Ketubot 98b — the Talmud in English

Here

in our Mishna

Rabbi taught

us

Rabbi [Rabbi taught us]:

One who gives money to his agent to go to the market to purchase merchandise for him

and the purchaser went and bought cheaply,

everything [all the remaining money ]

all the money that remained ]

to the

sender,

the owner of the money,

and the agent cannot say, “I profited.”

And even in our Mishna, the woman is like the orphans’ agent to sell the land, and since she sold the land at a high price, the law of the profit is that it is entirely for the orphans who sent her, and the woman cannot say, “I profited.”

As it was taught

As it was taught in a beraita in which the tannaim disputed this matter, and Rabbi Yosei’s view is that “everything belongs to the owner of the money” with an item that has no fixed price, and Rabbi formulated our Mishna anonymously concerning land, which is also an item that has no fixed price, in accordance with Rabbi Yosei:

For this is what we learned in a beraita:

For so we learned in a beraita: one who gives money to his agent to purchase for him, with his money, an amount equal to what is sold for that money, and

the sellers added for him

to the agent

one extra,

that they gave him a larger amount,

everything,

meaning: all the addition that they added for him—

belongs to the agent

—

the words of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rabbi Yosei says: They divide

the sender and the agent divide that profit, because Rabbi Yosei was uncertain whether he intended to give it to the agent or to the sender, the owner of the money, and therefore they divide.

And

we raised against it from that which was

taught:

Rabbi Yosei says: Everything belongs to the owner of the money,

and they do not divide!? And

he said,

he answered,

Rami bar Hama: It is not difficult!

Here—

where Rabbi Yosei says: they divide—

with an item that has a fixed measure,

such as legumes, which are sold as a measure filling the vessel for one pruta, for then, if the seller added extra legumes for him, he certainly intended it as a gift; and since we are uncertain to whom he intended to give the gift, they divide.

Here—

where Rabbi Yosei said: everything belongs to the owner of the money—

with an item that has no fixed measure,

such as a cloak, a garment, and vegetables, which are sold by estimation: sometimes he leaves over and sometimes he diminishes, and this is not a gift but a sale; therefore everything belongs to the owner of the money, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda, even in this case everything belongs to the agent.

It follows that our Mishna, which concerns land—an item whose price is not fixed, sometimes being sold at a high price and sometimes at a low price—follows Rabbi Yosei, who holds that in such a case everything belongs to the owner of the money and not to the agent.

And it follows that our Mishna, which deals with land that is an item with no fixed measure, sometimes being sold at a high price and sometimes cheaply, is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who holds that in this manner everything belongs to the owner of the money and not to the agent.

Rav Pappa said: The halakha is: with an item that has a fixed measure, they divide; with an item that has no fixed measure, everything belongs to the owner of the money,

and in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

What does this come to teach us,

meaning: he should have said, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei”?

And we explain: this comes to teach us that

the resolution that we resolved [the answer that we gave]—concerning the contradiction in Rabbi Yosei’s words—

the answer that we gave]]—to resolve the contradiction between Rabbi Yosei’s statements—

is a resolution [a true answer], and indeed according to Rabbi Yosei there is a distinction between an item that has a fixed measure and an item that has no fixed measure.

it is a valid answer]], and indeed, according to Rabbi Yosei, there is a distinction between an item whose price is fixed and an item whose price is not fixed.

Therefore he could not say, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,” since he came to teach us that this indeed is Rabbi Yosei’s view.

They raised a dilemma:

If

he said to him

the sender to the agent:

Buy for me

a house

of a half-kor [a letekh, which is half a kor],

go and sell for me a house of half a kor from my land.

And he went

the agent

and sold him a kor,

the agent went and sold an entire house of a kor from the sender’s lands.

What

meaning: it is obvious that the sale of the entire house of a kor does not stand, since he was not authorized to sell so much; rather, the scholars of the academy were uncertain whether the sale of the house of a letekh stands, as it explains the reason and proceeds.

Does

“adding”

the agent

to his words

of the sender

constitute this, and

if so,

the letekh at least is acquired

by the purchaser [the purchase of the letekh stands].

Or perhaps: “overstepping”

the agent

his words

of the sender

constitutes this, and even the letekh is not acquired

by the purchaser [even the letekh is not sold to the purchaser], and if the householder wishes to retract, he may not retract?

Rav Yaakov of Nehar Pekod said in the name of Ravina: Come and hear

a proof that it constitutes “adding” and not “overstepping”:

The householder said to his agent

concerning consecrated pieces belonging to the Temple treasury that were in his possession, and he thought that they were unconsecrated and they were found to be consecrated:

Give them one piece each [meaning: give each of them one piece of the meat that I have in the vessel]

that is, give each of them one piece of the meat that I have in the vessel]]

to the guests.

And he,

the agent,

said

to the guests:

Take two each

each one of you, and he added to the householder’s instruction, who had said only one piece for each person.

And they,

the guests,

took three each

pieces, each one of them.

All of them—

the sender, the agent, and the guests—

committed meila,

because one piece that the agent gave to each of the guests as the sender’s agent renders the sender liable, since there is agency for meila.

But the second piece that he gave to each of them without the instruction of the householder renders the agent liable for meila.

But the third piece that the guests took on their own renders them liable for meila.

If you grant

that in such a case the agent

“adds”

the agent

to his words

of the sender

—

for this reason the householder committed meila

for the piece concerning which he indeed sent the agent, because although the agent added through his actions, nevertheless the one piece that he gave is considered to have been given as the householder’s agent.

But if you say

that in such a case

he “oversteps” his words,

and even the one piece that the agent gave is not considered to have been given as the householder’s agent, then

why did the householder commit meila?

And

indeed

we learned: An agent who carried out his agency, the householder committed meila.

But if he

did not carry out his agency,

for example, he sent him to purchase a garment with the money and he purchased a cloak with it, then the

agent committed meila

and not the sender, because in this matter he is not his agent.

And here too, the agent did not carry out the householder’s agency, but rather overstepped his words; it should have been the agent who committed meila, and not the householder!?

And we reject this:

With what are we dealing here:

That he said to them,

the agent explicitly to the guests:

Take one

from the pieces

with the consent of the householder,

and thereby he carried out the householder’s agency and rendered the sender liable,

and one

of the pieces, take

with my consent, and they took three [meaning: the guests took three pieces].

and the guests took three pieces].

Come and hear

from our Mishna that he oversteps his words:

If her marriage contract was one hundred, and she sold land worth one hundred and one dinar for one hundred,

then

her sale is void.

Is it not

that our Mishna is dealing with a case

where she sold

the widow sold

land worth one hundred and one dinar for one hundred and one dinar,

at the land’s proper value—

And if you say: if so, that the Mishna is dealing with this situation, what is the meaning of what we learned: she sold land worth one hundred and one dinar “for one hundred,” implying that she reduced the price—

It is not difficult, because

and what is meant by “for one hundred”?

She sold land worth one hundred and one dinar in order to collect her

one hundred

from the money of the sale.

And if you say further: if so, what is the meaning of what we learned: “even” if she says, “I will return the dinar to the heirs,” for if she did not reduce their price, then it is obvious that she returns the dinar to the heirs, since she came only to collect one hundred?

This too is not difficult, because

and what is meant by “even”?

Even

if she says, “I will return the dinar to the heirs in land worth a dinar,”

meaning: I will not return the extra dinar that I received from the purchasers, but I will restore the situation to its original state and return to the orphans that extra land worth a dinar that I sold to the purchaser unlawfully.

And it teaches: Her sale is void,

and necessarily the reason is that she oversteps the orphans’ instructions, for they authorized her to sell only for the value of her marriage contract.

And if so, we have learned that he oversteps his words.

He said,

he rejected

Rav Huna son of Rav Natan

the proof from our Mishna:

No,

not as you explained our Mishna—that she sold beyond the value of her marriage contract at its proper price, but rather

when she reduced the price,

that she sold land worth one hundred and one dinar for one hundred, and since she erred, her sale is void.