Ketubot 99a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation of the Mishna:

And

But since the latter clause is when she reduced the price, the first clause is when she did not reduce the price [since if the first clause, too, deals with a case where she reduced the price, why did the tanna need to teach us that the sale is void when she reduced the price twice]!?

[For if the first clause also deals with a case where she reduced the price, why would the tanna need to teach us that the sale is invalid when she reduced the price twice?]!

As the latter clause teaches

of our Mishna:

If her ketuba was four hundred zuz, she sold to this one for a maneh and to that one for a maneh

and to a third for a maneh

and to the last one property worth a maneh and a dinar for a maneh, the sale to the last one is void, but the sales to all of them stand.

And the latter clause necessarily deals with a case where she reduced the price of the land for the last purchaser, for otherwise how did we state: “and to the last one property worth a maneh and a dinar ‘for a maneh”? You cannot interpret it as “for her maneh,” since her ketuba is not a maneh, as in the first clause; rather, her ketuba is four hundred zuz.

And since the first clause deals with a case where she did not reduce the price, necessarily the reason is that “she acts contrary to their instructions,” and the question is resolved.

And we reject this:

No

you cannot resolve it, because in fact

the first clause and the latter clause are both when she reduced the price.

And

As for what is difficult for you—if so, why do I need the latter clause?—it is not difficult, since

the latter clause teaches us this:

The reason is that she reduced the price from the orphans’ share,

meaning: specifically if the reduction was at the expense of the orphans, as in the case dealt with by our Mishna, where she sold the last purchaser land worth more than the value of the debt that they still owed her.

But if she sold from her own share, the sale stands,

meaning: but if the reduction was with the first purchasers and at her own expense—for example, she sold the first purchaser land worth two hundred for one hundred, since they owe her all two hundred and more—the sale stands, and she has suffered the loss, as though she had received two hundred in this sale.

The Gemara raises an objection: But

this—that when she reduced the price from her own share the sale stands—

that she sold at a loss from her own share and the sale stands—

you hear from the first clause

[we already knew it from the first clause], so why did the tanna need to teach it again in the latter clause!?

For we already stated in the first clause:

If her ketuba was two hundred, and she sold property worth one hundred for two hundred, or property worth

two hundred for one hundred, she has received her ketuba.

And we answer: The tanna needed to teach the latter clause as well, because

it might have been said

[perhaps you would say]

there

in the first clause, where she reduced the price from her own share,

it is

that the sale stands, since

she has completely withdrawn

the widow

from this house

[she received all her ketuba and withdrew completely from the orphans’ house], meaning: she will no longer collect anything from the orphans, and there is nothing to decree.

But here,

in the latter clause, where she sold to the first purchaser land worth two hundred for one hundred, so that the land sold does not cover even part of the ketuba at its true value, and she still needs to sell more in order to complete the entire debt of the ketuba, since her debt is four hundred zuz, I would say that

we should decree

that the sale is void with regard to the

first maneh

where the reduction is at her own expense,

lest you say the last maneh

where the reduction is at the expense of the orphans.

It teaches us this!

Here the Gemara returns to the beginning of the matter, where the members of the academy were uncertain regarding an agent whose principal told him, “Buy a lethekh for me,” and he went and bought a kor for him, and it brings another formulation of this question:

And some say:

This you need not ask

[there is no doubt about the matter], for

where he said to him

the principal to his agent:

Go buy a lethekh for me, and he bought a kor for him

[go and sell a houseful of half a kor of my land, and the agent sold a full houseful of a kor],

he certainly “adds” to his words

of the principal

is

the agent, and the sale of the houseful of a lethekh is valid and standing.

When do you need to ask,

and there is uncertainty only when the matter was reversed,

where he said to him

the principal to his agent:

Go buy for me

a houseful of

a kor

[go and sell a houseful of a kor for me] all at once,

and he went and bought for him

only a houseful of

a lethekh.

What

is the law of the sale? Does it stand or not?

Do we say that the agent can

can

say to him

the agent to his principal [do we say that the agent can say to his principal]:

I did what was good for you

[I benefited you] by selling only a houseful of a lethekh,

for

if I had sold a full houseful of a kor, then

if you do not need the money

[if it should become clear to you that you do not need so much money as payment for the entire houseful of a kor],

you would not be able to retract

[you would not have been able to retract], and it is better for you that I sold only half a houseful of a kor.

Or perhaps,

the agent can

say to him

the principal to the agent:

I do not want many documents to be issued against me

[I do not want to make many sales for which many documents would be issued against me].

Rabbi Hanina of Sura said: Come and hear

from a Mishna in tractate Meila:

For this is what we learned there:

He gave him

the principal to the agent

a gold dinar

[which is worth twenty-five silver dinars, which are six sela] of consecrated property,

and said to him:

Go

bring me

with this dinar

a cloak,

namely, a good and fine cloak whose price is a full dinar, six silver sela.

And he went

the agent

and brought him

to the householder

for

the price of

three

sela from the dinar [which are half of what he gave him]—

a cloak

small and poor—and with the

three

remaining sela the agent brought him—without the principal having requested this—

a shawl.

Both committed misuse,

the principal committed misuse with regard to the cloak that the agent bought as his agent, even though he bought a small and poor cloak at half the price, and the agent committed misuse with regard to the shawl that he bought on his own initiative with consecrated money.

And the Gemara proves from here the first side of the uncertainty that we raised:

Granted, if you say: An agent in such a case

who deviated from the opinion of the householder, who was interested in a good and fine cloak,

fulfills his agency

of the principal

and “adds”

to his words.

That is why the householder committed misuse,

since the agent fulfilled his agency.

But if you say:

an agent in such a case

“acts contrary” to his instructions, why did the principal commit misuse

for the agent did not fulfill his agency!?

And we answer: In fact, if the agent bought a poor cloak at half the price, the agent is one who “acts contrary” to the householder’s intention, and his agency is void; but

here

with regard to the cloak,

with what are we dealing?

That he brought him

[he brought him] the agent a good and fine cloak, as the principal wished, except that he brought that cloak,

worth six

sela,

for three

sela only. In any such case he is not called one who “acts contrary,” even though the principal told him to buy a cloak for six.

The questioner who raised the following difficulty had thought that the meaning of the Mishna, “Both committed misuse,” was that the agent also committed misuse with regard to the cloak. Although according to the basic law the principal commits misuse, nevertheless, by rabbinic law the agent also committed misuse, since in the end he deviated from the householder’s intention. Therefore the Gemara asks:

If so,

since the agent bought the principal a cloak according to the principal’s preference, only he bought it more cheaply, then even by rabbinic law he should not be regarded as having deviated from the householder’s intention, and

why did the agent commit misuse

by rabbinic law with regard to the cloak!?

And we answer:

It is with regard to the shawl

that the agent committed misuse by Torah law, whereas with regard to the cloak he did not commit misuse, even by rabbinic law.

The Gemara further raises an objection to the explanation of the Mishna in tractate Meila:

If so,

that the Mishna deals with an agent who bought a cloak that indeed was worth six, except that he bought it cheaply:

Say the latter clause

of that Mishna in Meila:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even in this case the householder did not commit misuse, because he can say

the principal to the agent:

I

wanted a large cloak, and

if

you brought me a small and poor cloak

you are not my agent in this matter.

It follows that the Mishna is not dealing with an agent who brought a cloak worth six for three, but with one who brought a small and poor cloak whose value was the price that the agent paid for it.

And we answer:

What

is the meaning of a small cloak and

“poor”

as Rabbi Yehuda said?

Poor in price,

meaning: a cloak for which you paid little money!

You might say: What does it matter to the householder that the agent bought him the cloak cheaply?

It is not so, since

he said to him

the principal to the agent:

If you had brought it to me for six,

if you had bought a cloak with all six [sela] that I gave you, then

all the more so it would have been worth twenty-four

large dinars [that is, certainly the true price of the cloak would have been more than double in proportion], since the greater the purchase, the greater the reduction in price as well. It follows that the agent acted contrary to his agency, for he did not buy him a more expensive cloak with all six sela.

It is precise as well,

that for this reason Rabbi Yehuda holds that the householder did not commit misuse,

for

this

is taught

in the latter clause of that Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to legumes

that if he told him to buy with this gold dinar, and the agent went and bought legumes only for three sela, and with the remainder he bought another object,

both

the principal and the agent

committed misuse.