Ketubot 99a (צט.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation of the Mishna:

And

since the latter clause deals with a case where she sold at a reduced price, the first clause must deal with a case where she did not sell at a reduced price

[For if the first clause also deals with a case where she reduced the price, why would the tanna need to teach us that the sale is invalid when she reduced the price twice?]!

As it teaches in the latter clause

of our Mishna:

If her ketuba was four hundred dinars, and she sold to this one for one hundred and to that one for one hundred

[and to a third for one hundred],

and to the last one property worth one hundred and one dinars for one hundred, the sale to the last one is invalid, but the sales to all of them are valid.

The latter clause must necessarily deal with a case where she reduced the price of the land for the last purchaser. For otherwise, how could we have learned: “And to the last one property worth one hundred and one dinars for one hundred”? You cannot interpret “for one hundred of hers,” since her ketuba is not one hundred, as it is in the first clause; rather, her ketuba is four hundred dinars.

And since the first clause deals with a case where she did not reduce the price, necessarily the reason is that “she has violated” their instructions, and the question is resolved. And we reject this:

We say:

No,

you cannot resolve it, because in fact

the first and latter clauses both deal with a case where she reduced the price.

And

as for your difficulty—if so, why do I need the latter clause?—it is not difficult, because

the latter clause teaches us this:

The reason is that she reduced the price at the orphans’ expense,

meaning, specifically when the reduction was at the orphans’ expense, as in the case dealt with by our Mishna, where she sold to the last purchaser land worth more than the value of the debt they still owed her.

But if she reduced the price at her own expense, the sale is valid,

meaning, if the reduction was made with regard to the earlier purchasers and at her expense—for example, she sold the first purchaser land worth two hundred for one hundred, where the entire two hundred was owed to her and even more besides—then the sale is valid, and she has suffered the loss, as though she had received two hundred in this sale.

The Gemara asks: But

this—

that when she reduced the price at her own expense, the sale is valid—

you already learn from the first clause

[we already knew this from the first clause], so why does the tanna need to teach it again in the latter clause?!

For we already learned in the first clause:

If her ketuba was two hundred, and she sold property worth one hundred for two hundred, or property worth

two hundred for one hundred, she has received her ketuba.

And we answer: The tanna needs to state the latter clause as well, because

it might have been said

[perhaps you would say] that

there,

in the first clause, when she reduced the price at her own expense,

it is

that the sale is valid, since

she has completely withdrawn

the widow

from this household

[she received the full amount of her ketuba and completely withdrew from the orphans’ household]. That is, she will no longer collect anything from the orphans, and there is no decree to enact.

But here,

in the latter clause, where she sold the first purchaser land worth two hundred for one hundred, the land sold does not cover even part of the ketuba at its true value, and she still needs to sell more in order to complete payment of the entire ketuba, since her debt is four hundred dinars, I would say that

we should decree

that the sale be invalid in

the first hundred,

where the reduction was at her expense,

on account of the last hundred,

where the reduction was at the orphans’ expense.

It teaches us this!

Here the Gemara returns to the original matter, concerning the doubt raised by the scholars regarding an agent whose principal said to him, “Buy half a kor for me,” and he went and bought a full kor, and it presents another formulation of this dilemma:

And there are those who say:

This is not a matter about which you need to inquire

[there is no doubt], for

where he said to him,

the principal to his agent:

Go buy half a kor for me, and he bought a full kor

[go and sell half a kor of my land, but the agent sold a full kor],

he certainly “added” to his words

of the principal

is

the agent, and the sale of the half-letakh is valid.

The matter about which you do need to inquire,

and the doubt exists only when the matter was reversed,

where he said to him,

the principal to his agent:

Go buy for me

a

full kor

[go and buy a full kor for me] in a single transaction,

but he went and bought for him

only half a

kor.

What

is the status of the sale? Is it valid or not?

Do we say that the agent

can

say to him

the agent to his principal [do we say that the agent can say to his principal]:

I acted for your benefit

[I benefited you] by selling only half a kor, because

if

I had sold a full kor, then

if you did not need the money

[if it would become clear to you that you did not need as much money as the price of the entire kor],

you could not have retracted

[you would not have been able to retract], and it was to your benefit that I sold only half a kor.

Or perhaps the principal

can

say to him,

the principal to the agent:

I do not want many deeds to be issued against me

[I do not want to make many sales for which many deeds would be issued against me].

Rabbi Ḥanina of Sura said: Come and hear

from a Mishna in tractate Me’ila:

This is what we learned there:

He gave him

the principal to the agent

a gold dinar

[which is worth twenty-five silver dinars, equal to six sela’im] of consecrated property,

and said to him:

Go

bring me

with this dinar

a cloak,

that is, a fine and attractive cloak whose price is one full dinar, six silver sela’im.

And he went

the agent

and brought him

to the owner of the property

for

the price of

three

sela’im from the dinar [which is half of what he had given him]—

a cloak

that was small and inferior—and

with the three

remaining sela’im, the agent brought him—without the principal having requested this—

a garment.

Both committed misuse,

the principal committed misuse with regard to the cloak that the agent purchased on his behalf, even though he purchased a small and inferior cloak for half the price, and the agent committed misuse with regard to the garment that he purchased on his own initiative with consecrated funds.

The Gemara proves from here in support of the first side of the doubt that we raised:

Granted, if you say that an agent in such a case

who deviated from the wishes of the owner, who wanted a fine and attractive cloak—

fulfills his agency,

he is the principal’s agent,

and “adds”

to his words.

That is why the owner committed misuse,

for the agent fulfilled his agency.

But if you say

that an agent in such a case

“violates” his instructions, why did the principal commit misuse

if the agent did not fulfill his agency?!

And we answer: In fact, if the agent purchased an inferior cloak at half the price, the agent is considered to have “violated” the owner’s instructions, and his agency is void. But

here,

with regard to the cloak,

what are we dealing with?

He brought him

[the agent brought him] a fine and attractive cloak, as the principal desired, except that he brought that cloak,

worth six

sela’im,

for three

sela’im בלבד, and in any such case he is not considered to have “violated” the instructions, even though the principal told him to purchase a cloak for six.

The questioner, who raised the following objection, had thought that the meaning of the Mishna, “Both committed misuse,” was that the agent also committed misuse with regard to the cloak. Although according to the basic law the principal commits misuse, nevertheless the agent also committed misuse by rabbinic enactment, since ultimately he deviated from the owner’s wishes. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

If so,

since the agent purchased for the principal a cloak according to the principal’s preference, only purchasing it more cheaply,

why did the agent commit misuse

by rabbinic enactment with regard to the cloak?!

And we answer:

It was with regard to the garment

that the agent committed misuse by Torah law; with regard to the cloak, he did not commit misuse, not even by rabbinic enactment.

The Gemara raises another objection to the interpretation of the Mishna in tractate Me’ila:

If so,

if the Mishna deals with an agent who purchased a cloak that was indeed worth six sela’im, but purchased it cheaply:

Consider the latter clause

of that Mishna in Me’ila:

Rabbi Yehuda says: In this case as well, the owner did not commit misuse, because he can say

the principal to the agent:

I

was asking for a large cloak, and

if

you brought me a small and inferior cloak

you are not my agent with regard to this matter.

It follows that the Mishna does not deal with an agent who brought a cloak worth six sela’im for three, but rather one who brought a small and inferior cloak whose value was equal to the price the agent paid for it.

And we answer:

What

is the meaning of a small and

“inferior” cloak

as stated by Rabbi Yehuda?

Inferior in price,

meaning, a cloak that cost you little money!

You might say: Why should it matter to the owner that the agent purchased the cloak for him cheaply?

It is not so, since

he said to him,

the principal to the agent:

Had you brought it to me for six,

had you purchased a cloak with all six sela’im that I gave you, then

all the more so it would have been worth eighteen

large dinars [that is, certainly the true price of the cloak would have been more than twice as much proportionately], since the greater the purchase, the greater the reduction in price as well. It follows that the agent violated his agency by not purchasing for him a more expensive cloak with all six sela’im.

This is also precise,

that for this reason Rabbi Yehuda holds that the owner did not commit misuse,

as

indeed

it teaches

in the latter clause of that Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to legumes

that if he told him to purchase them with this gold dinar, and the agent went and purchased legumes for only three sela’im, and with the remainder he purchased something else,

both of them

the principal and the agent

committed misuse.