be expounded to exclude a yevama?

And we answer:

Two instances of “for her” are written.

“For her” is written twice concerning a get:

A. “And he shall write for her a scroll of severance, and she shall leave his house and become another man’s” [Deuteronomy 24:1–2].

B. “And the latter man shall hate her and write for her a scroll of severance.”

Therefore, two expositions can be derived from here:

A. “For her”—for her sake.

B. “For her”—and not for a yevama.

And we ask: Indeed, “for her” is written twice concerning a get,

and

however,

we still need it

for both of them to teach two other expositions:

A.

One

“

for her”—

for her sake.

B.

And the other: “And he shall write

for her”—

and not for her and her fellow.

A man married to two women cannot write a single get for both of them in the wording: “I, so-and-so, divorce my two wives, so-and-so and so-and-so.”

As a result of this question, the Gemara retracts what it answered above—that the word “for her” teaches that a yevama does not become divorced through a get.

Rather,

we answer with another answer:

The verse says

[Deuteronomy 25], concerning a yevama [Deuteronomy 25],

“shoe.”

This word is superfluous there. It is stated [there]: “And his yevama shall approach him, and remove his shoe.” And afterward it is stated: “And his name shall be called in Israel, The house of the one whose shoe was removed.” Since “and remove his shoe” has already been stated, it is known that the halitza was performed with a shoe. If so, why is “The house of the one whose shoe was removed” stated? It could have said simply, “The house of the one who was removed.” It is already known that the halitza was performed with a shoe!

Rather, the verse comes to emphasize and say:

A shoe, yes

—

anything else—

no!

The verse teaches that a yevama acquires herself only through the removal of a shoe, but not through anything else. That is, not through a get.

And we ask:

And

is

this

“shoe”

really what it comes for?!

Does the word “shoe” come to teach us this?!

This is needed for that which was taught in a beraita,

for it is needed to teach the exposition brought in the beraita:

For this is what was taught in a beraita: It is stated concerning halitza [there]: “And she shall remove

his shoe

from upon his foot.”

I have derived only

from the wording of the verse that halitza is effective with

his shoe

alone, that of the yavam.

A shoe belonging to anyone else

—[placed on the yavam’s foot]—

from where does he derive it?

From where did the tanna in tractate Yevamot [101a] learn that such a shoe is also fit for halitza?

The verse states,

and for this reason it says,

“shoe”—

“shoe,”

twice [as above].

And through the repetition of the word “shoe,”

the verse included

every shoe, even a shoe that does not belong to the yavam, which is fit for halitza.

Perhaps you will ask:

If so,

if a shoe belonging to anyone is fit,

what is the meaning of

—why does it say—

“his shoe”?

The answer is:

“His shoe”

teaches that he must perform halitza with a shoe

that is fit for him,

the yavam.

Except for

a shoe that is

too large,

to the extent

that

the yavam

cannot walk in it.

And likewise,

except for

a shoe that is

too small,

to the extent that it does not

cover

—that is, cover—

most of his foot.